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As the United States reeled from the Soviet Union's launch of Sputnik in late 
1957, President Dwight D. Eisenhower received a top secret report prepared by a 
committee of leading scientific, business, and military experts. The panel, called the 
Gaither committee in recognition of its first chairman, H. Rowan Gaither, Jr., emphasized 
both the inadequacy of U.S. defense measures designed to protect the civil population and 
the vulnerability of the country's strategic nuclear forces in the event of a Soviet attack. 
The Gaither committee viewed these defense measures--ranging from a missile system to 
defend the continental United States to the construction of shelters to protect the 
population from radioactive fallout-and the maintenance of sufficient strategic forces to 
launch military strikes against Soviet targets as essential for the preservation of U.S. 
security. It concluded that in the case of a surprise Soviet nuclear attack the United States 
would be unable to defend itselfwith any degree of success. The committee emphasized 
the urgent need for the Eisenhower administration to strengthen the country's continental 
and civil defenses and to accelerate the development of its strategic striking power. 
iv 
This study examines the history of the Gaither committee: Why was it created? 
What were the backgrounds of its members? What evidence did it examine in performing 
its study? Why did it reach the conclusions it did? How influential was it on the 
Eisenhower administration? This manuscript illuminates the significance of the Gaither 
committee in shaping changes in Eisenhower's national security policies and in the 
development of President Kennedy's. It demonstrates that Eisenhower followed a 
consistent set of values and used an established decision making system to evaluate the 
Gaither committee's findings and to make changes in his national security policies. It 
reveals that Eisenhower sought the assistance of experts from a variety of professions to 
supplement the advice he received from his official advisers. Finally, it shows that the 
Gaither committee reached its conclusions based as much on the preconceptions of its 
members as on the evidence it examined. 
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Introduction 
Coming off a landslide victory over Adlai Stevenson in the November 1956 elec-
tion, President Dwight D. Eisenhower began his second administration seemingly posed to 
continue the policies of his first term. Ironically, however. 1957 would become one of the 
longest and most difficult years of his presidency. Over the course of the year, he strug-
gled with congressional cuts to his defense budget. faced a racial crisis over segregation in 
Little Rock, saw the Soviet Union launch the first satellite into space, and observed the 
country sinking into a recession. The results were dramatic. In less than a year his popu-
larity in the polls had fallen over twenty percentage points. 1 
The crises Eisenhower faced at the end of 1957 can be traced to both domestic and 
foreign policy issues. Without underemphasizing the widespread disenchantment with 
Eisenhower's handling of race relations and the economy, the concern of most Americans 
in late 1957 lay elsewhere. For the first time, the Soviet Union had made a significant 
technological advancement ahead of the Unittd States. On October 4, 1957, the Soviet 
Union shocked the world with the launch of Sputnik. Coupled with the Kremlin's earlier 
claim of a successful test of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the launch of -
Sputnik II on November 3, and the embarrassing failure of the United States Vanguard 
rocket in December, the Soviet satellite represented a clear challenge to U.S. technological 
superiority. More importantly, it raised the possibility that the Soviet Union might be able 
to launch a surprise nuclear attack against the United States using this new missile tech-
I In February 1957. a Gallup Poll revealed that 79 percent of those polled supported Eisenhower. By 
March 1958. only 52 percent supported Eisenhower. See Chester J. Pach. Jr., and Elmo Richardson. The 
Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower, revised edition (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1991), 175. 
2 
nology. Eisenhower's attempts to minimize the implications of the Soviet accomplish-
ments only inflated fears as many Americans assumed he was trying to conceal U.S. mili-
tary weaknesses.2 
In the midst of this uproar, Eisenhower received a top secret report prepared by a 
blue ribbon committee ofleading scientific, engineering, economic, and military experts. 
The panel, called the Gaither committee in recognition of its first chairman, H. Rowan 
Gaither, Jr., emphasized both the inadequacy of U.S. defense measures designed to pro-
teet the civil population and the vulnerability of the country's strategic nuclear forces in 
the event of a Soviet attack. The Gaither committee members viewed these defense 
measures-ranging from a missile system to defend the continental United States to the 
construction of shelters to proteet the population from radioactive fallout-and the mainte-
nance of sufficient strategic forces to launch military strikes against Soviet targets as es-
sential for the preservation of U.S. security. They concluded that in the case ofa surprise 
Soviet nuclear attack the United States would be unable to defend itself with any degree 
of success. The report emphasized the urgent need for the Eisenhower administration to 
strengthen the country's continental and civil defenses and to accelerate the development 
of its strategic striking power. It stressed that the United States either had to respond 
immediately to the expanding Soviet military capabilities or face potentially grave conse-
quences. 
2 For U.S. reaction to SPutnik. see Robert A. Divine. The Sputnik Challenge (New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press. 1993); and Walter A. McDougall, ... the Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the 
Space Age (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1985). 
3 
The Gaither committee recommended that the United States reduce the vulnerabil-
ity of its strategic forces, strengthen and enlarge its nuclear ballistic missile capabilities, 
improve the ability of the armed forces to wage limited military operations, reorganize the 
Department of Defense, and construct failout shelters to protect the civilian population. 
These recommendations would cost $44.2 billion spread between 1959 and 1963. The 
price was high, but the committee concluded that the costs for not instituting them would 
be higher yet--the possible subjugation of the United States to the Soviet Union. It 
stressed that, "The next two years seem to us critical. If we fail to act at once, the risk [of 
not preparing for a Soviet attack], in our opinion, will be unacceptable. ,,3 The committee 
accentuated that by the end of this two year period the Soviet Union would possess suffi-
cient nuclear forces to overwhelm U.S. defenses and to eliminate U.S. strategic nuclear 
capabilities. The only way the United States could avoid this llrisk" was to adopt the rec-
ommendations advocated by the committee. 
Eisenhower evaluated the Gaither report in the same manner as he studied most 
national security issues. He used the National Security Council (NSC) as the nexus for 
discussion of the committee's conclusions and recommendations. After receiving the re-
port in November 1957, the NSC assigned different government agencies responsibility for 
analyzing specific parts of the report. By January 1958 the NSC was ready to discuss the 
report itself and the agencies' comments. For almost six months, the Gaither report or 
issues directly related to it dominated NSC discussions. Periodically, for the remainder of 
3 U.S. Congress. Joint Committee on Defense Production. Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age 
(l'he "Gaither Report" of 1957) [hereafter Gaither Report) (Washington. D.C.: Government Printing Of-
fiee [hereafter GPO), 1976),25. 
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the Eisenhower administration and during the Kennedy administration, these same issues 
re-appeared in discussions of U.S. national security policies. 
The Gaither report significantly influenced Eisenhower's national security policies 
for the remainder of his presidency. Ofall the Gaither committee recommendations, Eis-
enhower disagreed only with a few. While he opposed construction of fallout shelters and 
expanding military capabilities to wage limited war for financial reasons, he approved the 
implementation of most of the other recommendations at least in part. His requests for 
supplementary appropriations to the FY 1958 defense budget and increases to the FY 
1959 budget reveal the importance of the Gaither report. Between the two budgets, Eis-
enhower added nearly $4 billion in defense spending. He accelerated the development and 
deployment of ICBMs, intermediate range ballistic missiles (lRBMs), and the Polaris sub-
marine launched missile system. He ordered the reduction of SAC vulnerability through 
the construction of early warning radar, the dispersal of SAC forces to a larger number of 
airfields, and the implementation of alert programs. Furthermore, he sought and received 
Congressional approval for the reorganization of the Defense Department. 
The influence of the Gaither report did not end with these changes. As a senator 
and then president, John F. Kennedy championed many of the same programs. After the 
contents of the report were leaked to the media in December 1957, many critics, including 
Kennedy, challenged Eisenhower's policies. The Massachusetts senator questioned why 
the United States was not doing more to overcome the apparent Soviet lead in military 
preparedness. While Eisenhower refused to expand military spending beyond certain lev-
els, Kennedy did not show the same inhibitions. In the 1960 campaign and his presidency, 
5 
Kennedy received advice from at least a dozen Gaither committee members. His "flexible 
response" military strategy reflected much of the advice contained in the Gaither report. 
He accelerated ballistic missile developments, expanded limited war capabilities, and ad-
vocated civil defense programs. 
Historiographical Debates and the Significance of this Study 
The Gaither committee's conclusions and recommendations had a clear influence 
on the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations. The report, however, has been ignored 
or, at a minimum, underemphasized by most scholars." One of the main reasons for this 
slight is that scholars focused on Sputnik as the cause for the changes in Eisenhower's 
policies. While the satellite obviously magnified concerns about Soviet missile capabilities, 
the Gaither report provided specific recommendations to overcome any possible deficien-
cies in U.S. military preparedness. It has only been in the past decade, as the Eisenhower 
Library, the National Archives, and other depositories have begun to release previously 
classified documents, that the true importance of the Gaither report has become apparent. 
The historiography of the Gaither committee is very limited. Only four scholars--
Morton Halperin, Fred Kaplan, Gregg Herken, and Peter Roman-have performed sub-
stantive research on this topic. With the exception of Roman, all of them have relied on 
the Gaither report itself, secondary sources, and/or interviews to obtain their evidence. 
4 See for example Divine, Sputnik Challenge, 40-41, 84, 125-7. and 196; Pach and Richardson, Presi-
dency of Dwight D. Eisenhower, 173~ McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth, 151; Stephen E. Ambrose, 
Eisenhower: The President, v. 2 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), 434-35; John Lewis Gaddis, 
Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 185-86; and Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense: Stra-
tegic Programs in National Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), 111-13. 
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Roman has tapped into some recently declassified documents to bolster his arguments. 
While they all examine some of the committee's findings, none of them analyze why it 
reached the conclusions that it did or exactly how influential it was in changing Eisen-
hower's policies. 
Halperin's 1961 study remains the best published source of infoimation on the 
Gaither committee. Halperin primarily used newspaper reports and congressional testi-
mony as the basis for his analysis. He was chiefly concerned with how the presidential 
decision making process worked and did not attempt to evaluate the bases for the commit-
tee's conclusions or its impact on the Eisenhower administration. He argues that the 
Gaither committee reveals both the strengths and weaknesses of the president acquiring 
advice from civilian experts. On the positive side, an independent committee can supply 
"an additional source of information for the President, unencumbered by future and past 
policy responsibility."s However, on the negative side, the "fear of civilian expertise and 
the inability of the Gaither group to put any influence back of its recommendations com-
bined with the motives discussed above [bureaucratic struggles between government 
agencies and military branches] to explain the failure of administration agencies to support 
the Gaither proposals.,,6 
For over twenty years, Halperin's article represented the most comprehensive at-
tempt to evaluate the Gaither committee. In the 1980s, both Kaplan and Herken added to 
5 Morton H. Halperin. "The Gaither Committee and the Policy Process," World Politics 13:3 (April 1961), 
384. 
6 Ibid .. 373. 
7 
Halperin's assessment in their analyses of the role of experts in decision making.7 Kaplan 
examines the influence of the RAND Corporation in the development of U.S. nuclear 
strategy. He argues that strategic analysts from RAND played a pivotal role in the Gaither 
committee's evaluation of Soviet military capabilities. He stresses in particular that 
RAND experts Andrew Wohlstetter, Herman Kahn, and Spurgeon K~ny were very influ-
ential.8 While Kaplan asserts that these experts influenced the conclusions of the Gaither 
committee, he concludes that Eisenhower accepted few of the committee's findings. He 
emphasizes that "Eisenhower did not take [Robert] Sprague's comments enough to heart, 
did not take the Gaither Report so seriously, as to believe that their fears warranted 
spending tens of billions of dollars, on top of an already expanding budget, to shore up a 
deterrent that he thought was, for the time being, already quite adequate.,,9 
Herken also explores the role of experts in developing U.S. nuclear policy. He ar-
gues that "American nuclear policy since 1945 has always been influenced, ifnot deter-
mined, by a small group of civilian experts-scientists, think-tank theorists, and academ-
ics.',10 He stresses that while Eisenhower rejected most of the Gaither recommendations, 
the report did stimulate the president and other experts to re-examine the importance of 
arms control. He points to the experiences of three Gaither committee members: Herbert 
York, Jerome Wiesner, and Spurgeon Keeny as examples of experts who began to realize 
after their work on the Gaither committee the impossibility of constructing an effective 
7 Unlike Halperin. Kaplan and Herken bad access to the Gaither report itself. The report was decIassified 
in 1973 and published by a congressional committee in 1976. 
g Fred Kaplan. The Wizards of Armageddon (New York: Simon and Schuster. 1983), 128-30. 
9 Ibid .• 152. 
10 Gregg Herken. Counsels of War (New York: AIfred A. Knopf, 1985), xiv. See all Gregg Herken, 
Cardinal Choices: PreSidential &ience Advisingfrom the Atomic Bomb to SDI (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1992). 
missile defense system. Herken concludes that ''the report would seem in retrospect the 
beginning of a fundamental change in attitude of scientists toward the arms race. "II 
While Halperin, Kaplan, and Herken focus on the role of experts, they only per-
fonn a cursory examination of the committee's conclusions and recommendations and 
spend even less time analyzing how and why it developed the findings that it did. Roman 
takes a different approach. He is concerned with Eisenhower's role in nuclear force plan-
ning from the launch of Sputnik to the Kennedy inauguration. He argues that 
"Eisenhower was an active participant in force planning who succeeded in manipulating 
the decision process, enabling him to impress his policy objectives on the outcomes." 12 
S 
While stressing the impact of the Gaither committee on the nuclear debate during 1958, he 
criticizes it for failing "to resolve four aspects of nuclear deterrence. These were: the 
credibility of nuclear deterrence, reaction time for nuclear forces, reliance on nuclear 
weapons in the U.S. defense posture, and whether strategic systems should be designed to 
disarm the Soviet Union or to retaiiate.,,13 In making his arguments, Roman was the first 
scholar to use newly declassified documents to show the influence of the Gaither commit-
tee. 14 
This brief overview of the arguments of these four scholars does not mean to imply 
that the Gaither committee has not been discussed elsewhere. However, most other ana-
11 Herken. Counsels of War, llS. 
12 Peter 1. Roman. "American Strategic Nuclear Force Planning. 1957-1960: The Interaction of Politics 
and Military Planning." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1982,2. 
13 Ibid., 3S. See also ibid., 43. 
14 Similar arguments to Roman's dissertation can be found in his new book. However, be does not focus 
nearly as much 00 the Gaither committee. See Peter 1. Roman, Eisenhower and the Missile Gap (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1995). 
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lyzes rely on these authors for their evidence. IS A common feature of all the literature is a 
lack of discussion of the Gaither committee itself. Who were its members? What were 
their backgrounds? How did they approach their study? Why did they devise the conclu-
sions and recommendations that they did? The limited historiography now available pro-
vides glimpses at some very compelling issues. Halperin's use of the Gaither committee as 
a case study on decision making sheds much light on the benefits and drawbacks of using 
civilian committees. Both Kaplan and Herken reveal the important role of experts in ad-
vising the Eisenhower administration. Finally, Roman makes it clear that the Gaither 
committee had a significant influence on the development of Eisenhower's national secu-
rity policies in 1958. 
Despite these studies, much of the Gaither committee's history is still obscure. 
Until recently, scholars faced severe hardships in studying the committee. Although the 
report was declassified in the early 1970s, other information related to the committee re-
mains restricted. The release of documents over the past few years, however, allows 
scholars to examine the Gaither committee in much greater detail. The new information 
provides an opportunity to acquire a greater understanding of the Gaither committee's 
IS See footnote 4; and McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty 
Years (New York: Random House, 1988),335-37; Desmond Ball, Politics and Force Levels: The Stra-
tegic }.fissile Program of the Kennedy Administration (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 
1980), 27-30; Richard A. Aliano, American Defense Policy from Eisenhower to Kennedy: The Politics of 
Changing Military Requirements, 1957-1961 (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1975),59; and John 
C. Donovan. The Cold Warriors: A Policy-Making Elite (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 
1974), 130-49. David Rosenberg also used newly classified documents in examining the Gaither commit-
tee, but he really did not add much to the other arguments. See David A. Rosenberg, "The Origins of 
Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960," Intemational Security 7:4 (Spring 
1983),46-49. 
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significance to the development of national security policies, Eisenhower's decision mak-
ing system, and the president's use of civilian experts to gain policy advice. 
Scholars over the past two decades have reversed initial assessments of Eisen-
hower as a do-nothing president who spent more time on the golf course than at the White 
House. While critical evaluations of Eisenhower's handling of important issues, in particu-
lar civil rights and the Third World, are becoming more prevalent, most scholars rank Eis-
enhower as a very good president. 16 While this study does not attempt to minimize the 
failures and weaknesses of the Eisenhower presidency, it does show that Eisenhower es-
tablished a distinct decision making system, followed a consistent set of values, and ac-
tively supervised decision making during his presidency. While he regretted ever creating 
the Gaither committee after the leak of its report, it did not stop him from carefully 
evaluating the committee's findings to determine which ones would enhance u.S. security. 
Eisenhower based his decisions on an established set of values and through the use 
of a highly organized decision making system. In addressing national security issues, Eis-
enhower analyzed the impact a decision would have on the country's military security and 
economic strength. 17 In an impassioned plea to the NSC in 1955, he told his advisors: 
16 Pach and Richardson, Presidency o/Dwight D. Eisenhower, 238-39. For an excellent overview of the 
historiography of the Eisenhower administration. see Gunter Bischof and Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisen-
hower: A Century Assessment (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1995). 1-13. 
17 See Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate/or Change. /953-/956 (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & 
Company, Inc., 1963),446 and 488; Robert W. Griffith, "Dwight D. Eisenltower and the Corporate 
Commonwealth," American Historical Review 87:1 (February 1982): 87-122; John W. Sloan, "The Man-
agement and Decision-Making Style of President Eisenhower," Presidential Studies Quarterly 20:2 
(Spring 1990): 295-313; R. Gordon Hoxie, "Dwight D. Eisenhower: Bicentennial Considerations," ibid., 
253~; Fred I. Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader (New York: Basic 
Books, Inc., Publishers, 1982). 100-51; Iwan W. Morgan. Eisenhower Versus 'The Spenders': The Eisen-
hower Administration. the Democrats and the Budget. 1953-60 (New York: St Martin's Press, 1990); and 
Douglas Kinnard, President Eisenhower and Strategy Management: A Study in De/ense Politics 
(Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1977). 
Budget-Making time is always difficult and expenses are mounting. 
Nevertheless, no official of the Government is truly performing his duty 
unless he clearly realizes that he is engaged in defending a way of life over 
a prolonged period and unless he is constantly aware of the weight offi-
nancial burden that our citizens are willing and able to bear. Our Govern-
ment could force upon our citizens defense and other spending at much 
higher levels, and our abundant economy could stand it-for a while; but 
you cannot do it for the long pull without destroying incentives, inflating 
the currency, and increasing government controls. This would require an 
authoritarian system of government, and destroy the health of our free so-
ciety. 
We must, of course, do what we must do to defend ourselves. We 
must not put dollars above the security of the United States. But we must 
prove, if we are to demonstrate the superiority of our system, that in times 
of unprecedented prosperity we can pay as we go without passing on intol-
erable burdens to coming generations. 
Consequently, every official of this Government must search out 
places where we can save a dollar which could be used somewhere else 
where its contnoution would be vital. This issue is critical. This doctrine 
should be remembered and preached in every waking hour by every official 
in this administration. 18 
11 
Almost four years after leaving the White House, Eisenhower described his belief 
system in a letter to his brother. At the time, he was trying to provide direction to the Re-
publican party after it had been soundly defeated in the 1964 presidential election. His 
advice for his party reflected the values and principles that guided his decision making. He 
told his brother: 
Here are some basic convictions in which I have long believed. 
18 Memorandum of Discussion at the 270th Meeting of the NSC, December 9, 1955, Dwight D. Eisen-
hower Library [hereafter ELI, Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower [hereafter DDE Papers), NSC Series, Box 
7. Folder - 270th Meeting of NSC, December 8, 1955,4-5. Eisenhower's concern with the impact of de-
fense spending can be seen as far back as 1945. While Army chief of sta1I: he wrote in his diary, "I'm 
astounded and appalled at the size and scope of plans the [Army] staff sees as necessary to maintain our 
security position now and in the future .... The cost is terrific. We'll be merely tilting at windmills un-
less we can develop something more in line with financial pos5lDilities." See Diary Entty of Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, December 12, 1945, in Robert H. Ferrell (ed.), The Eisenhower Diaries (New York: W. W. 
Norton & Company, 1981). 136. 
A Americans, individually and collectively, should strive con-
stantly for greater excellence in the moral, intellectual and material struc-
ture of the nation. 
B. The individual is of supreme importance. The rights guaranteed 
to him and the states by the Constitution and the "Bill of Rights" must be 
jealously guarded by government at all levels. The purpose of government 
is to serve, never to dominate. 
C. The spirit of the people is the strength of our nation; human lib-
erty and the American system of self-government with equal rights for all 
are the mainspring of that spirit .... 
D. To be secure and stay free we must be strong morally, eco-
nomically and militarily. This combination of strength must be used pru-
dently, carefully and firmly to preserve peace and protect the nation's vital 
interests abroad. 
E. Political power resides in the people; elected officials are ex-
pected to direct that power wisely and only as prescribed by the Constitu-
tion. 
F. Government must have a heart as well as a head. Republicans 
... insist that solutions must conform to common sense and recognize the 
right and duty oflocal and state government normally to attack these at 
their roots before the Federal Government acts. 
G. America cannot truly prosper unless all major areas and group-
ments [sic] in our society prosper. Labor, capital and management must 
learn to cooperate as a productive team, and reject any notion of "class 
warfare" bringing about maximum prosperity. 
H. To protect all our citizens, and particularly workers and all 
those who are, or will be, dependent on pensions, savings and insurance in 
their declining years, we strive always to prevent deterioration of the cur-
rency. In the constant fight against inflation we believe that, except in 
emergencies, we should pay-as-we-go, avoiding deficit spending and ad-
verse balance-of-payments. 
1. Under God we espouse the cause offreedom and justice and 
peace for all people. 19 
12 
These values and convictions provided the cornerstones for Eisenhower's decision 
making. His creation of the Gaither committee and later analysis of its report reflect these 
concerns. Eisenhower sought the best advice possible so that he could make the most in-
formed decisions about U.S. national security needs. After receiving the committee's ad-
19 Eisenhower to Milton Eisenhower, December 3, 1964, EL, Milton S. Eisenhower Papers, 1938-1973. 
Box 15, Folder - Correspondence - 1964,2-3 
13 
vice in November 1957, he carefully considered how its recommendations, ifimplemented, 
would affect the way of life he sought to preserve. He accepted the recommendations that 
he believed were necessary to guarantee U.S. security without undermining individual 
freedom or economic solvency. 
Eisenhower's use of the Gaither committee represents one way he obtained 
councel. When he entered office in 1953, he believed he could improve the organization 
of the White House and the entire decision making process. As far as decisions affecting 
national security, he viewed the NSC as the natural vehicle for obtaining advice. One of 
his first directives was to have Robert Cutler study ways to make the NSC more efficient 
and better able to provide guidance to his presidency. Cutler recommended significant 
changes in the operations of the NSC. He suggested that the president attend as many 
NSC meetings as possible, that the council meet regularly each week. and a new planning 
board be established to prepare study papers for the full council. While Eisenhower did 
not normally use the NSC to make decisions, he did use it to obtain advice, as a forum for 
vigorous discussions, and as a means to disseminate policy to his key advisors. 20 
Seldom did Eisenhower make decisions involving national security issues without 
at least consulting the NSC. It must be stressed, however, that the NSC always remained 
an advisory body, not a decision making one. When a reporter suggested in 1956 that the 
NSC made decisions, Eisenhower responded that "The National Security Council is set up 
to do one thing: advise the president. I make the decisions, and there is no use trying to 
20 Anna Kasten Nelson, "The 'Top of Policy Hill': President Eisenhower and the National Security Coun-
cil," Diplomatic History 7:4 (Fall 1983): 307-26. 
14 
put any responsibility on the National Security Council-its mine.,,21 He also used it as a 
channel to acquire advice from civilian experts. While Halperin, Kaplan, and Herken per-
suasively argue that Eisenhower used experts on several occasions, no scholar has sys-
tematically examined their use. The Gaither committee is a prime example of Eisen-
hower's use of a group of civilian experts to obtain policy advice. 
Critics of the effectiveness of Eisenhower's NSC have often relied on the conclu-
sions reached by the Senate Committee on Government Operations in 1961. The commit-
tee stressed that Eisenhower's NSC was plagued by bureaucratic conflicts, reached com-
promise decisions, and failed to challenge already established strategies.22 However, most 
scholars who have had access to internal NSC documents have raised serious questions 
about these assessments. They argue that Eisenhower's NSC fostered vigorous debate, 
facilitated long-term planning, and provided valuable advice.23 This study of the Gaither 
21 The President's New Conference of January 23, 1957, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United 
States. Dwight D. Eisenhower [hereafter PPP-DDE), 1957 (GPO, (958), 74. 
22 For the findings of the Senate committee, see U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government 0p-
erations, Organizingfor National Security. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on National Policy Ma-
chinery (GPO, (961); and Heruy M. Jackson, "Organizing for Security," Foreign Affairs 38 (1960): 446-
56. For those scholars who have relied heavily on the committee's interpretations, see I. M DestIer, '"The 
Presidency and National Security Organization, " in Norman A Graebner (ed.), The National Security 
(New York: Oxford University Press, (986),230; 1. C. Heinlein, Presidential Staffand National Security 
Policy (Cincinnati: Center for the Study of United Slates Foreign Policy. 1963),48; Richard A Melanson 
and David Mayers (eds.), Reevaluating Eisenhower: American Foreign Policy in the 1950s (Chicago: 
University oflliinois Press, (987),2; and Huntington, The Common Defonse, 154. 
23 See Anna Kasten Nelson, '"The Importance of Foreign Policy Process: Eisenhower and the National 
Security Council," in Bischof and Ambrose, Eisenhower: A Century Assessment, 111-25; Nelson, '"The 
'Top of Policy Hill'," 324: Phillip G. Henderson, "Advice and Decision: The Eisenhower National Se-
curity Council Reappraised, " in R. Gordon Hoxie, The President and National Security Policy (New 
York: Center for the Study of the Presidency, (984), ISS; R. Gordon Hoxie, '"The National Security 
CounciL" Presidential Studies Quarterly 12 (Winter 1982), 109; Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presi-
dency, 126; and Stanley L. Falk, '"The National Security Council Under Truman, Eisenhower, and Ken-
nedy," Political Science Quarterly 74:3 (1964),418. 
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committee supports the conclusion that the NSC played a pivotal and effective advisory 
role in Eisenhower's decision making system. 
Eisenhower established the Gaither committee to obtain advice that he hoped 
would be untainted by bureaucratic interests. This approach had worked for him previ-
ously when he created the Solarium task forces in 1953 and the Killian committee in 1954. 
He established Project Solarium to evaluate different national security policies. After the 
Soviet Union tested a hydrogen bomb and demonstrated increasing capabilities to deliver 
nuclear weapons against the United States, he created the Killian committee to analyze the 
ability of the Soviet Union to launch a surprise attack against the United States. After the 
groups completed their studies, Eisenhower incorporated many of their recommendations 
into his national security programs. 
Eisenhower's use of experts to acquire advice demonstrates the cooperation be-
tween leading scientific, engineering, business, and educational professionals and the fed-
eral government that had developed in World War IT and increased during the first fifteen 
years of the Cold War.24 The government's use of experts continued during the Truman 
administration. It was Eisenhower, however, who brought experts to central areas of 
policy making. Herken eloquently concludes that ''During the fifteen years since the dawn 
of the atomic age this nucleus of experts had for the most part merely witnessed the mak-
24 Brian Balogh. Chain Reaction: Expert Debate and Public Participation in American Commercial Nu-
clear Power. 1945-1975 (New York: Cambridge University Press, (991),22 and 172; Stuart W. Leslie, 
The Cold War and American Science: The Military-Industria/-Academic Complex at MIT and Stanford 
(New York: Columbia University Press); Albert H. Teich and Jill H. Pace (eds.), Science and Technology 
in the USA (Essex, UK: Longman House, (986), 20-22; Aaron L. Friedberg. "Science, the Cold War, and 
the American State," Diplomatic History 20: I (Winter (996), 117-18; Robert Gilpin and Christopher 
Wright (eds.), Sc;entists and National PO/icy-Making (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964); 
and Michael A. Bernstein and Allen Hooter, "The Cold War and Expert Knowledge: New Essays on the 
History of the National Security State," Radical History Review 63 (1995), 3-4. 
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ing of strategy and policy on the bomb. They had remained on the sidelines of the great 
national debate over defense. . . . Henceforth, they would be at its center.,,25 
In creating the Gaither committee, Eisenhower turned to leading experts who were 
either specialists in particular disciplines or possessed a broad understanding of national 
security issues. He asked the committee to evaluate whether the United States should 
embark on an expensive program of constructing active and passive defenses, including 
anti-aircraft and anti-missile weapons, early warning radar, and fallout shelters. Based on 
his desire to maintain a balance between economic and military security in his national se-
curity planning, Eisenhower believed a committee of experts would avoid making recom-
mendations that benefited a particular government department or military service but not 
necessarily the nation. He failed to recognize, however, that the Gaither committee mem-
bers entered the study with preconceived beliefs based on previous experiences or affilia-
tions that would color their interpretations and analyses. 
The Gaither committee was composed of a group of experts with diverse back-
grounds. Its initial director, Rowan Gaither, was well-known for leading non-profit re-
search organizations such as the RAND Corporation and the Ford Foundation. William 
Foster and Robert Sprague, who co-directed the committee after Gaither became ill, built 
their reputations in the chemical and electrical industries, respectively. James Killian and 
James Baxter were the respective presidents of Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(M.LT.) and Wtlliams College. Generals James Doolittle and James McCormack had il-
lustrious military backgrounds and close ties to the business community. Other members 
25 Herkert. Counsels of War. 134. 
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of the committee were equally noteworthy. As a group they did not enter the Gaither 
study with a set agenda, political objective, or financial motive. However, they did share a 
concern for U.S. national security which went beyond their support for Eisenhower or his 
policies. 
In summary, this examination is significant for several reasons. First, it reveals the 
previously unrecognized influence of the Gaither committee in shaping changes in Eisen-
hower's national security policies and in the development of President Kennedy's. Sec-
ond, it demonstrates that even in the emotionally charged atmosphere after the Soviet 
launch of Sputnik, Eisenhower followed a consistent set of values and used an established 
decision making system to evaluate the Gaither committee's findings and to make changes 
in his national security policies. Third, it reveals that Eisenhower sought the assistance of 
experts from a variety of professions to supplement the advice he received from his official 
advisers. Finally, it shows that the Gaither committee reached its conclusions based as 
much on the preconceptions of its members as on the evidence it examined. 
CHAPTER 1- Eisenhower's Core Values and Decision 
Making Systems 
Dwight D. Eisenhower won the 1952 presidential election against Democratic 
candidate Adlai Stevenson despite having never previously held a political office. While 
both parties had asked him to serve as their candidate in the 1948 election. he had con-
stantly rebuffed any political overtures. It was only in early 1952 that he felt duty-bound 
to accept the Republican nomination for president. After Eisenhower's victory, retiring 
President Harry S Truman questioned Eisenhower's ability to make the transition from 
military officer to president. Truman doubted whether Eisenhower could adjust to the 
political arena where orders were often questioned and sometimes not followed. 1 Tru-
man's assessment proved shortsighted. As George Reedy, a key aide to then-Senator 
Lyndon Johnson in the 1950s, recalled, Eisenhower's "most important attribute ... was 
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that he had held a number of political positions that the public did not regard as political.,,2 
While Eisenhower had only limited experience with Washington politics, he had dealt suc-
cessfully with politics within the Army, at Columbia University, and as a commander of 
multinational military forces. This experience and training provided significant preparation 
for his time as president. 
Prior to World War II, Eisenhower had pursued a successful, yet relatively undis-
tinguished, career in the army. After a quarter century of service, Eisenhower had risen to 
I See Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower, v. 2, 17-18; Robert H. Ferrell, Off the Record: The Private Pa-
pers of Harry S. Truman (New York: Penguin Books, 1980), 264; and David McCullough, Truman (New 
York: Simon & Schuster, 1992),412-14. 
2 George E. Reedy, The U.S. Senate: Paralysis or a Searchfor Cunsensus (New York: Crown Publishers, 
Inc., 1986),63. 
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the rank of colonel but had little chance of advancing much further in the peacetime army. 
Because of the limited size of the military, promotions were rare and far between. U.S. 
involvement in World War IT dramatically altered Eisenhower's career. From working for 
General George Marshall's War Plans Division in Washington, D.C. to commanding Al-
lied forces in North Africa to planning and implementing the defeat of Germany in West-
em Europe, Eisenhower quickly rose in rank from an obscure colonel to a five star general 
whose name was recognized and praised around the world. 
After the war, Eisenhower served as the Army chief of staff from 1945 to 1948. 
He then retired in order to become president of Columbia University where he remained 
from 1948 to 1951. However, his service to the nation did not end while he was there. 
From December 1948 to the late summer 1949, he spent several days a week in Washing-
ton serving as the unofficial chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Upon Truman's request 
in late 1950 he left Columbia to become the first supreme commander of NATO's military 
forces. He remained in this position until he announced his candidacy for the Republican 
nomination in the late spring 1952.3 His experiences during the war and after re-enforced 
and clarified his basic system of values and beliefs. Conservative by nature, Eisenhower 
learned to cherish the American system of government and the freedoms it represented, to 
value the importance of a balanced budget for a sound economy, and to make decisions 
based upon a carefully organized and structured decision making system. 
3 For a description of Eisenhower's activities between World War II and his presidency, see Stephen E. 
Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier. General of the Army. PreSident-Elect, v. 1 (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, Inc .• 1983),433-528. 
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Eisenhower's Basic Values and Decision Making System 
Specific values, based on a strong faith in the American democratic system of gov-
emment and in the freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, guided almost all of Eisen-
hower decisions.4 While he contemplated Columbia University's offer of its presidency in 
June 1947, he reminisced about his military career. In a letter to long-time friend Everett 
"Swede" Hazlett, Eisenhower described how through his lifetime "I had absorbed several 
simple conceptions and observations that would remain with me until the end of my days." 
He then emphatically explained: 
I believe fanatically in the American form of democracy-a system that rec-
ognizes and protects the rights of the individual and that ascribes to the in-
dividual a dignity accruing to him because of his creation in the image of a 
supreme being and which rests upon the conviction that only through a 
system of free enterprise can this type of democracy be prepared. Beyond 
this I believe that world order can be established only by the practice of 
true cooperation among the sovereign nations and that American leadership 
toward this goal depends upon her strength-her strength of will, her moral. 
social and economic strength and. until an effective world order is 
achieved, upon her military strength. S 
Eisenhower's firmly held beliefs originated in a childhood characterized by rugged 
individualism. strict discipline, and moral piety. His parents instilled in him and his broth-
ers the principles of hard work. equality, and individual responsibility.6 While these values 
provided the core of Eisenhower's belief system, he never systematically examined the 
4 See Sherman Adams, Firsthand Report: The Story o/the Eisenhower Administration (Westport. Cf: 
Greenwood Press Publishers, 1961), 155; and Steven Metz. "Eisenhower and the Planning of American 
Grand Strategy," Journal o/Strategic Studies 14:1 (March 1991),49-50. 
S Eisenhower to Swede Hazlett, July 19, 1947, in Robert W. Griffith (ed), Ike's Letters to a Friend, 1941-
1958 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1984),40. 
6 For descriptions of Eisenhower's childhood and upbringing, see Kenneth S. Davis, Soldier of Democ-
racy: A Biography 0/ Dwight Eisenhower (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Doran & Company, Inc., 
1945), 65-98; Bela Kornitzer, The Great American Heritage: The Story o/the Five Eisenhower Brothers 
(New York: Farrar, Straus, and Cudahy, 1955),9-56 and 85-98; and Ambrose, Eisenhower, v. 1, 18-42. 
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concept of democracy before World War II.7 However, after the United States joined the 
allies, he emphasized the importance of understanding exactly why the war was being 
fought. He argued that "Belief in an underlying cause is fully as important to success in 
war as any local esprit or discipline induced or produced by whatever kind of command or 
leadership action."s In a letter to his son, Eisenhower identified this underlying cause. He 
explained that "no other war in history has so definitely lined up the forces of arbitrary op-
pression and dictatorship against those of human rights and individualliberty."g In an or-
der to his commanders in 1942, he added that each American soldier needed to recognize 
that "the privileged life he has led ... is under direct threat. His rights to speak his own 
mind, to engage in any profession of his own choosing. to belong to any religious denomi-
nation, to live in any locality where he can support himself and his family, and to be sure of 
fair treatment when he might be accused of any crime-all of these would disappear," if 
Hitler's armies prevailed. 10 
In his memoirs of his World War II experiences, Eisenhower further illustrated 
these beliefs as he reflected on past, present, and future U.S.lSoviet relations. At a meet-
ing in Berlin in late 1945, Eisenhower met and developed a close friendship with Marshall 
7 Kenneth Davis categorizes Eisenhower's beliefs as pan of a frontier philosophy. He explained that "The 
frontiersman. without thinking about it, stood for diverse multiplicity, for individual freedom. for simplic-
ity, particularism. pragmatism." In discussing Eisenhower's early concept of democracy, Davis argues 
that the future president "had ... certain underlying principles of action which could be broadly grouped 
under the Golden Rule, which involved his profound belief in common people and his contempt for selfish 
egotism and for aristocratic pretensions. There was nothing coldly calculating, nothing relative in his 
belief in democracy; it was an absolute, instinctively held, upon which all relativities of action must rest" 
See Davis, Soldier for Democracy, 86-87; and Kornitzer, Great American Heritage, 17, 21, and 55-56. 
8 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Garden City, N.J.: Doubleday & Company, 1948),60. 
9 Eisenhower to John Eisenhower, April 8, 1943, quoted in ibid., 206. 
10 Eisenhower to Col. William Lee, October 29, 1942, quoted in Ambrose, Eisenhower, v. 1.,207. 
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Grigori Zhukov, one of the Soviet Union's most successful military commanders. 11 Shar-
ing a common bond from the war, Eisenhower and Zhukov reminisced about their World 
War IT experiences. During these conversations, they discussed a variety of topics ranging 
from military strategy to the philosophical differences between democracy and commu-
nism. From these conversations, Eisenhower gained a greater understanding and appre-
ciation of the principles he supported "fanatically". 
As they discussed the use of infantry during the war, Eisenhower quicldy realized 
that he placed a much greater emphasis on the life of the individual soldier than Zhukov 
and other Soviet leaders. For instance, Zhukov indicated that when confronting German 
positions that were protected by land mines, it was standard Soviet military practice to 
send their infantry straight through the minefield rather than to stop and try to clear it. 12 
While Eisenhower found the willingness of Russians to die for their country commendable, 
he was appalled that the Soviet leaders were so willing to sacrifice their soldiers to clear a 
minefield. Furthermore, Zhukov's sincere dedication to communism, a system of govem-
ment that Eisenhower saw as inherently evil, demonstrated how powerful and persuasive 
the communist message could be. 
Eisenhower's abhorrence of communism did not stem from any systematic study of 
that system of government. Rather, it developed from what he saw as communism's re-
jection of basic individual freedoms. He explained how Zhukov asked him to try ''to un-
II See Eisenhower to Georgi Konstantinovich Zhukov, December 6, 1945, in Louis Galambos (ed.), The 
Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower. The Chief of Staff: VII (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1978),591; and Eisenhower to Zhukov, March 13, 1946, ibid, 921. 
12 Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 467-68. Zhukov told Eisenhower that "When we come to a mine field 
our infantry attacks exactly as if it were not there." Eisenhower's assessment of the comment was that 
"Americans assess the cost of war in terms of human lives, the Russians in the over-all drain on the na-
tion." 
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derstand a system [of government] in which the attempt was made to substitute for such 
motivations [individual aspirations] the devotion of a man to the great national complex of 
which he formed a part.,,13 For Eisenhower, such a government placed the nation's wel-
fare above the individual's welfare. He believed that while communism's appeal to the 
common good represented an admirable goal, it, in reality, resulted in "dictatorial rule" .14 
He later elaborated this beliefby explaining that "The main issue [between the United 
States and the Soviet Union] is dictatorship versus a form of government only by the con-
sent of the governed, observance ofa bill of rights versus arbitrary power ofa ruler or 
ruling groUp."lS 
These conversations in many ways helped shape Eisenhower's views of the Soviet 
Union. While gaining a deep respect for Zhukov as a military leader and for the willing-
ness of the Soviet people to accept sacrifices for their nation, Eisenhower left Berlin with 
an even greater loathing of the Communist system and the lack of compassion the Soviet 
government seemed to have for its own people. After recounting these conversations, he 
concluded his memoirs with a strident defense of democracy and a rebuke of communism. 
"We [the democracies of the world]," Eisenhower emphasized, "believe individual liberty 
rooted in human dignity, is man's greatest treasure. We believe that men, given free ex-
pression of their will, prefer freedom and self-dependence to dictatorship and collectiv-
ism.,,16 
13 Ibid., 472. 
14 Ibid .• 476. By January 1946, Eisenhower was circulating a G-2 analysis which concluded that "It is 
believed that Soviet policy is to increase internal economic and military strength to support expansion, 
wherever and whenever practicable, in the international field." Galambos (ed.), Papers o/Dwight David 
Eisenhower: VII, 744n. 
IS Dwight D. Eisenhower Diary Entry, September 16, 1947, in Ferrell (ed.), Eisenhower Diaries, 143. 
16 Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 477. For a discussion of these conversations, sec ibid., 460-74. 
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Prior to his election in 1952, Eisenhower never clearly articulated how he would 
translate these beliefs concerning democracy, individual freedoms, and human dignity into 
specific policies. However, he did provide, on occasion, glimpses into how these guiding 
principles should be defended. Eisenhower believed that the fundamental role of any U.S. 
president was to defend these principles with unflinching determination. In performing 
this task, he recognized that in preserving the American way of life much more than mili-
tary defense had to be considered. Specifically, the defense of the United States involved 
the protection of its territorial boundaries and citizens, while at the same time, maintaining 
an economy that would allow the country to prosper. 17 These goals-preserving a way of 
life, building a strong military, and overseeing a prosperous economy-came to guide Eis-
enhower's defense policies in the 1950s. 
In testimony before the Military Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations 
Committee in 1950, Eisenhower attempted to describe the balance that the United States 
needed in its national security programs. While a strong military was obviously necessary, 
he resisted increases in defense spending that he thought might undermine the very way of 
life that it sought to protect. "If we should deem war imminent," Eisenhower testified 
there would be no expense too great and no preparation too elaborate to 
meet what we would see as an impending crisis. I am not talking in the 
terms of crisis; rather, I think that we should strive to answer this question 
on the basis of a period of indeterminate length. Since the purpose is to 
defend a way of life at the heart of which is the guaranteed freedom of the 
individual, we ltiust not so-over-burden or tax the resources of the country 
that we practically enslave or regiment people in the effort to keep them 
17 See Raymond J. Saulnier, "The Philosophy Underlying Eisenhower's Economic Policies," in Joann P. 
Krieg (ed.), Dwight D. Eisenhower: Soldier. President. Statesman (New York: Greenwood Press, 1981), 
99-104. 
free from foreign aggression. To wreck our economy, would be as great a 
victory for the Soviets as they could remotely hope for in a war.,,}8 
In January 1952 President Truman presented Congress a $85 billion budget that 
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included approximately $65 billion in spending for national security programs. As submit-
ted, the budget would have created a $14 billion deficit. Eisenhower was shocked at such 
spending levels and believed they represented the height of irresponsibility. In one of his 
clearest statements of the philosophy that guided his decision making, he articulated the 
dangers of high budgets and deficit spending. He recorded in his diary: 
I am greatly afraid that certain basic truths are being forgotten or ignored 
in our public life of today. The first of these is that a democracy under-
takes military preparedness only on a defensive, which means a long-term 
basis. You do not attempt to build up to a D-day because, having no in-
tention of our own to attack, we must devise and follow a system that we 
can carry as long as there appears to be a threat in the world capable of en-
dangering our national safety.}9 
He then explained that "it is necessary to recognize that the purpose of America is 
to defend a way of life rather than merely to defend property, territory, homes, or lives. 
As a consequence of this purpose, everything done to develop a defense against external 
threat, except under conditions readily recognizable as emergency, must be weighed and 
gauged in the light of probable long-term, internal, effect. ,,20 This theme consistently ap-
pears in Eisenhower's public and private life. He stressed that U.S. strength resided in a 
way of life represented by a combination of "devotion to democracy", "free enterprise", 
18 Excerpts from Military Sub-Committee of the Appropriations Committee of the Senate, quoted in 
Memorandum for the Record. March [1] 1950, EL, DOE Papers. Name Series, Box 7, Folder - DOE De-
fense Warnings. 1945-51,8. 
19 Eisenhower Diary Entry, January 22, 1952, in Ferrell (ed.), Eisenhower Diaries, 209. Eisenhower's 
views on budget deficits might stem from the failure of his father's business in the 1880s due in part to the 
purchase of too many goods on credit After this business disaster, Eisenhower's father "had a lifelong 
dread of debt." Ambrose, Eisenhower, Y. 1., 19. 
20 Eisenhower Diary Entry, January 22, 1952, in Ferrell (ed.), Eisenhower Diaries, 210. 
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"industrial and economic strength", "moral probity in all dealings", and "military 
strength".21 Together these qualities set the United States apart from the rest of the 
world, and especially, the Soviet Union. Eisenhower believed that as long as the United 
States emphasized and protected these values, it would prevail in the cold war. 
[n Eisenhower's mind. the budget Truman submitted failed to take adequate cog-
nizance of the dangers inherent in deficit spending. He was especially concerned that the 
proposed national security programs were designed to meet a specific period of danger in 
the future. Eisenhower believed the fallacy of such planning was that you could never 
predict with any accuracy the future actions of a potential adversary. The Truman budget 
reflected the contention that 1954 was the year of maximum danger. Eisenhower disa-
greed. He stressed that national security programs should be based on what the country 
could afford over an indefinite period. He viewed the Truman budget in a different light. 
It emphasized a maximum year of danger without seriously considering the financial bur-
dens that would be experienced by the United States in the years that followed. 
After critiquing the dangers of the Truman program. he identified the defense phi-
10 sophy that he would follow in his presidency. He explained that, as Army chief of staff 
and then as the unofficial chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 
The reason that we [Eisenhower and Secretary of Defense James Forrestal] 
felt it so important to make some estimates of this kind [planning for the 
long-term] is that one of the most expensive practices in the maintenance of 
military force is unevenness in the scale of preparedness and in yearly ap-
propriations. Peaks in one year or a series of years, followed by unwise re-
ductions in a period when economy is the sole watchword, tend to demand 
extraordinary expenditures with no return. 22 
21 Eisenhower Dimy Entry. Mtij 26, i 946. ibid.. 137. 
22 Eisenhower Dimy Entry. January 22, 1952. ibid .• 211. 
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Eisenhower saw the proposed Truman budget as producing a fiscal drain on the economy 
by producing large budget deficits without really increasing long-term U.S. security. He 
then added that he and Forrestal had "very greatly hoped to produce a plan and budget 
that would be, in effect, an element of bipartisan policy and which would be as free as 
possible of the defects and costs brought about by yearly cuts or increases, usually due to 
impulses or aberrations of the moment.,,23 Although not yet developed, Eisenhower was 
articulating the basic premise of his New Look policy. 
Eisenhower concluded his diary entry with a statement that exemplified the essence 
of his national security philosophy. He explained that "We can say only that properly bal-
anced strength will promote a probability of avoiding war. In this sense, we need the 
strength soon-but it must be balanced between moral power, economic power, and purely 
military power.,,24 The goal of preserving and magnifying these trilateral "powers" guided 
Eisenhower in the development of his administration's economic and national security 
policies. 
During the 1952 presidential campaign, Eisenhower championed similar beliefs. 
He questioned the increased defense spending resulting from the Korean War, and more 
important, from NSC 68.2S Between June 1950 and the 1952 election, spending for na-
tional security programs increased over 200 percent.26 Eisenhower challenged the efficacy 
23 Ibid 
24 Ibid., 213. 
2S NSC 68 represented President Truman's strategy to increase defense spending to meet the perceived 
Soviet threat I will discuss it more later in the chapter. 
26 See Paul Y. Hammond, "'NSC-68: Prologue to Rearmament, " in Warner R Schilling, Paul Y. Ham-
mond, and Glenn H. Snyder. Strategy. Politics. and Defonse Budgets (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1962), 351-58. For exact amounts spent on national security programs, see The Statistical History 
o/the United States: From Colonial Times to the Present (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1976), 1124. 
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of such high spending and openly wondered whether the United States could continue to 
afford such defense programs. In a campaign speech in September 1952, Eisenhower elo-
Quently expressed these doubts. He argued that increasing spending on defense would not 
necessarily augment U.S. security. The key was to develop a defense strategy that the na-
tion could afford for the indefinite future. "The real problem," he explained, "is to build 
the defense with wisdom and efficiency. We must achieve both security and solvency. In 
fact, the foundation of military strength is economic strength. A bankrupt America is 
more the Soviet goal than an America conquered on the field ofbattle.,,27 
After Eisenhower accepted the Republican nomination, the outcome of the No-
vember election was a foregone conclusion. He had tremendous advantages over the 
Democratic nominee Adlai Stevenson. First, retiring Democratic President Truman was 
unpopular. Second, the Democratic Party had been in power for two decades and people 
were looking for a change. Finally, Eisenhower was a military hero who Americans be-
lieved could end the Korean War. Together, this fame and the widespread disenchantment 
with the Truman administration formed the basis of Eisenhower's resounding victory. As 
he entered the White House, Eisenhower viewed the election as a mandate for his political 
and economic philosophy and endeavored to create a presidential administration that 
propagated his values.28 
On several occasions as the Army chief of staff and the unofficial chairman of the 
10int Chiefs of Staff, Eisenhower had visited President Truman at the White House. While 
27 Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Text of Eisenhower Address on 'Famine or Feast' Defense Policy," in New 
York Times, September 26, 1952, Sec. A, 12. 
28 See the title of Eisenhower's presidential memoirs for his first term, Mandate/or Change. 
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conceding that the visits did not allow him to acquire a full understanding of how the 
presidency operated, they left an impression that he did not like. In his memoirs, Eisen-
hower explained how he saw the reorganization of the White House as one of the priori-
ties of his new administration. He stressed that "With my training in problems involving 
organization, it was inconceivable to me that the work of the White House could not be 
better systemized [sic] than had been the case during the years I observed it.,,29 Eisen-
hower's military experience had led him to conclude that the best decisions were made 
only after careful consideration by all of those involved.30 The reorganization of the White 
House along the lines of a military staff system enabled Eisenhower to make careful deci-
sions in a manner that reflected his basic political and economic philosophy. 
Contrary to the claims of some critics, Eisenhower did not see organization as an 
end in itself.31 He viewed it as an effective means of acquiring, analyzing, and synthesizing 
the vast information created by large administrative bodies. Eisenhower elucidated why 
developing and maintaining an efficient organizational system was critical for effective 
government: 
Organization cannot make a genius out of an incompetent, even less can it, 
of itself, make the decisions which are required to trigger necessary action. 
On the other hand, disorganization can scarcely fail to result in inefficiency 
and can easily lead to disaster. Organization makes more efficient the 
gathering and analysis of facts, and the arranging of the findings of experts 
in logical fashion. Therefore organization helps the responsible individual 
make the necessary decision, and helps assure that it is satisfactorily carried 
out. 32 
29 Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 87. 
30 Oral History of Andrew 1. Goodpaster, Oral History Research Office, Columbia University, 1967, 31. 
31 See H. W. Brands, "The Age of Vulnerability: Eisenhower and the National Insecurity State," Ameri-
can Historical Review 94:4 (October 1989): 963-89; and Henry M.lackson (ed.), The National Security 
Council (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965). 
32 Eisenhower, Mandatefor Change, 114. 
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Eisenhower carefully organized the White House to produce maximum effi-
ciency.33 "Because of his long experience with military organization," Chester Pach con-
eludes, ''Eisenhower believed that clear lines of authority radiating from the Oval Office 
would ensure the smooth workings of his presidency.,,34 One of Eisenhower's greatest 
criticisms of other presidential administrations was the lack of effective coordination 
within the White House. To overcome this problem. Eisenhower appointed Sherman Ad-
ams as his special assistant. Adams supervised the White House staff and prepared the 
president's schedule. Additionally, Eisenhower appointed other subordinates to supervise 
specific areas of presidential policy such as congressional liaison (General Wilton B. 
"Jerry" Persons), minority issues (Maxwell Rabb), and top secret national security matters 
(first General Paul T. ''Pete'' Carroll and then Colonel Andrew 1. Goodpaster).35 By dele-
gating authority within a well-designed organization, Eisenhower achieved a degree of ef-
ficiency that previous presidents had rarely experienced. 36 
The Reorganization of the National Security Council 
The National Security Council (NSC) structure that Eisenhower inherited in 1953 
was still relatively new. It had only been in existence since 1947 when Congress estab-
lished it as part of the National Security Act. As with any new organization, the NSC ex-
33 See Greenstein, Hidden-hand Presidency, 124-38; and Andrew J. Goodpaster, "Four Presidents and the 
Conduct of National Security Affairs - Impressions and Highlights." Journal of International Relations 
2:1 (Spring 1977),27-28. 
34 Pach and Richardson, Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower, 38. 
35 For descriptions of the organization of the Eisenhower White House, see Eisenhower, Mandate for 
Change. 115-20; Pach and Richardson, Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower. 38-39; and Ambrose, Eis-
enhower, v. 2. 24-26. 
36 Oral History of Dr. Arthur S. Flemming. EL, 1988. 13. 
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perienced its own share of growing pains. Prior to the outbreak of the Korean War in 
1950, Truman rarely attended the NSC meetings. However, after the outbreak of the war 
and his acceptance ofNSC 68 Truman turned more and more to the NSC for policy ad-
vice.37 For the remainder of his administration, NSC 68 guided many of Truman's na-
tional security policies.38 
In two of the most important studies of this period in U.S. history, Melvyn Leftler 
and Burton Kaufinan stress the significance ofNSC 68 to the development of U.S. na-
tional security policy. In his masterful treatment of the Truman administration, Leftler de-
scribes NSC 68 as "one of the most significant studies of the entire cold war era.,,39 [n his 
study of the Korean War, Kaufinan calls it ''the United States' field manual for waging the 
Cold War.,,40 Neither one argues that NSC 68 reflected a significant shift in Truman's 
policies, but they do contend that it resulted in a major increase in spending for national 
security programs. 
Written by the director of the Policy Planning Staff Paul Nitze, NSC 68 viewed the 
Soviet Union as a relentless enemy that could only be deterred through the construction 
and maintenance of a strong military force. It argued that "Our free society finds itself 
37 For Truman's reluctance to participate actively at NSC meetings prior to 1950, see Samuel R William-
son. Jr., and Steven L. Rearden. The Origins of u.s. Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1953 (New York: Sl Mar-
tin's Press, 1993),55-56; Anna Kasten Nelson. "President Truman and the Evolution of the National Se-
curity Council," Journal of American History 72:2 (September 1985), 360-61 and 373-78; James S. Lay, 
Jr., Organizational History of the National Security Council During the Truman and Eisenhower Admini-
strations (GPO, 1960),5 and 14-22; and David L. Snead, "United States National Security Policy Under 
Presidents Truman and Eisenhower: The Evolving Role of the National Security Council," M.A. Thesis, 
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1991,27-29. 
38 For some recent analyses ofNSC 68, see Ernest R May (ed.), American Cold War Strategy: Interpret-
ing NSC 68 (Boston: Bedford Books ofSl Martin's Press, 1993). 
39 Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the 
Cold War (Stanford University Press, 1992), 313. 
40 Burton I. Kaufman, The Korean War: Challenges in CriSis, Credibility, and Command (New York: 
Alfred Knopf, 1986), 28. 
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mortally challenged by the Soviet System. No other value system is so wholly irreconcil-
able with ours, so implacable in its purpose to destroy ours, so capable of turning to its 
own uses the most dangerous and divisive trends in our society.,,41 NSC 68 recommended 
the appropriation of more money for defense spending because the military's role was "to 
serve the national purpose by deterring an attack upon us . . . and to defend the integrity 
and vitality of our free society and to defeat an aggressor. ,,42 
Along with the Korean War, NSC 68 led the Truman administration to increase 
spending for national security programs from the programmed $13.5 billion for FY 1951 
(July 1, 1950 to June 30, 1951) to over $48 billion by December 1950. These spending 
levels continued for the remainder of the Truman administration and reflected a growing 
perception of the Soviet threat. The important point to emphasize is that only approxi-
mately ten percent of the spending increase went towards the cost of the Korean War.43 
It was the other ninety percent that raised Eisenhower's concern. He did not believe that 
the Truman administration had carefully analyzed the long-term impact of these increases 
on the United States economy. 
When Eisenhower assumed the presidency, he was determined to reduce defense 
spending. In order to do this he wanted to examine different policy alternatives, ranging 
from containment to roll-back that could possibly lead to a more efficient and effective 
defense policy. He anticipated that the NSC would analyze these alternatives. One of 
Eisenhower's most important advisors recalled that the president used the NSC to obtain 
41 A Report to the President Pursuant to the President's Directive of January 31, 1950, Papers Related to 
the Foreign Relations o/the United States [hereafter FRUS] 1950, v. 1 (GPO, 1977),244-41. 
42 Ibid., 244. 
43 Snead, "United States National Security Policy Under Presidents Truman and Eisenhower, n 2 L 
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"an integration of views which would be the product of continuous association between 
skilled representatives of all elements germane to national security. ,,44 However, Eisen-
hower did not believe the NSC structure that he inherited from the Truman administration 
was capable of performing such a study. Before he could assign the NSC this responsibil-
ity, he had to restructure it into the organization that he wanted. 
Eisenhower turned to Robert Cutler, a key campaign aide and influential Boston 
banker, for advice concerning the reorganization of the NSC. After a brief study, Cutler 
recommended several changes to the NSC's structure. After the National Security Act 
had been revised in 1949, the NSC only had five statutory members: the president, the 
vice president, the secretary of state, the secretary of defense, and the chairman of the Na-
tional Security Resources Board (NSRB). The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and 
the director of the Central Intelligence Agency acted as advisors. Finally. three groups: 
the CIA. the senior NSC Staff, and the Interdepartmental Intelligence Committee served in 
a variety of capacities. While the National Security Act established this membership 
structure, it did not provide specific guidance as to how the NSC should operate. Before 
the Eisenhower administration, the NSC did not operate in either a consistent or particu-
larly systematic manner. 45 
Cutler asked several government officials, including Paul Nitze, how the NSC 
could operate more efficiently and effectively. Nitze recommended several specific 
44 Robert Cutler, No Time For Rest (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965, 1966), 296. 
4S Nelson, "President Truman and the Evolution of the National Security Council," 371-78. Prior to the 
revision of the National Security Act. the NSC's statutory members were the president, the secretary of 
state, the secretary of defense, the chairman of the National Security Resources Board, and the secretaries 
of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. See 1947 National Security Act. Public Law 253. 80th Congress. July 
26, 1947 (61 Stat. 495), reprinted in United States Statutes at Large, v. 61 (GPO, 1948), 495-97. 
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changes in the NSC's operations. He stressed that an advisory committee needed to be 
created to formulate policy papers for consideration before the NSC. This committee 
would replace the NSC senior staff. These policy papers should contain both majority and 
minority opinions if a consensus could not be reached. This would ensure that the NSC 
discussed the issues that could not be resolved by the advisory committee. Finally, he 
concluded that the statutory membership of the NSC should remain the same. 46 
Cutler incorporated many ofNitze's recommendations in his proposal to Eisen-
hower. He recommended major changes in the NSC's structure. The president should 
attend and serve as chairman of as many NSC meetings as possible. Cutler believed that 
one of the weaknesses of the Truman NSC was the failure of the president to take an ac-
tive role in its meetings. He argued that the president had to be an integral part of the 
meetings for it to operate most effectively. The original senior staff should be replaced by 
the newly created Planning Board whose purpose would be to develop policy papers for 
NSC discussions. The Planning Board would consist of representatives from each of the 
statutory agencies of the NSC. The Planning Board should create papers that reflected a 
consensus opinion of its members. However, if there was no consensus or there were dis-
senting views, these opinions should be submitted to the NSC. Finally, Cutler recom-
mended the appointment of a new advisor, a special assistant for national security affairs, 
to coordinate the activities of the Planning Board and the NSC.47 
46 Paul Nitze to Cutler, February 17, 1953, National Archives [hereafter NA], RG 59, Records of the Dc-
partment of State, SIS - NSC (Miscellaneous) Files, Lot 66D 95, Box 11. 
47 "Report by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs," March 19, 1953, FRUS 
1952-1954. 2: (GPO, 1984),245-57. 
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Eisenhower approved Cutler's recommendations and a few days later he publicly 
announced plans for the restructured NSC. He appointed Cutler as his new special assis-
tant for national security affairs. He expanded the NSC's membership to include the sec-
retary of the Treasury, the director of Mutual Security Administration, and the director of 
the Office of Defense Mobilization (replaced the NSRB chairman).48 As Cutler recom-
mended, he established the Planning Board to develop papers for NSC discussions. Fi-
nally, he announced that the NSC would periodically seek civilian consultants "to bring to 
Council deliberations a fresh point of view, not burdened with departmental responsibili-
ties.,,49 
Eisenhower's revamped NSC clearly shows how he desired to incorporate his 
philosophy and organizational beliefs into his decision making. First, he expanded the 
NSC's membership to obtain a more balanced examination of national security issues. By 
including the secretary of the treasury and budget director, Eisenhower emphasized the 
importance of analyzing the economic implications of any national security policies. Sec-
ond, by appointing Cutler and by creating the Planning Board, he revealed his desire for an 
organization that would examine policy options more systematically. Finally, by occa-
sionally turning to civilian consultants, he recognized the significance of obtaining advice 
independent of the government bureaucracy. so 
48 Eisenhower also asked the Director of the Bureau of the Budget to attend NSC meetings as an informal 
member. Later, he created the Operations Coordinating Board to supervise the implementation of the 
NSC's decisions. See Lay, "Organizational History of the National Security Council," 23-30; and Nelson, 
"The 'Top of Policy Hill': President Eisenhower and the National Security Council," 308-10. 
49 Press Release, March 23, 1953, NA, RG 59, State Department Records. SIS - NSC (Miscellaneous) 
Files, Lot 66095, Box 11, 1. For discussions of the reorganization of Eisenhower's NSC, see Cutler, No 
Time For Rest, 293-313; and Snead, "United States National Security Policy," 36-39. 
so Most scholars, including both supporter and detractors, who have examined Eisenhower's NSC have 
recognized the importance of these factors. See for example Brands, "Age of Vulnerability": 963-89; 
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Project Solarium, NSC 16111, and the New Look 
Having completed the reorganization of the NSC, Eisenhower turned to the federal 
budget deficit that he inherited from the Truman administration. Forecasts for Truman's 
FY 1954 budget predicted a shortfall of approximately S10 billion. To eliminate this 
deficit, Eisenhower knew he would have to cut military spending because it represented 
over 66 percent of the total budget.sl While Eisenhower had questioned Truman's refusal 
to increase spending beyond SIS billion in the late 1940s, he was very reluctant to accept 
budgets for national security programs that had tripled in three years to over S50 billion. 52 
As with his reorganization of the White House and the NSC, Eisenhower believed that his 
national security programs could be developed and implemented in a cheaper and more 
efficient manner. 
In September 1952, the NSC asked Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson, Secretary 
of Defense Robert Lovett, and Director of Mutual Security Averell Harriman to prepare a 
report that analyzed the status of U.S. national security policies. This small committee 
presented its report, NSC 141, to Truman as he prepared to leave office in January 1953. 
It recommended the continuation of existing policies and the appropriation of additional 
Griffith. "Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Corporate Commonwealth." 87-122; lohn W. Sloan, "The Man-
agement and Decision-Making Style of President Eisenhower," 295-313; Morgan, Eisenhower Versus 
'The Spenders '; Huntington, The Common Defonse; Richard D. Challener, "The National Security Policy 
From Truman to Eisenhower: Did the 'Hidden Hand' Leadership Make Any Difference," in Graebner, 
The National Security; Aliano, American Defonse Policy from Eisenhower to Kennedy, and Kaplan, Wiz-
ards of Armageddon. 
SI Statistical History of the United States, 1124. 
S2 See Ambrose, Eisenhower, v. 2, 489. For Eisenhower's desire for more money for defense spending, 
see Eisenhower Diary Entry, January 8, 1949, in Ferrell (ed.), Eisenhower Diaries, 153. 
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funds to improve continental defenses. S3 This report served as the starting point for 
changes Eisenhower wanted to make in U.S. national security programs. 
At one of the NSC's first meetings in the new administration, Cutler recommended 
that this report be used as the basis for the study and development of new national security 
policies. S4 During the spring, Eisenhower and his top advisors discussed ways to cut 
spending on national security policies while at the same time preserving U.S. military 
strength. In May Eisenhower ordered the NSC to create three panels to review possible 
national security policy alternatives. The NSC turned to outside consultants to staff these 
groups. Operating under the codename Project Solarium, the panels launched a six week 
investigation of current and future U.S. polices.ss The NSC's use of experts outside the 
government established a precedent that would be repeated several times in the Eisen-
hower presidency, as when he subsequently established the Gaither committee. 
The NSC appointed the directing panel of Project Solarium to develop guidelines 
for the study.s6 The panel established three task forces-A, B, and C. S7 The panel ordered 
S3 Memorandum for the President by the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of Mutual Se-
curity, January 16, 1953, FRUS 1952-1954,2:1,211 and 213. 
54 Minutes of the 13 1st Meeting of the National Security Council. February II, 1953, NA, RG 273, Rec-
onts of the National Security Council. Folder - 13 1st Meeting of the NSC. 
ss For a discussion of the establishment of Project Solarium, see Snead, "United States National Security 
Policy Under Presidents Truman and Eisenhower," 39-41; Glen H. Snyder, "The 'New Look' of 1953," 
in Schilling, Hammond, and Snyder, Strategy. Politics and Defense Budgets, 407-10; and William B. 
Pickett, "The Eisenhower Solarium Notes," Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations News-
letter 16 (June 1985): 1-3. 
56 The members of the Directing Panel were General James H. Doolittle (chairman), Robert Amory, Jr., 
Lt. General L. L. Lemnitzer, Dean Rusk, and Admiral Leslie C. Stevens. See Memorandum to the Secre-
taryofState, 5/15153, FRUS 1952-1954, 2:1, 327. 
S7 Eisenhower assigned each task force one of three specific strategies: containment. drawing a line in the 
sand, and roU-back, and asked them to develop a national security policy based on that strategy. There 
was evidently a fourth alternative-Alternative D. Although it remains unclear as to what Alternative D 
was, it was based on "the poSSIbility that time is not working in our favor." See Memorandum for the 
President. undated [June 19537], NA, RG 273, NSC. Folder - 15Sth Meeting of the NSC, 1. Richard 
Immerman bas found similar evidence related to an Alternative D. See Richard H. Immerman, 
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Task Force A to assume the position advocated by NSC 141-the continuation ofTru-
man's containment policies-and to recommend a national security policy based on that 
alternative. The panel assigned Task Force B the responsibility for developing a national 
security policy based on explicitly stating the areas which the United States would auto-
matically defend against a Soviet attack. Finally, the panel ordered Task Force C to de-
velop a policy based on "rolling back" communism. S8 As Glenn Snyder succinctly argues, 
Eisenhower's goal in creating these task forces ''was to highlight three dramatically differ-
ent policy lines and to develop thoroughly the implications of each. "S9 
The directing panel with Eisenhower's approval, selected seven members for each 
task force. George Kennan, General James McCormack, and Admiral Richard Conolly 
served as the chairmen of task forces A, B, and C, respectively.60 The panels convened in 
June at the National War College in Washington, D.C. for a six week study of their re-
spective alternatives. The details of Project Solarium were of the highest confidentiality. 
George Kennan stated years later that "It was all highly secret--you have no idea how well 
"Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist: An Agonizing Reappraisal," Diplomatic History 14:3 
(Summer 1990), 337. 
58 Memorandum to the Secretary of State, May 15, 1953, FRUS 1952-1954 2:1,325-26. 
S9 Snyder, "The 'New Look'," 408. 
60 Task Force A consisted of Kennan, Col. C. H. Bonesteel, Rear Adm. H. P. Smith, Col. George Lincoln, 
C. T. Wood, 1. Maury, and Capt. H. S. Sears. Task Force B was composed of McCormack, Maj. Gen. J. 
R Deane, J. K. Penfield, P. E. Mosely, Calvin Hoover, 1. C. Campbell, and Col. E. S. Ligon. Task Force 
C consisted of Conolly, Lt. Gen. L. L. Lemoitzer, G. F. Reinhardt, Col. K. Johnston, Col. A J. Goodpas-
ter, Leslie Brady, and Col. H. K. Johnson. Memorandum of Discussion at the 157th Meeting of the Na-
tional Security Council, July 16, 1953, FRUS 1952-1954,2:1,395-96. It remains unclear how and when 
the members of these task forces were selected. A list of prospective members on May 20, 1953 is re-
markably different from the task forces that made presentations to the NSC in July. See Memorandum by 
the President to the Secretary of State, May 20, 1953, ibid., 350-52. 
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this was protected; nobody knew [about Project Solarium] the whole summer despite the 
fact that fifty to a hundred people were involved in it ... 61 
The directing panel ordered each task force to consider three possible courses of 
Soviet action before making their recommendations: 
1) The Soviets may seek a military decision with the West at any time, 
based either on a determination to resort to war as an instrument of policy 
or upon a miscalculation as to free world intentions. 
2) The Soviets may maintain, at some risk of general war, aggressive pres-
sure, continuously or interspersed with active phases of "Peace Offen-
sives", to extend their control and weaken the free world coalition. 
3) The Soviets may accept a defensive posture in order to consolidate the 
present position of the Soviet bloc and to avoid a risk of general war, rely-
ing upon and encouraging the divisive forces within the free world. 62 
These alternatives represented the generally accepted views of U.S. policy makers as to 
possible future Soviet actions. 
On June 26 the three task forces made preliminary presentations to the NSC. 
Cutler wanted to familiarize the Council with the task forces' general arguments and to 
acquaint each task force with what the others were doing. Not surprisingly, the recom-
mendations followed the basic arguments assigned earlier to each task force. However, a 
common theme did permeate their reports. The theme, best stated in Task Force A's re-
port, was that "On the question of the relation of our defense effort to domestic economic 
61 Transcript of "Project Solarium": A Collective Oral History, John Foster Dulles Centennial Confer-
ence, Princeton University, 1988,3. See also George F. Kennan, Memoirs, v. 2 (Boston: Little, Brown 
and Company, 1972), 182. 
62 Paper Prepared by the Directing Panel of Project Solarium, June I, 1953, FRUS /953-/954,2:1,361. 
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problems, the position will be stressed that the U.S. economy can stand for a considerable 
length of time a higher level of defense expenditures than the currently operative ones. ,,63 
On July 16 each task force presented its final report to the NSC. Under the direc-
tion of George Kennan, Task Force A recommended continuing the policies advocated by 
the Truman administration with slight increases in spending to improve continental de-
fenses. 64 The task force believed that the Soviet Union posed a threat in three broad ar-
eas: its maintenance ofa strong and dangerous military establishment, its control of East-
em and Central Europe, and its ability to subvert democracy throughout the world.6s In 
light of these threats, Kennan's panel stressed the need for flexibility in U.S. policy plan-
ning as the directions of Soviet policy could never could be predicted with great accuracy. 
It concluded that the United States needed ''to recapture essential flexibility, to effect bet-
ter integration and cohesion within our strategy, and to improve its implementation.,,66 
Task Force A criticized the rapid demobilization of American forces after World 
War IT and warned that a similar policy at the conclusion of the Korean War would pro-
vide "the most likely invitation to aggression. ,,67 It therefore advocated a policy of main-
taining military forces at a level sufficient to fight either limited or general wars. Military 
force and equipment levels, the task force stressed, should be based on analyses of Soviet 
63 Notes Taken at the First Plenary Session of Project SolariUlll, June 23, 1953, FRUS 1952-1954.2:1, 
389. 
64 These policies were summarized in NSC 153. See NSC 153!1 -"A Report to the National Security 
Council by the Executive Secreta!y on Restatement of Basic National Security Policy," June 10, 1953, 
reprinted in Marc Trachtenberg, The Development of American Strategic Thought: Basic Documents 
from the Eisenhower and Kennedy Periods. Including the Basic National Security Papersfrom 1953 to 
1959 (New York: Garland Publishing, 1988), 19-33. 
65" A Report to the National Security Council by Task Force "A" of Project SolariUlll," July 16, 1953, NA, 
RG 273, NSC. Folder - 157th Meeting of the NSC, 7-8. 
66 Ibid., 15-16. 
67 Ibid .. 22. 
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military capabilities not "the zigzags of Soviet political policy. ,,68 It argued that the United 
States needed to maintain adequate military capabilities to achieve its objectives and to 
resist any possible Soviet aggression. Flexibility was Task Force A's military strategy. 
The United States needed the capability to meet any Soviet aggressive move with an ap-
propriate military response. 
Task Force A identified the second objective of U.S. national security policy as 
rallying both Americans and non-Americans to the strategy of containing the Soviet Un-
ion. It believed that the public had to understand what was being done to counter the So-
viet threat. Only a well-informed public would support the policies necessary to wage the 
cold war. It placed considerable importance on maintaining European support for U.S. 
policies. Although the authors believed that Americans would support increased defense 
spending and a greater reliance on nuclear weapons, they expressed reservations that 
Europeans would. "A strong, vitalized and cohesive free Europe, orientated towards the 
same general objectives of the United States," the task force emphasized, "would be most 
important, if not decisive, factor in the successful resolution of the Soviet threat. ,,69 
The last issue addressed by Task Force A concerned a topic ofspedal interest to 
Eisenhower. He wanted to balance the budget as soon as possible and knew that defense 
spending had to be cut. He, therefore, asked each task force to predict the probable costs 
of their policy recommendations assuming the Korean War would end in 1953.70 Task 
Force A indicated that under its proposals defense programs would cost between $43 and 
68 Ibid., 23. 
69 Ibid., 83. 
70 See Project Solarium Outline, undated [June 1953?}, NA. RG 273, NSC, Folder - 155th Meeting of the 
NSC, 7-8. 
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$44 billion for fiscal years 1954 and 1955 and then gradually decline to approximately $35 
billion per year. The task force believed that the United States economy was capable of 
meeting this burden of defense spending without raising taxes. However, it supported the 
imposition of a new defense tax if additional revenue was needed to offset the increased 
costs. In the final analysis, it argued that "The United States can afford to survive.,,71 
The Directing Panel assigned Task Force B the alternative of drawing a line be-
yond which any move by the Soviet Union would precipitate a general war with the 
United States. Under this strategy, the United States would explicitly state what Soviet 
actions would automatically lead to general war. Supporters of this strategy assumed that 
if Soviet leaders knew the consequences of their actions, they would by more reluctant to 
act aggressively. Task Force B criticized the strategy of Task Force A as too ambiguous 
and strongly opposed continuing the policies of the Truman administration. It concluded 
that such a strategy "may be beyond the economic capabilities of the United States, will 
deprive the nation of the initiative, and will certainly divert the American people from the 
task of making the best possible use of their power and resources to be prepared to inflict 
decisive defeat on the Soviet Union if it imperils the vital security of this nation by continu-
ing an active policy of expansion.,,72 In its place, the task force recommended developing 
a strategy based on waging a general war if Soviet bloc military forces advanced beyond 
their current borders. 
7\ "A Report to the NSC by Task Force "An,n 1-1,46, and 56. 
72 "A Report to the National Security Council by Task Force "Bn of Project Solarium, n July 16, 1953, NA. 
RG 273, NSC, Folder - 157th Meeting of the NSC, 30. 
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To facilitate the implementation of its strategy, Task Force B stressed that the 
United States needed to expand its offensive nuclear power. 1l0ur policy," it concluded, 
"will bring into focus the central fact that U.S. strategic power is the ultimate military de-
terrent to Soviet aggression. lI73 The task force believed that by relying on nuclear weap-
ons, the United States would be able to avoid the costly expense of maintaining sufficient 
military forces to wage both limited and general wars. In addressing the costs of alterna-
tive B, the task force assumed a position similar to Task Force A It emphasized that, re-
gardless of the cost, the United States had to address the Soviet threat. IIWhatever the 
evils of inflation, whatever the economic problems involved in efforts to control it, II the 
task force argued, IIthese cannot be weighed in the same scales with the grave danger to 
our national survival.1I74 It concluded that IIAlternative B is in effect an announcement that 
the United States and the Free World will accept the risk of annihilation before they accept 
Soviet domination. 1I7S 
The directing panel ordered Task Force C to develop a national security policy 
based on the alternative of "rolling-back" communism. This alternative proposed using 
every means available, except military force, to undermine communist-controlled coun-
tries. Task Force C stated its broad objectives as "ending Soviet domination outside its 
traditional boundaries, destroying the communist apparatus in the Free World, curtailing 
Soviet power for an aggressive war, ending the Iron Curtain, and cutting down the 
73 Ibid., 13. 
74 Ibid., 20. 
7S Ibid., 1-4. 
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strength of any Bolshevik elements left in Soviet Russia. ,,76 It believed that the only way 
to achieve these goals was to take the foreign policy initiative away from the Soviet Un-
ion. Alternative C required the United States to assume a much more aggressive policy. 
Believing that the United States had forfeited the initiative by only reacting to Soviet ac-
tions, it argued that the only way to regain the advantage in the cold war was "by waging 
a political offensive." Stated more explicitly the task force asserted that "we must proceed 
to bring about the political subversion and liquidation of the conspiracy against us. ,,77 
To regain the initiative, Task Force C proposed two strategies-subverting com-
munism and continuing a military build-up. Subversion was the policy of action, the mili-
tary build-up was the insurance if subversion failed. Task Force C recommended that "In 
carrying out this policy [of subversion], we recommend that this Government aggressively, 
both overtly and covertly, attack the Communist apparatus wherever it be found in the 
world .... What we seek to do is to harass and hound every conceivable Communist ac-
tivity using all available political, legal, financial and economic devices in our posses-
sion.,,78 The task force placed few limitations on possible U.S. subversive policies. It ar-
gued that "All means of action ... --short of preventive war-are available under the Al-
temative.,,79 It recognized that this policy embodied a greater risk of war but argued that 
the only way to win the cold war was to be aggressive. 
76 "A Report to the National Security Council by Task Force "C" of Project Solarium. ... July 16, 1953, NA, 
RG 273, NSC, Folder - 157th Meeting of the NSC. 16. 
77 Ibid., 9. 
78 Ibid., 22. 
79 Ibid .• 85. 
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Task Force CIS evaluation of the expense of its policy revealed a greater initial cost 
than either alternatives A or B but a smaller amount in the long term because the cold war 
would have ended in victory. It called for 560 billion annual defense budgets for fiscal 
years 1954 and 1955 and $45 billion for each year thereafter until the United States won 
the cold war.so It argued that the cost was worth the benefits of victory. By assuming this 
policy, the United States would prevail in any type of conflict with the Soviet Union. 
After receiving the task force presentations, the NSC ordered the Planning Board 
to analyze the reports and to develop a policy paper incorporating the best features of 
each one. The Planning Board established an ad-hoc committee composed of representa-
tives from each of the statutory members of the NSC. For three weeks the committee 
studied the three reports. Robert Bowie, the director of the Policy Planning Staff and the 
State Department representative on the Planning Board, stated that "the planning board 
worked on this ... and attempted to build on what had been in the task force reports, par-
ticularly Task Force A which was pretty much recognized as the principal basis on which 
the president had come down. ,,81 The Planning Board presented the draft of it policy pa-
per to the NSC on September 30. This policy paper evolved through three broad stages: 
NSC 162, 16211, and 162/2 . 
. Eisenhower established the tone ofNSC discussions concerning the issues studied 
in Project Solarium when he bemoaned the paradox of defense spending. He explained 
that in the struggle with the Soviet Union, "We were engaged ... not only in saving our 
money or in defending our persons from attac~ we were engaged in the defense of a way 
80 Ibid., 62. 
81 Ibid., 22. 
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of life, and the great danger was that in defending this way of life we would find ourselves 
resorting to methods that endangered this way of life.,,82 Eisenhower's prescription for 
avoiding this paradox was to adopt a level of defense spending that the United States 
could afford for the indefinite future. It was the NSC's responsibility to discover that 
level. 
The question of defense spending divided the NSC. Secretary of Treasury George 
Humphrey and Director of the Bureau of Budget Joseph Dodge believed that defense 
spending should be limited to between $35 and $36 billion for FY 1955. Dodge argued 
that lithe threat to the economy was part and parcel of the Soviet threat." In his view, the 
continued budget deficits could lead to a bankrupt treasury. Secretary of Defense Charles 
Wilson, who recommended defense spending levels of approximately $42 billion, vehe-
mently opposed Dodge's position.83 The debate became so heated that Secretary Hum-
phrey exclaimed, liThe military ought to be so damned dollar conscious that it hurts. 1184 
The president resolved the dispute by stressing that the administration's national security 
policies would place an equal emphasis on economic security and military strength. as 
Tied closely to the issue of the level of defense spending was how the country 
should meet the costs of its other national security programs. Humphrey and Dodge ar-
gued that a balanced budget was as important to national security as a strong military es-
tablishment. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles argued that a balanced budget was an 
82 Memorandum of Discussion at the 163rd Meeting of the National Security Council, September 24, 
1953, FRUS 1952-1954, 2:1, 469. See also, Untitled Remarks by Eisenhower to Cabinet, April 20, 1953, 
EL, DOE Papers, White House Central Files, Subject Series, Box 45, Folder - National Security (I), 1-2. 
83 Memorandum of Discussion at the 165th Meeting of the National Security Council. October 7, 1953, 
FRUS 1952-1954,2:1,516. 
84 Ibid., 521. 
85 Ibid., 522. 
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ideal goal but that it should not be reached at the cost of reducing national security. He 
believed that the position of the Treasury Department and the Bureau of the Budget 
"would be interpreted as an absolute commitment to balance the budget and ... felt such a 
commitment at this time to be very dangerous. ,,86 The debate ended when Humphrey and 
Dodge reluctantly accepted a higher level of defense spending with the understanding that 
a balanced budget remained the ultimate goal. 
Discussions ofNSC 162 continued at the Council meetings on October 13 and 29 
where the members debated what types of weapons-nuclear andlor conventional-should 
fonn the foundation of U.S. military planning. The Ioint Chiefs of Staff (ICS) and the sec-
retary of defense wanted military plans to be based on the availability of both conventional 
and atomic weapons. They argued that the proposed cuts in defense spending would re-
quire that tactical nuclear weapons be assigned a more integral role in military planning. 
Admiral Arthur Radford, the new ICS chairman, argued that "unless we could use these 
weapons [tactical nuclear weapons] in a blanket way, no possibility existed of significantly 
changing the present composition of our armed forces. ,,87 Although the president and the 
rest of the NSC believed that NSC 162 clearly allowed this option, Eisenhower reaffirmed 
this position by concluding that "we should state what we propose to do, namely, to keep 
the minimum respectable posture of defense while emphasizing [U.S. atomic] offensive 
capability. ,,88 
86 Ibid, 524. 
87 Memorandum of Discussion at the 166th Meeting of the National Security Council, October 13. 1953, 
FRUS 1952-1954, 2:1, 547. 
88 Ibid., 573. 
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In its final report, the NSC established the basic goal of the United States as 
meeting the perceived Soviet threat, while avoiding economic ruin.89 Not surprisingly, it 
incorporated recommendations from each of the Solarium task forces. While it viewed the 
world through the spectrum of an EastlWest struggle as did the task forces, it placed a 
much greater influence on economic security than any of them. To achieve its national 
security goals, it established three requirements: 
a. Development and maintenance of: 
I) A strong military posture with emphasis on the capability of in-
flicting massive retaliatory damage by offensive striking power; 
2) U.S. and allied forces in readiness to move rapidly initially to 
counter aggression by Soviet bloc forces and to hold vital areas and 
lines of communication; and 
3) A mobilization base, and its protection against crippling damage, 
adequate to insure victory in a general war. 
b. Maintenance ofa sound, strong and growing economy. 
c. Maintenance of morale and free institutions and the willingness of the 
U.S. people to support the measures necessary for national security.90 
These requirements embodied most of Task Force A's recommendations.91 The differences 
arose in NSC 1 62/2's emphasis on both economic and military strength. 
89 Statement of Policy by the National Security Council, October 13, 1953, ibid., 578. 
90 Ibid, 582. 
91 Williamson and Rearden argue that Eisenhower's "New Look" strategy was simply a continuation of 
Truman's policies with a few modifications. While true in part, this argument does not sufficiently ex-
plain the sharp spending reductions Eisenhower sought in his military programs. Truman might have 
been a fiscal conservative, as Williamson and Rearden argue, but Eisenhower was much more of one. See 
Williamson and Rearden. Origins of u.s. Nuclear Strategy, 105-7, 148-49, and 191-93. For the devel-
opment of Eisenhower's thinking concerning the New Look, see Samuel F. Wells, "The Origins of Mas-
sive Retaliation." Political Science Quarterly 96 (Spring 1981): 31-52. 
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The NSC also adopted the principle that both tactical and strategic atomic weap-
ons would be used in wartime.92 To differing degrees, each task force recommended a 
greater reliance on these weapons in case of a military contlict. Accepting this premise, 
the NSC argued that "The major deterrent to aggression against Western Europe is the 
manifest determination of the United States to use its atomic capability and massive re-
taliatory striking power if the area is attacked. ,,93 The true meaning of "massive retalia-
tory striking power" became much more clear when the NSC emphasized the important 
role of nuclear weapons in any type of contlict. "In the event of hostilities," it argued, "the 
United States will consider nuclear weapons to be as available for use as other muni-
tions. ,,94 
While the NSC recognized that the efficacy of atomic deterrence could be limited, 
it still believed that reliance on nuclear weapons provided the most cost efficient strategy 
for successfully waging the cold war. It concluded that if Soviet leaders knew there were 
certain actions that would lead automatically to a U.S. nuclear counterattack, then they 
would pursue a more cautious policy. This concept of clearly declaring specific responses 
to possible Soviet actions is reminiscent of Task Force B's "drawing the line" .9S The idea 
in NSC 162/2 was not to define an entire policy around this concept but to warn the 
Kremlin leaders of the possible consequences of their actions. The NSC believed that if 
the United States explicitly stated its position regarding Soviet aggressive moves, then the 
92 War. as defined here. meant a general conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. Con-
flict in peripheral areas of the world. i.e. Korea. were classified differently. 
93 Statement of Policy by the National Security Council. October 30. 1953. FRUS 1952-1954, 2: 1,585. 
94 Ibid., 593. 
9S Ibid., 581. 
50 
United States military officials would be able to develop plans based on more clearly de-
tined policies. 
In addressing the policy of "rolling-back" communism, NSC 162/2 concluded that 
there was little likelihood of detaching a country from the Soviet bloc. However, it did 
recommend that the United States "Take overt and covert measures to discredit Soviet 
prestige and ideology as effective instruments of Soviet power.,,96 NSC 162/2 accepted 
Task Force C's premise that communism could be thwarted in countries not firmly in the 
Soviet bloc. The idea was to undermine the governments of countries which had com-
munist leanings, but at the same time, were not directly tied to the Soviet Union. The Eis-
enhower administration clearly adopted this position in its later policies towards countries 
such as Iran and Guatemala.97 
NSC 162/2 represented the Eisenhower administration's clearest expression of its 
"New Look" national security policy. It emphasized that military plans would be devel-
oped under the assumption that atomic weapons would be used in future conflicts, 
authorized the use of both overt and covert operations to achieve U.S. goals, and recog-
nized the importance of economic strength to U.S. security. The paper also stressed the 
importance of the rest of the world to the United States. The policy paper stated that 
"The assumption by the United States, as the leader of the free world, of a substantial de-
96 Ibid., 595. 
97 In an infonnativc analysis of the literature describing Eisenhower's foreign policies and the Third 
World, Robert McMahon argues that Eisenhower failed to take adequate cognizance of the forces ofna-
tionalism in the Third World. Instead, the president viewed revolutions in developing countries as com-
munist inspired. This view led to policies which ultimately weakened the U.S. position in the Third 
World. See Robert J. McMahon, "Eisenhower and Third World Nationalism: A Critique of the Revision-
ists," Political Science Quarterly 101 (Fall 1986): 453-73. 
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gree of responsibility for the freedom and security of the free nations is a direct and essen-
tial contribution to the maintenance of its own freedom and Security.,,98 
The development ofNSC 162/2 clearly reveals the importance Eisenhower as-
signed to examining policy alternatives thoroughly within a tightly organized decision 
making system. By stressing his economic and political philosophies to the participants in 
this system, he provided guidance for the development of his policies. General Andrew 
Goodpaster, a member of Task Force C and later Eisenhower's staff secretary, recalled 
that in the NSC meetings, the president 
wanted to get . . . all of the responsible people in the room, take up the issue, 
and hear their views. He had what amounted to a tacit rule that there could be 
no non-concurrence through silence. If somebody didn't agree, he was 
obliged to speak his mind and get it all out on the table ... and then in light of 
all of that, the President would come to a line of action, he wanted everybody 
to hear it, everybody to participate in it, and then he wanted everybody to be 
guided by it.99 
This approach allowed Eisenhower to select his preferred national security policy a1terna-
tives. 
The Threat of Surprise Attack and the Killian Committee 
In early 1954 Eisenhower again turned to the NSC and outside consultants to ex-
amine a problem that had been bothering him for many months. Recent technological ad-
vances, including the successful Russian test of the H-bomb and the development of long-
range aircraft, raised the question whether Soviet Union could launch a successful surprise 
98 Statement of Policy by the National Security Council, October 30, 1953,584. 
99 Transcript of "Projcct Solarium": A Collective Oral Interview, 20. 
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attack against the United States. 1oo The lack of concrete intelligence concerning Soviet 
military capabilities or intentions accentuated the concern. In March. Eisenhower turned 
to the Science Advisory Committee of the Office of Defense Mobilization to study 
whether the Soviet Union had the capability and/or intention to launch an attack against 
North America and what the United States could do to prepare for that possibility. 
Eisenhower's fears mirrored the concerns of many earlier U.S. policymakers. In 
the immediate aftermath of World War IL U.S. officials recognized the preponderance of 
u.S. world power. IOI However, after the Soviet detonation of the atomic bomb in 1949, 
u.S. superiority became less certain and accurate assessments of Soviet intentions became 
even more paramount. Ever since Pearl Harbor, Americans experienced a foreboding 
sense of vulnerability. The Soviet atomic test now raised the specter that the Kremlin 
leaders might one day acquire the capability to attack the United States. In assessing the 
significance of Soviet possession of the bomb less than two months later, Air Force Chief 
of Staff Hoyt Vandenberg revealed that "There are strong reasons to believe that a sudden 
surprise attack by Soviet atom bombers would result in not only inflicting unthinkable 
mortalities on our people and our industry, but also might cripple our strategic air forces, 
thereby denying us the means to redress the balance through retaliation."I02 In a separate 
memorandum on the same day, Vandenberg discussed the inadequacies of U.S. air de-
fenses and asserted that "almost any number of Soviet bombers could cross our borders 
100 For excellent an exceUent analysis of U.S. assessments of Soviet military strength. see John Prados, 
The Soviet Threat: U.S. Intelligence Analysis & Russian Military Strength (New York: Dial Press, 
1982). 
101 Lefiler, Preponderance of Power, 96. 
102 Draft Memorandum for the President, November 16, 1949, Library of Congress [hereafter LC}, Papers 
of Muir Fairchild. Box I, Folder - 9/30/49-1217/49. l. 
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and fly to most of the targets in the United States without a shot being fired at them and 
without even being challenged in any way.,,103 
During the early 1950s, a Soviet surprise attack was not expected, but the possi-
bility could not be ignored. Most intelligence estimates from this time period, including 
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 3, NIE 48, and NIE 64, concluded that the Soviet 
Union would not deliberately initiate war. 104 Retired Air Force General Idwal Edwards 
chaired a committee for the NSC that examined the capability of the Soviet Union to in-
jure the United States and concluded that if the Soviet leaders launched an attack it 
"would be an act of desperation and not an exercise in military judgment." lOS However, 
while Edwards's committee and the other NIEs did not expect an attack, they would not 
eliminate that possibility. For example, after arguing that the Soviet Union would proba-
bly not initiate a general war against the United States, NIE 48 quickly equivocated and 
stressed that "Soviet courses of action can never be predicted with confidence. In particu-
lar the possibility of deliberate initiation of general war cannot be excluded at any time 
merely because such initiation would contradict past Soviet political strategy."l06 
103 Memorandum by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 11116/49, ibid., 5. 
104 See NIE 3, "Soviet Capabilities and Intentions," November 15, 1950, NA, RG 263, Records of the 
Central Intelligence Agency, Box 1 - NIE's Regarding Soviet Union 1950-1955, Folder #1,9; NIE 48, 
"Likelihood of the Deliberate Initiation of Full-Scale War by the USSR Against the US and Its Western 
Allies Prior to the End of 1952," January 18, 1952, ibid., 1; and, NIE 64 (part ll), "Probable Soviet Bloc 
Courses of Action Through Mid-1953," December ll, 1952, ibid., 2. For a description of the Soviet Un-
ion's reluctance to go to war, see Leffier, Preponderance o/Power, 488. 
lOS Memorandum of Discussion at the 148th Meeting of the National Security CounciL June 4, 1953, 
FRUS 1952-1954,2:1,369. Eisenhower agreed completely with Edwards's assessment See ibid., 370. 
For a copy of Edwards's report see NSC 140/1 - Report to the National Security Council by the Special 
Evaluation Subcommittee of the National Security Council, May 18, 1953, ibid., 328-49. 
106 NIE 48, NA, RG 263, CIA, Box 1 - NIE's Regarding Soviet Union 1950-1955, Folder #1, 2. At the 
same NSC meeting where Edwards presented his report, CIA Director Allen Dulles concluded that the 
U.S. could "not expect any warning ofa Soviet 'sneak' attack." Memorandum of Discussion at the 148th 
NSC Meeting, FRUS 1952-1954,2:1,369. 
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Eisenhower also received a steady stream of conflicting reports concerning Soviet 
capabilities and u.S. wlnerabilities. A notable deficiency in most of these reports was the 
lack of a detailed analysis of Soviet intentions. In 1953, the Strategic Air Command 
(SAC) initiated Operation Tailwind to discover "How well could SAC survive a Pearl 
Harbor type ofattack?,,107 Simulating one possible Soviet attack scenario, SAC launched 
ninety-nine bomber sorties against targets in the United States during a 48 hour period 
when the Air Defense Command (ADC) was on alert for an attack. Despite the attack 
warning and its alert status, the ADC intercepted only six bombers. lOS This dismal per-
formance provided evidence to support SAC's contention that "it is extremely difficult to 
effectively prevent penetration of coordinated heavy bomber attacks which hit the early 
warning screen from many directions simultaneously. ,,109 
Influenced in part by Operation Tailwind, the NSC examined U.S. continental de-
fenses during the summer of 1953. It concluded that 
The present continental defense programs are not now adequate to prevent, 
neutralize or seriously deter the military or covert attacks which the USSR 
is capable of launching, nor are they adequate to ensure the continuity of 
government, the continuity of production, or the protection of the indus-
trial mobilization base and millions of citizens in our great and exposed 
metropolitan centers. This condition constitutes an unacceptable risk to 
our nation's survival. 110 
107 Memorandum Op-36C/jrn. March 18, 1954, reprinted in David Alan Rosenberg. "A Smoking Radiat-
ing Ruin at the End of Two Hours," Intemational Security 6:3 (Winter 1981182),26. Any Soviet attack 
precipitated on these lines would have required the launching of bombers on one-way missions. At this 
time, the Soviets Union relied on the TU-4 bomber whose range would not allow two-way missions to the 
United States without refueling. See SE-36 - Soviet Capabilities for Attack on the US Through Mid-1955, 
March 5, 1953, NA, RG 263, CIA. Box 1 - NIE's Regarding Soviet Union 1950-1955, Folder #1 - NIE's 
Regarding Soviet Union 1950-1955,2-5. 
108 Memorandum Op-36C/jrn. March 18, 1954, 24. See also L. Weinstein et al., The Evolution o/U.S. 
Strategic Command and Control and Waming. 1945-1972 (Arlington, VA: Institute for Defense Analy-
sis, 1975). 103-4. 
109 Memorandum Op-36C1jrn. March 18, 1954, 24. 
110 NSC 159/4 - Statement of Policy by the National Security Council, September 25, 1953, FRUS 1952-
1954,2:1,478. 
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The NSC, therefore, recommended improving intelligence-gathering capabilities, expand-
ing radar coverage, increasing fighter-interceptor and anti-aircraft forces, developing plans 
for government continuity after an attack, and adopting new civil defense programs.lll 
These recommendations closely mirrored the views of the JCS at the same time. 112 
While these reports made it clear that U.S. defenses were inadequate to stop a 
Soviet attack, the question remained as to whether the Soviet Union intended to take such 
actions or even if it could. In a striking report, "Magnitude and Imminence of the Soviet 
Air Threat to the United States," neither the Air Force, the Navy, nor the JCS expected 
the Soviet Union to launch an attack before the end of 1957.113 The Navy representative 
summarized this position by arguing that "The preservation of the security of the USSR 
under the worst possible contingencies of war will loom large in their estimate of the 
situation. In the Soviet mind, overwhelming strength will be required. It is not believed 
that the Soviets are likely to conclude, between now and 1957, that they have such 
strength." 114 
However, Soviet advances in both atomic weapon technology and long-range 
bomber capabilities clouded these conclusions. While it would have been difficult for the 
Soviet Union to launch an attack, its testing of the H-bomb in 1953 and its introduction of 
new medium and long-range bombers in 1954 indicated that it was acquiring the capability 
1 II Ibid, 483-85. 
112 Memorandum for the NSC, August 21, 1953, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1951-53 
Geographic File, Folder - CCS 381 US (5-23-46) Sec. 25, 396. See also Kenneth Schaffel, The Emerging 
Shield: The Air Force and the Evolution o/Continental Air Defense. /945-/960 (Washington, D.C.: 
Office of Air Force History, 1991), 193. 
113 Magnitude and Imminence of Soviet Air Threat to the United States - 1957, October 30, 1953, RG 
218,lCS, 1951-53 Geographic File, Folder - CCS 350.09 USSR (12-19-49) Sec. 5, 1216-18. 
114 Ibid., 1217. 
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to do so. liS More importantly, the destructive power of nuclear weapons provided an ag-
gressor the potential capability to win a war through a carefully planned first strike. 116 At 
this stage, the perception among U.S. policymakers that the Soviet Union sought world 
domination became paramount. Charles Bohlen, the State Department representative on 
Truman's NSC senior stat( concluded "there is no important disagreement [among poli-
cymakers] that ifmatters reach the point where the Soviets attain the capability of deliver-
ing a 'decisive' initial blow on the United States without serious risk to their own regime, 
they would do so." \17 
The question whether the Soviet Union would launch an attack, if it could, was 
further complicated by American memories of Pearl Harbor. The Japanese had caught the 
United States by surprise and mounted a devastating attack to start World War II. The 
introduction of nuclear weapons raised the stakes if a similar attack was used to start a 
1\5 In 1954, the Soviet Union introduced two new medium and long-range bombers: TU·16 (codenamed 
Badger) and M-4 (codenamed Bison). See David A. Brinkley and Andrew W. Hull. Estimative Intelli-
gence (Washington. D.C.: Defense InteUigence School, August 1979). chapter 3, reprinted in Harold P. 
Ford, Estimative Intelligence: The Purposes and Problems 0/ National Intelligence Estimating (New 
York: Defense Intelligence College, 1993),217.18. 
116 A. 1. Wohlstetter, F. S. Hoffman, R. J. Lutz, and H. S. Rowe~ Selection and Use o/Strategic Air 
Bases (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. 1963),227. Although not publicly published until 1963, 
this report was completed and widely circulated within the government in 1954. 
117 Memorandum by the Counselor (Bohlen), March 27, 1952, FRUS 1952-1954,2:1,5-6. It must be 
stressed that Bohlen and most policy makers did not expect the Soviet Union to attack the United Statcs. 
However, differences did arise between policy makers concerning the risks the Soviet Union would be 
willing to take to achieve its goals. Regardless, Bohlen's entire statement concerning the assumptions of 
U.S. policymakers about the Soviet Union is particularly revealing. He argued that "there are certain fun· 
damental features of the Soviet system which are generally uncontested by all analyses." He then ex· 
plained that "it is generally accepted that the Soviet system: 
a. Is a totalitarian system, heavily armed and continuously seeking to increase its military p0-
tential, where the power of decision rests entirely in the hands of a small group of men; 
b. By the nature of its state structure, reinforced by its ideology, is fundamentally and unap-
peasably hostile to any society not suscepUDle to its control; 
c. The directing group of the Soviet Government and of international Communism are [sic] to-
tally uninluDited by any considerations of a humanitarian. moral, or ethical character which 
have acted, in history, as restraints upon the use of force ... 
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new war. Jack Nunn, in a pioneering study of the importance of the Soviet first strike 
capability, carefully articulates how this capability when tied to the memories of Pearl 
Harbor changed U.S. perceptions of its vulnerability. "The Japanese attack [on Pearl Har-
bor]," he argues, "was etched on the collective U.S. consciousness, the name linked with a 
vision of a surprise attack-pitting a calculating aggressor against an unaware and unwar-
like democracy.,,118 
One Eisenhower's greatest problems was that he did not know what the Soviet 
Union planned to dO. 119 While he did not expect the Kremlin to order an attack, he could 
not rule out the possibility. If the Soviet Union possessed the capability to attack the 
United States with nuclear weapons and U.S. defenses remained vulnerable to such an at-
tack, the enemy posed a potentially deadly threat. This cruel dilemma bedeviled Eisen-
hower. While he did not expect an attack, the assumption that the Soviet Union might 
attack, if it believed it could do so without suffering devastating retaliation, formed the 
basis of U.S. policies. 120 In essence, Eisenhower had to base his policies on a strategic 
alternative that he did not expect to happen. 
118 Jack H. Nunn, The Soviet First Strike Threat: The U.S. Perspective (New York: Praeger Publishers, 
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In 1954 Eisenhower continued to view U.S. strength with confidence. However 
technological advances in both weaponry and delivery capabilities raised the possibility 
that the Soviet Union might soon be able to launch a surprise and devastating attack 
against the United States. In March 1954 he expressed this concern to his Science Advi-
sory Committee and asked its members whether technological means existed to obtain 
early warning of a Soviet surprise attack and to defend the United States if such an attack 
did occur. 121 His concerns led to the creation of a special committee to address these 
technological questions. 122 
In July 1954, Dr. Lee Dubridge, the chairman of the Science Advisory Committee, 
proposed a study that would analyze Soviet capabilities and explore possible scientific and 
technological means to meet that threat. Upon Eisenhower's request, Dr. James Killian, 
president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a member of the Science Advi-
sory Committee, agreed to serve as chairman of the soon to be created Technical Capa-
bilities Panel (TCP). From September 1954 to February 1955, this panel, known as the 
Killian committee, assessed the Soviet Union's strengths and weaknesses, the wInerability 
of the United States to surprise attack, and the measures needed to improve U.S. offensive 
121 Dr. Lee A. Dubridge to Dr. Arthur S. Flemming, May 24, 1954, EL, DOE Papers, White House Cen-
tral Files, Subject Series, Box 104, Folder - World War III (1) Confidential File, 1-4. For the best sum-
mary oCthe activities oCthe Killian committee, see James R Killian, Jr. Sputnik, Scientists. and Eisen-
hower: A Memoir of the First Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology (Cambridge, 
MA: The MIT Press, 1977),67-93. 
122 In addition to appointing this committee, Eisenhower also established the National Indications Center 
on July 1 ''for the express purpose of 'preventing strategic surprise'." R Cargill Hall, "The Eisenhower 
Administration and the Cold War: Framing American Astronautics to Serve National Security," Pro-
logue: Quarterly of the National Archives 27:1 (Spring 1995),61-62. 
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and defensive capabilities. The committee presented its 190 page report to the National 
Security Council in February 1955.123 
The TCP's activities, conclusions, and recommendations are of striking importance 
to understanding the Gaither committee. As will be shown in later chapters, many of the 
Gaither committee's conclusions and recommendations reflected the influence of the TCP. 
Considering their respective memberships, this should not have been surprising. Of the 
nine members of the TCP's steering committee, five-Dr. James Killian, Dr. James Fisk, 
Dr. James Baxter, Dr. James Doolittle, and Robert Sprague-would later serve on the 
Gaither committee in significant capacities. 124 In addition, another five consultants served 
on both the TCP and Gaither committee. 125 
In the preface to its study, the TCP's steering committee stated that its objective 
was to examine "the present wlnerability of the United States to surprise attack and ways 
whereby science and technology can strengthen our offense and defense to reduce this 
hazard."I26 To address this problem fully, Killian asked outside consultants to sit on three 
panels that would examine specific problems related to technological changes. Panel 1, 
chaired by Dr. Marshall Holloway, examined U.S. offensive capabilities. Panel 2, headed 
by Dr. Leland Haworth, studied U.S. continental defense. Finally, Panel 3 directed by Dr. 
Edwin Land, studied U.S. intelligence capabilities. The creation of these three panels re-
flected key assumptions that guided the steering committee. First, it viewed offensive and 
123 The Report to the President by the Technological Capabilities Panel of the Science Advisory Commit-
tee, February 14, 1955, [hereafter "Killian Report"1 reprinted in Trachtenberg, The Development of 
American Strategic Thought, 189-90 (in original document). 
124 Ibid., iii. 
125 These five were Dr. Albert Hill, Dr. Brockway McMillan. Dr. Jerome Wiesner, Dr. David Beckler, and 
Col. Vincent Ford. See ibid., 187-88. 
126 Ibid .• v. 
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defensive weapons as integrated components in the defense of the United States. Second, 
it believed that continental defenses, ranging from early warning to anti-aircraft weapons, 
were inadequate. Finally, it recognized that the acceleration of Soviet technological de-
velopments increased U. S. vulnerability. 127 
The TCP concluded that U.S. offensive forces, comprised at that time primarily by 
the Strategic Air Command, were essential to the reduction of U.S. vulnerability to a sur-
prise attack. In reaching these conclusions, it operated under the assumption that "both 
'offensive' and 'defensive' forces are essential to accomplish the general mission of de-
fending the United States. Both are deterrents to surprise and, should war begin, both 
contribute to the destruction of the enemy power .. Neither one alone is adequate to defend 
the United States." 128 The panel concluded that aircraft and later missiles would provide 
the United States with a deterrent capability that might force Soviet leaders to reevaluate 
any plans to launch a first strike. If the Soviets did order an attack, the survival of an of-
fensive striking capability would allow the United States to retaliate through a devastating 
counterstrike. Finally, the existence of an offensive striking force gave the United States 
the option oflaunching a first strike ifit so chose. l29 While never the official policy of the 
127 In addition to these three panels, Dr. Jerome Wiesner chaired the Communications Working Group 
that examined the vulnerability of U.S. communication systems. 
128 "Killian Report," v. 
129 This capability should be viewed as providing two policy options. First, the U.S. could initiate the use 
of atomic weapons after a war had already begun. Second, the U.S. could initiate either a preemptive or 
preventive war. For a description of the distinction between preemptive and preventive war, see Freed-
man, Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 126; and General Thomas S. Power, Design for Survival (New York: 
Coward-McCann Inc., 1964, 1965),39 and 79-84. 
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United States, this option was still being seriously considered in different crisis situations 
in the 1950s.130 
In evaluating the threat ofa surprise attack against the United States, the commit-
tee gave no real consideration to Soviet intentions. The Killian committee readily ac-
knowledged that it based its conclusions on technological changes rather than on any re-
evaluation of Soviet intentions. It simply accepted the assumption that the Soviet Union's 
ultimate goal was world domination and that Soviet leaders would be willing to use any 
means to achieve it. Technological advances in weaponry and delivery systems magnified 
the threat. The committee was particularly concerned with the Soviet development of a 
hydrogen bomb and its research into ballistic missiles. "This evolution of nuclear bombs 
and the means to deliver them," the committee stressed, "has given warfare a potential for 
swift, complete destruction and sudden decisiveness that is revolutionizing our concepts of 
offense and defense." 131 
The Killian committee concluded that advances in delivery capabilities posed a 
greater threat than improvements in nuclear weaponry. While it did not preclude further 
advances in warhead design and/or yield, it stressed that these advances would be rela-
tively minimal. Equally important, it noted that the United States would not be able to 
130 For Eisenhower's denunciation of preventive war, see PPP-DDE, 1954 (GPO, 1955),698. In addition. 
see Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, 132-46; Tami Davis Biddle, "Handling the Soviet Threat: 
'Project Control' and the Debate on American Strategy in the Early Cold War Years," Journal o/Strate-
gic Studies 12 (September 1989): 273-302; Michio Kaku and Daniel Axelrod, To Win a Nuclear War: 
The Pentagon's Secret War Plans (Boston: South End Press, 1987), X-xi, 3, and 5; Paul Bracken, The 
Command and Control o/Nuclear Forces (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1983),83-84 and 
183-84; Weinstein et al., Evolution o/U.s. Strategic Command and Control and Warning, 101 and 201; 
David Alan Rosenberg, "Toward Annageddon: The Foundations of United States Nuclear Strategy, 1945-
1961," Ph.D. Dissertation. University of Chicago, 1983, 197 and 221; and Bundy, Danger and Survival, 
251-52. 
131 "Killian Report." 3-4. 
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maintain its lead in warhead technology for long since present ''technology is already near 
the upper limit of yield per ton of bomb allowed by nature."lJ2 With the imminent emer-
gence of virtual equality in the field of nuclear weaponry, advances in delivery systems be-
came pivotal in the military balance of power between the Soviet Union and the United 
States. 133 
The committee examined the effectiveness of two types of delivery systems: 
bombers and ballistic missiles. It argued that "Attack by manned bombers will continue to 
be a threat long after the advent of the intercontinental missiles.,,134 However, it did em-
phasize the potential strategic and psychological consequences of the development of the 
ICBM. It concluded that 
In the hands of the Soviets such a weapon [the ICBM] would represent an 
even greater jump in capability since it would to a considerable extent wipe 
out the present geographical advantage enjoyed by the U.S. With such a 
capability the Soviets could put pressure on much of the world outside of 
the U.S., either by direct threat to them or by threat against the U.S. It, 
therefore, appears urgent to achieve this type of capability before the So-
viets, in order to at least match threat with threat. 13S 
The defense problems raised by both long-range bombers and ballistic missiles 
brought into focus the issues before Panels 2 and 3. Offensive striking forces would be 
useless if they could be destroyed before the United States could launch a retaliatory 
strike. This dilemma forced these panels to determine the impact of technological ad-
vances in several areas. Panel 2 had to analyze whether the threat raised by these ad-
vances could be countered by improving U.S. defenses. Panel 3 had to determine how 
132 Ibid., 7. 
133 Ibid., 14. 
134 Ibid., 76. 
135 Ibid., 64. 
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technological advances could strengthen U.S. intelligence-gathering capabilities. For both 
panels, technology could either undennine or strengthen U.S. security. 
that 
In a scathing critique of U.S. continental defenses, the Killian committee concluded 
the United States is at present unacceptably vulnerable to surprise attack. 
Our military defenses are as yet numerically deficient and have serious 
qualitative weaknesses. The defenses could be avoided or overwhelmed 
and might even be unaware of an attack until the first bomb exploded. Un-
der these circumstances our cities could suffer millions of casualties and 
crippling damage, and enough SAC bombers and bases could be destroyed 
to reduce drastically our ability to retaliate. 136 
More specifically, the committee argued that if the Soviet Union launched an attack, the 
United States would receive little or no warning because of the weaknesses in its intelli-
gence gathering capabilities and the gaps in radar coverage at both high and low alti-
tudes. 137 These deficiencies opened the United States to a surprise attack if the Soviet 
Union decided to launch one. 
Because of the existing and expected advances in delivery capabilities and the de-
ficiencies in continental defense, Dr. Land's panel examined how effectively technology 
was being used to acquire intelligence of the Soviet Union. In the mid-1950s, the United 
States lacked a clear knowledge of Soviet capabilities. The various U.S. intelligence 
agencies, including the CIA and the intelligence departments within each branch of the 
military, based their estimates of Soviet capabilities on limited first-hand evidence, ex-
trapolations from known U.S. weapons capabilities, estimates of Soviet manufacturing 
capabilities, and sightings of Soviet military hardware (often at military parades and air 
136 Ibid., 18. 
137 Ibid .• 75-6, 96-7, and 101-2. 
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shows).138 The Killian committee aptly concluded that, "estimates of the specific capa-
bilities and immediate intentions of the Soviets have, at their center, only a very small 
core of hard facts.,,139 [emphasis in original] Quite obviously, intelligence estimates based 
on such evidence could not be totally reliable and might lead to incorrect, or at least, am-
biguous conclusions and recommendations. 
Although most of the section of the Killian report dealing specifically with the ac-
quisition and interpretation of intelligence remains classified, enough evidence is available 
to indicate the committee's basic conclusions and recommendations. It emphasized that 
"there is a good possibility that an enemy's preparations for a massive surprise attack on 
the United States would be detected. However, this possibility is not a certainty."I40 Ac-
cordingly, it stressed that "Because we are unable to conclude that the United States 
surely will, or surely will not, have useful strategic warning in the event of a surprise at-
tack, we recommend that our planning take serious account of both possibilities.,,141 The 
committee recommended that the United States "must find ways to increase the number of 
hard facts upon which our intelligence estimates are based, to provide better strategic 
138 While U.S. intelligence estimates of Soviet capabilities during the 1950s have become increasingly 
available over the past few years, there remains considerable ambiguity as to how the U.S. agencies gath-
ered the information they used to make these estimates. For an excellent description of sources of U.S. 
intelligence and the variety of organizations involved in intelligence gathering and assessment, see Jeffrey 
Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1985); and 
Prados, The Soviet Estimate, 24-37. For an analysis oftbe limitations on intelligence, see Brinkley and 
Hull, Estimative Intelligence, 215-22. For an example of the use of aerial overflights (besides the U-2) to 
acquire intelligence of the Soviet Union, see Robert S. Hopkins, Ill, "An Expanded Understanding of Eis-
enhower. American Policy, and Overflights," a paper presented at the Society of Historians of American 
Foreign Relations Annual Conference, June 1995. 
139 "Killian Report," 25. 
140 Ibid., 24. 
141 Ibid., 25. 
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warning, to minimize surprise in the kind of attack, and to reduce the danger of gross 
overestimation or gross underestimation of the threat."142 [emphasis in original] 
An important question is whether the committee believed that the United States 
should launch either a preventive or preemptive war against the Soviet Union. While the 
committee never explicitly made either recommendation, evidence suggests that it sup-
ported maintaining a first strike capability.143 For example, it argued that, "Our striking 
forces must blunt the attack at its source."I44 In a more extensive analysis, it concluded 
that "The importance to the defense of the U.S. ofan offensive air striking force stems 
from its ability to attack the Soviet long-range air force on the ground.,,14S By being able 
to strike at the "source" or "on the ground," the United States would possess the capabil-
ity of preventive war, or at a minimum, preemptive war. 146 
The final Killian report made several specific recommendations to limit the vulner-
ability of the United States to a surprise attack by the Soviet Union. The committee rec-
ommended the acceleration of ballistic missile development, the acquisition of additional 
bases for the Strategic Air Command, the completion of a comprehensive review of both 
u.S. and Soviet target systems, the construction of the Distant Early Warning Line, the 
addition of gap-filler radar, the use of atomic weapons in defense against attacking bomb-
ers and/or missiles, and the study of ways to reduce civilian casualties in the event of an 
attack. 147 
142 Ibid., 44. 
143 This conclusion is based on the declassified portions of the final Killian report and published accounts 
of the activities of the committee. 
144 Ibid., 17. 
145 Ibid., 49. 
146 See footnote above and Rosenberg. "Toward Armageddon," 221. 
147 "Killian Report," 37-46. 
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The Killian committee's findings had a tremendous influence on Eisenhower and 
his administration, especially in the areas of accelerating missile development and intelli-
gence-gathering. David Rosenberg argues that "the TCP ... provided an important 
benchmark in the evolution of Eisenhower's thinking about nuclear strategy."I48 Eisen-
hower acknowledged in his memoirs how he accelerated the development of both the 
IRBM and the ICBM after receiving the Killian report. 149 However, Dr. Land's intelli-
gence panel probably had the most important influence. It recommended the construction 
of an airplane capable of photographing the Soviet Union from high altitudes. The rec-
ommendation to build such a spy plane was so sensitive that it was presented to Eisen-
hower directly, instead of to the full NSC. 1SO Eisenhower accepted this recommendation 
and immediately initiated the U-2 program. In the view of retired CIA historian Donald 
Welzenbach, after the meeting of the TCP, "Killian and Land virtually controlled the de-
velopment of the nation's technical intelligence collections agencies."m 
The recommendations of the Killian committee that Eisenhower incorporated into 
his national security policies were tremendously influential. They laid the foundation for 
the acceleration of U.S. intelligence-gathering and ballistic missile programs. The TCP 
exercise provided a clear example of how Eisenhower sought advice from outside consult-
ants who were experts in specific fields. Through the filter of his national security deci-
148 Rosenberg. "The Origins ofOverkiIl: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960," 38. See 
also Bundy, Danger and Survival, 325. 
149 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace. 1956-1961 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 
1965), 208. See also, Memorandum of Discussion at the 257th Meeting of the National Security Council, 
8/4/55, FRUS 1955-1957, 19 (GPO, 1990), 100-103. 
ISO Killian to Herbert F. York, May 27, 1976, Massachusetts Institute ofTecbnology [hereafter M.LT.] 
Archives, MC 423, James R Killian Papers, Box 13. Folder - Correspondence L-Z, 2. 
lSI Donald Welzenbach, "Din Land: Patriot from Polaroid, " Optics and Photonics News (October 1994), 
23. 
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sion making structure, Eisenhower ordered, received, and evaluated this advice. He ac-
cepted parts, modified others, and rejected some. The result of the entire process was a 
policy that reflected Eisenhower's desire to wage the cold war based on a combination of 
political, military, and economic strength. 
Conclusiolls 
Eisenhower succeeded admirably in achieving the goals he established for his first 
term as president. Starting with a systematic review of U.S. national security programs in 
1953, Eisenhower devised a military strategy based on his country's overwhelming superi-
ority in atomic weapons and delivery capabilities. He decided that, rather than react to 
every world crisis with the deployment of troops or by increasing the defense budget, the 
United States would emphasize the deterrent power provided by atomic weapons. Be-
cause of this strategy, he was able to cut overall defense expenditures by reducing the size 
of U.S. conventional-non-nuclear-forces. This ''New Look" strategy, as it was called, 
enabled Eisenhower to balance two of his first four annual budgets and to maintain the 
necessary military capability to launch a devastating counterstrike if the Soviet Union de-
cided to attack the United States. 
In all of his decisions, Eisenhower attempted to preserve what he viewed as the 
twin foundations of American society: democratic government and a viable capitalist eco-
nomic system. When making decisions concerning national security matters, he believed 
these principles could only be protected by maintaining a careful balance between a sound 
economy--meaning low inflation and a balanced budget-and defense spending. An over-
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emphasis on one would only lead to weakness in the other. Throughout his first term in 
office, Eisenhower struggled to maintain these twin goals while resisting almost constant 
calls for more spending. 1s2 
To ensure the integration of his political and economic philosophies into his na-
tional security policies, Eisenhower employed a decision making system which he had 
carefully designed at the inception of his presidency. Utilizing a complex system of 
committees and advisory groups, he believed that reviewing a problem or issue step-by-
step from the lowest to the highest levels of policy making would facilitate the develop-
ment of the best possible policy alternatives. Through this process, Eisenhower expected 
to obtain advice and guidance based on careful study and discussion. 1s3 On matters of na-
tional security, the NSC stood at the center of this process. Following the advice of Rob-
ert Cutler, Eisenhower streamlined the process for developing policy papers, established a 
standardized procedure for presentations at NSC meetings, set the criteria for using out-
side consultants, and expanded the NSC membership to include both the secretary of the 
treasury and director of the budget. 
Eisenhower used these new procedures to analyze national security issues. On two 
occasions during his first term, the NSC turned to outside consultants to examine specific 
national security problems. In 1953, it created three task forces as part of Project Solar-
ium to examine different policy alternatives. Eisenhower incorporated many of their final 
152 Eisenhower's attempts to balance militaIy spending with economic security are fully detailed in John 
w. Sloan, Eisenhower and the Management of Prosperity (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1991); 
Morgan, Eisenhower Versus The Spenders'; and Kinnard, President Eisenhower and Strategy Manage-
ment. 
153 Sec Kenneth W. Thompson (ed.), The Eisenhower Presidency: Eleven Intimate Perspectives of Dwight 
D. Eisenhower (New York: University Press of America, Inc., 1984), 63-87. 
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recommendations in his new national security policy-NSC 162/2. This policy emphasized 
the maintenance of an overwhelming offensive striking power, the use of tactical nuclear 
weapons as well as conventional arms in future conflicts, and the employment of covert 
operations to undermine communism. In 1954, Eisenhower again turned to outside con-
sultants when he ordered the creation of the Killian committee to analyze the wlnerability 
of the United States to a Soviet surprise attack. After receiving the committee's conclu-
sions, Eisenhower accelerated the development of both IRBMs and ICBMs and imple-
mented the U-2 program to acquire intelligence of Soviet military capabilities and possible 
intentions. 
Scholars, such as H. W. Brands, I. M. Destler, and Samuel Huntington, have 
questioned the effectiveness of Eisenhower's organizational structure. They argue that 
rather than forcing policy advisors to make clear decisions on controversial issues, the 
NSC developed recommendations based on compromise and consensus-building. Eisen-
hower's critics claim that these recommendations were more often than not too broad or 
ambiguous. In either case, they provided only minimal guidance in developing specific 
policies. Is4 
In contrast to the above interpretations, the examples presented in this chapter re-
veal an organizational system that provided the type of advice that Eisenhower sought. ISS 
154 For critiques of the Eisenhower NSC, see Brands, "Age of Vulnerability," 986; Oestler, "The Presi-
dency and National Security Organization"; Huntington. Common Defonse, 154; Heinlein. Presidential 
Staff and National Security Policy); Melanson and Mayers (eds.), Reevaluating Eisenhower. 
ISS For more positive analyses of the Eisenhower NSC, see John Prados, Keepers olthe Keys: A History 
of the National Security Council from Truman 10 Bush (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 
1991); Falk. "The National Security Council Under Truman. Eisenhower, and Kennedy"; Nelson, "The 
Importance of Foreign Policy Process: Eisenhower and the NSC," in Bischofand Ambrose (eds.), Eisen-
hower: A Centenary, Nelson, "The 'Top of Policy Hill': President Eisenhower and the National Security 
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Eisenhower turned to the NSC and outside consultants to acquire the assistance he needed 
to make decisions. He utilized the recommendations he received from Project Solarium 
and the Killian committee to help fonnulate his policies. These committees and the NSC 
provided Eisenhower a means to explore different policy options in an environment con-
ducive to open discussion and debate. From these alternatives, Eisenhower was able to 
develop and augment his ''New Look" policies. 
The examples of Project Solarium and the Killian committee reveal the reliance 
Eisenhower placed on his decision making system. He used outside consultants to obtain 
fresh appraisals concerning specific problems and the NSC as a forum for thorough dis-
cussion and debate. Through this system, he was able to develop policies that reflected his 
economic, military, and political philosophies. Although not without its faults, the organ-
izational structure Eisenhower constructed and used in making decisions concerning na-
tional security policies during his first term provided clear and effective guidance for 
waging the cold war. 
Council"; Sloan. "The Management and Decision-Making Style of President Eisenhower"; and Hoxie, 
"Dwight David Eisenhower: Bicentennial Considerations," 253-264. 
CHAPTER 1 - The Establishment and Background 
or the Gaither Committee 
The New Look policies that Eisenhower adopted in 1953 and 1954 remained the 
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center pieces of U.S. strategy through his presidency as he relied on nuclear weapons and 
continued technological improvements to deter the Soviet Union as well as covert and 
psychological operations to wage the cold war against communism. The experts involved 
in both Project Solarium and the Killian committee helped devise the administration's 
policies. The results seemed positive. After a brief economic downturn in 1954, the 
economy prospered. Furthermore, while the Soviet Union continued to strengthen its 
military forces, the United States augmented its own capabilities by placing greater em-
phasis on strategic nuclear power. 
Eisenhower's policies won acclaim with the American population. Without sacri-
ticing security, defense spending was at its lowest since before the Korean War. In addi-
tion, the economy was experiencing steady growth with little infIation--one of Eisen-
hower's most important goals. After defeating the Democratic candidate, Adlai Steven-
son, in the 1956 presidential election, he began his second term with hope and confidence. 
Unfortunately, the promising beginning to 1951 proved short-lived. By the end of the 
year, his administration was under attack from all angles. In late November 1957, he 
wrote a friend that "Since July 25th of 1956, when Nasser announced the nationalization 
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of the Suez, I cannot remember a day that has not brought its major or minor crisis. 
Crisis had now become 'normalcy.,,,t 
Of all the controversies that plagued Eisenhower in 1957, the question of civil de-
fense had the greatest influence on the establishment of the Gaither committee. Debates 
raged over the implications of radioactive fallout, the correct balance between shelters and 
evacuation, and the requirements for stockpiling emergency materials.2 These controver-
sies were not new. Ever since the Soviet Union acquired the capability of attacking the 
United States, the president and his advisors recognized the potential consequences of a 
nuclear exchange for the civilian population, the country's infrastructure, and the govern-
ment's ability to continue to function.3 Months prior to the establishment of the Gaither 
committee, Eisenhower told the NSC ''that the picture of the terrific destruction resulting 
from a nuclear attack warranted taking a look at the whole matter in terms of determining 
how much destruction the United States and its people can absorb and still survive.''"' 
The question that concerned Eisenhower the most about civil defense was how to 
develop a plan that would "avoid hysteria on one side and complacency on the other. "S 
He recognized that U.S. civil defense programs were important to U.S. security, yet he did 
I Dwight D. Eisenhower to Swede Hazlett, November 18, 1957, in Griffith (ed.), Ike's Letters to a Friend, 
190. Eisenhower makes reference to the same letter in his memoirs to highlight the problems he faced in 
1957. See Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 226. 
2 Sec Robert A. Divine, Blowing on the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1954-1960 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1978), 54; and Allan A. Winkler, Lifo Under A Cloud: American Anxiety 
About the Atom (New York: Oxford University, 1993),84-135. See also Letter to President Eisenhower 
[from eight Representatives], June 7, 1957, EL, White House Central Files, Official Files, Box 526, Folder 
- (3),2-4. 
3 Sec for example, Report by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee. August 24, 1951, RG 218, JCS, 1951-
1953 - Geographic File, CCS 350.09 USSR (12-19-49), Sec. 14,5. 
4 Memorandum of Discussion at the 306th Meeting of the National Security Council, December 20, 1956, 
FRUS 1955-1957, 19,381. 
5 Memorandum of Discussion at the 257th Meeting of the National Security Council. August 4, 1955, 
ibid., 99. 
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not want to adopt a plan that would undermine the way of life he sought to protect. He 
desired a middle ground between regimenting society in preparation for an attack and ac-
cepting the destruction of urban centers as unpreventable.6 In January 1957, the Federal 
Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) recommended that the United States build a $32 
billion shelter system. Eisenhower and his advisers had to decide whether to accept such a 
major undertaking. 
As he had in 1953 and again in 1954, Eisenhower turned to a group of experts to 
study the relationship between active defenses-interceptor aircraft, anti-aircraft guns, and 
air defense missiles-and passive defenses-early warning radar, evacuation plans, and 
shelters. With the assistance of the Science Advisory Committee of the Office of Defense 
Mobilization (ODM), Eisenhower asked H. Rowan Gaither in May 1957 to establish a 
committee of experts formally called the Security Resources Panel but better known as the 
Gaither committee. Over the course of the summer and early faIl, the committee examined 
U.S. national security programs. When it completed its final report in November, it made 
recommendations that reflected the preconceived biases and years of study of its expert 
members. 
Plans for Civil Defense 
The impetus for the creation of the Gaither committee came from growing pres-
sures on the Eisenhower administration to reevaluate U.S. civil defense policies and to 
institute a nation-wide shelter program. From January to June of 1956, Representative 
6 Eisenhower to Governor [Val1 Peterson, July 17, 1956, EL, DOE Papers, Cabinet Series, Box 8, Folder-
Cabinet Meeting of January 9, 1957 (I), 1-2. See also, Ambrose, Eisenhower, v. 2, 397-401. 
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Chet Holifield (D-CA) chaired hearings before the House Military Operations Sub-
committee of the House Committee on Government Operations concerning the adequacy 
of u.S. civil defense planning. Holifield believed that the administration was placing too 
much emphasis on offensive striking power at the expense of continental and civil defense. 
In January 1957, the committee submitted legislation, H.R. 2125, which if passed, would 
have greatly expanded the importance of civil defense. In particular, it would have forced 
the federal government to assume control of civil defense planning whether it wanted to or 
not. 
Holifield subjected the FCDA, headed by former Nebraska governor Val Peterson, 
to the most vigorous criticism. Holifield believed that the FCDA placed too much em-
phasis on evacuating the population after receiving warning of a Soviet nuclear attack 
rather than providing shelters for the majority of the urban population who would be un-
able to leave. He emphasized that "The FCDA's policy of reliance on evacuation as the 
key civil defense measure is weak and ineffective and indeed dangerously shortsighted.'" 
Instead of evacuation, Holifield stressed the importance of shelters in protecting the 
population and deterring the Soviet Union. 8 
Holifield proposed the creation of a Department of Civil Defense, the development 
of a national plan for civil defense, and the construction of shelters in predetermined target 
areas.9 More specifically, his legislation called for the construction offaIlout shelters that 
7 U.S. Congress. House Military Operations Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, 
Civil Defense Plan for National Survival, 84th Congress, 2nd Session, 1956,692. 
8 For Holifield's views on civil defense and in particular shelters, see Thomas J. Kerr, Civil Defense in the 
U.S.: Bandaidfor a Holocaust (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1983),83-99. 
9 For a description of the proposed civil defense legislation, see ibid., 195. 
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would provide some protection to the entire American population of 170 million. The 
proposed shelter system would cost approximately $20 billion. lo The House of Represen-
tatives rejected most of Holifield's legislation during the spring of 1957, but it did shift the 
burden for civil defense planning from the localities to the federal government. 
Despite the criticism, Peterson and his assistants from the FCDA supported many 
of the Holifield committee's recommendations. Although they had originally emphasized 
evacuation, the advent of more powerful weapons and advanced delivery systems led them 
to develop a policy balanced between shelters and evacuation. In particular, the FCDA 
reevaluated its civil defense plans after the March 1954 Bravo nuclear test fanned the fears 
of radioactive fallout. This explosion yielded twice the expected amount of power and 
produced fallout that covered nearly 7,000 square miles. II After the deadly results of 
these tests became known, the FCDA placed even more emphasis on shelters because of 
the "greatly increased radiation hazard from fall-out." 12 
In December 1956, Peterson reported that the Soviet Union had the capability to 
launch a nuclear attack against the United States using bombers and submarine-launched 
missiles. After the advent of the ICBM, the warning time of such an attack could be as 
little as fifteen minutes. 13 Because of this potential threat, he submitted a FCDA proposal 
10 Ibid., 97. 
11 See Kerr, Civil Defense in the U.S., 68-70; Divine, Blowing on the Wind, 27 and 74-75; and Winkler, 
Lifo Under A Cloud, 93-94 and 116-17. 
12 NSC 5509 - Status of United States Programs for National Security as of December 31, 1954, Pan 5-
The Civil Defense Program, February I, 1955, NA. RG 273. NSC, Folder - NSC 5509, 9. 
13 Civil Defense Legislative Program. December 20, 1956, NA. RG 273, NSC, Folder - NSC 5709 
(Background Documents), 2. While it is still unknown whether the Soviet Union was capable oflaunch-
ing missiles from submarines in 1956, both the CIA and SAC reported that the Soviets might have this 
capability. See Memorandum by the Chief of Staff. U.S. Air Force for the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Sub-
marine Guided Missile Threat, September 24, 1956, NA RG 218, JCS, CCS 350.09 USSR (12-19-49) Sec. 
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in January 1951 to build a nationwide system of shelters that would be used in conjunc-
tion with pre-established evacuation plans.14 The report, which became known as NSC 
5109, accepted the conclusions of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee (NESC) which ar-
gued that 80 percent of the casualties in a nuclear attack would result from radioactive 
fallout. IS Concerned about the impact of this fallout and influenced by Holifield's call for 
shelters, the FCDA concluded that, "Most of the fallout casualties could be prevented by 
adequate shelter. ,,16 It recommended spending $32 billion over the following eight years 
to build sufficient shelters to protect the entire population. 17 
Despite the report's dire warnings, neither Eisenhower nor his top advisors were 
willing to spend such a large sum of money on an unproven method of protection. Robert 
Cutler, Eisenhower's assistant for national security affairs, argued that while shelters may 
have been necessary, without knowledge of their impact on the economy and on domestic 
and foreign opinion, a massive construction program could not be immediately imple-
mented. 18 Nonetheless, the magnitude of the anticipated destruction from a Soviet attack 
sufficiently alarmed administration officials to request further examinations of the problem. 
They launched new studies to examine the likely casualties in a nuclear exchange, the ef-
13, 10-18; and Memorandum for the Secretaty of Defense (from Admiral Radford), October 10, 1956, 
ibid., CCS 334 Air Defense of North America Ad Hoc Comte (9-2056) Sec. 1, 1-2. 
14 For a description of the FCDA's position on shelters, see ibid, 100-107. For a description of the Con-
gressional setting where Holifield's legislation met its fate, see Ambrose, Eisenhower, v. 2, 388-91. 
IS "Report of the Federal Civil Defense Administration on A Federal Civil Defense Shelter Program" 
[hereafter "Federal Civil Defense Shelter Program"1, January 17, 1957, EL, WHO, OSANSA, NSC Se-
ries, Policy Paper Subseries, Box 21, Folder - NSC 5709 - Shelter Program for Civil Defense, A-2. For a 
description of the NESC report, see FRUS 1955-1957, 19,379-81. 
16 "Federal Civil Defense Shelter Program," A-2. 
17 ibid., A-3 and A-lO. 
18 R.C. Conclusions, March 22,1957, EL, WHO, OSANSA, NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 4, 
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Programs," March 19,1957, FRUS 1955-1957, 19,442-45; and Memorandum of Discussion at the 3 18th 
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fectiveness of passive defense measures in preventing casualties, the capability of active 
defenses to destroy Soviet forces before they reached their targets, and the economic con-
sequences of these defense programs. 19 
The Establishment of the Gaither CommiUee 
Eisenhower used the NSC to examine these issues. From January to March 1957, 
the planning board discussed the FCDA's report on shelters and recommended that the 
NSC perform another study that would answer a series of questions, but most importantly, 
"What is the optimum balance between active and passive defense measures for protection 
of the civil population?,,20 On April 4, 1957, the NSC ordered four studies to answer the 
planning board's questions: 
19 "Federal Civil Defense Shelter Program." B-I-B-3. 
2O"A Federal Shelter Program for Civil Defense," March 29, 1957, EL, WHO,OSANSA. NSC Series, 
Policy Paper Subseries, Box 21, Folder - NSC 5709 - Shelter Program for Civil Defense, 2. It seems that 
in developing these questions, which were labeled A to L, the Planning Board may have been influenced 
by Dr. Isidor Rabi. a member of the Science Advisory Committee and future member of the Gaither 
committee. In a letter to ODM Director Gordon Gray, Rabi wrote: 
There is need for a broadly based study in which personnel protection is examined in rela-
tion to the following factors: strategic concepts. including conditions of strategic and tacti-
cal warning and the deterrent values of shelters; advances in the types and numbers of nu-
clear warbeads and delivery systems; capabilities of active defenses; the long-range practi-
cability of protecting densely populated urban areas from the effects of blast and cratering; 
evacuation possibilities; the relative values ofblast and fallout protection; the problems of 
post-attack recovery under continuing atomic harassment; the costs ofvarious types of 
structural protection and the relationship of dollars invested to types and extent of protec-
tion afforded; the possibility of dual purpose construction, including public building pro-
grams of school and highway construction; city planning and future patterns of expansion of 
industry and population; and national construction capabilities under normal and emer-
gency situations. 
I have quoted from Rabi's letter at length because the Gaither committee seems to have examined most of 
these factors in its study. Dr. Isidor I. Rabi to ODM Director. undated [probably March 19571, quoted in 
Infonna! Memorandum for Use at Meeting with Mr. Gaither. June 27. 1957, ibid., Briefing Notes Subser-
ies, Box 8, Folder - Fallout Shelters, 2. 
1) A study by an interdepartmental committee composed of representatives 
from the FCDA, ODM, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), and the De-
partment of Defense of different shelter programs. 
2) A study by the Science Advisory Committee of the ODM of active and 
passive defense measures for the protection of the civil population. 
3) A study by the Council of Economic Advisors of the economic costs of 
various shelter programs. 
4) A study by the Department of the Treasury of providing financial assistance 
to individuals and industries to stimulate private shelter construction.21 
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The second study by the Science Advisory Committee proved the most important 
as it eventually incorporated the findings of the other three in reaching its final conclu-
sions. To perform this study, the NSC turned to the decision-making system it had used 
so successfully in the cases of Project Solarium and the Killian Committee. It requested 
that the Science Advisory Committee appoint a panel of experts to study U.S. active and 
passive defense measures. 22 
The Science Advisory Committee gave Dr. James Killian, one of its members, the 
responsibility for selecting the project director. He recommended that the committee ap-
point Gaither, a long-time friend from their days at the World War II Radiation Labora-
tory, to oversee the study.23 Based on this recommendation, Eisenhower asked Gaither to 
ZI Memorandum of Discussion at the 318th Meeting of the National Security Council, April 4, 1957, 
FRUS 1955-1957, 19,463-64. 
22 Among the members of the Science Advisory Committee at the time of the Gaither study were Dr. 
Lloyd V. Berkner, Dr. Hans A. Bethe, Dr. Det1ev W. Bronk. Dr. Hugh L. Dryden. Dr. James B. Fisk. Dr. 
Caryl P. Haskins, Dr. Albert G. Hill, Dr. James R. Killian. Jr., Dr. Edwin H. Land, Dr. Emanuel R. Piore, 
Dr. Isidor I. Rabi, Dr. Herbert Scoville, Jr., Dr. Alan T. Waterman., and Dr. Jerrold R. Zacharias. 
n J.R. Killian to Herbert F. York. September 9, 1976, MI.T. Archives, MC 423 - Killian Papers, Box 13, 
Folder - Correspondence L-Z, 2. 
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serve as the director of the soon to be created Security Resources Panel. 24 Through the 
early summer, Gaither and the ODM selected individuals to serve on this pane~ aptly 
called the Gaither committee. Gaither divided the committee into two principle groups: 
the Steering Committee and the Advisory Panel. After he was diagnosed with arterial 
thrombosis, he stepped down as the committee's director in September to be replaced by 
Robert Sprague and William Foster. Sprague and Foster directed the Steering Committee 
which also consisted of Dr. James Baxter, Dr. Robert Calkins, John Corson, Dr. James 
Perkins, Dr. Robert Prim, Dr. Hector Skifter, William Webster, Dr. Jerome Wiesner, and 
technical advisor, Edward Oliver. The Advisory Panel included Gaither (after his illness), 
Admiral Robert Carney, General James Doolittle, General John Hul~ Dr. Mervin Kelly, 
Dr. Ernest Lawrence, Robert Lovett, John McCloy, and Dr. Frank Stanton. In addition to 
these individuals, two other groups played important advisory roles: a subcommittee of 
the Science Advisory Committee containing Dr. James Fisk. Dr. James Killian, and Dr. 
Isidor Rab~ and a committee from the Institute for Defense Analyses composed of Gen-
eral James McCormack and Dr. Albert Hill. 
In addition to its permanent members, the Gaither committee recruited nearly sev-
enty expert consultants from leading scientific organizations, engineering firms, strategic 
think -tanks, and business institutions to provide advice and make recommendations.2S 
These consultants provided invaluable background material and technical support to the 
committee. In fact, some scholars have argued that several of these advisors actually 
24 Eisenhower to Gaither, May 8,1957, EL, WHO, OSS, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subserics, Box 23, 
Folder - Science Advisory Committee (1) July '56- May '57, 1. 
2S For a complete membership list. see Gaither Report, 41-45. 
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played much larger roles than their titles as technical consultants would indicate. In par-
ticular, Colonel George Lincoln and Paul Nrtze seemed to have had great influence on the 
final report. 26 
The high caliber of this committee was without question. A sample of the qualifi-
cations of some of the members of the Steering Committee and Advisory Panel should 
provide ample evidence of the committee's expertise. Killian and Baxter served as the re-
spective presidents ofM.LT. and Wtlliams College. Because of his research at the Radia-
tion Laboratory on molecular beams, Rabi won the 1944 Nobel Prize for physics. During 
the last years of the Truman administration, Lovett and Foster acted as the Secretary and 
the Deputy Secretary of Defense, respectively. These men and the rest of the Gaither 
committee represented some of the best minds in the country. 
The Gaither committee was comprised of the type of experts which Eisenhower 
and his NSC used to acquire policy advice. The president wanted the assistance of con-
sultants who were either specialists in particular fields or possessed a broad understanding 
of U.S. national security issues. Eisenhower's belief that experts could provide invaluable 
advice dated to his experiences in World War II. While serving as the Army chief of staff 
immediately after the war, he implored his key subordinates to recognize the essential 
contnoutions that scientists, business leaders, and other experts had made to the war ef-
fort. He explained: 
The lessons of the last war are clear. The military effort required for vic-
tory threw upon the Army an unprecedented range of responsibilities, many 
26 See Kaplan. Wizards of Armageddon, 128-34; David Callahan, Dangerous Capabilities: Paul Nitze 
and the Cold War (New York: HarperCollins Publisbers, 1990), 167-71; and Steven L. Rearden. The 
Evolution of American Strategic Doctrine: Paul Nilze and the Soviet Challenge (Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1984),41-46. 
of which were effectively discharged only through the invaluable assis-
tance supplied by our cumulative resources in the natural and social sci-
ences and the talents and experience furnished by management and labor. 
The armed forces could not have won the war alone. Scientists and busi-
ness men contributed techniques and weapons which enabled us to outwit 
and overwhelm the enemy. Their understanding of the Army's needs made 
possible the highest degree of cooperation. This pattern of integration 
must be translated into a peacetime counterpart which will not merely fa-
miliarize the army with the progress made in science and industry, but draw 
into our planning for national security all the civilian resources which can 
contribute to the defense of the country. rJ 
He concluded by explaining that ''The association of military and civilians in educational 
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institutions and industry will level barriers, engender mutual understanding, and lead to the 
cultivation offiiendships invaluable for future cooperation.,,28 
Background of Key Gaither Committee Members 
More than a decade later, Eisenhower took this advice to heart when he ordered 
the establishment of the Gaither committee. Its members were well known and widely re-
spected within the Eisenhower administration. Most had either advised the administration 
earlier or had published their views on matters related to active and passive defenses. 
Without exception, the Gaither committee members viewed the expansion of Soviet mili-
tary capabilities with great concern. They did not question the assumption that if the So-
viet Union acquired the capability to launch a devastating attack on the United States 
without suffering a massive counterstrike, it would not hesitate to do SO.29 Most impor-
tandy, they believed that advances in Soviet nuclear weaponry and delivery capabilities 
27 To Directors and Chiefs of the War Department General and Special Staff Divisions and Bureaus and 
the Commanding Generals of the Major Commands, April 30, 1946, reprinted in Galambos (ed.), Papers 
o/Dwight David Eisenhower. VII,1046-47. 
28 Ibid., 1049. 
29 See Chapter 1. In most American assessments of the Soviet Union, the Kremlin leaders' intentions 
were not normally examined extensively. It was assumed that their intention was world domination. 
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raised the specter of a growing Soviet threat that had to be confronted with stronger 
U.S. strategic retaliatory forces, expanded continental defenses, and improved civil de-
fenses.3o 
The Directors 
As director of the new pane~ Gaither assumed a position with which he was quite 
familiar. Throughout his career, he had repeatedly served the government, industry, and 
research institutions as an advisor in a variety of capacities, and on several occasions su-
pervised the activities of groups of experts. While practicing law in California during 
World War II, Gaither was asked by the Radiation Laboratory at M.LT. to become the 
associate director in charge of administration. "His job," Dwight Macdonald explains, 
"was to coordinate the work of the scientific staff and to act as liaison officer between the 
Laboratory and the anned services.,,31 While at M.I.T., he became acquainted with lead-
ing scientists, engineers, and social thinkers, including Killian, Rabi, and Hill. Gaither's 
activities at the Radiation Laboratory earned him a reputation for efficient administration 
and leadership.32 
30 An internal State Department Policy Planning Staff report sheds light on problems of basing policy on 
preconceptions and assumptions. It concluded that "there is danger that policy may develop unduly on the 
basis of preconceptions and assumptions." It then explained that after World War II, and especially after 
the advent of long-range bombers and intercontinental missiles, the United States searched for something 
to blame for its new sense of vulnerability. The report argued that "The instinctive, almost visceral reac-
tion of a nation undergoing so disillusioning an experience is to seek an explanation that is psychologi-
cally satisfying. Something had gone wrong. The cause, the evil thing must be identified and personified. 
The Soviet Union became the candidate for diabolus ex machina in this situation. It satisfied all require-
ments. It was evil, powerful, implacable. The cold war was on. Soviet Communism was the enemy." L. 
W. Fuller, "An Inquiry into United States Policy Respecting the Soviet Union," April I, 1958, RG 59, 
State Department, Policy Planning Staff Records, Lot 670 548, Box 194, Folder - SIP Papers 1958 
(January-April), 1 and 4. 
31 Dwight Macdonald, The Ford Foundation: The Men and the Millions (New York: Reynal & Com-
pany, 1956), 10. 
32 Memorandum for Brig. Gen. Andrew Goodpaster, May 8, 1957, EL, WHO, ass, Subject Series, Al-
phabetical Subseries, Box 23, Folder - Science Advisory Committee (I), I; and Author's Interview with 
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After the war Gaither returned to California to teach law at the University of 
California Law School. 33 His tenure there was short, however, as the RAND Corporation 
asked him to assist in its transition to a non-profit organization. RAND had been created 
during World War II as part of the Douglas Aircraft Company to perform research and 
development for the Army Air Forces. After the war, questions arose as to whether the 
military and a specific company should be tied so closely together. The Air Force and the 
Douglas Company agreed to spin offRANO as an independent, non-profit corporation. 
Beginning in late 1947, Gaither joined RAND's Board of Trustees to lead it through this 
transition. From 1948 to his death in 1961, with the exception of only one year, Gaither 
served as the chairman of the RAND Board ofTrustees.34 
Gaither's leadership at RAND led to opportunities in other areas. One of 
Gaither's responsibilities was to arrange financing for RAND's operations. Through his 
contacts with former M.I.T. President Karl Compton. he obtained a meeting with Henry 
Ford II to discuss a possible grant for RAND. Gaither's presentation so impressed Ford 
that the automotive heir not only gave RAND a $1 million grant, but asked Gaither to join 
the Ford Foundation and write a report proposing the future objectives of that organiza-
tion.35 Gaither promptly accepted. 
Dr. Albert Hill, August 14, 1995. For descriptions of the Radiation Laboratory, see John Burchard, 
Q.E.D.: MI. T. in World War II (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1948),215-36; Ivan A. Getting. 
All in a Lifotime: Science in the Defense of Democracy (New York: Vantage Press, 1989), 187-201; and 
Daniel 1. Kevles, The Physicists: The History of a Scientific Community in Modem America (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), 303-8. 
33 Eleanora W. Schoenebaum (ed.) Political ProfiJes: The Eisenhower Years (New York: Facts on File, 
Inc., 1977), 219. 
34 Bruce L. R. Smith, The RAND Corporation: Case Study of a Nonprofit Advisory Corporation 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966),67 and 185. 
35 Macdonald, Ford Foundation, 11. 
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In his final report for Ford, Gaither reached several conclusions that are relevant 
to his later work on the Gaither committee. He saw the Ford Foundation as an organiza-
tion that could provide financial support for "studies and analyses by special committees, 
individuals, or research institutes" in an environment unhampered by political pressures. 36 
He believed that it was essential that the United States government avoid overly defensive 
or negative policies. He stressed that "If such a defensive attitude is allowed to control 
our planning and thinking, our national effort will be diverted unduly to expedient and 
temporary measures from the more important tasks ahead, and we may grow like the thing 
we fight. ,,37 Gaither's work on this report led to his appointment in 1951 as the Ford 
Foundation's associate director and in 1953 as its president.38 
After Gaither fell ill in August 1957, he was unable to continue his duties as the di-
rector of the committee. He was succeeded by William Foster and Robert Sprague who 
had equally illustrious backgrounds. Foster had served the Truman administration in a va-
riety of capacities and was currently the vice president of the Olin-Mathieson Chemical 
Company. Sprague was the president of Sprague Electric Company and had advised the 
Eisenhower administration on continental defense questions on several occasions prior to 
1957. Together, they completed the task that Gaither began. 
Foster rose to prominence in the manufactured steel industry during World War ll. 
Because of his position as the president of the Pressed and Welded Steel Products Com-
36 Report of the Study for the Ford Foundation on Policy and Program (Detroit, MI: Ford Foundation, 
1949),58. 
37 Ibid., 22. 
38 Schoenebaum. Political Profiles: The Eisenhower Years, 219. For a more in-depth description of 
Gaither's study for the Ford Foundation, see Macdonald, Ford Foundation. 137-40. 
85 
pany, he served on several government committees during the war that were concerned 
with small business manufacturing. After the war, Secretary of Commerce Averell Harri-
man asked President Truman to appoint Foster undersecretary of commerce. Foster 
served in that position from January 1947 to the summer of 1948. When Harriman was 
appointed ambassador-at-Iarge to Western Europe to supervise the operations of the Eco-
nomic Cooperation Administration (ECA), he asked Foster to join him as his assistant. 
Foster rose from this position to become the deputy administrator of the ECA in 1949 and 
administrator in 1950. While serving in the ECA, he helped integrate Greece into the 
Marshall Plan, briefed Congress on European economic needs, and, after the start of the 
Korean War, negotiated loans with European countries to encourage their participation in 
the war.39 
In 1951, Truman appointed Foster deputy secretary of defense. From this posi-
tion. Foster became acquainted with the most controversial military issues and learned a 
great deal about the formulation and implementation of Defense Department policies.40 
Two of his most important assignments during his tenure as the deputy secretary were to 
brief Congress on the efficiency of the Defense Department's organization and to head a 
panel of experts which made a comparative study of U.S. and Soviet military strength.41 
39 Eleanora W. Schocnebaum (ed.), Political Profiles: The Truman Years (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 
1978), 175-76. For descriptions of some of Foster's activities on the ECA, see Michael 1. Hogan, The 
Marshall Plan: America, Britain. and the Reconstruction o/Western Europe. 1947-1952 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1987),222,283, and 388-91; and Sallie Pisani, The eM and the i\-farshall 
Plan (Lawrence. KA: University of Kansas Press, 1991),95-96. 
40 Leffler. Preponderance o/Power, 497-98. 
41 Schoencbaum, Political Profiles: The Eisenhower Years, 211-12. 
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Of particular importance to his later work on the Gaither committee, he became aware 
of the strengths and weaknesses of the Strategic Air Command. 42 
Foster resigned from the Defense Department to become the president of the 
Manufacturing Chemists Association when Eisenhower took office. In 1955, he became 
the executive vice president of the Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation. 43 
Sprague maintained much closer ties to the Eisenhower administration than Foster. 
Sprague was Eisenhower's first choice for the position of under secretary of the Air Force 
in 1953. However, Sprague was unable to accept the appointment because he could not 
relinquish his stock holdings in his own Massachusetts electric company.44 This problem 
did not long impede his opportunities for government service.4S In October 1953, Senator 
Leverett Saltonstall (R-MA) requested Sprague's assistance in examining u.S. continental 
defenses.46 Sprague traveled to SAC headquarters and received a two-day briefing from 
General LeMay concerning the relationship of SAC forces to continental defense.47 He 
also gained access to numerous top secret studies and reports from the Department of 
Defense, Army, Air Force, Navy, Atomic Energy Commission, National Security Council, 
42 William Foster to General Curtis leMay, September 10, 1952, LC, Papers of General Curtis LeMay, 
Box 72, Folder - Visits to SAC, l. 
43 Scboenebaum, Political Profiles: The Eisenhower Years, 212. 
44 Robert Sprague to General Vandenberg. February 10, 1953, LC, Papers of General Hoyt Vandenberg, 
Box 31, Folder - S (General), 1-3; and Robert C. Sprague Oral History, August I, 1964, John Foster 
Dulles Oral History Collection, Princeton University, 2-3. 
4S For a summary of the Sprague's involvement as an advisor, see Memorandum for the Files, December 9, 
1957, EL, WHO, OSANSA, NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 16, Folder - Security Resources 
Panel, 1. 
46 Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, October 20, 1953, NA. RG 218, JCS, Records of Admiral 
Arthur Radford, Folder - CJCS 381 (Continental Defense) 1953, l. 
47 Notes for the Commander, November 10, 1953, LC, LeMay Papers, Box B 10430 Folder - LeMay Diary 
#5, 1. 
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and Central Intelligence Agency.48 Fmally, JCS chairman Admiral Arthur Radford 
briefed him on the ability of the Soviet Union to prevent a retaliatory strike, the impact of 
such a strike on that country, and the wlnerability of the United States to a surprise at-
tack.49 
Sprague presented his report to the Senate Armed Services Committee in March 
1954 and later also briefed the Joint Atomic Energy Committee and the House Armed 
Services Committee. so He recommended expanding early warning radar coverage, in-
creasing the number and quality of interceptor airplanes, and strengthening anti-aircraft 
defenses around SAC bases. SI He concluded that the problems of continental defense 
"will never be static," and that the United States will have "to face up to the fact that the 
threat ofan air-atomic attack introduces a new factor in our way of life. Living with it 
may not be so comfortable as before, but it is a burden which the country can abide, still 
remaining free. It means doing the things which must be done, paying the bills which must 
be paid, and running the risks which must be run. ,,52 
48 Memorandum for Adm. Gardner, Gen. Partridge, Gcn. Lemnitzer, and Gen. Twining, November 27, 
1953, NA, RG 218, lCS, Radford Records, Folder - CICS 381 (Continental Defense) 1953, 1; Memoran-
dum for Admiral Radford, December 9. 1953, ibid., 1-2; and Memorandum for Admiral Radford, Decem-
ber 4, 1953, ibid., I. In his oral history interview, Sprague reported that he bad access to all documents 
related to U.S. continental defenses, except for a report prepared for the lCS on "an assumed air atomic 
attack by the United States on Russia." Admiral Radford refused to release the report because the lCS had 
not even had the opportunity to review the report. However, Radford did brief Sprague for two hours con-
cerning the content of the document See Sprague Oral History, 3-4. 
49 Memorandum for the Record, December 12, 1953, NA, RG 218, lCS, Radford Records, Folder - CICS 
381 (Continental Defense) 1953, 1-2. 
so "Report on Continental Defense to the Senate Armed Services Committee," March 8, 1954, EL, DDE 
Papers, Administrative Series, Box 33, Folder - Sprague, Robert C. Material, 1. For a description of the 
briefing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, see Memorandum for Admiral Arthur Radford, March 
26, 1954, NA, RG 218, lCS, Radford Records, Folder - CICS 381 (Continental Defense) Jan.-Mar. 1954, 
1. For a description of Sprague's briefing ofboth the Joint Atomic Energy Committee and the House 
Armed Services Committee, see Memorandum for Admiral Arthur Radford, March 30, 1954, ibid., 1-2. 
51 "Repon on Continental Defense," 2-5. Large portions of this report remain classified. 
52 Ibid, 6. 
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Sprague reached even more alarming conclusions three months later after Soviet 
scientists tested a one megaton nuclear device and the United States completed a series of 
tests on thermonuclear weapons. The tests indicated that the Soviet Union was not far 
behind the United States in nuclear weapons technology and highlighted the gradual de-
cline of U.S. military power relative to the Soviet Union. Sprague believed that the 
United States was more vulnerable to an atomic attack than the Soviet Union. He also 
stressed that the initiative in a conflict would remain with the Kremlin leaders. and "the 
moral character of the Soviet rulers is such that the thought of wide-spread death and de-
struction in an atomic war is of no significance [to them] in deterring such a war.,,53 He 
then identified three possible policy alternatives. First. the United States could construct a 
defensive system capable of withstanding any possible Soviet attack. Second. it could 
"strike the first blow." Third. it could "Live with the USSR in a state of equilibrium 
brought about by mutual fear of atomic attack. ,,54 
After becoming a consultant to the NSC on continental defenses in June 1954. 
Sprague reported that the danger from a Soviet surprise attack had grown. He argued 
that since the United States had tested new thermonuclear weapons, the Soviet Union 
could not be far behind. Furthermore, these new weapons produced so much radioactive 
fallout that each nuclear explosion was now much more dangerous. Finally, the Soviet 
development of the Type 39 jet bomber signaled a potential Soviet capability to launch a 
surprise attack against the United States. Sprague concluded that "These three new ele-
S3 Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, June 23, 1954, NA. RG 218, Radford Records, Folder-
CJCS 381 (Continental Defense) Jun.-Dec. 1954, 1. This memorandum discusses a briefing that Sprague 
presented to Senators Saltonstall, Styles Bridges (R-NH), Harry or Robert (1) Byrd. and Adm. Radford. 
54 Ibid., 1. 
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ments of danger enormously increase the threat to our national survival in the event of a 
Soviet surprise attack against the continental United States."" 
Less than a year later, Sprague presented a new report to the NSC. While making 
an obvious reference to the recently completed Killian report, Sprague argued that the 
years from 1958 to 1960 represented the "period of greatest danger-when Russia will 
have a large enough stockpile of multi-megaton weapons and the means for delivering 
them on continental U.S. targets.,,'6 When the NSC examined this report, Eisenhower 
stated that he believed that Sprague may have overestimated Soviet delivery capabilities. 
But, he did not question the great value of Sprague's report. Its importance "lay in mak-
ing us reassess our programs . . . for the purpose of seeing if we were placing proper em-
phasis on the right programs. ,,51 
Committee Members and Adviserrs 
While Sprague worked extensively as a consultant with the Eisenhower admini-
strati on, many other Gaither committee members had served in advisory roles. Several of 
its members had developed close professional relationships with one another while work-
ing at the Radiation Laboratory during World War II. This was particularly true for Kil-
55 "Report of Robert C. Sprague (NSC Consultant) to the National Security Council on Continental De-
fense," November 24, 1954, EL, WHO, OSANSA. NSC Series, Subject Subseries, Box 3, Folder - Conti-
nental Defense, Study of - by Robert C. Sprague (1953-1954) (12), 1. 
56 "Report of Robert C. Sprague (NSC Consultant) to the National Security Council on Continental De-
fense," June 16, 1955, ibid., Folder - Continental Defense, Study of-by Robert C. Sprague (1955) (3), 3. 
57 Memorandum of Discussion at the 252nd Meeting of the National Security Council, June 16, 1955, 
FRUS /955-1957, 19,89. 
58 This section will contain descriptions of some of the experts who served on the Gaither committee's 
steering panel, advisory panel, and sub-committees. The authors of the final report will be discussed in a 
separate section. 
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lian and Hill. Killian had served as the vice-president of M. I. T. during the war. S9 In this 
capacity, he worked closely with the Radiation Laboratory. ~ a physics professor, di-
rected the laboratory's Division Five dealing with transmitter components.60 After the 
war, Killian and Hill collaborated closely on many problems involving M.I.T. and defense 
Issues. 
In 1953 they co-authored an article for Atlantic magazine. Killian and Hill argued 
that the United States "must achieve a stronger defense without weakening or subordinat-
ing our offensive power.,,61 They were concerned that if the United States continued to 
neglect continental defenses while emphasizing offensive capabilities, the Soviet Union 
might acquire the ability to attack North America.62 They identified five military priorities: 
controlling the seas, defending the continent, maintaining a nuclear counterstrike capabil-
ity, protecting Western Europe, and preventing small wars from becoming larger ones.63 
They stressed that the United States needed to develop a reliable early warning system, 
anti-aircraft and anti-missile defenses, and the ability to destroy enemy forces at long 
range. 64 
As M.LT.'s president, Killian played a pivotal role in establishing the Lincoln 
Laboratory in February 1951. By this time there was a growing concern within the Air 
Force that the Soviet Union might acquire the capability to attack the United States. Be-
cause the Chief of Staff of the Air Force General Hoyt Vandenberg did not believe that the 
S9 Getting, All in A Lifetime, 205. 
60 Ibid., 192. 
61 James R. Killian and A. G. Hill, "For a Continental Defense, n Atlantic 192:5 (November 1953), 38. 
62 James R. Killian, The Education a/College President: A Memoir (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 1985), 
74. 
63 Killian and Hill, "Continental Defense," 37. 
64 Ibid., 40. 
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Air Force itself could analyze U.S. air defenses effectively, he approached Killian about 
establishing an independent research and development organization similar to the Radia-
tion Laboratory. After months of negotiations, M.I.T. accepted a tri-service contract from 
the Army, Navy, and Air Force to establish a laboratory to perform military research. 
With Killian's approval, Dr. Hill directed the new laboratory until 1955.6s Its main re-
sponsibility was to develop the Semi-Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE) air defense 
system.66 
In addition to its involvement with the Lincoln Laboratory, M.1. T. provided sup-
port facilities for several studies of U.S. defense issues.67 In 1950 M.LT. physics profes-
sor, and future Gaither committee member, Jerrold Zacharias developed the concept of the 
summer study program when he directed Project Hartwell, a Navy sponsored examination 
of underseas warfare. In 1951 and 1952, Hill supervised Project Charles and Project Lin-
coln--two separate studies of U.S. air defenses. In these same years, fifteen scientists par-
ticipated in Project Beacon Hill, a study of Air Force intelligence and reconnaissance ca-
pabilities.68 Together, these summer studies emphasized the need for "measures to reduce 
the wlnerability to surprise of our strategic air power, to keep the sea lanes open, to im-
65 For a discussion of the creation of the Lincoln Laboratory, see "Draft - Lincoln Laboratory, and the 
Years 1945-1955," MIT Archives. MC 365 - Hill Papers, Box 14, Folder #4,3-5; Schaffel, Emerging 
Shield, 145-56; and Leslie, The Cold War and American Science, 32-43. 
66 The Lincoln Laboratory researched and developed the SAGE system until 1958, when it turned it over 
to a non-profit organization. the MITRE corporation. See MITRE: The First Twenty Years, A History of 
the MITRE Corporation (1958-1978) (Bedford, MA: The MITRE Corporation, 1979), 12-16. 
67 For a complete list of the different summer study projects, see Special Reports - Studies and Projects, 
undated [1977J, M.I.T. Archives, MC 423 - Killian Papers, Box 13, Folder - Backup O-Z, 5. 
68 Wclzenbach, "Din Land," 22. 
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prove our military communications and gathering of hard intelligence, [and] to acceler-
ate our ICBM programs. ,,69 
Of these studies, Project Charles and Project Lincoln were the most important in 
shaping Killian's and Hill's views concerning continental defenses. Project Charles vividly 
described the problems faced by the United States in planning air defenses. "The problem 
of the defense of the Untied States against air attack," it concluded, 
is characterized above all by a lack of knowledge of what we have to de-
fend against. The enemy has the initiative. Our intelligence tells us essen-
tially nothing about his plans; informs us only partially about his present 
capabilities; and as to his future capabilities leaves us essentially dependent 
on assumptions that he can, if he chooses, do about as well in any aspect as 
we expect to do ourselves.70 
Project Lincoln addressed these problems by recommending the extension of the Distant 
Early Warning (DEW) Line to provide earlier warning ofa Soviet attack. The study also 
called for the development of an effective interceptor force and suggested that plans be 
devised to meet the threat posed by the ICBMs.71 
After their 1953 article, Killian and Hill continued their involvement in studies of 
U.S. continental defenses. Killian directed the extremely influential 1954 Technical Ca-
pabilities Panel. This group, which contained many future Gaither committee members, 
perceived a potentially significant threat as the Soviet Union acquired advanced nuclear 
weapons and delivery capabilities. It recommended the development of an intercontinental 
ballistic missile, the reduction of SAC vulnerability, and the strengthening of continental 
69 Killian, Sputnik, &ientists, and Eisenhower, 103. 
70 "Problems of Air Defense, Final Report of Project Charles," v. I, August I, 1951,3, quoted in Nunn, 
The Soviet Threat, 118. 
71 Schaffel, Emerging Shield, 174-75. 
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defenses. More specifically, it advised that the United States needed to construct addi-
tional SAC bases, institute an emergency dispersal plan for SAC forces, and develop ac-
tive defenses surrounding SAC bases.72 
As a member of the Science Advisory Committee, Killian's influence on Eisen-
hower did not stop with the panel's final report. In a meeting with Eisenhower in 1956, 
Killian and Dr. James Fisk, another member of the Science Advisory Committee and later 
of the Gaither committee, reiterated the need for strengthening U.S. continental defenses. 
They argued that the United States had to accelerate ''the development of high altitude 
radar, SAC dispersal, and quicker reaction time for SAC in case of attack. ,,73 Without 
these improvements, they feared the Soviet Union would be able to launch a successful 
attack against the United States. 
Demonstrating his confidence in Killian, Eisenhower asked him to chair a new 
committee, the President's Board ofConsuitants on Foreign Intelligence, that would ex-
amine the effectiveness of the CIA in performing its responsibilities. In addition to Killian, 
the committee consisted offuture Gaither committee members, General James Doolittle 
and Robert Lovett, Admiral Richard Conolly, Benjamin Fairless, General John Hull, 
Josesph Kennedy, and Edward Ryerson.74 Eisenhower gave the board broad discretion in 
its investigations so that it could determine if the "policies and programs pursued by the 
CIA and other elements of the intelligence community are sound, effective, and economi-
12 See chapter 1. 
73 Memorandum ofa Conference with the President, May 18, 1956, FRUS 1955-1957, 19,303. 
74 John Steven Chwat, "The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board: An Historical and Contem-
porruy Analysis (1955-1975)," Congressional Research Office, 1975,5. 
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cally operated.,,7S While most of its activities remain classified. the committee did meet 
with Eisenhower five times and held nineteen other meetings between 1956 and 1961.76 
One of the most important conclusions that the committee did reach was that the "Quality 
of foreign intelligence-Both National and Departmental Intelligence with respect to the 
Soviets is seriously inadequate in all fields and at allievels."n 
Hill served the Eisenhower administration more indirectly than Killian. In addition 
to acting as the director of the Lincoln Laboratory until 1955, he also served as the direc-
tor of the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group (WSEG) and as the vice president of the 
Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA). The JCS created WSEG in 1948 and assigned it 
three broad objectives: 
1) To bring scientific and technical as well as operational military expertise 
to bear in evaluating weapons systems. 
2) To employ advanced techniques of scientific analysis and operations re-
search in the process. 
3) To approach its tasks from an impartial, supra-Service perspective.7S 
In this capacity, WSEG studied numerous defense issues, including an examination of 
continental defenses in 1955 under Hill's direction.79 While it did not reach any new con-
75 Eisenhower Diary EntIy, January 24, 1956, in Ferren (ed.), Eisenhower Diaries, 312. 
76 Chwat, "The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board." 6. The committee was officially created 
by e.xecutive order 10586, February 8, 1956. 
77 Perfonnance of Function of CIA, undated, MIT Archives, MC 423 - Killian Papers. Box 36, Folder -
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board [7I8J, 2. 
78 John Ponturo, Analytical Support for the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The WSEG Experience. 1948-1976 
(Arlington, VA: Institute for Defense Analysis, 1979), X. 
79 Joint Chiefs of Staff Decision on JCS 1812151 on Program of Future Work for WSEG, May 4, 1955, RG 
218, JCS, 1957 Decimal File, Folder - CCS 334 WSEG (2-4-48) Sec. 5, i. 
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elusions, it enabled Hill to become acquainted with General leMay and to learn about 
SAC.SO 
In 1956 both SAC and CIA intelligence estimates indicated that the Soviet Union 
could acquire the capability to launch missiles with nuclear warheads from submarines.81 
If the Soviets possessed this capability, they could possibly launch an attack against the 
United States without warning. Accordingly, JCS chairman Admiral Radford asked Hill 
to lead a new ad hoc committee to study U.S. air defenses.82 Hill's committee reached 
shocking conclusions. After arguing that "The goal for the defense of North America 
against air attack should be the achievement and maintenance of a level of air defense ef-
fectiveness sufficient to give a reasonable chance of defending approximately 80 percent of 
the vital target areas of the nation," it stressed that the United States was falling danger-
ously short of these capabilities.83 
Hill's involvement in the IDA stemmed from his close association with Killian. 
One of Killian's overriding goals as the president ofM.LT. was to foster close coopera-
tion between scientists, academic institutions, and the government. In 1956, Killian 
worked with the Department of Defense to establish a university consortium to support 
80 leMay to Ll. General S. E. Anderson, December 29, 1955, LC, LeMay Papers, Box B205, Folder-
B50703.1. 
81 Memorandum by the Chief of Staff. U.S. Air Force for the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Submarine Guided 
Missile Threat. September 24, 1956, NA, RG 218, JCS, Folder - CCS 350.09 USSR (12-19-49) Sec. 13, 
10-18. 
82 Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, October 10, 1956, ibid, Folder - CCS 334 Air Defense of 
North America Ad Hoc Comte (9-20-56) Sec. 1, 1-2. In addition to Hill, the committee consisted of Gen-
eral Carl Spaatz, General Thomas Handy, and Admiral John Ballentine. See Memorandum for General 
Carl Spaatz, General Thomas Handy, Admiral John Ballentine, and Dr. Albert Hill, November 7, 1956, 
ibid., 1. 
83 "Report of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Ad Hoc Committee on Air Defense, n June 30, 1957, quoted in Note 
by the Secretaries of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Briefing Presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Levels 
of Defense Effectiveness, October 18, 1957, ibid, Folder - CCS 381 US (5-23-46) Sec. 89 RB. 2395. 
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WSEG. He organized five universities-M.I.T., California Institute for Technology, 
Case Institute, Stanford, and Tulane-into the non-profit IDA He hoped that the IDA 
would be "a means of lending scientific prestige to the enterprise [WSEG], facilitating ac-
cess to the scholarly research community, and promoting a working climate that would 
appeal to civilian research analysts."" Hill became the IDA's vice president. The IDA 
later proved instrumental in the development of the Gaither report. Both Hill and General 
James McCormack, M.l. T. 's vice president for Industrial Relations, served as the IDA's 
advisors to the Gaither committee.85 "The [Gaither] Committee," one scholar concludes, 
"called on IDA as its prime contractor to help support the panel participants with technical 
assistance, research and fact-finding, managerial and administrative services, editorial and 
publication support, security, and the like.,,86 
As an expert on continental defense issues, Hill also studied civil defense problems. 
In the 1950s he served on two committees that were concerned with these issues: the 
1952 Project East River and the 1955 Review of Project East River. These committees 
contained several future Gaither committee members, including General Otto Nelson and 
Dr. Lloyd Berkner. This 1952 study, named after the river that flows through New York 
City, laid the foundation for most civil defense plans developed in the Eisenhower admini-
strarion.87 In its six volume final report, the initial Project East River committee reached 
several conclusions that were of direct relevance to the Gaither committee. The report 
84 Pooturo. Analytical Support for the Joint Chiefs ofStafJ, xv. 
85 McConnack also bad an extensive background in strategic matters. For instance, he served as the di-
rector of Task Force B of Project Solarium. See chapter 1. 
86 Pooturo, Analytical Support for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 164-65. 
87 Sec the influence of the 1952 Project East River in Memorandum for President Eisenhower, April 10, 
1953, EL, DOE Papers, Miscellaneous Series, Box 4, Folder - President's Advisory Committee 00 Gov-
ernment Organization - Government Reorganization Civil Defense, 2. 
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stressed that the United States had to improve both its air defenses and civil defenses.ss 
It then emphasized that continental and civil defenses were interchangeable components in 
the security of the United States. An air defense system must "be devised that aims at de-
stroying substantially all of the airborne attackers prior to the time that they reach the 
United States. If this is not achieved, Civil Defense becomes unmanageable and largely 
futile.,,89 In the area of civil defense, the committee called for achieving the greatest pos-
sible warning of an attack, constructing shelters, and educating the public to the dangers 
of radioactive fallout. 90 
In 1955, Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson, FCDA Director Peterson, and 
ODM Director Arthur Fleming requested that Nelson, Berkner, and Hill create a group to 
review the findings from the 1952 report and determine whether the United States had 
strengthened its continental and civil defenses in the intervening years. Wilson, Peterson, 
and Fleming told the group that "Most ofall we need the thinking of those of you who are 
away from the day to day activities of the Federal Government, but who are still thor-
oughly concerned with the basic problems.91 After their review, Nelson's committee con-
eluded that "Despite the efforts made [between 1952 and 1955], it is necessary to report 
that the nation's preparations and progress in non-military defense are still far from what 
88 For a description of the 1952 Project East River, see Schaffel, Emerging Shield, 172-91. 
89 "Military Measures Precedent to a Manageable Civil Defense, Part IIA of the Report of Project East 
River," June 26, 1952,63, quoted in Joseph T. Jockel. No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada. the United 
States. and the Origins of North American Air Defonse. 1945-1958 (Vancouver: University of British 
Columbia Press, 1987), 28. 
90 Project East River: Reduction of Urban Vulnerability, part 5 (New York: Associated Universities, 
Inc., 1952),60a. 
91 "1955 Review of the Report of Project East River,'" October 17, 1955, NA. RG 218, JCS, Folder - CCS 
384.51 (10-31-46) sec. 10 BP Planning for Civil Defense of U.S., iii. 
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they should be. ,,92 They attributed the deficiencies to rapid technological advances and 
the lack of positive leadership in developing non-military defenses. Without improvements 
in these areas, they believed the United States was in serious danger. 
The review committee of civilian experts was particularly influenced by the poten-
tial implications of the rapid advances in nuclear weapons technology. "The most impor-
tant consequence of the rapid progress in making much more powerful and cheaper nu-
clear weapons and the resulting increasingly serious problem of radioactive fallout," it 
concluded, "is that the potential disaster area will be larger than any city boundary and will 
frequently overlap several state boundaries. ,,93 They recommended the strengthening of 
u.s. non-military defenses, especially the protection of the civil population. They believed 
the best way to achieve these results was to create an intelligence gathering apparatus 
which would provide the maximum strategic warning of a Soviet attack and to design 
plans for both the evacuation and sheltering of the civil population if such an attack was to 
occur. 94 
Testimony before the 1956 Holifield Committee on civil defense echoed the find-
ings of both the 1952 and 1955 Project East River committees. Representative Holifield 
invited many experts, including Hill, Berkner, Killian, and Nelson, to come before his 
committee. They all emphasized the inadequacies of U.S. civil defense programs and the 
need to recognize the close relationship between offensive and defensive capabilities in 
deterring the Soviet Union. Hill argued that "it is impossible to defend our offensive 
92 Ibid., 2. 
93 Ibid., s. 
94 See ibid., 7 and 15. 
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strength without defending the civilian population as well.,,95 In evaluating the relation-
ship between offensive and defensive capabilities, Berkner explained that "By remaining an 
easy and inviting target, we encourage an uncompromising enemy to believe that war 
against us is an easy and feasible way to succeed in his objectives ... 96 In his testimony, 
Killian stressed that, "While our main deterrent to war and to an attack against the United 
States is our capacity to inflict terrible damage on the enemy, this deterrent needs to be 
augmented and accompanied by the deterrent strength of an adequate defense against 
atomic attack and an adequate civil defense to reduce the damage of an atomic attack 
should it come."cn Finally, Nelson argued that U.S. civil defenses "could become the criti-
cal, determining factor that might persuade the Soviets, in even a period of great rashness 
and madness, that they should not risk an atomic war.,,98 
Other future Gaither committee members corroborated these findings in separate 
studies. Dr. Mervin Kelly, the vice president of Bell Telephone Laboratories, and Dr. 
James Baxter, the president of Williams College, participated in studies in 1952 and 1953 
which examined U.S. air defenses. In 1952 Truman's secretary of defense, Robert 
Lovett, also a future Gaither committee member, asked Kelly to chair a panel that would 
study u.s. air defenses.99 Although Kelly's committee concluded that an absolute defense 
9S Civil Defense Plan for National Survival, 83. 
96 Ibid., 97. 
97 Ibid., 215. 
98 Ibid., 671. 
99 Memorandum for JCS, Janwuy 26, 1953, NA. RG 218, JCS, 1951-1953 Geographical File, Folder-
CCS 381 US (5-23-46) sec. 23, I. In addition to Kelly, the committee consisted of Walker Cisler, the 
president of Detroit Edison Company, S. C. Hollister, dean of Engineering at Cornell University, F. L. 
Hoyde, president of Purdue University, C. C. Lauritsen, physics professor at the California Institute for 
Technology, Arthur E. Raymond, vice president of Douglas Aircraft Company, and R E. Wilson, chair-
man of Standard Oil Company. 
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network could not be built and offensive capabilities bad to be emphasized, it neverthe-
less called for the development of "a comprehensive plan for air defense," the extension of 
the early warning radar network "as far as possible from US borders," and the implemen-
tation of "a vigorous civil defense program."UIO 
The Kelly report prompted Eisenhower to appoint two new committees to study 
u.S. continental defenses. The first, headed by retired General Harold Bull, presented its 
report in July and provided the foundation for the Eisenhower administration's first policy 
statement concerning continental defenses--NSC 159. The Bull report reached similar 
conclusions as the Kelly committee. 101 In evaluating the Bull committee's findings, Eisen-
hower turned to a second committee of outside consultants, including Baxter, for its 
opinions. 102 At a September 1953 NSC meeting, this committee supported NSC 159 but 
stressed the importance of continuing the administration's emphasis on reducing the 
budget. 103 
While various experts were lamenting the inadequacies of u.S. civil and continen-
tal defense plans, Eisenhower was growing concerned about the inability of the United 
States to acquire accurate inteUigence assessments of the Soviet Union. His creation of 
the Killian committee reveals just how disturbed he was about the possibility of the Soviet 
100 Robert 1. Watson, History o/the Joint Chiefs o/Staff: The Joint Chiefs o/Staff and National Policy. 
1953-1954, v. 5 (GPO, 1986), 119-20. For a description of the Kelly Report, see Schaffel, Emerging 
Shield, 185-90. 
101 See Watson. History o/the Joint Chiefs o/Staff, v. 5, 126-27. 
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president AT & T. 
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Union being in a position to launch a surprise attack against the United States. His 
concern stemmed from the changing technological environment and the secrecy that en-
veloped the Soviet Union. Eisenhower attempted to identify and rectify some of the diffi-
culties in intelligence gathering by asking General James Doolittle, a trusted advisor and 
World War II hero, to examine the effectiveness of the CIA's operations. 
Doolittle became a national hero after leading a surprise air raid on Tokyo four 
months after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. His expertise went beyond this ac-
complishment. Prior to the war he was a Rhodes scholar and earned a Ph.D. in aeronauti-
cal engineering from M.LT. After the war, he became the vice president of Shell Oil 
Company. In addition to working at Shell, Doolittle continued to advise the Air Force. 
From 1950 to 1958, he served on the Air Force Science Advisory Board and acted as its 
chainnan for the last three years. 104 While this position may not seem illustrious, it pro-
vided Doolittle personal access to the Air Force chief of staff. One of his contemporaries 
recalled that «Jimmy [Doolittle] carried much more weight in Air Force affairs after he re-
tired than the titles he held would indicate, and the reasons ... were his reliability and his 
credibility." lOS 
It was not surprising that Eisenhower turned to Doolittle in 1954. Not only was 
Doolittle already serving on the steering committee of the Technical Capabilities Panel, 
but he possessed a philosophy that comported with Eisenhower's. Doolittle recognized 
104 Thomas A. Strum, The USAF Scientific Advisory Board: Its First Twenty Years. 1944-1964 (GPO, 
1967),45. Dr. Mervin KeUy, a future Gaither committee member, also served on this board from 1951 to 
1957. 
lOS Herbert F. York, Making Weapons. Talking Peace: A Physicist's Odyssey from Hiroshima to Geneva 
(New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1987),88. 
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the importance of both economic security and technological advancement. In a 1949 
speech, he emphasized that "Economy should be the watchword in our military thinking. 
Waste plays directly into Russia's hands. Balance between the services must be achieved 
with national. not individual service, welfare in mind. The course is clear: The first step in 
avoiding war with Russia is to avoid waste and to remain technologically ahead of her." 106 
At an Air Force Science Advisory Board meeting during the same year, Doolittle dis-
cussed the importance of maintaining technological superiority over the Soviet Union. He 
explained "that the only thing that is going to keep us out of war is our technological ad-
vantage. It is far better to keep out of war than to win a war. If we permit a potential en-
emy to get ahead of us technologically ... that is the surest way to start a war." 107 
When Eisenhower turned to Doolittle in 1954, he wanted to obtain "some indica-
tion of the over-all adequacy of our National Intelligence Program and the manner of its 
implementation." He added that "we should briefly review the activities of all agencies of 
government charged with the collection, interpretation and dissemination of intelligence 
dealing with the plans, capabilities and intentions of potential enemies.,,108 For three 
months, Doolittle and the other committee members, William Frank, Morris Hadley, and 
William Pawley, examined U.S. intelligence operations. In their examination they had ac-
106 James H. Doolittle, "A Program for World Peace," address at Georgetown University, April 30, 1949, 
reprinted in Eugene M. Emme (cd), The Impact of Air Power: National Security and World Politics, 
(Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1959), 800. 
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1~ Charter for Doolittle Committee, July 13, 1954, EL, WHO, OSS, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subser-
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cess to all available information concerning U.S. intelligence activities including covert 
operations. 109 
Eisenhower treated the committee's report with the utmost sensitivity. He ordered 
CIA Director Dulles "to show it to no one else," when he analyzed its recommendations 
and conclusions. 110 The White House press release describing the committee's findings 
did little more than say that the committee had found a few areas that needed improve-
ment, but, on the whole, the CIA was in good shape. III It is now clear that this press re-
lease understated the problems in U.S. intelligence operations. The study called for a new 
policy in waging the cold war. "It is now clear," Doolittle's committee pronounced, 
that we are facing an implacable enemy whose avowed objective is world 
domination by whatever means and at whatever cost. There are no rules in 
such a game. Hitherto acceptable norms of human conduct do not apply. 
If the United States is to survive, long-standing concepts of 'fair play' must 
be reconsidered. We must develop effective espionage and counter-
espionage services and must learn to subvert, sabotage, and destroy our 
enemies by more clever, more sophisticated, and more effective methods 
than those used against us. It may become necessary that the American 
people be made acquainted with, understand, and support this fundamen-
tally repugnant philosophy. 112 
As with his views on technology and the economy, Doolittle advocated intelligence poli-
cies that Eisenhower liked. The president had already followed such policies in Iran and 
Guatemala. 
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The Writers 
The last two Gaither committee members that must be examined in some detail are 
Paul Nitze and Colonel George Lincoln. In his memoirs, Nitze claims that" Abe [Lincoln] 
and I were mentioned as 'project members' at the back of the [Gaither] report, which 
masked the fact that we shared importantly in shaping the substance of the final ver-
sion.,,113 While Nitze may have overstated their importance, they certainly did influence 
the final report. Their earner writings adumbrated the recommendations and conclusions 
contained in the subsequent Gaither report. 
Although Paul Nitze is the more famous of the two men, his reputation should not 
overshadow Lincoln's accomplishments. Nitze himselfwrote that Lincoln was his "most 
reliable mentor and advisor.,,114 Lincoln acquired his reputation as a strategic planner 
while working on the staff of General George Marshall's Operation Division (OPD) dur-
ing World War II. He served as the OPD's chief of Strategy and Policy Group, a role that 
"included, not only military planning, but also meshing the military side of international 
statecraft with the political side ofstrategy."m As part of this job, Lincoln served as a 
member of the 10int Planning Staff Planners. 116 He also acted as a military advisor to As-
113 Paul Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost to Glasnost: At the Center of Decision (New York: Grove 
Weidenfeld, 1989), 167. 
114 Nitze to Colonel G. A. Lincoln, January 30, 1961, USMA, Lincoln Collection, Subject Files - Names, 
Box 194, Folder - Nitzc, Paul, 1956-61, 1. 
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day (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1967). See also Ray S. Cline, United States Anny in 
World War II: The War Department. Washington Command Post: The Operations Division 
(Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Anny, 1951), 194.299-
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sistant Secretary of War and future Gaither committee member 10hn J. McCloy on is-
sues involving the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee. 117 He described his work 
with McCloy as trying to arrange the "official marriage of political and military policy of 
the State Department and the War Department." 118 
After the war, Lincoln continued to serve on the OPD in the military's transition 
from wartime to peacetime status. 119 Despite his prominent position and his bright future 
in the Army, he decided in 1947 to retire from active service and to teach at the United 
States Military Academy. When he announced his retirement, Eisenhower, the Army chief 
of staff, attempted to persuade Lincoln to reconsider. Over sixteen years later, Eisen-
hower recalled that "I used every pressure 1 could bring to bear on him to persuade him to 
stay in the Pentagon because of the high value 1 placed upon his knowledge, thoroughness 
and good sense."I20 After reluctantly accepting his resignation, Eisenhower wrote Lincoln 
that "I attribute in very great part to you a noticeable growth in the soundness and clarity 
of military policy pertaining to U.S. security .... 1 personally have leaned heavily on your 
advice since my arrival here, confident that your solutions would be the best that hard 
work, outstanding intelligence, integrity and devotion to duty could provide.,,121 
Lincoln's contributions to military planning did not end with his retirement from 
the Army. He periodically returned to Washington to provide advice. In 1950 Ambassa-
dor Averell Harriman asked Lincoln to be his military advisor on the Temporary Council 
117 Leffier, Preponderance 0/ Power. 29. 
118 Quoted in Cline, Washington Command Post, 330. 
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106 
Committee for NATO. The committee examined the military, political, and economic 
capabilities of each NATO country to determine a practical strategy for the defense of 
Western Europe. Harriman later recalled that "I looked to Abe [Lincoln] to help me rec-
oncile every factor.,,122 
Lincoln's publications proved even more important. In 1954, he revised a compi-
lation of essays, &onomics and National Security. In this work, Lincoln addressed three 
issues of particular importance to the later Gaither committee. First, he outlined what he 
saw as the potential threat posed by the Soviet Union. Second, he discussed the impor-
tance of maintaining a high level of economic mobilization. Finally, he emphasized the 
significance of technological changes to national security programs. 
Lincoln believed that the only way to coexist peacefully with the Soviet Union was 
to create an armistice "made by power and preserved by power."l23 He further explained 
that "Soviet communism is committed to world conquest, and we cannot rely on it 
changing this policy in our time.,,124 Lincoln did not expect the Soviet Union to initiate a 
war, but he believed a war could happen at any time due to miscalculation. He stressed 
that the successors to Stalin were not likely 
to be tempted to rash actions gravely imperiling the Soviet base of com-
munism. On the other hand continual pressure and struggle are basic tenets 
of communism, and failure to take advantage of an opportunity for advance 
is a cardinal sin in the communism code. The movement has a discipline 
usually described as 'Prussian.' It is versatile and resourceful. It is con-
tinually at war with the remainder of the world and uses a strategy that un-
122 Quoted in Nye. "George A. Lincoln. " 8. 
123 George A. Lincoln, Economics of National Security: Managing America's Resources for Defense. 2nd 
cd. (Englwood Cliffs. N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc .• 1954).24. 
124 Ibid. 
derstands the weaknesses and appreciates the tactics in the fields of 
politics, economics, and psychology. 115 
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Because he saw the Soviet threat as ''world-wide,'' "total," and "of indefinite dura-
tion," Lincoln argued that the United States had to maintain an economy based on prepar-
edness and government control. 126 Until the Soviet Union recanted its philosophy or ac-
cepted defeat in the Cold War, Lincoln believed that the United States had little choice but 
to prepare for war. He argued that "the choice must be made between the hazards of 
greater and lesser evils .... When the greater evil is the threat to survival, the choice 
should fallon the lesser evil-which is a considerable expenditure of resources for a sus-
tained level of preparedness, an all-out effort in case of war, and adequate measures to 
keep the economy strong and healthy meanwhile."I21 He later added that ifthe threat of 
war became probable, then concern over the strain of defense spending on the economy 
should become second to survival. 128 
Lincoln also addressed the relationship of science and technology to national se-
curity. Reminiscent of Eisenhower's memorandum to his subordinates at the end of 
World War IT, Lincoln viewed the war as providing important precedents for sustaining 
cooperation between the scientific community and the military establishment. He believed: 
125 Ibid. 
1) Science must be integrated with military strategy in the future. 
2) Military research and development are of the same order of importance 
as industrial preparedness and manpower reserves. 
126 Ibid., 2S and 44-45. 
127 Ibid., 43. 
128 Ibid., 85 
3) Timing of technological advances has become all important. The 
race for technological advantage is a major part of the race for survival in a 
power struggle. 129 
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Lincoln feared that if the Soviet Union achieved some technological breakthrough before 
the United States, it might use that advantage to move against U.S. interests oppressively. 
When Lincoln finished revising his book in 1954, the United States and the Soviet 
Union were in the midst of an accelerating technological race. The new thermonuclear 
weapons were a thousand times more powerful than the atomic bombs dropped on Hi-
roshima and Nagasaki. The introduction ofintercontinentaI bombers and the anticipated 
development of ICBMs raised the possibility that an aggressor could win a war in the ini-
tial strike. Lincoln stressed the importance of the United States maintaining its techno-
logical lead over the Soviet Union. He argued that "The time element . .. has been mag-
nified by modem technology in at least three ways. Fi~ the race for technological advan-
tage is decided before hostilities. Second, the aggressor has an increasing advantage paral-
leling the upward slant of technological change. Third, and related to the preceding point, 
the surprise aggression becomes more attractive and harder to meet." 130 [Emphasis in 
original] 
Lincoln's work did not go unnoticed in Washington. Eisenhower repeatedly asked 
Lincoln to serve as an advisor to the administration. In 1953 Lincoln worked on Task 
Force A of Project Solarium. In 1956, he participated in a committee that examined the 
psychological aspects of U.S. strategy for Eisenhower's adviser Nelson Rockefeller. 131 In 
129 Ibid., 364. 
130 Ibid., 378. 
131 For a description of Project Solarium. see chapter 1. For a description of the Rockefeller study group, 
also known as the Quantico II Panel. see FRUS /955-/957, 19, 153-4. 
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that same year, Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles asked Lincoln to 
direct the State Department Policy Planning Staff. Although Lincoln could not take the 
job, the offer reveals Eisenhower's continued interest and respect for the West Point pro-
fessor. 132 
In addition to serving on the Gaither committee in 1957, Lincoln wrote an influ-
ential essay that discussed U.S. capabilities to wage limited military operations. In this 
paper, he asked, "Are we of the Western World so committed to deterrent nuclear force, 
and so fearful of the slightest nuclear threat that we lack the means, or wit, or both, to 
deal with local and limited situations?" 133 In raising this penetrating question. Lincoln was 
in essence challenging the reliance of the Eisenhower administration on massive retalia-
tion. 
Lincoln presented ten propositions to elaborate his philosophy concerning the re-
lationship between technology, politics, and war. He emphasized that while the United 
States had to prepare for a general, atomic war with the Soviet Union. the most likely fu-
ture conflicts would be limited in nature. He stressed that the United States had to main-
tain the capability to wage either general or limited wars and to be able to use either con-
ventional or nuclear weapons. The key was maintaining a level of flexibility in military 
capabilities. Lincoln believed that technological changes widened the political and military 
options available to states yet raised the stakes of waging war. "The hazards arising from 
132 Nyc, "George A Lincoln," 11. 
133 Colonel G. A. Lincoln and Lt Colonel Amos A. Jordan, Jr., "Technology and the Changing Nature of 
General War," Military Review 36 (May 1957), 13. 
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the opportunities and temptations for rash, desperate, or just uninformed leadership," 
Lincoln concluded "are increasing." 134 
Lincoln's close friend and sometimes professional collaborator, Paul Nitze, played 
an active role in government affairs during the Truman administration. He participated in 
the assessment of the effects of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.13S He sub-
sequently joined the State Department and then directed its Policy Planning Staff from 
1950 to 1952. He was the principal author ofNSC 68, calling for much larger military 
expenditures. 136 
Nitze's tenure at the State Department came to an abrupt end after Eisenhower 
took office in 1953. Although Eisenhower's new defense secretary, Charles Wtlson, of-
fered Nitze a new position his department, he met fierce resistance from congressional 
Republicans, especially Senate Majority Leader Wtlliam Knowland, who believed that 
Nitze was tied too closely to the previous administration. Secretary of State Dulles found 
Nitze's continued presence in the administration appalling and demanded his dismissal. 
Bowing to pressure, Wtlson asked for and received Nitze's resignation. Nitze was embit-
tered and thereafter despised Dulles. 137 
134 Ibid., 7. 
\3S Herken. Counsels of War, 17; Rearden, Evolution of American Strategic Doctrine, 2-4; and United 
States Strategic Bombing Survey: Summary Report (pacific War) (GPO, 1946). The summary report. 
which Nitze helped write, reached several conclusions that influenced his later writings. It stressed the 
importance of maintaining offensive retaliatory power, building continental defenses, developing and im-
plementing civil defense plans, preserving technological superiority, and increasing intelligence capabili-
ties. See Summary Report, 29-32. 
136 See chapter I. 
137 For descriptions of the controversial dismissal ofNitze, see Emmet lohn Hughes, The Ordeal of 
Power: A Political Memoir of the Eisenhower Years (New York: Antheneum. 1963), 120-21; and Calla-
han. Dangerous Capabilities, 150-52. 
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Before he left the State Department, Nitze set forth his opinions concerning 
continental defense. Although be wanted a considerable increase in U.S. offensive capa-
bilities, he did not believe they alone could preserve U.S. security. He believed that the 
United States also needed to construct civil and continental defenses. In one ofbis last 
memoranda while still at the State Department, Nitze explained that "In dealing with the 
problem of continental defense it is important to recognize the inter-relationship of military 
defense, offensive striking power, and the civil defense program. These three elements are 
complementary and mutually supporting.,,138 Four years later when he helped write the 
Gaither report, these views remained paramount. 
In 1954, Nitze became an outspoken critic of the Eisenhower administration and in 
particular the policies articulated by Secretary of State DuDes. After listening to DuDes's 
massive retaliation speech to the Council on Foreign Relations, Nitze privately circulated a 
dissenting paper. He argued that by placing primary reliance on atomic weapons, the 
United States was guaranteeing that any future conflicts would involve the use of these 
weapons. He argued that "If we are to obtain victory, or peace with justice and without 
defeat, we must attain it with non-atomic means while deterring an atomic war.,,139 With 
this paper, Nitze began a campaign which would last until the Kennedy administration to 
force the government to recognize the importance of maintaining sufficient conventional 
forces to supplement U.S. nuclear capabilities. 
138 Memorandum by Nitze and Savage, May 6, 1953, FRUS 1952-1954, 2, 322. 
139 Paul Nitze, "Critique of Dulles' 'Massive Retaliation' Speech" reprinted in Kenneth W. Thompson and 
Steven L. Rearden (eds.), Paul H. Nitze on National Security and Arms Control (Lanham, MD: Univer-
sity Press of America. Inc., 1990),41; and Rearden, Evolution of American Strategic Doctrine, 37-38. 
Years later, Nitze described in his memoirs how he viewed the strategic situa-
tion in the 1950s. He explained: 
In the event of a crisis involving a serious possibility of war with the United 
States, how might the problem be seen from the Kremlin? Being careful 
planners, the Soviets undoubtedly would have carefully prepared war plans 
for a variety of contingencies. One could therefore theorize with some 
confidence that Soviet plans would include a disarming first strike, if we re-
sponded with the remains of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) byattack-
ing Soviet base structure and nuclear attack facilities, the exchange ratios 
would go against us very quickly. In two, three, four, or at most five ex-
changes, the United States would be down to a woefully low level of ca-
pability while the Soviet Union could still be at a relatively high one. We 
could then be at their mercy. Ifwe choose to attack their populations, we 
would invite almost total annihilation in the United States. 140 
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Nitze's explanation clearly indicates his preoccupation with the Soviet Union's capabilities 
while giving little thought to its goals or intentions. 141 
In an article in Foreign Affairs in 1956, Nitze expounded an alternative strategy to 
massive retaliation. He argued that Eisenhower's policies were inconsistent because the 
United States military did not possess the ability, beyond atomic weapons, to wage the 
war against communism. 142 He explained that the country needed to acquire the capability 
to raise the stakes in a conflict gradually rather than immediately resorting to massive re-
taliation. He emphasized ''that it is to the interest of the West that the means employed in 
warfare and the area of engagement be restricted to the minimum level which still permits 
us to achieve our objectives. Our basic action policy must therefore be one of 'graduated 
deterrence. ", 143 By responding in kind to an aggressive act, Nitze believed the United 
140 Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, 165. 
141 Callahan, Dangerous Capabilities, 160. 
142 Paul Nitze, "Atoms, Strategy and Policy," Foreign Affairs 34:2 (January (956), 198. 
143 Ibid., 188. 
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States could limit the scope of the conflict and the area affected by the military en-
gagements. But. in 1956, Nitze believed that the United States did not possess the neces-
sary capabilities. 
Nitze stressed that the United States needed to expand its offensive retaliatory ca-
pabilities, build defenses against a surprise attack, and prepare to wage limited wars. Re-
cent developments in nuclear weapon and delivery technology particularly concerned him. 
"The side which has lost effective control of the intercontinental air spaces will face a truly 
agonizing decision. It may still have the capability of destroying a few of the enemy's cit-
ies. But the damage it could inflict would be indecisive and out of all proportion to the 
annihilation which its own cities could expect to receive in retum."l44 Accordingly, he 
stressed that "It is important that the West maintain indefinitely a position of nuclear at-
tack-defense superiority versus the Soviet Union and its sateUites.,,14S Consequently, the 
United States needed to "develop an air defense system which makes full use of the 
West's geographic advantages."l46 
While not satisfied with either U.S. offensive retaliatory or defense capabilities, the 
Eisenhower administration's cuts in conventional forces particularly bothered Nitze. He 
believed U. S. commitments exceeded its military capabilities. He emphasized that the 
United States needed to be able to wage limited wars with and without atomic weapons. 
The United States should be able to meet aggression initially without atomic weapons. It 
should expand hostilities only if no other alternative existed to rectify the situation. If it 
144 Ibid .• 196. 
145 Ibid. 
146 Ibid., 197. 
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decided to use atomic weapons, it should use them only against military targets. Non-
atomic capabilities, therefore, were needed to lower its dependence on atomic forces. 147 
These policies would enable the United States to institute his strategy of "graduated deter-
renee." 
Two months prior to the presentation of the Gaither report to the NSC, Nitze 
published another article that denounced the Eisenhower administration's reliance on 
massive retaliation. "Secretary Dulles' massive retaliation statement," Nitze wrote, "did 
not announce a new doctrine but a return to a pre-1950 doctrine [pre-NSC 68]. It is not a 
step forward; it was a step backward - a step back dictated not by new strategic consid-
erations but by domestic political and budgetary considerations. Ever since, the rationale 
of our military-political doctrine has been a shambles of inconsistencies, inadequacies, and 
reappraisals."I48 Nitze stressed the need for a full range of military capabilities that would 
later be included in the Gaither report. "1 see little purpose," Nitze concluded, "in making 
every war, even a limited war, a nuclear one.,,149 
Conclusions 
As he had on previous occasions, Eisenhower established a committee of experts 
in 1957 to examine a vexing national security problem. When the FCDA proposed a $32 
billion shelter system in January, the president had to decide whether such a program 
would sufficiently improve the country's security to justifY its cost. While he was satisfied 
with the status of U.S. military strength and his national security programs, he recognized 
147 Ibid., 196. 
148 Paul Nitze, "Limited Wars or Massive Retaliation?," The Reporter 17 (September 5, 1957), 41. 
149 Ibid, 41. 
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that others were justly concerned about the consequences of a nuclear war. ISO Eisen-
hower believed that the Gaither committee would provide answers to at least one key 
question. Should the United States attempt to reduce the vulnerability of its population 
through an elaborate system of continental and civil defenses? 
The creation of the Gaither committee to address this very question represented 
Eisenhower's reliance on a decision-making system that he used throughout his presi-
dency. Eisenhower wanted to receive advice from those who were the most qualified. 
While he respected and valued the advice of his official advisers, he realized that they were 
not always the best experts in particular fields. He, therefore, turned to consultants out-
side the government. Eisenhower explained in his memoirs that the Gaither committee 
"had been formed to bring new minds and background experience to bear on major prob-
lems of government. It was empowered to receive information from government agencies 
and departments and to come up with an independent appraisal. With nO vested interest in 
a particular department, and no federal jobs to protect, the panel was a means of obtaining 
independent judgments." IS I 
The Gaither committee was composed of experts whom Eisenhower respected and 
admired. They came from a variety of backgrounds. Some, such as Rabi, Berkner, and 
Hill, were specialists in the fields of nuclear weaponry, radar, and radiation. Others, like 
Sprague, Fisk., and Doolittle, had built their reputations in studies of U.S. continental de-
fense, fallout shelters, intelligence operations, and military forces. Finally, there were con-
ISO Winkler, Lifo Under A Cloud,84-85. 
lSI Eisenhower. Waging Peace, 220. 
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sultants, such as Gaither, Foster, and Killian, who were known for supervising and co-
ordinating diverse groups in the development of advisory reports. 
These men shared many of the president's basic beliefs. Most were concerned 
with balancing economic and military strength. Almost all of them viewed the rapid tech-
no logical changes of the 1950s with a sense of accomplishment and dread. They saw u.s. 
security as dependent on the interplay of offensive and defensive military capabilities, a 
strong economy, and continued close relations with its allies in Europe and around the 
world. Eisenhower believed that their advice could help him comprehend and make deci-
sions concerning questions that went beyond his expertise. 
Eisenhower's use of experts raises several historiographical issues that transcend 
the importance of the Gaither committee itself. World War IT had transformed the rela-
tionship between scientists, engineers, and other experts and the federal government. 
Prior to the war, there was little close cooperation. While experts worried about the pos-
sible restrictions resulting from government involvement in their work, political leaders 
questioned spending money on projects that did not guarantee some direct benefit to the 
public. World War II forced both groups to work together. The government needed ex-
perts to develop new technologies that would help the war effort, and the experts sought 
funding that only the federal government could provide. Whether in the development of 
the atomic bomb, radar, or some other technology, this relationship proved relatively con-
genial. 1S2 
152 For summaries of the impact of World War II on the relationship between experts. expertise. and the 
federal government, see Balogh. Chain Reaction, 4-13 and 21-23; Kevles, The PhysiCiSts, 302-67; Fried-
berg, "Science, the Cold War, and the American State," 108-9; Leslie, The Cold War and American Sci-
ence. 6-7; Ralph E. Lapp, The New Priesthood: The Scientific Elite and the Uses of Power (New York: 
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After the war, the quickening pace of scientific and technological advances 
precluded any layman from keeping abreast of all the changes. Furthermore, the exorbi-
tant costs of research forced scientists and engineers to look for funding from different 
sources. As a result, the continued cooperation of experts and the government was only 
natural. Through expanded funding for research and development, the federal government 
maintained a pool of experts to call upon when it needed assistance in making decisions 
concerning highly technical issues. On the other hand, with the available funding scientists 
and engineers were in a position to perform research that they could not have on their 
own. m 
The Gaither committee represents one example of the federal government utilizing 
experts during the early Cold War to acquire scientific and technical advice. Prior to 
World War II, this type of committee would have been unnecessary. However, with the 
expansion of knowledge during and after the war, political leaders needed some means to 
understand the complicated technological and scientific problems they faced. By the end 
of his administration, Eisenhower recognized the transformation that had occurred in de-
cision making since 1945 and lamented the possible repercussions. In his now famous 
farewell address, he warned the American people: 
This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large 
arms industry is new in the American experience .... 
In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisi-
tion of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-
industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced 
power exists and will persist. 
Harper & Row, Publishers, 1965),39-86; and Robert Gilpin. "Introduction: Natural Scientists in Policy-
Making," in Gilpin and Wright (eds.), Scientists and National Policy-Making, 3-6. 
153 See Balogh. Chain Reaction; Leslie, The Cold War and American Science; Lapp, The New Priesthood, 
12-15; and Friedberg, "Science, the Cold War, and the American State," 107-118. 
We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our 
liberties or democratic process .... 
The prospect of domination of the nation's scholars by Federal 
employment, project allocations, and the power of money is ever present-
and is gravely to be regarded. 
Yet, in holding scientific research and discovery in respect, as we 
should, we must also be alert to the equal and opposite danger that public 
policy could itself become the captive of a scientific-technological elite. 1S4 
1I8 
Despite these warnings, it was Eisenhower who expanded the role of experts in presiden-
tial decision making and left a precedent for their use in future administrations. As Gregg 
Herken persuasively concludes, "The culminating irony of Eisenhower's presidency was 
the fact that he himself had done more than anyone else to raise the role of experts and 
expertise to prominence in the government." ISS 
154 Farewell Radio and Television Address to the American People by President Eisenhower, January 17, 
1961, reprinted in Robert L. Branyan and Lawrence H. Larsen (cds.), The Eisenhower Administration 
1953-1961: A Documentary History (New York: Random House, Inc., 1971). 1375-76. 
ISS Hcrlcen, Counsels o/War, 133. 
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CHAPTER 3 - 1957: A YEAR OF TURMOIL 
The question of civil defense was only one of many problems that Eisenhower 
faced in 1957. Although the year began with Eisenhower's popularity at its height, he 
soon faced a sequence of serious problems. Legislatively, he was at loggerheads with a 
Democratic Congress. PoliticaIly, new civil rights legislation and the confrontation in 
Little Rock, polarized the nation. Economically, the country slowly slipped into a 
recession. TechnologicaIlyand militarily, the Soviet Union's launch of Sputnik and the 
continued disappointments in U.S. space programs engendered soul-searching about the 
superiority of American science and the military security of the United States. I 
Politics of the Defense Budget and a New Recession 
Iwan Morgan argues that when Eisenhower entered office in 1953 he believed that 
"the nation faced economic ruin unless fiscal responsibility was quickly re-established as 
the guiding principle of budgetary policy.,,2 By the end of 1956 Eisenhower thought that 
he was restoring fiscal prudence. He lowered annual defense spending from $43.8 billion 
in FY 1953 to $35.5 billion in FY 1956, and produced budget surpluses of$3.2 billion and 
$4.1 billion for FY 1956 and FY 1957, respectively. 3 These figures were in sharp 
contrast to the $5.3 billion deficit Eisenhower inherited in the FY 1954 budget.4 
I In this argument. I am accepting the main premise of one of the seminal works on Eisenhower's national 
security programs. Samuel Huntington argues that "Military policy cannot be separated from foreign 
policy, fiscal policy, and domestic policy." See Huntington, Common Defense, x-xi. 
2 Morgan, Eisenhower Versus 'The Spenders', be. 
3 Statistical History of the United States, 1123-24. 
4 Ibid., 1105. Eisenhower had to make significant reductions in the FY 1954 budget that he inherited 
from Truman to have only a $5.3 billion deficit Truman's original budget would have produced a $10 
billion deficit. See Iwan W. Morgan, "Eisenhower and the Balanced Budget. " in Shirley Anne Warshaw 
(ed.), Reexamining The Eisenhower Presidency (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993), 125. 
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Despite his success in limiting government spending, in January 1957 Eisenhower 
presented Congress with the largest peacetime budget in u.s. history-573.3 billion for FY 
1958. Although he expressed concern that further increases in spending could lead to 
higher taxes and greater inflation, he believed that this budget reflected a careful analysis 
of the domestic needs and international responsibilities of the United States. In particular, 
Eisenhower recognized that as long as the United States and the Soviet Union remained 
locked in the cold war, there were limits to how much overall spending could be cut. In 
this budget, he requested $43.3 billion for major national security programs. The 
president regretted the need for such high spending levels, but he felt ''the size of the 
national budget largely reflected the size of the national danger. ,,5 
Some of his advisers remained concerned about the large budget. Treasury 
Secretary George Humphrey lamented at a press conference on January 15 that 
I would deplore the day that we thought we couldn't ever reduce 
expenditures of this terrific amount, [and] the terrific tax we are taking out 
of this country. Ifwe don't over a long period of time, I predict that you 
will have a depression that will curl your hair, because we are just taking 
too much money out of the economy that we need to make jobs that you 
have as time goes on.6 
Humphrey's oft-quoted prediction of "a depression that will curl your hair", grabbed 
headlines around the country. Although he did not expect a depression, he wanted to 
warn Americans of the dire consequences of spending levels that required high taxes, large 
deficits, or both. When Eisenhower attempted to defend the secretary, he implied that 
S Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 129. 
6 For the text of the press conference, see Nathaniel R. Howard (ed.) The Basic Papers o/George M. 
Humphrey (Cleveland: Western Reserve Historical Society, 1965),236-52. 
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Congress should make cuts in the budget. 7 The point seemed clear to both Democrats and 
Republicans. The budget was fair game for politically beneficial cuts. 8 
Eisenhower expected Congress to increase the defense budget and believed he 
would have to fight to hold the line on defense spending.9 He was surprised when "The 
Democrats inexplicably became economy-minded."lo Public opinion seemed to be 
demanding budget cuts and Democrats wanted to get on the bandwagon. Eisenhower's 
chief of staff, Sherman Adams, remembered that "There was a prairie fire of public 
opinion that the federal government was about to spend too much of the people's money 
and the conservatives of both parties took advantage of the prevailing sentiment to cut 
programs left and right." II 
Opposition to the budget came from both parties. Within the Republican Party, 
Eisenhower represented the views of the more moderate wing who accepted some of the 
social welfare programs of the New Deal and supported international policies, such as 
membership in NATO and the UN. 12 The conservative Republicans, or Old Guard, were 
led by Senators William Knowland, Styles Bridges, Joe McCarthy, and Barry Goldwater. 
They advocated a smaller role for the federal government, limiting the involvement of the 
United States in international organizations, and more aggressive policies against 
7 The President's News Conference of January 23. 1957, in ppp, DDE. 1957, 74. 
8 See Morgan. Eisenhower Versus 'The Spenders " 84; Thomas A Gaskin. "Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, 
the Eisenhower Administration, and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1957-60," Presidential Studies Quarterly 24:2 
(Spring 1994),341; Robert A. Divine, Since 1945: Politics and Diplomacy in Recent American History, 
3rd ed, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), 78-80; and Kinnard. President Eisenhower and Strategy 
Management, 67. 
9 Pach and Richardson, Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower, 168. 
10 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 129. 
II Adams, Firsthand Report, 366. 
12 For a discussion of Moderate Republicanism, see Arthur Larson, A Republican Looks at His Party (New 
York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1956). 
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commurusm. They did not criticize Eisenhower's defense policies, but they concluded that 
he was spending too much on social programs and foreign aid. 13 
The Democrats welcomed the fissures in the Republican Party as an opportunity to 
gain political support for their programs. 14 Led by Senate Majority Leader Lyndon 
Johnson (0-TX) and Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn (D-TX), the Democrats argued 
that the budget could be reduced without cutting existing programs. They stressed that 
substantial savings could be achieved by eliminating government waste. In particular, they 
saw the budgets for the Defense Department and the Mutual Security Agency as good 
areas to find savings. With bipartisan support, Congress passed a defense budget in July 
that reduced Army spending from $8.465 to $7.265 billion, Navy spending from $10.487 
to $9.866 billion, and Air Force spending from $16.471 to $15.930 billion. IS With an 
additional $1.7 billion in cuts from the rest of the budget, including $1 billion from the 
Mutual Security program, Congress was able to reduce the president's spending plans by 
nearly $4.0 bi1lion. 16 
The spring 1957 budget crisis represented a new problem for Eisenhower and his 
advisors. In his first term, he had to protect the economy against demands for additional 
spending. In 1957, he found himself defending the military budget against the calls for 
more cuts. He sent a letter to the Speaker of the House Rayburn requesting that Congress 
13 See Eisenhower. Waging Peace. 130; and Morgan, Eisenhower Versus 'The Spenders', 84. 
14 Morgan, Eisenhower Versus 'The Spenders', 84-88. See also Ambrose, Eisenhower, v. 2, 390; Pach 
and Richardson, Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower, 168; and Edward A. Kolodziej, The Uncommon 
Defonse and Congress, 1945-1963 (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1966),245-52. 
IS Charles H. Donnelly, United States Defonse Policies in 1957 (GPO, 1958),83. 
16 Morgan, Eisenhower Versus 'The Spenders', 88. The House Appropriations Committee justified its cuts 
by arguing that "the nature and e.~ent of a military threat against the United States and its allies appears, 
in certain respects to have somewhat abated. n Quoted in Donnelly, United States Defonse Policies in 
1957,83. 
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reconsider its reductions. He explained that "I most solemnly advise the House that in 
these times a cut of any appreciable consequence in current expenditures for national 
security and related programs would endanger our country and the peace of the world." 17 
He further added that "a muitibillion-doUar reduction in 1958 expenditures can be 
accomplished only at the expense of the national safety and interest.,,18 His request went 
unheeded. 
As debate over the FY 1958 budget came to a close, economic indicators revealed 
the economy was slipping into a recession.19 William McChesney Martin, the chairman of 
the Federal Reserve Board, believed the economic problems were tied to inflation and 
raised the discount rate from 3 to 3 112 percent. Instead of stimulating the economy, the 
increase stymied economic growth.20 In late 1957 and early 1958, exports declined 
precipitously, industrial production feU 14 percent, corporate profits declined 25 percent, 
and unemployment rose to 7.5 percent. It was only in May 1958 that the economy began 
to recover. 21 
Eisenhower reacted to the new economic situation with his usual caution. Other 
than reducing the discount rate to 3 percent in November 1957 and releasing $177 million 
for the housing industry in December, Eisenhower and advisers did little to combat the 
17 Letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives on the 1958 Budget. April 18, 1957, reprinted in 
PPP-DDE, 1957, 304. 
18 Ibid., 305. 
19 Eisenhower's chainnan of the CEA, Raymond Saulnier, made this announcement at a cabinet meeting 
on May 3, 1957. Quoted in Sloan, Eisenhower ond the Monagement o/Prosperity, 143-44. 
20 Ibid., 144; and Morgan, Eisenhower Versus 'The Spenders', 94. 
21 The figures are reported in Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 305; Morgan, Eisenhower Versus 'The 
Spenders', 93-94; and Sloan, Eisenhower and the Monagement 0/ Prosperity, 144-45. 
recession.22 In particular, he resisted calls for a tax cut and emergency public works 
programs. He explained to his former CEA chairman, Arthur Burns, the reasons for his 
response: 
I trust that I am not getting stubborn in my attitude about logical federal 
action in this business slump, but I am bound to say that I cannot help but 
feel that precipitate, and therefore largely unwise, action would be the 
worst thing that we could now do. I realize that to be conservative in this 
situation . . . can well get me tagged as an unsympathetic, reactionary 
fossil. But my honest conviction is that the greatest service we can now do 
for our country is to oppose wild-eyed schemes of every kind. I am against 
vast and unwise public works programs ... as well as the slash-bang kinds 
of tax-cutting from which the proponents want nothing so much as 
immediate political advantage. 23 
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While Eisenhower held true to his principles to limit the role of the federal government in 
the economy and to avoid deficit spending, his popularity and effectiveness suffered 
another blow.24 
Civil Rights and Preserving the American Constitutional System 
Eisenhower's struggles in 1957 were not limited to his disagreements with 
Congress over the budget and the economic recession. He also faced major civil rights 
controversies. For the first time since Reconstruction, Congress passed a Civil Rights Act 
to strengthen the voting rights of black Americans, and the president used military force to 
support the integration of southern schools.2S These civil rights issues illuminated 
22 For descriptions of Eisenhower reaction to the recession, see Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 305-10; 
Morgan, Eisenhower Versus 'The Spenders', 93-98; and Sloan, Eisenhower and the Management of 
Prosperity. 143-51. 
23 Eisenhower to Arthur Burns, March 12, 1958, quoted in Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 309. 
24 Pach and Richardson, Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower, 176-77. 
2S The best study of Eisenhower's civil rights policies remains Roben Frederick Burk, The Eisenhower 
Administration and Black Civil Rights (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1984). For an 
excellent roundtable discussion of civil rights in the 1950s involving some of the Eisenhower 
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Eisenhower's desire to limit the role of the federal government yet guarantee individual 
rights. He was also very worried that the country's racial problems would hinder his 
ability to wage the cold war. 
In his State of the Union address in January 1957, Eisenhower announced that one 
of his goals for the coming year was to obtain the passage of a Civil Rights Act that 
protected the voting rights of black Americans. His Attorney General Herbert Brownell 
developed a bill that would have given federal courts greater leeway in preserving access 
to the voting booths, allowed the Justice Department to file suits more easily in cases 
where an individual's voting rights had been obstructed, and created a non-partisan civil 
rights commission to study and report on the status of racial relations.26 While modest, 
Eisenhower saw the legislation as a step towards improved race relations. He insisted that 
racial divisions within the country could only be bridged gradually through a process of 
education.27 He wrote to Congressman Adam Clayton Powell: 
It is my conviction now, as it has always been, that progress must steadily 
be made in assuring to all citizens equality under our Constitution and 
under the laws. Moreover, I have repeatedly stated my conviction that it is 
not in laws alone that rapid achievement of this purpose will be found, but 
rather that citizens will more readily respond to the dictates of fair and just 
administration's key participants, see Shirley Anne Warshaw (ed.), The Eisenhower Legacy: Discussions 
of Presidential Leadership (Silver Springs, MD: Bartleby Press, 1992), 63-88. 
26 See Pach and Richardson, Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower, 146; and Burk, The Eisenhower 
Administration and Black Civil Rights, 208-17. 
27 James C. Duram, A Moderate Among Extremists: Dwight D. Eisenhower and the &hool 
Desegregation (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, Inc., 1981), viii and 116-19. Eisenhower's beUefin the 
imponance of education as a means to overcome racial animosity can be seen in a letter he wrote his 
brother in 1946. Milton Eisenhower, the president or Kansas State University, asked Dwight's advice in 
establishing the objectives on a new 'Citizenship' course. Eisenhower replied that "In presenting the 
objectives of the course I should bear down bard on elimination of racial intolerance." [emphasis in 
original] Eisenhower to Milton Stover Eisenhower, March IS, 1946, reprinted in Galambos (ed.), Papers 
of Dwight David Eisenhower, VI!, 942. 
laws if explanation, understanding and moderation as well as firmness of 
purpose are used by officials of government at every level. 28 
Eisenhower's call for civil rights' legislation met a fairly positive response. The 
House passed a civil rights' bill in June that was very similar to the one proposed by 
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Brownell. The Senate, led by Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson, was more resistant to the 
administration's proposals. However, the Texas senator realized that the passage ofa bill 
would raise his national stature as a potential candidate for the 1960 presidential election. 
Accordingly, he worked to frame legislation that provided greater civil rights to black 
Americans, but at the same time was politically palatable to the white South.29 The 
resulting compromise bill contained most of the provisions Eisenhower requested, but also 
included an amendment that allowed juries to render verdicts in voting rights' cases. The 
amendment almost guaranteed that any case initiated by a black plaintiff would be brought 
before a white jury that would not be sympathetic to civil rights' complaints. While 
Eisenhower was opposed to this amendment and even considered vetoing the entire bill, 
he decided that minimal civil rights' legislation was better than none at all.30 
Almost immediately after signing the bill, Eisenhower faced a new and potentially 
violent crisis in Little Rock, Arkansas. Despite the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. 
Topeka Board of Education, most schools in the South remained segregated in 1957.31 
28 Telegram to Congressman Powell of New York in Response to His Request for a Meeting, September 
18, 1957, PPP-DDE. 1957,677. 
29 Merle Miller, Lyndon: An Oral Biography (New York: Ballentine Books, 1980),249-58. See also 
Taylor Branch, Parting the Waters: America in the King Years. 1954-63 (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1988),220-21. 
30 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 159-62. 
31 Harvard Sitkoff reports that "In 1960, only one-sixth of one percent of the black students in the South 
went to a desegregated school." Harvard Sitkoff, The Strugglefor Black Equality. 1954-1992, Revised 
Edition (New York: Hill and Wang, 1981, 1993), 36. Eisenhower did not agree with the Brown decision. 
In expectation of that decision, Eisenhower told South Carolina governor James Byrnes that he feared the 
127 
The court's ruling in 1955 that it was the responsibility of the states and localities to 
integrate schools "with all deliberate speed" allowed the southern states to establish a slow 
pace for desegregation.32 In Little Rock. the school board implemented an eight year plan 
in May 1955 to integrate schools gradually, and on several occasions, courts ruled that the 
plan represented a legitimate means to achieve the objective of integration. With its 
emphasis on slow and incremental change, this plan represented what Eisenhower saw as 
an appropriate way to educate the population in a non-inflammatory way. 
There was widespread opposition to even gradual integration in the Southern 
states. Traditional organizations like the Ku Klux Klan and new groups like the White 
Citizens' Councils resisted integration. Furthermore, state and local politicians, including 
both those who shared racist attitudes and those who simply recognized the pitfalls of 
encouraging desegregation, campaigned against the Supreme Court's decision. In 1956, 
over one hundred congressmen signed the Southern Manifesto declaring their opposition 
to desegregation and calling for the reversal of the Brown decision. In addition, several 
Southern states, including Alabama and Texas, experienced incidents that foreshadowed 
the coming crisis in Little Rock.33 
consequences of court-ordered desegregation. He explained "that improvement in race relations is one of 
those things that will be healthy and sound only if it starts locally. I do not believe that prejudices, even 
palpably unjustified prejudices will succumb to compulsion. Consequently, I believe that federal law 
imposed upon our states in such a way as to bring about conflict of the police powers of the states and of 
the nation. would set back the cause of progress in race relations for a long, long time." Eisenhower 
Dimy Entry, July 23. 1954, in Ferrell (ed.), Eisenhower Diaries, 246-47. 
32 Brown v. Board o/Education, 349 U.S. 294, 75 S.Ct 753,99 L.ED. 1083 (1955), reprinted in Roland 
D. Rotunda, Modern Constitutional Law: Cases and Notes 3rd ed. (St Paul, MN: West Publishing Co., 
1989),495. This case is often referred to as Brown II as it was the follow-up case to the original Brown 
decision. The question before the Supreme Court was what was an appropriate time frame to expect 
desegregation. 
33 For descriptions of some of the desegregation disputes in the South, sec Burk, The Eisenhower 
Administration and Black Civil Rights, 159-61,167, and 186; and Duram, Moderate Among Extremists, 
56-59, 123, and 134-35. 
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As the school year began, Central High School in Little Rock was earmarked to be 
integrated under the local school board's plan. There had been surprisingly little 
opposition to the proposal in the months leading to the new school year. However, in late 
August a parent sought a court injunction to stop the scheduled integration. Although 
granted by a local court, a federal appeals court ordered Central High to be opened to 
both black and white students. In an act of open resistance, Arkansas Governor OrviIIe 
Faubus ordered the National Guard to prevent the attendance of the black students. He 
argued that their presence could provoke violence. Eisenhower faced a delicate crisis: a 
state governor was blatantly challenging the Supreme Court's right to judicial review and 
the federal government's authority to enforce the laws of the land.34 
The stalemate between Faubus and the federal government continued until 
September 20 when Faubus ordered the National Guard to withdraw. Although the crisis 
seemed over, an important question still remained. Without the National Guard present, 
would anybody try to stop the black students from attending school on Monday, 
September 23? On that day nine black students entered the high school relatively 
uneventfully. However, as the day progressed a mob grew outside. By mid-day, the 
police asked that the black students be sent home for their own safety.3s 
The mob violence forced Eisenhower's hand. He believed that the federal 
government had the responsibility to preserve public order and to enforce laws when the 
34 For a description of the Little Rock crisis, see ibid, 144; Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 162-75; and Diary 
Entry of the President, October 8, 1957, in Ferrell (cd), Eisenhower Diaries, 347-48. 
3S For an excellent description of the tensions at the school, see Elizabeth Huckaby, Crisis at Central 
High. Little Rock. 1957-58 (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1980),39. See also, 
Burlc, The Eisenhower Administration and Black Civil Rights, 185-86. 
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states could not or would not do so. "Cruel mob force," he exclaimed "had frustrated the 
execution of an order of a United States court, and the Governor of the state was sitting 
by, refusing to lift a finger to support the local authorities. ,,36 The president called the 
occurrences in Little Rock "disgraceful" and explained that he would ''use the full power 
of the United States including whatever force may be necessary to prevent any obstruction 
of the law and to carry out the orders of the Federal Court.,,37 He authorized the dispatch 
of 1,000 troops from the Army's 10Ist Airborne Division to Little Rock to restore peace 
and guarantee respect for the law.38 
The struggle for the Civil Rights Act and the crisis in Little Rock indicate clearly 
the underlying principles that guided Eisenhower's decision-making and the domestic 
tensions that plagued the country in 1957. He believed that the federal government should 
only be involved in people's lives in areas that the individual, locality, andlor state could 
not manage. He temporized on issues unless the federal government had a clear 
prerogative to intervene. Several scholars and contemporaries argue that Eisenhower 
failed to provide leadership on civil rights issues when he had an opportunity to make 
dramatic changes.39 To a degree, these criticisms are valid. At times, Eisenhower 
attempted to avoid civil rights issues, and he did disagree with the Brown decision. 
However, he did initiate the first civil rights legislation since Reconstruction and did use 
36 Eisenhower. Waging Peace, 168. 
37 Statement by the President Regarding Occurrences at Central High School in Little Rock, September 
23, 1957, in PPP-DDE, 1957,689. 
38 Radio and Television Address to the American People on the Situation in Little Rock. September 24, 
1957, ibid, 690-2. 
39 See for instance Hughes, The Ordeal a/Power, 243-45; SitkotI: Struggle/or Black Equality, 31; and 
Robert F. BurIc. "Dwight D. Eisenhower and Civil Rights Conservatism," in Krieg (ed.), Dwight D. 
Eisenhower. 51-52. 
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federal troops to insure compliance with the court's orders concerning integration. These 
decisions were neither easy nor popular, but they comported with his principles to limit the 
role of the federal government as much as possible while at the same time protecting the 
rights of the individual. 40 
Eisenhower was also concerned about the impact of the civil rights issues to U.S. 
foreign policy. He decried how the crisis in Little Rock continued ''to feed the mill of 
Soviet propagandists who by word and picture were telling the world of the 'racial terror' 
in the United States.,,41 In his address to the American people he lamented: 
At a time when we face grave situations abroad because of the hatred that 
Communism bears toward a system of government based on human rights, 
it would be difficult to exaggerate the harm that is being done to the 
prestige and influence, and indeed to the safety, of our nation and the 
world. 
Our enemies are gloating over this incident and using it everywhere 
to misrepresent our whole nation. We are portrayed as a violator of those 
standards of conduct which the peoples of the world united to proclaim in 
the Charter of the United Nations.42 
Another Pearl Harbor 
Within weeks after the federal government's intervention in Little Rock, the Soviet 
Union shocked the world by launching Sputnik. The potential implications of the Soviet 
rocket capability had a profound impact on the Gaither committee and how its findings 
would be received by Eisenhower, Congress, and the country at large. Sputnik raised 
40 Duram. Moderate Among Extremists, viii; Stanley I. Kotler, "Eisenhower, the Judiciary, and 
Desegregation: Some Reflections," in Bischofand Ambrose (eds.), Eisenhower: A Centenary 
Assessment, 100; and Michael S. Mayer, "Regardless ofSration. Race, or Calling: Eisenhower and Race," 
in Krieg (ed.), Dwight D. Eisenhower, 39. For a description of the decline of Eisenhower's popularity due 
in part to the civil rights disputes, see Pach and Richardson. Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower, 175. 
41 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 171. 
42 Radio and Television Address to the American People on the Situation in Little Rock, September 24, 
1957, in PPP-DDE. 1957,694. 
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questions about Eisenhower's ability to lead the nation, the United States military position 
vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, and the status of the United States among the world's scientific 
and technical elite.43 
Americans had become convinced of their scientific superiority and were amazed 
that the Russians could beat the world's most technically advanced country to outer space. 
The implications of the launch of Sputnik were frightening. If the Soviet Union could 
send a satellite into space, why could it not launch a nuclear-tipped missile across the 
oceans?44 Newsweek concluded that Sputnik represented a "defeat in three fields: In pure 
science, in practical know-how, and in psychological cold war."4S Life argued "Let us not 
pretend that Sputnik is anything but a defeat.,,46 Public opinion polls revealed that 49 
percent of the American people believed that the Soviet Union was "ahead of the United 
States in the development of missiles and long distance rockets. ,,47 
Senators and congressmen reached similar conclusions. Comparisons to the attack 
on Pearl Harbor were widespread. In special hearings to address the adequacy of U.S. 
missile programs, Senator Lyndon Johnson claimed that "We meet today in the 
atmosphere of another Pearl Harbor.,,48 Charles Donnelly, a legislative assistant, 
43 For U.S. reactions to Sputnik, see Divine, The Sputnik Challenge; and McDougall, ... the Heavens and 
the Earth. 
44 For the reaction of David Beckler, a Gaither Committee member, see Memorandum for Mr. Victor 
Cooley, Acting Director ODM, October 8, 1957, EL, WHO, OSAST, Box 3, Folder - Space October 1957-
October 1959, 1. He argued that "Although the satellite is not a military weapon, it tends to be identified 
in the minds of the world with the impressive military and technological strength of the USSR In a 
military sense it underscores Soviet long-range missile claims. In a technological sense it shows the 
Soviets to have impressive technological sopbistication and resources." 
45 "Into Space: Man's Awesome Adventure," Newsweek, 50:16 (October 14, 1957),37. 
46 Quoted in McDougall, ... The Heavens and the Earth, 145. 
47 George H. Gallup, The Gallup Poll, v. 2 (New York: Random House, 1972), 1521. 
48 United States Congress, Senate, Inquiry into Satellite and Missile Programs, Hearings before the 
Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, 85th Congress, 1st and 
2nd Sessions, 1957-1958,342. 
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explained that ''there were few in January [1957] who foresaw that, before the end of the 
year, the United States would suffer a Pearl Harbor in the Cold War and be striving to 
repair its damaged prestige just as desperately as, in 1942, it was trying to reconstitute its 
battered naval strength. ,,49 
While the media, public, and Congress were stunned by Spu~ Eisenhower 
exhibited little concern.so The president's initial reaction was to determine how and why 
the Soviet Union was able to achieve this capability first and what were its possible 
implications. The consensus of his advisors was that the Soviet Union had deliberately 
linked its missile and space programs to launch a satellite as Quickly as possible. Deputy 
Secretary of Defense Quarles explained to Eisenhower that "There is considerable 
intelligence to indicate that the Russian satellite work has been closely integrated with and 
has drawn heavily on their ballistic missile developments. "Sl In contrast, the United States 
had followed a policy of developing a satellite capability separate from its military's missile 
programs. 
Eisenhower decided that three facts should guide his administration's explanations 
to the American public concerning the Soviet achievement: 
a. The U.S. determined to make the Satellite a scientific project and to 
keep it free from military weaponry to the greatest extent possible. 
b. No pressure or priority was exerted by the U.S. on timing, so long as the 
satellite would be orbited during the IGY 1957-1958. 
49 Donnelly, United States De.fonse Policies in 1957, 1. 
so See Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 211-12; McDougall, ... the Heavens and the Earth, 146-50; and 
Divine, Sputnik Challenge, xiv, 7-8, and 16-17. . 
51 Memorandum for the President, October 7, 1957, EL, WHO, OSANSA, NSC Series, Briefing Notes 
Subseries, Box 7, Folder - Earth Satellites, 4. Quarles bad resigned as the Secretary of the Air Force 
earlier in the year to become the deputy secretary of defense. 
c. The U.S. Satellite program was intended to meet scientific requirements 
with a view toward permitting all scientists to share in information which 
the U.S. might eventually acquire. 52 
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Eisenhower emphasized that Sputnik did not pose any significant military threat to 
the United States. He recognized that launching a satellite into space was much less 
difficult than hitting a target thousands of miles away with an ICBM. By stressing these 
principles he hoped to address the concerns raised by his advisors about the implications 
of Sputnik. Quarles believed that "two main cold war points are involved: (1) the impact 
on public imagination of the first successful invasion and conquest of outer space, and (2) 
the inferences, ifany, that can be drawn about the status of their [the Soviet Union's] 
development of military rocketry.,,53 Eisenhower calculated that his military prestige and 
popularity would reassure the nation and hoped he would not have to initiate new and 
expensive military projects. He could not have been more wrong. 
Prior to his first press conference after the Soviet launch, Eisenhower explained 
that his goal was "to allay histeria [sic] and alarm," while not belittling the Russian 
accomplishment.s", In a two page statement, released on October 9, he described the 
development of the United States satellite program and defended its progress. He only 
mentioned the Soviet achievement once. He congratulated the "Soviet scientists upon 
putting a satellite into orbit. ,,55 In answering questions at the press conference, 
S2 Conference in the President's Office, October 8, 1957, ibid, 1. 
S3 Memorandum for the President, October 7, 1957, ibid., 6. 
54 Memorandum of Conference with the President, October 8, 1957, EL, DDE Papers, DDE Series, Box 
27, Folder - October 1957 Staff Notes (2), 1. At this 5:00 p.m. meeting, Eisenhower had Dr. Detlev 
Bronk, the chairman of the National Science Foundation, read the statement and offer suggestions. Bronk 
approved the statement with only a few corrections. 
ss Statement by the President, October 9, 1957, EL, WHO,OSS, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, 
Box 23, Folder - Satellites [October 1957- February 1960J (I), 2. Two of Eisenhower's principal critics, 
134 
Eisenhower asserted that the United States was not in a race with the Soviet Union. He 
emphasized that the United States satellite program would still be directed towards 
scientific, not military, goals and would continue on its current pace towards a launch in 
December. He tried to reassure the country that Sputnik did not pose a security risk. 56 
Over the next few months, Eisenhower continued his attempts to calm fears. He 
argued that the planned launch of a satellite using the Vanguard missile in December was 
an opportunity to prove that the United States possessed similar capabilities to the Soviet 
Union. But on December 6, Vanguard exploded on takeoff"as if the gates of Hell had 
opened Up.,,57 The implications seemed clear. The United States was far behind the 
Soviet Union in missile capabilities. 58 
The president's attempts to persuade Americans that Sputnik did not represent a 
significant threat failed. Even he began to question his response. He told a group of 
legislators that he "had been trying to play down the situation, but perhaps had been guilty 
of understatement in regard to the strength of the Nation's defenses despite Sputnik."S9 In 
a recent study of the impact of Sputnik on the United States, Robert Divine reaches the 
same conclusion. He argues that "Eisenhower, for all his prudence and restraint, failed to 
meet one of the crucial tests of presidential leadership: convincing the American people 
Drew Pearson and Jack Anderson., call his response to Sputnik "Operation Soothing Syrup". Drew 
Pearson and Jack Anderson., U.S.A. - Second-Class Power? (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1958),5. 
56 See Divine, Sputnik Challenge, 7-8. 
57 Quoted in McDougall, ... the Heavens and the Earth, 154. 
58 Divine, Sputnik Challenge, 73-74. 
59 Legislative Leadership Meeting, January 7, 1958, EL, ODE Papers, Legislative Meeting Series, Box 3, 
Folder - Legislative Minutes 1958 (1) January-February, 1. 
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that all was well in the world. His inability to understand the profound uneasiness and 
sense of impending doom was a political failure of the first order."6O 
Challenges to the New Look 
The launch of Sputnik brought to the forefront possible deficiencies in 
Eisenhower's New Look military strategy. Since 1953, critics had questioned whether the 
strategy could effectively meet U.S. commitments and objectives. The critics asked 
several questions: 
1) Did the New Look strategy guarantee that nuclear weapons would be 
used in any future conflict? 
2) Did it rely too heavily on nuclear weapons at the expense of 
conventional forces? 
3 ) Was it based on an accurate analysis of the targets that needed to be 
attacked in the Soviet Union and its satellites in the event of hostilities? 
4) Did the strategy place too much emphasis on offensive weapons while 
leaving the country vulnerable to attack? 
While these questions had circulated since 1953, they now became more relevant. 
Although many criticisms were leveled at the New Look, no statement received 
more attention than Secretary of State John Foster Dulles's address to the Council on 
Foreign Relations on January 12, 1954. In this speech he introduced the doctrine of 
massive retaliation. which became synonymous with the New Look. Dulles argued that 
"Local defenses must be reinforced by the further deterrent of massive retaliatory power. 
A potential aggressor must know that he cannot always prescribe battle conditions that 
60 Divine, The Sputnik Challenge, viii. See also Bundy, Danger and Survival, 341-42. 
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suit him.'.61 He then emphasized that ''the way to deter aggression is for the free 
community to be willing and able to respond vigorously at places and with means of its 
own choosing.,,62 
Dulles's speech raised considerable controversy inside and outside the government. 
For those who were already skeptical about the New Look, Dulles's emphasis on "massive 
retaliatory power" seemed to indicate that any future conflict, however big or small, 
would be resolved through the use of nuclear weapons. This belief raised at least two 
major concerns. First, the reliance on nuclear weapons would produce extraordinary 
casualties in any future conflicts. Second, by emphasizing the importance of nuclear 
weapons, the administration seemed to be subordinating the role of conventional forces. 
While Dulles may have overstated the importance of nuclear weapons to the New Look, 
Eisenhower had no intention of sacrificing the nation's ability to wage a variety of 
different types of conflicts. 63 "We had never proposed to strip ourselves naked of all 
military capabilities except the nuclear weapon," he remonstrated during a National 
Security Council discussion in June 1954. "It was ridiculous to imagine anything of this 
sort.,,64 But, despite the president's insistence that the New Look did not mean exclusive 
reliance on nuclear weapons, critics remained unconvinced. 
By the time of Sputnik, debate raged over the adequacy of Eisenhower's New 
Look strategy. Some critics believed that by relying so heavily on nuclear weapons the 
61 John Foster Dulles, "The Evolution of Foreign Policy," Department o/State Bulletin 30:271 (January 
25, 1954), 108. 
62 Ibid. 
63 See John S. Duffield, Power Rules: The Evolution 0/ NATO's Conventional Force Posture (Stanford 
University Press, 1995), 124-30. 
64 Memorandum of Discussion at the 204th Meeting of the National Security Council, June 14, 1954, 
FRUS 1952-1954, 2, 690. 
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United States was restricting its options in future conflicts. Others argued that the 
emphasis on nuclear weapons was correct, but the administration had cut the budget too 
much to maintain a viable nuclear deterrent force. Still others claimed that the New Look 
strategy w~s too ambiguous and did not provide adequate guidance for military planning. 
The debates over these strategic questions were heightened by military service rivalries 
and the bureaucratic conflicts that plagued the implementation of the president's policies. 
Eisenhower constantly reminded his military advisors that they represented the 
nation, not a particular military branch. From his own experiences as the Army's chief of 
staffand as an adviser to the JCS, he was well aware of the potential for conflicting 
interests. In fact, he called himself"a fanatic" on the need for cooperation between the 
military services.6S During his presidency, Eisenhower reiterated on several occasions "the 
need for each Chief to subordinate his position as a champion of a particular Service to his 
position as one of the overall national military advisors.,,66 In one particularly frustrating 
moment, Eisenhower exclaimed that ''Everyone in the Defense establishment should nail 
his flag to the staff of the United States of America, and think in terms of the whole. ,,67 
Eisenhower was concerned that comments from military officials were producing 
the impression that the administration was not united behind its national security policies.68 
At least one subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee reached this very 
65 Dwight D. Eisenhower to Swede Hazlett, November II, 1945 in Griffith (ed.), Ike 's Leiters to a Friend, 
29. 
66 Memorandum ofa Conference with the President, March 30, 1956, FRUS 1955-1957, 19,281. See also 
Memorandum for General Nathan F. Twining. February 4, 1956, LC, Twining Papers, Box 92, Folder-
1956 White House, 3; and Memorandum ofa Conference with the President, April 5, 1956, FRUS 1955-
1957, 19,286,289. 
67 Ibid., 287. 
68 See A. 1. Baccvich, The Pentomic Era: The u.s. Army Between Korea and Vietnam (Washington, 
D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1986),42-«). 
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conclusion. Senator Stuart Symington (D-MO), a former secretary of the Air Force, 
chaired the Air Power Subcommittee and delivered a scathing indictment of Eisenhower's 
policies at the beginning of 1957. The subcommittee concluded that "Financial 
considerations have often been placed ahead of defense requirements, to the serious 
damage of our air-power strength relative to that of Russia; and hence to our national 
security. ,,69 Although Eisenhower obviously disagreed with these conclusions, what 
bothered him most was that they were reached because of the advocacy by many military 
officials for greater spending for their particular military branch. 
Critics also raised questions about the selection of Soviet targets to strike in the 
event ofa war.70 In his seminal essay on the influence of targeting on nuclear strategy, 
David Rosenberg criticizes Eisenhower for failing to limit the growth of the United States 
nuclear arsenal. Rosenberg argues that the president's inability to resolve the disputes 
between the military branches over strategy and targeting led to the growth of a nuclear 
arsenal well-beyond what the United States needed.71 He concludes that "Eisenhower 
never took action to cut back the production of weapons designated for the strategic air 
offensive, despite his growing conviction that the nation already had more than adequate 
striking power." 72 
One of the main debates that Rosenberg analyzes was the types of targets that the 
United States should attempt to destroy ifwar occurred with the Soviet Union. In 1950, 
69 "Air Power and National Security," from the Air Power Subcommittee on the Air Force of the Senate 
Committee on Anned Services, January 25, 1957, 85th Congress, 1st Session, reprinted in Emme (ed), 
The Impact of Air Power, 704. 
70 See Freedman, Evolution o/Nuclear Strategy, 95. 
71 Rosenberg. "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960," 69. 
72 Ibid., 66. 
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the lCS adopted targeting guidelines that provided the foundation for U.S. nuclear war 
planning for the entire decade. The chiefs of staff assigned first priority to destroying the 
Soviet Union's capability to deliver atomic bombs, second priority to retarding Soviet 
military advances, and third priority to destroying Soviet war-making capacity. 
Codenamed BRAVO, ROMEO, and DELTA, respectively, these plans led to a continually 
increasing target list and in conjunction, an expanding nuclear weapons stockpile.73 
Targeting debates revolved around how the New Look strategy should be 
implemented. There were clear divisions between the positions of the Army and Navy and 
that of the Air Force.74 The Air Force recommended attacking BRAVO or counterforce 
targets--the Soviet air-missile nuclear forces--first. After destroying these, it would then 
focus on other targets. The Army and the Navy, on the other hand, stressed that it would 
be virtually impossible to destroy the enemy's entire offensive nuclear capability even 
under the best conditions; therefore, they argued that priorities should be established to 
recognize the limited number of targets that could and/or needed to be hit. Instead, Army 
and Navy representatives recommended giving equal emphasis to counterforce and 
countercity (DELTA) targets.75 By developing a more limited, yet more defined target 
list, they hoped to create a nuclear strategy that was not dependent on the availability of 
the entire United States nuclear striking force. 76 
73 Ibid., 16-17 and 23. 
74 See Oral History Interview with Lyman L. Lemnitzer. OH #301. Oral History Research Office, 
Columbia University, 1973.56. Lemnitzer argued that from 1957 to 1960, "We in the anned forces were 
probably having the greatest controversy that existed among the services in my time at least, and that had 
to do with the role of the various services in the Strategic Bombing area. .. 
75 For succinct definitions ofboth counterforce and countercity strategies. see Huntington. Common 
Defense. 103. 
76 Rosenberg. "Origins of Overkill." 51-55. 
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The debate also revolved around timing of when targets should be struck. 
Although it is clear that Eisenhower considered and rejected plans to launch a preventive 
war against the Soviet Union in 1953 and 1954, the possibility of preemption remained 
part of U.S. policy throughout the 1950s." Preemption meant that if the United States 
discovered preparations for a Soviet attack, it would launch a military strike to prevent or 
preempt it. The Air Force's emphasis on counterforce strategy reflected this belief.'8 
The preemptive strategy can clearly be seen in the thinking of Air Force General 
Curtis leMay, commander of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) from 1948 to 1957. In 
December 1949, he told Chief of Staff Force Hoyt Vandenberg: 
it would appear economical and logical to adopt the objective of 
completely avoiding [an] enemy attack against our strategic force by 
destroying his atomic force before it can attack ours. Assuming that as a 
democracy we are not prepared to wage a preventive war, this course of 
action poses two most difficult requirements: 
(1) An intelligence system which can locate the vulnerable elements of the 
Soviet striking force and forewarn us when [an] attack by that force is 
imminent, and 
2) Agreement at [the] top governmental level that when such information is 
received the Strategic Air Command will be directed to attack. 79 
77 See Diary Entry of the President, January 23, 1956, reprinted in Kaku and Axelrod, To Win a Nuclear 
War, 105; Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, 132; and David Alan Rosenberg, "U.S. Nuclear War 
Planning, 1945-1960," in Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson (eds.), Strategic Nuclear Testing (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1986), 44. An Air Force study in 1953-54 called Project Control sheds light on 
the widespread consideration of aggressive policies by the United States against the Soviet Union. The 
plan called for the United States to gain control of the Soviet air space and force the Kremlin to change its 
policies. See Biddle, "Handling the Soviet Threat": 273-302. 
78 For a counterforce strategy to work, the enemy's offensive striking power would have to be hit before it 
could be launched. See Rosenberg, "Origins of Overkill", 63. 
79 LeMay to Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, December 12, 1949, LC, LeMay Papers, Box - B195, Folder-
B3II,3. 
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He reiterated this strategy in a lecture at the National War College in 1954. He argued 
that "We [SAC] think the best chance of preventing attacks on this country is to get those 
airplanes on the ground before they take off: rather than depending on the Air Defense 
Command to shoot them down after they got [sic] here."so 
leMay's views are important because they shed light on a debate raging among 
Air Force commanders, and because he was an influential witness before the Gaither 
committee. At their annual conference in 1957, Air Force commanders discussed a 
recently completed report that emphasized the basis of a successful strategy in a future 
war was "to select and destroy a target system, the destruction of which is possible in the 
event of initiation of war by the u.S. or after Soviet surprise attack."sl As indicated, one 
strategic option envisioned the United States initiating a war with the Soviet Union. On at 
least two other occasions the commanders discussed preventive and preemptive wars. 
While they did not recommend either strategy, it is clear from their discussions that as late 
1957 they had not ruled out such actions.82 
As important as the debates were about targeting and preemption, they paled in 
comparison to questions concerning the capability of the United States to wage limited 
military operations.83 In 1957, two of the decade's most influential books on nuclear 
strategy were published-Robert Osgood's Limited War and Henry Kissinger's Nuclear 
80 General Curtis leMay. 'The Strategic Air Command: Question Period." lecture given at the National 
War College. Janwuy 28. 1954. ibid.. Box 8204. Folder - 8-33815. I. 
81 Memorandum to the CbiefofStaff-Enclosure D. September 30. 1957. LC. Papers ofTbomas D. White. 
Box 6. Folder - General White-McConnell Report. 2. 
82 Sec "5 November 1957". ibid.. Folder - Conference 4 November 1957. 5-6; and "6 November 1957". 
ibid .• 1-3. 
83 Sec Herken. Counsels of War. 99; Kaplan. Wizards of Armageddon. 185-200; and Kinnard. President 
Eisenhower and Strategy Management. 42-46. 
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Weapo1ls and ForeigTl PoliCY. Numerous articles appeared at the same time emphasizing 
the need to abandon or reduce the Eisenhower administration's reliance on strategic 
nuclear weapons.84 Eisenhower generally did not follow the debates of civilian strategists 
closely, and reportedly, questioned "What the hell do they know about it [nuclear 
strategy]?,,8S Nevertheless, he was aware of their arguments and even passed a brief of 
Kissinger's book to Secretary of State Dulles. 86 
The various limited war strategies owe much to the writings of British Rear 
Admiral Sir Anthony Buzzard, the former director of British Naval Intelligence.87 In 
January 1956, Buzzard argued that "all our fighting should be limited (in weapons, targets, 
area, and time) to the minimum force necessary to deter and repel aggression, prevent any 
unnecessary extension of the conflict, and permit a return to negotiation at the earliest 
opportunity-without seeking total victory or unconditional surrender. ,,88 He explained 
that this strategy, "by providing an intermediate deterrent, guards against these dangers 
[limited wars], and gives more latitude for our diplomacy, without reducing our deterrent 
against all-out attack.,,89 
84 For excellent bibliographies of the writings concerning limited war strategies, see Morton H. Halperin, 
Limited War: An Essay on the Development o/the Theory and An Annotated Bihliography (Cambridge, 
MA: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1962); and Department of the Army, Pamphlet 
20~0: Bibliography on Limited War, Headquarters, Departmem of the Anny, February 1958. 
8S Oral History of Andrew Goodpaster, #477, EL, 1982,30. 
86 See Heruy Cabot Lodge to the President, July 25,1957, EL, DDE Papers, Administrative Series, Box 
23, Folder - Kissinger Book; "Synopsis 'Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy' by Henry A. Kissinger," 
ibid.; Memorandum for the Acting Secretary of State, July 31, 1957, ibid, DDE Diary Series, Box 25, 
Folder - July 1957-DDE Dictation; and "Transcript of Remarks by Henry A. Kissinger Before the Board 
of the Research Institute of American," [September 19571], DDE Records, White House Central Files, 
Subject Series, Box 7, Folder - Atomic Energy & the Bomb (10). 
87 Freedman, Evolution 0/ Nuclear Strategy, 113. See also John Baylis, "Anthony Buzzard, .. in John 
Baylis and John Garnett (eels.), Makers o/Nuclear Strategy (London: Pinter Publishers, 1991).0 
88 Rear Admiral Sir Anthony W. Buzzard, "Massive Retaliation and Graduated Deterrence," World 
Politics 8:2 (January 1956),229. 
89 Ibid .• 230. 
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In 1957 Buzzard elaborated on these ideas in an unpublished paper that circulated 
among members of the Gaither committee. He argued "that the key to achieving this 
essential balance of power is to establish a firm distinction between local tactical atomic 
war and total global war.,,90 He explained that "If only we would firmly and publicly 
establish that tactical atomic war was a strictly limited affair and need not spread to total 
war, it would of course, take a large step towards counterbalancing the inherently superior 
Communist conventional strength, and thus restoring the tactical balance of power. ,,91 
[emphasis in original] He further expounded why a limited war capability added to U.S. 
deterrent power. He stressed that "It is sometimes forgotten that a deterrent has two 
elements-severity and certainty of application, and--particularly, with the Russians--it is 
more important for our deterrent to be reasonably severe and certain of being applied than 
for it to be disastrous in its consequences and quite uncertain of being applied. ,,92 
[emphasis in original] He finally concluded that for a limited war strategy to be successful, 
the belligerents must have agreed before the outbreak of a conflict to limit war aims, the 
boundaries of the conflict, the types of weapons to be used, and the number of legitimate 
targets.93 
Kissinger adopted many of Buzzard's arguments in his study of nuclear weapons.94 
He explained that "In a limited war the problem is to apply graduated amounts of 
destruction for limited objectives and also to permit the necessary breathing spaces for 
90 "Paper by Rear Admiral Sir Anthony Buzzard." June 19, 1957, USMA. Box 63A. Folder #10 - Gaither 
Committee, 1957, l. 
91 lbid.,6. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid., 8-9. 
94 For a good short summary of Kissinger's strategic ideas, see Lawrence Freedman, "Henry Kissinger," 
in Baylis and Garnett (eds.), Makers of Nuclear Strategy. 
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politi~al contacts."9S He stressed that "The purpose of limited war is to inflict losses or to 
pose risks for the enemy out of proportion to the objectives under dispute. The more 
moderate the objective, the less violent the war is likely to be ... 96 He further added that 
''the result of a limited war cannot depend on military considerations alone; it reflects an 
ability to harmonize political and military objectives.,,97 By providing a clear explanation 
of U.S. intentions and providing an alternative to all-out war, Kissinger and Buzzard 
believed that they were providing a strategy that allowed greater flexibility. 
Osgood reached similar conclusions. He argued that "Only by carefully limiting 
the dimensions of warfare can nations minimize the risk of war becoming an intolerable 
disaster.,,98 He then explained that for a limited war strategy to succeed there had to be 
agreed upon limits in political objectives, geographical areas of conflict, weapons, and 
targets.99 Of particular importance were his arguments concerning the establishment of 
political objectives and the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Osgood contended that it is 
necessary that "the government establish concrete, feasible objectives, sufficiently well 
defined yet flexible enough to provide a rational guide for the conduct of military 
operations, and that it communicate the general import of these objectives ... to the 
enemy."IOO He also explained that by limiting weapons that might be used in a conflict a 
country was not forsaking the use of tactical nuclear armaments. Osgood concluded that 
9S Henry A. Kissinger. Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper & Brothers. 1957). 156-
57. 
96 Ibid .• 145. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Robert Endicott Osgood. Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy (Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press. 1957). 26. 
99 Ibid .• 237-59. 
100 Ibid .• 239. 
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"if the American government were to adapt tactical nuclear weapons to a well-conceived 
strategy of limited-war, based upon a policy of graduated deterrence, then it should not be 
difficult to erase this stigma [that tactical nuclear bombs were substantially different from 
conventional explosives] by publicizing the facts in a sober and candid fashion.,,101 
Buzzard, Kissinger, and Osgood represented only a small number of the limited 
war strategists. Their ideas triggered an intense debate concerning nuclear strategy in 
1957. Officials within the Eisenhower administration pondered the need for acquiring 
more diversified military capabilities in order to achieve greater policy flexibility. Robert 
Cutler told Eisenhower that the question of limited war was receiving widespread 
attention in the NSC's planning board meetings. He advised the president ''that continuing 
attention should also be given to the U.S. capabilities to deal with hostilities short of 
general war."102 He finally suggested ''that some way be found to elevate in the highest 
councils the need for such continuing attention, without calling for increased financial 
expenditures. ,,103 [emphasis in original] 
Within the State Department, the Policy Planning Staff also discussed a paper that 
called for the development of an alternative policy to massive retaliation. It concluded 
that "Unless there is a national doctrine for limited war and a definition of means by which 
limited war will not expand into global holocaust, the United States stands in danger of 
starting a chain of events which might lead to national disaster.,,104 It rationalized that 
101 Ibid.,257. 
102 Memorandum for the President, August 7, 1957, EL, WHO,OSANSA, NSC Series, Briefing Notes 
Subseries, Box 12, Folder - Limited War (2) 1957-61, 1. 
103 Ibid. 
104 R. McClintock. "A National Doctrine for Limited War," October 4, 1957, NA, RG 59, Records of the 
Department of State, Policy Planning Staff Records, 1957-61, Lot 670 548, Box 121, Folder - Military 
and Naval Policy, 2. 
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with the development of increasingly more powerful nuclear weapons, the possibility of 
victory in a general war becomes unlikely. The paper recommended limiting objectives 
and the types of weapons, and relying on indigenous forces to wage Wars. 105 In a not so 
veiled critique of the administration's policies, the paper concluded that"A philosophy for 
limited war implies cool-headed policy and self-restraint in the choice of objectives and the 
tactics to achieve those limited ends."I06 
Even John Foster Dulles, the author of the massive retaliation phrase, left room for 
modifying his own strategy. In an October 1957 article in Foreign Affairs, he explained 
that it may "be feasible to place less reliance upon deterrence of vast retaliatory power. It 
may be possible to defend countries by nuclear weapons so mobile, or so placed, as to 
make military invasion with conventional forces a hazardous attempt." 107 If such a policy 
were adopted, "would-be aggressors will be unable to count on a successful conventional 
aggression, but must themselves weigh the consequences of invoking nuclear war.,,108 
While these comments do not indicate the abandonment of the massive retaliation 
doctrine, they do indicate that key officials in the Eisenhower administration were 
beginning to question whether the United States possessed adequate military capabilities 
to wage limited military operations. 
The discussions concerning limited war capabilities were most relevant to the 
military branches. Of the three, the Army was the most persistent advocate of a limited 
lOS Ibid., 6-7. 
106 Ibid., 7. 
107 John Foster Dulles, "Challenge and Response in United States Policy," Foreign Affairs 36: 1 (October 
1957),31. 
I<XI Ibid., 31. Duffield reports that as early as November 1954, Secretary of State Dulles argued that the 
United States and NATO needed to maintain flexibility in their military forces. Duffield, Power Rules, 
114. 
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war strategy. In defending their positions, Anny leaders stressed that most wars through 
history were fought for limited objectives and that with the advent of multimegaton 
nuclear weapons there would be even more incentive to keep them that way. Both 
Generals Matthew Ridgeway and Maxwell Taylor resigned from the JeS in 1955 and 
1959, respectively, because of what they saw as the administration's lack of commitment 
to the Anny's needs. 109 They did not necessarily advocate the abandonment of massive 
retaliation, but sought a better balance between the military branches so that the Anny 
could meet its commitments in all types of military conflicts. 
While the Army was the most consistent advocate of a limited war strategy, both 
the Air Force and the Navy seriously considered it as well. In December 1957, the Air 
Force Science Advisory Board held a conference on limited war. 110 Although it was not 
designed to reach specific conclusions~ the conference did provide an opportunity for open 
discussions of both the advantages and disadvantages ofa variety of limited war strategies. 
[n January 1958, the Navy completed a report that concluded "Military superiority in 
unlimited war no longer connotes an ability to 'win' -nobody wins a suicide pact. Thus 
all-out war is obsolete as an instrument of national policy."lll [emphasis in original] 
While both the Air Force and the Navy had their own reasons for embracing a strategy 
109 Baccvicb. Pentomic Era, 48. 
110 Science Advisory Board Meeting on Limited War on December 4, 5, and 6 Tentative Agenda. 
November 5, 1957, LC, Twining Papers, Box 6, Folder - Diary ofCJCS 8115157 to 12131/57, 1-2. Among 
the military leaders making presentations were General Lemnitzer, Army Vice Chief of Staff, Admiral 
Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, General White, Air Force Chief of Staff, and General Power, SAC 
Commander-in-Chief. 
III Summary of Major Strategic Considerations for the 1960-70 ERA, January 22, 1958, NA, RG 59, State 
Department Records, Policy Planning Staff Records (1957-61), Lot 670 548, Box 121, Folder - Military 
and Naval Policy, 1. 
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that provided greater flexibility, their efforts to incorporate limited military operations into 
their plans reflected the influence of limited war arguments. 
Conclusions 
The dramatic events and debates of 1957 transformed the setting in which the 
Gaither committee's findings were going to be assessed. The crises over the budget, the 
debacle in Little Rock, and the start of an economic recession damaged Eisenhower's 
reputation and hamstrung his attempts to govern the nation. Furthermore, Sputnik raised 
concerns about the Soviet Union's ability to attack the United States and expanded 
debates about Eisenhower's national security policies. After all of these crises, 
Eisenhower could no longer rely on his own reputation to reassure the nation. 
By the time the Gaither committee delivered its report in November, conditions 
had markedly changed from its inception the previous May. When it was created, 
Eisenhower still hoped that his budget would be passed with few modifications; he saw a 
victory on the horizon in the passage of the first civil rights legislation since 
Reconstruction; and he viewed U.S. military strength with pride. Little did he realize that 
the future was not nearly so bright. When the Gaither committee presented its conclusions 
and recommendations, the nation was prepared to believe its dire outlook. Six months 
earlier that would not have happened, but in this case, timing meant everything. 
CHAPTER 4 - The Activities and Conclusions 
of the Gaither Committee 
When Eisenhower ordered the establishment of the Gaither committee in May 
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1957, he conceived ofa group which would analyze two important, yet limited, national 
security issues: active and passive defense. He believed that by making improvements in 
these areas the United States might be able to strengthen its deterrent power against the 
Soviet Union. This strategy of deterrence formed the basis of Eisenhower' s national se-
curity policies. 1 He assumed that if the United States maintained sufficient military power 
to strike the Soviet Union even under the worst circumstances, the Kremlin would be 
unwilling to initiate war and risk annihilation. The president's press secretary, James 
Hagerty, summarized the administration's position in 1955. The strategy of deterrence, he 
said, was based on "blunting the threat of attack by establishing an adequate continental 
defense and building up our guided missiles here at home, and secondly, to emphasize the 
retaliatory concept of warfare by putting more money into the air and developing a better 
early warning system.,,2 Two key parts of this strategy, continental defense and early 
warning, fell into the areas of active and passive defense that Eisenhower asked the 
Gaither committee to study. 
After listening to countless briefings, studying numerous reports, and examining 
the most secret intelligence estimates, the committee reached some troubling conclusions. 
It found the United States facing an adversary who was expanding its military power at an 
I For descriptions of deterrence theory in the Eisenhower administration, see Freedman, Evolution o/Nu-
clear Strategy, 81-89; and Deborah Welch Larson, "Deterrence Theory and the Cold War," Radical His-
tory Review 63 (Fall 1995), 86-95. 
2 Diary Entry by the President's Press Secretary (Hagerty), January 3, 1955, FRUS /955-/957, 19,4. 
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alarming rate and who sought world domination. It argued that the United States had to 
make significant changes and additions to its active and passive defenses. It also recom-
mended that the United States expand its offensive retaliatory capabilities in order to pres-
ent a greater deterrent to the Soviet Union. The programs that the committee proposed 
would cost $44 billion over five years. The final Gaither report challenged the effective-
ness of the Eisenhower administration's national security policies and forced its advisors 
to confront some very complicated issues. 
Parameters and Organizational Strocture of the Gaither Committee 
Some government officials who knew about the proposed study were concerned 
that the Gaither committee's analysis would expand beyond what the NSC initially re-
quested. Gaither met with Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald Quarles on June 19 to 
discuss the parameters of the proposed study.3 Quarles worried that if the Gaither com-
mittee made recommendations like the Killian panel the Defense Department would have 
difficulty implementing them. In the early summer of 1957, the Defense Department was 
just beginning to deal with the adverse effects of congressional cuts on "the operational 
readiness dates of the early warning system, the Continental Air Defense System, and the 
dispersal of the Strategic Air Forces.,,4 Requests for additional programs would have only 
exacerbated this dilemma. 
3 Diary - Donald Quarles, Wednesday,lune 19, 1957, EL, Quarles, Donald: Papers, Box I, Folder - Un-
titled [5/1/57-12/31/571, l. 
4 Memorandum for the President.luly 10, 1957, EL, WHO, 055, Subject Series, Dcpartmem ofDefensc 
Subseries, Box 6, Folder - Military Planning, 1958-1 % 1 (l), 6. 
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Eisenhower gave Robert Cutler, his assistant for national security affairs, and Gor-
don Gray, the director of the ODM, the responsibility for formulating the guidelines of the 
Gaither committee study. After Quarles expressed his concerns, Cutler reassured him that 
the president's intention was not to obtain a thorough re-evaluation of U.S. national se-
curity programs. Rather, Eisenhower wanted broad advice "derived from wide experi-
ence" and careful study. S Cutler told Quarles that liThe broad-brush study which is sought 
from the [Gaither] Committee relates to whether it is advisable for the U.S. Government 
in future years to embark on a greatly enhanced program of passive defense (shelters) or 
whether monies that would be devoted to that purpose had better be used instead for ac-
tive defense, accepting whatever risk may be entailed." Cutler then added that "The last 
thing the President wants to come out of this study is a series of detailed recommendations 
for changing our defense programs.,,6 
At a meeting on June 27, 1957, Cutler presented instructions to Gaither and a few 
other committee members which emphasized the importance of performing a broad over-
view of U.S. active and passive defense measures, but one which did not offer specific 
guidelines for the president to follow.7 Cutler elaborated: 
In arriving at its broad opinion with respect to protection of the civil 
population against nuclear attack, the Panel should take into account (a) 
the degree of protection afforded by passive defense programs now in be-
ing and programmed for the future, (b) the degree to which such protection 
would be afforded by existing and programmed active defenses, and (c) the 
benefits and risks to our military and non-military defenses which would be 
entailed, and the economic and political considerations which would be in-
5 Robert Cutler's Personal Notes, June 20, 1957, ibid., OSANSA, OCB Series, Subject Subseries, Box 3, 
Folder File - June 1957 (4), l. 
6 Ibid. 
7 For a list ofthosc who attended this meeting, see Memorandum for File, June 28, 1957, ibid., NSC Se-
ries, Briefing Notes Subscries, Box 8, Folder - Fallout Shelters (3), 1. 
volved, in any decision to undertake a significant shift of emphasis with re-
gard to either active or passive defenses. The end result of the study 
should be to suggest which of the various active and passive defense meas-
ures are likely to be most effective, in relation to their costs, in protecting 
the civil population.8 [emphasis in original] 
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In July, Gaither and William Foster approached Cutler to expand the parameters of 
the study.9 Cutler readily consented because he believed that a larger view of U.S . na-
tional security programs would facilitate the development of the most accurate opinions. 
In his memoirs, he recalled this exchange. "Its leaders, Rowan Gaither and WIlliam Fos-
ter," Cutler wrote, "asked permission to extend its [the Gaither committee's] inquiries into 
the overall U.S. defense programs, as having an obvious relation to what the national 
economy might be called upon to bear. The request seeming reasonable, I gave my assent 
without foreseeing the result." 10 
The request to expand the scope of the study may have stemmed from meeting 
between members of the committee and Eisenhower on July 16. The president reportedly 
asked the panel, "If you make the assumption that there is going to be a nuclear war, what 
should I dO?"ll By offering credibility to a Soviet action that he did not expect, Eisen-
hower may have inadvertently given the committee the wrong premise from which to 
work. Instead of developing opinions based on the belief that the Soviet Union might at-
tack, but probably would not, it assumed that there would be a nuclear war. Foster, in 
8 Infonna! Memorandum for Use at Meeting with Mr. Gaither, June 25, 1957, ibid., 3-4. 
9 Fred Kaplan argues that Alben WohIstetter persuaded Gaither to expand the scope of the committee's 
study. After meeting with Wohlstetter, "Gaither was talking about something potentially larger-a Presi-
dentially appointed commission, packed with prominent names, that might change the whole focus of the 
Eisenhower Administration's skimpy and unimaginative defense policies." Kaplan, Wizards of Armaged-
don, 128. See also, Herken, Counsels, 114. 
10 Cutler, No Time for Rest, 355. 
II Quoted in Winkler. Lifo Under a Cloud, 119. 
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fact, believed that Eisenhower "thought it was time for a fresh assessment of the balance 
of this country in relation to Russia in science, education, foreign trade, domestic econ-
omy, national morale, military strength and world friends.,,12 
As the committee and the president's assistants attempted to sort out the study's 
parameters, Gaither, with the help of the ODM, continued to select advisors. 13 By the end 
of July, he created a steering committee and an advisory panel as well as obtained the 
services of the Institute for Defense Analyses. 14 He organized four subcommittees: 
Evaluation Quantitative Assessments, Active Defense, Social-Economic-Political, and 
Passive Defense. These subcommittees were chaired by Robert Prim and Stan Lawwill, 
Jerome Wiesner and Hector Skifter, John Corson and Robert Calkins, and Wtlliam 
Webster and James Perkins, respectively. IS Each subcommittee examined specific issues 
and developed conclusions that the steering committee and advisory panel used in making 
their final analysis. 
12 William C. Foster, "Search for Survival," June 1958, EL, WHO, 08S, Subject Series, Alphabetical Sub-
series, Box 13, Folder - Foster, William C. May-July 1958 (1), 1. Foster further explained why the 
committee asked to expand its study. "The reasoning. " he wrote, "was simply: We had come together to 
study the best means of protecting America's civil population from nuclear extinction in case of attack. 
But we knew our military strategy was based on the assumption that any defense is worthless unless it has 
absolute capability of returning an attack. And when you return an attack, you are then on the offensive. 
Defense alone as a national policy is an invitation to oblivion. Offensive power is key to defense." Ibid., 
4. See also Nitze, From Hiroshima 10 Glasnost, 166. 
13 Memorandum for File, June 28, 1957, EL, WHO, NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 8, Folder-
Fallout Shelters (3), 1-2. 
14 Sec Cutler to H. Rowan Gaither, June 18, 1957, EL, WHO, OSANSA, OCB Series, Subject Subseries, 
Box 3, Folder - June 1957 (4), 1; Passive Panel- Preliminary Roster as of July 11, 1957, ibid., 1-2; and 
Group Visiting President, July 16. 1957, ibid., NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 16, Folder-
Security Resources Panel, 2. 
IS Gaither Report. 30. 
154 
Briefings Received by the Gaither Commillee 
By late Augu~ the Gaither committee and its various subcommittees were ear-
nestly examining the complex issues that surrounded U.S. strategic capabilities. For active 
defenses, the committees studied how the United States could prevent attacking Soviet 
forces from reaching their targets. Generally, this meant the development of sufficient 
forces of interceptor airplanes, anti-aircraft guns, and surface-to-air missiles to destroy 
attacking Soviet bombers and/or missiles. In conjunction with its examination of active 
defenses, the experts explored passive defense measures designed to protect the civil 
population from the effects of a nuclear attack if Soviet bombers and/or missiles reached 
their targets. These measures were designed to achieve the earliest possible warning of an 
impending Soviet attack and to shield the population from the worst effects of nuclear 
explosions. Finally, Gaither and his colleagues examined the relationship between active 
and passive defenses and offensive striking power. 
The Gaither committee had access to voluminous sources which detailed U.S. of-
fensive and defensive capabilities. The committee received briefings from the Defense 
Department, the Net Evaluation Subcommittee of the NSC, the CIA, the AEC, the FCDA, 
the ODM, and the NSC Representative on Internal Security.16 In addition to these brief-
ings, the committee had access to both CIA and Air Force intelligence estimates, to special 
studies performed by the agencies mentioned above, and to studies by private organiza-
tions like the Rand Corporation and the National Academy of Sciences. The committee 
16 Informal Memorandum for Use at Meeting with Mr. Gaither. June 25, 1957,3-4. See also Prados, So-
viet Threat, 68-69. 
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members also questioned the nation's top military leaders and inspected its key defense 
installations. 17 
The Gaither committee's subcommittees and their various staff groups met fre-
quently to discuss the key issues concerning U.S. capabilities for resisting a Soviet attack. 
The content of these meetings remains a mystery. With only a few exceptions, the notes 
are either classified or lost. 18 However, an analysis of the briefings that have become 
available, along with the known views of some of the participants, provides a revealing 
picture of the advice that the Gaither committee received. 
The Gaither committee met some initial resistance from within the military estab-
lishment in its attempts to acquire information, but ultimately, received the assistance it 
requested. 19 The JCS denied the committees request for eight briefings but did agree to 
provide three. The first covered all aspects of the Soviet threat; the second identified U.S. 
continental defense capabilities; and the third reviewed U.S. retaliatory capabilities.20 
The Air Force initially provided the committee "the 50-cent tour for visiting fire-
men" of SAC headquarters 21 Later, however, General Thomas Power, the new SAC 
commander after General LeMay was promoted to vice chief of staff of the Air Force, 
presented a much more detailed briefing. He described SAC's most secret intelligence es-
17 See Foster, "Search for Survival,'" 1-2; and Memorandum for lames S. Lay, Jr., December 24, 1957, 
NA, RG 273, NSC, Folder - NSC 5724 (background documents), 1. 
18 Very little information on the proceedings of the Gaither committee between its establishment in May 
and the presentation of its report to the NSC in November actually exists. I have been unable to determine 
why that is this case. I have bad little luck obtaining the declassification of documents. For the various 
archival sources that I have examined, see the bibliography. 
19 See Memorandum for the Deputy Secretary of Defense, July 31, 1957, NA, RG 218, JCS, CCS 381 US 
(5-23-46) Sec. 84 RB, 1; and Col. Robert H. Warren to Gaither, August 16, 1957, ibid. 
20 Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, July 11, 1957, NA, RG 218, JCS, CCS 384.51 (10-31-46) 
Sec. 14, 1. 
21 Foster, "Search for Survival,'" 7. 
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timates of Soviet capabilities and answered "questions with great precision and compe-
tence and, as requested, philosophized with clear forethought and understanding about 
deterrence, Soviet future capabilities and intentions, and so on.,,22 
The Gaither committee's second SAC briefing symbolized a change in how the 
committee was now going to be treated. At the new briefing, LeMay "was completely 
candid in answering questions, and regained for the Air Force the respect of the panel 
leaders.,,23 While notes and memoranda from the briefing are unavailable, an examination 
of LeMay's statements around the same time should provide an idea as to what advice he 
gave the committee?4 In 1956 he argued that the Soviet Union was "bent upon dominat-
ing the world by imposing upon nations and peoples everywhere a way of life radically and 
irreconcilably opposed to all of the things we believe in.,,25 He then explained that the 
outcome of the next war will be determined in the first few days of the conflict. He 
stressed that the only way to prevent a Soviet attack was to make its leaders realize that 
they would face a devastating counterstrike.26 
In remarks before the Air Force Science Advisory Board in May 1957, LeMay dis-
cussed several issues relevant to the Gaither committee. He enunciated that a strategy of 
22 Carroll L. Zimmennan, Insider at SAC: Operations Analysis Under General LeMay (Manhattan, KA: 
Sunflower University Press, 1988), 115. See also Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, 132. 
23 Zimmennan.. Insider at SAC, 114. See also Gaither to LeMay, August 26, 1957, LC, LeMay Papers, 
Box B 107, Folder - Personal Correspondence July-Dec. 1957, I. 
24 I have to thank Robert Hopkins for providing me a copy of a government records transmittal form that 
identifies some of the Air Force's briefings and meeting during the summer and fall 1957. He found the 
form at the National Security Archive. At the time of this writing, my request for the declassification of 
this infonnation is still pending. See Transmittal of Government Records, Ac. 61-AI449, RG 341, Rec-
ords ofHq USAF. The records are still under Air Force custody. 
2S General Curtis E. leMay, "Strategic Air Command and World Peace", reprinted in Emme, Air Power, 
668. 
26 Ibid .• 670. 
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deterrence would only be successful if the enemy was positive it could not successfully 
attack the United States. He emphasized that "unless our forces are clearly capable of 
winning under operational handicaps of bad weather and no more than tactical warning, 
and despite any action the enemy may take against them, our forces are not a genuine de-
terrent. By 'winning' is meant achieving a condition wherein the enemy cannot impose his 
will on us, but we can impose our will on him. ,,27 [emphasis in original] He then descn"bed 
how "the most important contribution of air defense systems is provision of warning to 
enable the air offensive forces to get underway before they are destroyed at base. ,,28 He 
stressed that while the United States currently maintained the capability to strike the So-
viet Union, he feared that if SAC did not improve its ability to penetrate Soviet defenses 
by 1962, then he "could not be confident of winning the Air Power Battle.,,29 
Fred Kaplan argues that in LeMay's briefings to the Gaither committee, the new 
Air Force vice chief of staff was even more explicit in his plans for defeating the Soviet 
Union. On one of the committee's visits to SAC headquarters, it witnessed a surprise alert 
drill. When SAC bombers were unable to take offin less than six hours, Robert Sprague 
questioned why LeMay was not upset. The general responded that the United States flew 
intelligence missions over the Soviet Union every day and would know about any attack 
well in advance, and his bombers would have more than six hours to get off the ground. 
27 General Curtis E. leMay, "The Operational Side of Air Offense," remarks to the USAF Scientific Ad-
visory Board. May 21, 1957, LC, LeMay Papers, Box B206, Folder - B60725, 2-3. 
28 Ibid., 3. 
29 Ibid., 6. 
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He then argued that if attack plans were discovered, the United States would not hesitate 
to launch a pre-emptive strike. 30 
On September 17, Air Force Chief of Staff General Thomas White briefed the 
Gaither committee. He made three key arguments: 
1) The threat to our nation is not simply a great and static threat, but rather 
one which is evolving, and growing at a rate which should no longer sur-
prise us. The threat is largely a military threat and within the military cate-
gory, it is essentially an air threat. 
2) Our military structure must be designed to counter this threat. In de-
scribing and modeling the development of our military structure, we con-
centrate effort in keeping with priorities which derive from the need to 
counter the threat. 
3) Today, more than ever before, defense is in large part, even primarily, a 
product of offensive capability. The two are tightly joined and each defies 
decision in isolation from the other. This stems from both military and 
economic considerations.31 
He concluded by arguing that while the Air Force could operate effectively on a $20 bil-
lion budget in 1958, there would have to be significant increases in the future. 32 
Each of the other military branches also briefed the committee. However, the only 
briefing for which we have a record was the one given by the Commandant of the Marine 
Corps Lt. General Randolph Pate in late September. In his presentation, he focused on 
two issues that were significant to the committee: the role of tactical nuclear weapons in 
warfare and the growing relevance of limited war capabilities. He stressed that the Ma-
30 Kaplan. Wizards of Armageddon, 132-34. See also Hopkins, "An Expanded Understanding of Eisen-
hower, American Policy, and Overflights," 6-9; and Richard H. Hahn and Joseph P. Harahan (cds.), "U.S. 
Strategic Air Power, 1948-1962," International Security 12:4 (Spring 1988): 78-95. 
31 White to Sprague, September 23, 1957, Le, White Papers, Box 7, Folder - White House, 1. See also 
Sprague to White, September 18, 1957, ibid., 1. 
32 Letter from White to Sprague, September 23, 1957, 1-2. 
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rines "must possess these characteristics: READINESS, VERSATILITY, FLEXIBIL-
ITY, [and] OFFENSIVE POWER.,,33 [emphasis in original] He lamented that the Marine 
Corps' ability to accomplish its tasks had "already been appreciably lowered by personnel 
losses. ,,34 
In his explanation for why the Marines remained essential to U.S. military efforts, 
Pate differentiated between general and limited war. He argued that after the initial atomic 
exchange in a general war, the Marines and other mobile forces would "most likely be the 
ultimately decisive element in insuring defeat of the enemy.',3S He also argued that he had 
"become increasingly convinced that the deterrent forces of each side are such that the 
mutual holocaust of an all-out, unlimited nuclear war suddenly starting is unlikely. This 
being the case, I believe that wars of limited forces and scope are much more likely.,,36 
Accordingly, the United States had to be prepared to wage limited military operations. He 
then stressed that the military's only amphibious force, the Marines, could use tactical nu-
clear weapons to help achieve their objectives. "We found," he claimed, "that atomic 
weapons are not just to be feared. By the exploitation of these weapons, the amphibious 
force can compress days of preliminary bombardment into a few minutes of time. ,,37 
According to Paul Nitze and George Lincoln, the Gaither committee's various 
meetings raised two categories of questions about limited wars. The first category dealt 
with the political question surrounding such wars: Where were these wars most likely to 
33 Statement by the Commandant of the Marine Corps to Gaither Committee, September 25, 1957, 
USMA, Lincoln Papers, Box 63A, Folder #10 - Gaither Committee 1957, I. 
34 Ibid., 10. 
35 Ibid., 8. 
36 Ibid., II. 
37 Ibid .• 4. 
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occur? What level of support would the United States receive from the people and the 
governments in the areas of the conflict? And what should U.S. objectives be in view of 
its over-all world strategy? The second category involved the military implications of lim-
ited wars: What forces, both U.S. and indigenous, were available? What types ofweap-
ons should be used? And what targets should be attackedf8 
From the briefings, Nitze and Lincoln concluded that the Air Force believed that 
U.S. capabilities to wage limited wars were restricted by the forces and weapons available 
to the enemy. If the adversary possessed comparable capabilities, it would be difficult to 
keep the conflict limited and still achieve a successful resolution of the conflict. But if 
SAC maintained its superiority, the Air Force argued it would deter limited as well as gen-
eral wars because it did not think an adversary would risk annihilation.39 The Navy, on the 
other hand, questioned the efficacy of nuclear weapons in limited wars, fearing that they 
would lead to the escalation of a conflict into a general war.40 The Army insisted that the 
key to a successful limited war strategy was maintaining flexibility to respond in a variety 
of ways. This flexibility would include the use of tactical nuclear weapons "if their use is 
to our military advantage.,,41 
The Army's views on limited war can be elaborated further by examining presen-
tations delivered by Army Vice Chief of Staff General Lyman Lemnitzer in 1957. He 
made similar presentations to the Army Policy Council in September and the Air Force 
38 [Col. George Lincoln and Paul Nitze), "Limited Military Operations," undated [December 19571, EL. 
WHO, OSANSA, Special Assistant Series, Subject Subseries, Box 11, Folder - SRP, lO-1 L 
39 Ibid., 2. 
40 Ibid., 5. 
4\ Ibid. 
161 
Science Advisory Board Conference on Limited War in December.42 Lemnitzer criticized 
the doctrine of massive retaliation. He contended that "Those who talk ofa war for sur-
vival or who insist that we must first fight and win the air battle, or who assert that the 
capacity to retaliate massively is the vital element in any war strategy are being tyrannized 
by their own doctrine .... This doctrine implies that every modem war must inevitably be 
a total war. ,,43 Lemnitzer elaborated: 
The decisive limitation in limited war is that the war must be fought for a 
limited objective. . .. The only rational course is to act on the assumption 
that wars can be limited and develop a strategy which will at the same time 
enable us to deal with limited wars and to minimize the risk of an all-out 
war. 
If we proceed on the assumption that total war is not inevitable, 
and if we develop a doctrine for limited war, then we should be able to 
employ armed forces as required to support national security policies, and 
still overt an all-out conflict.44 
The Army and Air Force also argued that the nation's missile defenses needed to 
be improved. The Soviet announcement in August 1957 that it had successfully tested an 
ICBM raised considerable concern about the vulnerability of the United States. Repre-
senting the Air Force position, General E. E. Partridge, the commander of the Continental 
Air Defense Command, argued that "It is apparent that, in the ballistic missile field, the 
Soviets are developing a serious threat to our survival. To counter this threat, the United 
States must take positive and immediate action with the state-of-the-art to attain a defen-
42 The presentation to the Army Policy Council occurred at the same time as the Army's presentation to 
the Gaither committee. [do not know if they are related. 
43 [General Lyman Lemnitzer), "The Philosophy of Limited War," Briefing for Army Policy Council, 
September 9, 1957, RG 59, State Department, PPS Records, Lot 670 548, Box 121, Folder - Military and 
Naval Policy, 13. 
44 Address by General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, December 4, 1957, LC, White Papers, Box 18, Folder - Sci-
ence Advisory Board, 14. 
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sive capability.,,4S Army Chief of Staff General Maxwell Taylor also emphasized "that de-
velopment of the anti-ICBM system should be accelerated to the extent ofa national pri-
ority equal to the national priority accorded the development of the ICBM.,,46 
The briefings received by the Gaither committee were not limited to presentations 
by the military. On at least two occasions the State Department's Policy Planning Staff 
met with the committee met to discuss U.S. national security policies. As with the military 
briefings, one of the most important topics was limited war capabilities. Possibly influ-
enced by Secretary of State Dulles's apparent shift away from the massive retaliation doc-
trine, a PPS study argued that ''unless there is a national doctrine for limited war and a 
definition of means by which limited war will not expand into global holocaust, the United 
States stands in danger of starting a chain of events which might lead to national disas-
ter.,,47 The report concluded that "A philosophy for limited war implies cool-headed pol-
icy and self-restraint in the choice of objectives and the tactics to achieve those limited 
ends.,,48 
4S Memorandum by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force on Ballistic Missile Defense, September 4, 1957, 
NA, RG 218, lCS, 1957 Geographic File, CCS 381 US (5-23-46) Sec. 85, 2334-35. For other examples of 
the Air Force's support ofa ballistic missile defense system, see Memorandum by the Chief of Staff, No-
vember 14, 1957, ibid., CCS 381 US (5-23-46) Sec. 89, 1; and Department of Air Force Decision, Sep-
tcmber 19. 1957, LC, White Papers, Box 5, Folder- 1957 Chairman of Staff Decisions, 1. 
46 Memorandum by the Chief of Staff U.S. Army, Septcmber 15, 1957, RG 218, lCS, 1957 Geographic 
File. CCS 381 US (5-23-46) Sec. 89,2. 
47 R. McClintock. "A National Doctrine for Limited War," October 4, 1957, NA, RG 59, State Depart-
ment, PPS Records, Lot 670 548, Box 121, Folder - Military and Naval Policy, 2. 
48 Ibid., 7. At a meeting in October, the Gaither committee and PPS discussed the committee's tentative 
conclusions. See Memorandum of Conversation of Meeting, October 1, 1957, ibid., Box 117, Folder -
Civil Defense, 1-2. 
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Studies and Reports Examined by the Gaither Committee 
When Cutler discussed the parameters of the study with Gaither in June, he told 
the committee chairman that the panel would have access to any information pertinent to 
its study, including Air Force, SAC, and CIA estimates of the Soviet Union's military ca-
pabilities.49 In addition, it could examine the reports produced by the Net Evaluation Sub-
committee of the NSC (NES) which had been charged to consolidate the various intelli-
gence estimates of the Soviet Union's capability to damage the United States. Finally, it 
would have the authority to acquire any other government or non-government study that 
would assist in its examination. 
While no declassified record exists which details the specific sources of intelligence 
that the Gaither committee used in making their evaluations, the evidence indicates that 
the committee eventually gained access to every report or study it requested. However, it 
apparently did not examine the U-2 intelligence. A review of the declassified national in-
telligence estimates between 1955 and 1957 reveals certain common conclusions. The 
Soviet Union was unlikely to initiate a nuclear war in the near future. so While the it was 
not likely to start a war, the Soviet Union's strategic capabilities were increasing at an 
alarming rate, and represented a significant potential threat if used against the United 
States.51 Although the institution ofa nationwide fallout shelter program would initially 
cause some confusion and alarm throughout the world, it would eventually be seen as an 
49 Informal Memorandum for Use at Meeting with Mr. Gaither, June 25, 1957, EL, WHO,OSANSA. 
NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 8, Folder - Fallout Shelters, 3-4. At this point, I have been 
unable to locate any records which state what happened at these briefings. 
so See NIE 11-4-57. November 12, 1957, FRUS /955-1957, 19,665. 
51 See NIE 100-7-55, November 1, 1955, ibid .• 134. 
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understandable defensive program. S2 These three broad trends can be seen in the Gaither 
report. While a Soviet attack was not expected, it couId not be ruled out; therefore, the 
United States needed to prepare for all possible Soviet actions. 
The NIEs suggested that the Kremlin sought world domination, but would not 
jeopardize the security of the communist regime itseifin pursuit of this goal.S3 NIE 11-4-
54 reported that "The Soviet leaders almost certainly believe that during the period of this 
estimate [to mid-1959] the non-Communist world will possess such strength in major 
components of military power that general war would involve not only the certainty of 
widespread destruction within the USSR but the possibility of the destruction of the So-
viet system itseIf"S4 An estimate in 1956 reached a similar conclusion: 
It seems unlikely that US action short of overt military intervention or ob-
vious preparation of such intervention would lead the USSR deliberately to 
take steps which it believed would materially increase the risk of general 
war. The Soviet leaders probably recognize that the US nuclear-air capa-
bility remains superior to that of the USSR, and have probably concluded 
that at present the USSR, even if it launched a surprise attack, would re-
ceive unacceptable damage in a nuclear exchange with the US. ss 
Another NIE predicted that the Soviet Union would avoid actions that would "gravely risk 
general war," but would "probably regard itself as progressively achieving greater freedom 
52 See SNIE 100-5-57, March 19, 1957, ibid., 442-45. 
53 For descriptions of the process used in developing an NIE, see Shennan Kent, "The Law and Custom of 
the National Intelligence Estimate: An Examination of the Theory and Some Recollections Concerning 
the Practice of the Art," in Donald P. Steury (ed.), Sherman Kent and the Board of National Estimates 
(Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study ofIntelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1994),56-115; and 
Freedman, US Intelligence, 32-41. 
54 NIE 11-4-54, "Soviet Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action Through Mid-1959," NA, RG 263, 
Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, NIE's 1950-1992, Box 2, Folder #66, 34. 
5S SNIE 12-2-56, "Probable Developments in Eastern Europe and Implications for Soviet Policy," October 
30, 1956, reprinted in Scott A. Koch, Selected Estimates on the Soviet Union. 1950-1959 (Washington, 
D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1993),3. 
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of maneuver in local situations. ,,56 These estimates were consistent in predicting the So-
viets would not attack, but they never questioned the assumption that the Soviet Union 
sought world domination. If a general war was to occur, it most likely would result from 
miscalculation, not deliberate actions. 
In their attempts to predict whether the United States would be able to detect a 
Soviet attack, the NIEs presented somewhat contradictory estimates. SNIE 11-8-54 ex-
ami ned the probable warning that the United States would receive in the event of Soviet 
aggression. It argued that such an offensive would be preceded by heightened political 
tensions that should provide fifteen to thirty days ofwarning.S7 But. NIE 11-6-55 con-
eluded that if the Soviet Union could keep political tensions low, it might strike the United 
States with "a high degree of surprise. ,,58 
The NIEs consistently predicted military capabilities based on estimates of Soviet 
maximum production levels. NIE 11-4-57 concluded that while the Soviet Union was not 
producing as many bombers as earlier predicted, it still maintained a long-range bomber 
force of 1,500 airplanes. 59 Another estimate asserted that the Soviet Union would have 10 
ICBMs in 1958, 100 in 1959, and 500 in 1960. By comparison, it reported that the 
United States planned to have only 10 ICBMs in 1959,30 in 1960, and 50 in 1961. Even 
ifIRBMs were included, the picture was not much brighter. By 1961, the United States 
56 NIE 11-4-57, November 12, 1957, FRUS 1955-1957. 19,665. See also NIE 100-7-55, "World Situa-
tion and Trends," November I, 1955, ibid., 134. 
57 SNIE 11-8-54, "Probable Warning of Soviet Attack on the US Through Mid-I 957," September 14, 
1954, NA, RG 263, CIA, NIE's 1950-1992, Box 2, Folder #66, 2-3. 
58 NIE 11-6-55, "Probable Intelligence Warning of Soviet Attack on the US Through Mid-1958," July I, 
1955, ibid., 13. 
59 NIE 11-4-57, FRUS 1955-/957, 19,671. By mid-1957, intelligence estimates of Soviet bomber pro-
duction were shrinking remarkably. See Freedman, US Intelligence. 66-67; Prados, The Soviet Estimate, 
43-50, and Ford. £mmative Intelligence, 217-22. 
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planned to have only 120 IRBMs and 3 nuclear submarines carrying 16 Polaris missiles 
each.60 
The last NIE of significance to the Gaither committee, SNIE 100-5-57, examined 
the possible world reaction to a U.S. fallout shelter program. It concluded that among 
allied countries, such a program would initially produce doubts about U.S. commitments 
and strategies, but that most countries "would probably come to recognize that the shelter 
program, taken by itself, was a defensive measure and did not necessarily indicate any ba-
sic change in US foreign policy or substantially affect the likelihood of general war.,,61 It 
stressed that the Soviet Union would attempt to exploit the program by arguing that it was 
one more piece of evidence that the United States was preparing for war. However, it 
emphasized that the Soviets would probably not believe that the program represented any 
significant shift in U.S. strategies.62 
In addition to the NIEs, the Gaither committee relied on SAC and Air Force intel-
ligence estimates. The Air Force and SAC consistently developed estimates of Soviet 
bomber and missile strengths that were higher than those of the CIA and the other military 
branches. Sherman Kent, the director of the Office of National Estimates, recalled that in 
60 Comparison of Estimated US-USSR Missile Operational Capability, January 5, 1958, EL, WHO, 
OSANSA, NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 16, Folder - Security Resources Panel, 1. This es-
timate was probably part ofNIE 11-4-57 or SNIE 11-10-57. After reading this estimate, one member of 
the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research exclaimed that "We must, then, reckon that 
in one year the United States may well, with absolutely no direct defense, confront a Russian capability for 
shattering devastation of the homeland." The ICBM Threat to the United States, December 23, 1957, NA, 
RG 59, State Department, Records of the Intelligence Bureau, Office of the Director, 1949-1959, Box 9, 
Folder - SIP, I. Another member of the Office of Intelligence Research and AnalysiS called the report 
"Doom." See Memo from R. P. Joyce to Mr. A. Evans, January 6, 1958, ibid., Box 10, Folder - ICBM, l. 
61 SNIE 100-5-57, "Probable World Reaction to Certain Civil Defense Programs," March 19. 1957, FRUS 
1955-1957, 19,444. 
62 Ibid., 445. 
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determining the emphasis that the Soviet Union was placing on long-range bomber pro-
duction, the Air Force argued "that the Soviets would continue to give a high priority to 
the Bison [long-range bomber] Force and enlarge it very considerably.,,63 At Senate 
hearings in 1956, General LeMay asserted that between 1958 and 1960 the Soviet Union 
'\viII have a greater striking power [in long-range bombers] than we will have . . . under 
our present plans and programs.,,64 The Gaither committee had to decide whether the 
Soviet Union was producing bombers at maximum levels as SAC argued or at the more 
moderate levels estimated by NIE 11-4-57. 
The Gaither committee also relied heavily on the intelligence assessments devel-
oped by the NES. Under the guidelines contained in NSC 5511, the NES was established 
to develop "integrated evaluations of the net capabilities of the USSR, in the event of gen-
eral war, to inflict direct injury upon the continental U.S. and key U.S. installations over-
seas, and to provide a continual watch for changes which would significantly alter those 
net capabilities.,,6s Composed of the chairmen of the JCS, the AEC (starting in 1956), the 
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, and the Interdepartmental Committee on Inter-
nal Security, and the directors of the ODM, FCDA, and CIA, the NES integrated the in-
telligence estimates of the various military and government agencies to produce annual 
reports for the president.66 
63 Kent, "Law and Custom of the National Intelligence Estimate," 81. 
64 United States Congress, Senate, "Report of the Subcommittee on the Air Force of the Committee on 
Anned Services," (GPO, 1957),57. See also Prados, The Soviet Estimate, 43-46; and Freedman, US In-
telligence, 67. 
6S NSC 551 I - A Net Evaluation Subcommittee, February 14, 1955, quoted in FRUS 1955-1957, 19,56. 
66 See Memorandum for the Record by the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, 
January 23, 1956, ibid., 190. 
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By the time the Gaither committee completed its final report, the NES had already 
presented assessments to the NSC in 1955 and 1956. The 1955 analysis focused on the 
consequences of a Soviet attack on the United States. It war-gamed two potential attack 
scenarios. Plan A involved an attack where the United States received no warning prior to 
the launch of the attack. Plan C assumed that the United States would obtain sufficient 
strategic warning of an impending attack to place its military and civil defenses on full 
alert.67 In analyzing both plans, the NES had access to the best estimates of Soviet mili-
tary capabilities through 1958.68 Under both scenarios, the NES concluded that approxi-
mately 65 percent of the American population would need some form of medical attention 
after the attack, and for at least six months, the economy would be practically inoper-
able.69 The only significant difference between the two plans was that Plan C would allow 
the United States the initiative to launch a preemptive strike if it discovered Soviet prepa-
rations for an attack. In either a preemptive or retaliatory strike, the subcommittee con-
cluded that the United States would inflict even worse damage on the Soviet Union. 70 
The NES performed its 1956 evaluation using the same two scenarios as in its first 
study. In this report, the NES concluded that if the United States did not maintain an ade-
quate alert status for its nuclear retaliatory forces, a Soviet nuclear attack in 1959 would 
kill or injure over fifty percent of the civil population and lead to the Soviet Union's emer-
67 Memorandum of Discussion at the 263rd Meetiog of the National Security Council. October 27, 1955, 
ibid., 127. There was 00 Plan B as far as I can tell. 
68 Ibid, 128. 
69 Diary Eotry By the Presideot, January 23, 1956, ibid., 187. 
70 Ibid, 187-88. Regardless whether the United States launched a preemptive or retaliatoty strike, it 
would use the same types of forces. In 1956, these forces consisted of medium and loog range bombers. 
The main differeoce between the two is that if the United States allowed the Soviet Union to attack first, a 
sufficient number of U.S. bombers and runways would have to survive to permit a retaliatoty strike. 
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gence as the world's greatest power. It stressed that regardless of U.S. nuclear capabili-
ties a Soviet nuclear attack would, in the age of the ballistic missiles, cause massive dam-
age if adequate civil defense plans were not introduced. 71 
Although the Gaither committee had access to NlEs, the NES evaluations, and top 
secret briefings, it does not appear that it examined intelligence gathered by the U-2. At 
least three different members of the committee: lames Killian, Herbert York, and Paul 
Nitze, claim that they did not see any of the U-2 intelligence at the time of the study.72 
York, who analyzed Soviet military capabilities for the committee and later had access to 
the U-2 data, explained that "At that time I knew much of the intelligence we had concern-
ing the status of Soviet developments and deployments, but I knew little about how we 
got it.,,73 While it appears that the committee did not have access to the U-2 intelligence, 
at least some of its individual members did know about the overflights. Richard Bissell, a 
consultant to the committee, ran the U-2 program for the CIA, and Killian had partici-
pated in the establishment of the U-2 program in 1954.74 
7\ Memorandum of Discussion at 306th Meeting of the NSC, December 20,1956, ibid, 380. 
72 See Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, 167; Handwritten Notes by Killian, [undated], M.l. T. Ar-
chives, Me 423 - Killian Papers, Box 25, Folder - Greenstein, 1; and Herbert F. York, "The White House 
Years (1957-1961)," ibid., Box 66, Folder - Correspondence, xyz. 1965-87,42. 
73 York. "White House Years," 42. 
74 See chapter 1 and also, Herbert F. York and G. Allen Greb, "Strategic Reconnaissance," Bulletin of the 
Atomic &ientists (AprllI977): 33-42. Dino Brugioni argues that General Doolittle also bad access to the 
U-2 photographs. See Dino A. Bmgioni, Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Cri-
sis (New York: Random House, 1991),32. A significant issue raised by the Gaither committee's appar-
ent inability to examine the U-2 photographs is whether that information would have altered its ultimate 
conclusions. While it is impossible to know with certainty, the answer is probably no. This conclusion 
can be reached for two reasons. First, when the committee met. the U-2 program was only a year old. 
While it produced excellent intelligence, there were limits to what the few overtlights which had already 
occurred could reveal. Second, while the CIA used the U-2 to prove what military capabilities the Soviet 
Union actually possessed, it was also attempting to show what the Soviets did not have. When DO ICBMs 
were photographed, it seemed to show that they did not exist. However, with the relatively limited cover-
age provided by the U-2, it could also be argued that the Soviet missiles simply had not been seen. Be-
tween January 1959 and June 1960, only 13.6 percent of Soviet territory considered suitable for maintain-
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Government Reports Examined by the Gaither Committee 
Even without the U-2 photographs, the Gaither committee still had access to a full 
range of information. Beyond the briefings, intelligence estimates, and the NES evalua-
tions, the committee was able to examine reports produced by government agencies. In 
August 1956, the Air Force presented its own views on SAC vulnerability to the NSC. In 
a briefing, General R. C. Lindsay identified four major weaknesses in SAC's capabilities. 
There were an insufficient number of air bases to provide effective dispersal of SAC's 
long-range and medium-range bombers. Their were gaps in radar coverage, especially at 
high and low altitudes, that could be exploited by the Soviet Union in a surprise attack. 
Since at best only II percent of SAC forces could take otfwith 15 minutes warning, this 
was a significant vulnerability.7s SAC's communications and control systems remained 
underdeveloped and relatively unprotected from a nuclear blast. u.S. nuclear weapons 
were stockpiled at only 45 locations with over 50 percent of the weapons at 13 sites.76 
ing ICBM forces had been photographed by the U-2. Office of Research and Reports, "Visual-Talent 
Coverage oftbe USSR in Relation to Soviet ICBM Deployment, January 19S9-June 1960," July II, 1960, 
reprinted in Kevin C. Rufliler (ed.), Corona: America's First Satellite Program (Washington, D.C.: 
Central Intelligence Agency, 1995), 106. See also CIAlNPIC, Photographic Intelligence Report, 
"Chronological Development oftbe Kapustin Yar/Vladimirovka and Tyuratam Missile Test Centers, 
USSR, 1957-1963," November 1963, reprinted in Ruffiler, Corona, 191-96; Jeffrey Ricbelson, American 
Espionage and the Soviet Target (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1987), 146; and 
Gartboff. Assessing the Adversary, 41-42. 
75 Henry M. Narducci, Strategic Air Command and the Alert Program (Office oftbe Historian, Headquar-
ters SAC, Offutt Air Force Base, NB, 1988), 1. A memorandum sent to Eisenhower presented even more 
pessimistic numbers. It said that only 134 out of SAC's 1654 heavy and medium bombers would be able 
to take off with two hours warning. See Memorandnm for the President, October 25, 1957, EL, WHO, 
OSANSA, NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 16, Folder - Security Resources Panel, 1-2. 
76 Memorandum of Discussion at the 292nd Meeting of the National Security Council, August 9, 1956, 
FRUS 1955-1957, 19,339-41. The Gaither committee definitely got to see a copy oftbe report presented 
by Lindsay. See Transmittal of Govemment Records, AC-AI449, RG 341, Records oftbe Headquarters 
USAF. The report is still in Air Force custody. 
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The Air Force made several recommendations to remedy these problems. It ar-
gued that the government should construct additional air bases to facilitate a wider disper-
sal of SAC forces and study the possibility of using civilian airfields in wartime. It also 
recommended allotting additional funding to build radar sites to fill the gaps in coverage at 
high and low altitudes. It requested money to accelerate its implementation of an alert 
force program. It asked for additional funding to construct more efficient and secure 
communication lines. Finally. it advocated further study of how the vulnerability of the 
nuclear weapons stockpiles could be reduced. 77 
The JCS foUowed this Air Force study with the creation of an ad hoc committee to 
study u.S. air defenses.78 The impetus for this study originated from both SAC and CIA 
estimates which revealed that the Soviet Union might possess the capability to launch bal-
listic missiles from submarines.79 In November 1956. the JCS appointed Dr. Albert HilL a 
future member of the Gaither committee. to chair a panel which included General Carl 
Spaatz., General Thomas Handy. and Admiral John Ballentine to study U.s. air defense 
needs.80 This committee. which completed its report in June 1957. argued that "The goal 
for the defense of North America against air attack should be the achievement and mainte-
nance of a level of air defense effectiveness sufficient to give a reasonable chance of de-
77 Memorandum of Discussion at the 292nd NSC Meeting. August 9, 1956, FRUS 1955-1957, 19,339-40. 
See also Alert Operations and the Strategic Air Command, 1957-1991 (Office of the Historian. Headquar-
ters SAC, Offutt Air Force Base, NE, 1991),4-5. 
78 The Gaither Committee definitely examined this report, officially called the Report of the JCS Ad Hoc 
Committee on the Air Defense of North America. The report remains classified. 
79 See Memorandum by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force for the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Submarine 
Guided Missile Threat, September 24, 1956, NA. RG 218, JCS, CCS 350.09 USSR (12-19-49) Sec. 13, 
10-18; and Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense (from Admiral Radford), October 10, 1956, ibid., 
CCS 334 Air Defense of North America Ad Hoc Comte (9-20-56), Sec. I, 1-2. 
80 Memorandum for: Spaatz, Handy, Ballentine, and Hill. November 7, 1956, ibid., l. 
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fending approximately 80 percent of the vital target areas of the nation. n81 Although the 
report remains classified, analyses of Soviet strategies from the time period indicate that if 
the Soviet Union launched an attack, its military forces would concentrate first on U.S. 
retaliatory capabilities and then political, industrial, and economic centers.82 The commit-
tee concluded that most target areas were very wlnerable. 
The other study that the Gaither committee explicitly requested was the Continen-
tal Air Defense Objectives Plan, 1956-1966. Its assumptions about the Soviet Union's 
ultimate goal and objectives in a general war are illuminating. "It is accepted," the report 
stressed, ''that the ultimate national aim of the Soviet Union is world domination. ,,83 It 
then argued that if a general war developed between the two superpowers, the Soviet ob-
jectives would be: 
a) to secure the Soviet Union against a retaliatory attack, by both offensive 
and defensive operations against any force capable of significantly threaten-
ing its security. 
b) To gain control of Eurasia, and to gain control of or neutralize the 
United Kingdom and the island chains of the Far East; 
c) To neutralize North America's war-making capacity to the extent neces-
sary to success in a. and b. 
d) Ifpossible, without prejudice to a., b., or c., to reduce North America's 
economic and social structure to the point where North America could not, 
for many years, constitute a threat to the expanded Soviet Empire. 84 
81 "Report of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Ad Hoc Committee on Air Defense," June 30,1957, quoted in Note 
by the Secretaries to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Briefing Presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Levels of 
Defense Effectiveness, October 18, 1957, ibid., CCS 381 US (5-23-46) Sec. 89 RB, 2395. 
82 William Lee, "Soviet Nuclear Targeting Strategy," in Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson (eds.) Stra-
tegic Nuclear Targeting (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986), 86. For the JCS's assessment of 
the attack strategies the Soviet Union might employ in an attack against the United States, see Request for 
Assistance in Determination of the Soviet Atomic Threat Against North America in 1960, January 9, 
1957, RG 218, JCS, 1957 Geographic File, CCS 381 US (5-23-46) Sec. 75, 2106-25. 
83 Notes to the Secretaries of the Joint chiefs of Staff on Briefing Presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 
Levels of Defense Effectiveness, November 12, 1957, ibid., CCS 381 US (5-23-46) Sec. 89 RB, 2391. 
84 Ibid., 2391-92. 
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According to the report, the most important U.S. requirement was to develop the neces-
sary defenses to prevent a successful Soviet attack. 
The Gaither committee also had access to government studies from non-military 
agencies. Most importantly, numerous NSC studies provided invaluable information re-
lated to the committee's tasks. Of obvious importance was the Killian committee report. 
Not only did it address some of the same issues as the Gaither committee, it also was 
composed of some of the same people. Six additional studies undertaken either by the 
NSC itself or by groups under its direction were very significant. NSC 5606, a FCDA 
study, Part 5 ofNSC 5720, a report by a special committee on shelters, and economic 
analyses of shelter programs performed by both the CEA and the Treasury Department. 
In 1956 the NSC issued its first full report on continental defense in nearly two 
years-NSC 5606. Heavily influenced by Robert Sprague, the report concluded that "The 
strength of the United States which must be maintained is an integrated complex of offen-
sive and defensive elements. Each of these elements has its proper role in deterring an at-
tack [by the Soviet Union] and in the defense of the United States should an attack oc-
cur."SS Additionally, the report contended that "The deterrent effect of U.S. power will be 
dangerously lessened if Soviet production of multimegaton weapons and an adequate de-
livery capability is achieved before the United States develops an adequate warning and 
defense system and significantly reduces the wlnerability of its retaliatory nuclear 
power. ,,86 It, therefore, recommended achieving maximum tactical warning, defense 
against both air vehicles and ballistic missiles, expanding the passive defenses of the coun-
85 NSC 5606 - Continental Defense. June 5. 1956. NA, RG 273. NSC. Folder - NSC 5606. 2. 
86 Ibid., 4. 
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try's retaliatory capability, and implementing new civil defense programs. NSC 5606 pro-
posed a gradual increase in spending on these measures from $3.8 billion in 1956 to $11.5 
billion in 1960.87 
Later in 1956, the findings of an FCDA panel added weight to the recommenda-
tions ofNSC 5606.88 After studying the effects ofa nuclear attack on the United States, 
the panel delivered a set of alarming conclusions to the president and the NSC. The panel 
analyzed the consequences of an all-out Soviet attack that struck at least half of the met-
ropolitan centers in the United States. Such an attack, it predicted, would cause 50 mil-
lion American casualties, including between 30 and 35 million deaths.89 It argued that "In 
the event of a massive nuclear attack on the United States, of the proportions assumed 
without drastically improved preparation of the people, support of the National Govem-
ment and of the war effort would be in jeopardy, and national disintegration might well 
result. ,,90 [emphasis in original] To avoid such devastation. the panel advocated stockpil-
ing essential food and medical supplies, developing plans for recovery after an attack, re-
hearsing carefully developed evacuation plans, and building shelters for those unable to 
leave a target area.91 
87 Ibid, 15-18. In the part of the NSC meeting on NSC 5606, "Mr. Sprague commented on the vital im-
portance that SAC be in a position to get the required percentage of SAC planes otfbases and in the air 
within the estimated warning time ofRussiao attack." Memorandum of Discussion at the 288th Meeting 
of the NSC, June 15, 1956, FRUS 1955-1957, 19,328. 
88 See Wm. F. Vandercook, "Making the Very Best of the Worst: The 'Human Effects of Nuclear Weap-
ons' Report of 1956," Intemational Security 11:1 (Summer 1986): 184-95. 
89 "The Human Effects of Nuclear Weapons Development," November 21, 1956, WHO, OSANSA, NSC 
Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 9, Folder - Human Effects of Nuclear Weapons Development, 9. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid, 13. Operation Alert in 1957, the Eisenhower administration's annual test of its civil defense pro-
grams, reached similar conclusions. See Operation Alert 1957 - Final Exercise Progress and Evaluation 
Report, July 19, 1957, EL, DDE Papers, Cabinet Series, Box 9, Folder - Special Cabinet Meeting on 0p-
eration Alert-July 19, 1957,2. 
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Part 5 ofNSC 5720, the NSC's assessment of the status of U.S. national security 
programs in 1957, reached similar conclusions. Produced by the FCDA, this report did 
not predict a Soviet attack but concluded ''that the USSR has the capability of attacking 
any target within the United States or its possessions.,,92 Soviet intentions were not im-
portant to the FCDA unless the possibility ofan attack could be eliminated. Since U.S. 
military plans were based on what the Soviet Union might do, the FCDA operated under 
similar assumptions. It concluded that if the Soviet Union attacked in 1957, current 
evacuation plans and shelter space would be inadequate. It stressed that, "Most of the 
radiation casualties resulting from [a Soviet] attack (and these would have numbered in 
the millions) could be attributed to insufficient protection from fallout, plus inadequate 
radiological defense programs. ,,93 
Although the preceding studies were significant, the reports developed by three 
groups that were created simultaneously with the Gaither committee were even more im-
portant. As with many of the other studies discussed earlier in this chapter, the reports 
developed by the special committee on shelters, the CEA, and the Treasury Department 
remain restricted. However, recently declassified memoranda do contain important sum-
maries of the assumptions used by these groups in reaching their conclusions. The special 
committee studied the effectiveness of different shelter systems in limiting the casualties 
from a Soviet attack. The CEA and Treasury Department then analyzed the economic 
implications of implementing these programs. 
92 NSC 5720 - Status of National Security Programs on June 30,1957, Part 5 - Civil Defense Program. 
EL, WHO, OSANSA, NSC Series, Status of Projects Subseries, Box 7, Folder - NSC 5720 (5), 19. 
93 Ibid., 3. 
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After developing possible Soviet targeting strategies, the special committee exam-
ined the effectiveness of eight different shelter programs ranging from fallout shelters to 
protect a limited part of the population to combinations of blast and fallout shelters to 
shield the entire population.94 The first three programs represented partial shelter plans 
costing from $5.1 to $16.5 billion, while the last five provided at least complete national 
protection from fallout and ranged in costs from $24.5 to $70.0 billion. Each program 
would be implemented over an eight year period beginning in FY 1958 and concluding in 
FY 1965.95 The committee calculated that if the United States did not build any new 
shelters, casualties resulting from a Soviet attack would range between 67 and 116 million 
depending on the strike pattern.96 Each successive shelter program would reduce the 
number of casualties with the most significant improvements in survival rates occurring 
between the most expensive partial shelter plan ($16.5 billion), the least expensive com-
plete shelter program ($24.5 billion), and the next one ($43.5 billion). After this point, the 
potential return on the shelter investment diminished.97 
After the special committee finished its examination, the CEA and Treasury De-
partment analyzed the economic implications of the shelter programs. The CEA examined 
four of the eight shelter plans--the SIO.I, S24.5, $49.4, and $70.0 billion programs.98 It 
calculated that if the United States Gross National Product (GNP) grew $16 billion an-
94 See Memorandum for Gaither, Director Security Resources Panel, ODM, Science Advisory Committee, 
July 23, 1957, EL, WHO, OSANSA, NSC Series. Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 16, Folder - Security Re-
sources Panel, 1-2; and Memorandum for Mr. Smith, October 18, 1957, NA, RG 59, State Department. 
PPS Records, Lot 670 548, Box 194, Folder· SIP Papers 1958 (Jan.-Apr.) (from William Leonban), l. 
95 Memorandum for Mr. Smith, (Attachment 1), October 18, 1957, ibid., 1 
96 Ibid., 2. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Memorandum for Mr. Smith, (Attachment 2), October 18, 1957, ibid., 1. 
177 
nually, federal revenue increased S3 billion annually, and federal expenditures were held to 
a 1 percent increase, then the economy would produce a S30 billion surplus between FY 
1959 and FY 1962. These assumptions, however, depended on the country avoiding a 
recession, maintaining current tax levels, and keeping spending in check. The CEA con-
c1uded that while the first three shelter plans could be accommodated by the federal econ-
omy, only the S10.1 billion program was really manageable. It argued that the programs 
costing beyond SI 0.1 billion would have an inflationary impact and strain stee~ cement, 
and labor supplies.99 
Treasury Department officials examined ways to finance a shelter program. They 
studied the possibility of providing tax incentives to industry and civilians to encourage the 
construction of private shelters. They also calculated possible ways to raise federal reve-
nues to pay for shelters. They concluded that tax incentives would primarily aid the 
wealthy while providing only limited additional shelter space, and that increasing federal 
expenditures would measurably increase tax liabilities. 1°O Accordingly, the Treasury De-
partment opposed the construction of any shelters because of its potential drain on federal 
revenues. More pointedly, it argued that even if the United States could finance a shelter 
program without raising the current level of expenditures, it would still oppose such a 
venture because the country ''would have to forego tax reductions to release funds for the 
activity and investment necessary for sustained economic growth through private initia-
tive. ,,101 
99 Ibid. 
100 Memorandum for Mr. Smith. (Attachment 3), October 18,1957, 1. 
101 Ibid., 1. 
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Reports by Non-government Organizations and Experts 
The Gaither committee's study groups supplemented these government estimates, 
studies, and briefings with books and reports produced by civilian experts. The study 
groups turned to the works ofleading experts to analyze the best possible national security 
programs. On issues concerning SAC vulnerability, active defense measures, and military 
preparedness, reports by the RAND Corporation, Stanford Research Institute, Rockefeller 
Foundation, and 10hns Hopkins University significantly influenced the committee's con-
c1usions. The studies examined by the committee concerning passive defense measures are 
too extensive to list, but a sampling of the organizations which produced them should be 
sufficiently revealing: the Stanford Research Institute, the Walter Reed Army Institute of 
Research, the National Academy of Sciences, and 10hns Hopkins University.102 Finally, 
the works of Henry Kissinger and Anthony Buzzard influenced the Gaither committee's 
assessment of U.S. military strategies. 
The RAND Corporation played a particularly influential role in helping the Gaither 
committee develop its conclusions. The committee received briefings from several RAND 
experts, including Albert Wohlstetter, Spurgeon Keeny and Herman Kahn.103 In addition, 
the committee had access to several RAND studies of SAC wlnerability and weaknesses 
in U.S. air defenses. In particular, R-266 - Selection and Use of Strategic Air Bases, and 
R-290 - Protecting U.S. Power to Strike Back in the 1950s and 1960s, laid the bases for 
102 For a complete bibliography of the sources used by the Passive Defense subcommittee, see Security 
Resources Panel, Volume 2 - "Passive Defense", November 27, 1957," EL, WHO, NSC Staff: Papers, 
1948-1961, Executive Secretary Subject File Series, Box 16, Folder - Security Resources Panel, v. II (2), 
88-100. 
103 Kaplan. Wizards of Armageddon, 129-30. See also R-322-RC, Report on a Study of Non-Military De-
fonse. July I, 1958, RAND Corporation. Kahn was responsible for writing this report. 
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the Gaither committee's conclusions that U.S. strategic retaliatory forces were vulnerable 
to a Soviet nuclear attack. 
In his monumental study of U.S. air bases, Wohlstetter and his colleagues at 
RAND examined four different alternatives for selecting SAC base locations and analyzed 
which of them provided the optimum balance between security from an enemy attack and 
maintaining the capability to reach enemy targets effectively. The first alternative repre-
sented the United States strategy in the early 1950s to place SAC forces at overseas bases 
to allow the quickest access to enemy targets. The second alternative proposed maintain-
ing SAC forces overseas but at bases further from the front lines. The third alternative 
was to locate SAC forces in the United States and depend on aerial refueling to reach en-
emy targets. The last alternative called for basing SAC forces in the United States while 
relying on overseas bases as ground-fueling staging areas. 1M It concluded that U.S. re-
taliatory forces were currently vulnerable to a Soviet nuclear attack because SAC overseas 
bases were located within range of Soviet aircraft and poorly designed to withstand at-
tacks. lOS It stressed that the best base system would be the last one because it reduced the 
wlnerability of SAC forces without adding the cost of aerial refueling. 106 
Another RAND study which examined measures to protect U.S. strategic power 
proved equally influential. It evaluated the vulnerability of the United States to a surprise 
Soviet attack and discovered that with relatively limited forces, the Soviet Union could 
104 Smith. RAND Corporation, 212. 
lOS A. 1. Wohlstetter, F. S. Hoffman, R 1. Lutz, and H. S. Rowen, Selection and Use o/Strategic Air 
Bases R-266 (Santa Monica. CA: RAND Corporation, 1963),375-83. 
106 Smith. RAND Corporation, 213. See also Memorandum for Director of Plans, April 6, 1955, NA. RG 
218. lCS. Radford Records. Folder - 381 (1955). 1-4. 
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cause mass destruction. It asserted that a surprise Soviet attack involving as few as 150 
heavy bombers and 150 ICBMs could devastate the ability of SAC to launch a counterat-
tack. To meet this potential threat, the report recommended dispersing existing forces, 
hardening SAC bases, constructing active defenses around SAC bases, and developing 
better early warning capabilities. 107 
Two other groups involving some Gaither committee members completed studies 
in 1957. The Army contracted with the Operations Research Office (ORO) at Johns 
Hopkins University to study U.S. air defenses. At the same time, the RockefeUer Foun-
dation established several panels to examine U.S. domestic and foreign security. One 
pane~ including Gaither committee members Colonel George Lincoln, Dr. James Fisk, and 
General James McCormack, studied the military aspect of international security. Both 
groups completed their reports by January 1958. 
According to Dr. Ellis Johnson, the director of the Johns Hopkins study, the ob-
jective of the ORO study was to find weaknesses in U.S. air defenses and determine ways 
to eliminate them. The study concluded "that the U.S. is falling behind the Soviets in 
military power." 108 Furthermore, it stressed that the country "absolutely must face up to 
the fact that the price for moral leadership is that we must spend much more than the So-
viet on thermonuclear attack and defense systems since we will be attacked if we are so 
weak as to invite attack, and the U.S. will be that weak unless we are sure of having 
enough SAC left, after the surprise Soviet attack, to clobber them in retum."I09 [emphasis 
107 For a discussion ofR-290, see Kaplan, Wizards, 117-21. 
108 "Interview with Dr. Ellis A. Johnson Who Directed the Top-Secret Johns Hopkins Report, " U.S. News 
and World Report 44:5 (January 31, 1958), 50. 
109 Ibid, 54. 
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in original] To meet the Soviet threat. it recommended increasing annual defense spending 
by SIS billion for an indefinite period. 110 
The RockefeUer Foundation acquired the assistance of over 150 experts, who 
worked on seven different panels, to study U.S. domestic and foreign security in the late 
1950s. 111 Panel n. which examined the military aspects of international security, per-
formed a similar study to the Gaither committee. The panel concluded that "Mankind .. 
is faced by two somber threats: the Communist thrust to seek world domination that 
seeks to exploit all dissatisfactions and to magnify all tensions; and the new weapons tech-
nology capable of obliterating civilization.,,112 Furthermore, while it recognized that the 
United States would be able to meet any Soviet attack during the next two years with "a 
crushing reply," it was concerned with the period beyond that time frame. 113 It lamented: 
In looking at the strategic equation for all-out war there is reason for seri-
ous concern. Our retaliatory power is imperiled by Soviet advances in the 
missile field and by the inadequate dispersal and protection of our Strategic 
Air Command. Our active defense designed against manned planes will 
have to be redesigned for the missile age. Our civil defense program and 
that of our allies is completely inadequate. 114 
To remedy the deficiencies that it saw in U.S. military programs, it recommended 
spending an additional S3 billion annually on defense programs. liS It specifically recom-
mended modernizing the Air Force with new aircraft, developing ICBM and IRBM ca-
pabilities, reducing SAC vulnerability by improving warning, reaction times, and base 
110 Ibid., 53. 
III Prospect For America: The Rockefeller Panel Reports (Garden City, N.J.: Doubleday & Company, 
Inc., 1961), xv-xxvi. 
112 Ibid, 97. 
113 Ibid, 108. 
114 Ibid., 111. 
liS Ibid, 152. 
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structures, expanding the military's capability to wage limited military operations, and 
constructing fallout shelters. 116 In its argument for improving U.S. civil defenses, the re-
port claimed "that it is long overdue. It does not make sense for the free world to engage 
in a major military effort without at the same time protecting its most important resource: 
its civilian population.,,1l7 
Some of the last items that the Gaither committee examined were the writings of 
civilian strategists. Lincoln, who himselfhad been active in publishing his views on strat-
egy, sent a memorandum to other committee members that contained excerpts from Henry 
Kissinger's Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Poi icy. 111 The passages that Lincoln cited re-
veal a fundamental critique of Eisenhower's national security strategy. Kissinger argued 
that "The purpose of our capability for all-out war will be to deter Soviet aggression 
against us by developing a retaliatory force of a size which can inflict an unacceptable 
amount of damage on the enemy, no matter what level of destruction he may accomplish 
by a surprise attack.,,1l9 In addition, he emphasized that the United States needed to de-
velop a capability to wage a limited war in Europe. Kissinger stressed that if the United 
States did not develop this capability, then "In every crisis it will force us either to resort 
to a suicidal nuclear war which would not save Europe from being overrun or to violate 
our solemn pledge [to defend Europe]."l20 He concluded that while it was understandable 
1\6 Ibid., 150-51. 
117 Ibid., 141. 
1\8 Memorandum for Mr. Sprague, Mr. Foster, Security Resources Panel, October 21, 1957 (from G. A. 
Lincoln), USMA, Lincoln Papers, Box 63A, Folder # 10 - Gaither Committee 1957, 1. 
119 Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, 96. 
120 Ibid., 274. 
183 
that some government officials wanted to maintain defense spending at current levels, it 
was also foolish. 121 
Views o/Gaither Committee Members in the late 1950s 
One last way that the reasons underlying the Gaither committee's conclusions can 
be explored is to examine the reports and testimony produced by some of its members in 
the late 1950s. Many of the committee members studied specific problems for the Defense 
Department and testified before congressional committees. Jerome Wiesner and Sprague 
publicly discussed the Soviet threat and capabilities. Doolittle and Mervin Kelly testified to 
weaknesses in U.S. air defenses. Nitze and Lincoln wrote a report emphasizing the need 
for increased conventional forces to wage limited war. James Corson and Fisk analyzed 
the weaknesses in U.S. military defense organizations. James Baxter, David Beckler, and 
Foster stressed the need for fallout shelters. Finally, Albert Hill criticized the Eisen-
hower's administration's emphasis on a balanced budget at the risk of national security. 
Wiesner told a national television audience in June 1958 "that the Soviets have 
managed to make a considerably more effective air defense system than we have; I think it 
is perfectly obvious to everyone that they are ahead of us in the missile field. I believe that 
their limited war capability both in quantity and quality is superior to ours, and their sub-
marine fleet is certainly a much larger one than we have at the present time." 122 In the 
same broadcast, Sprague argued that "in the near future, we are vulnerable to a surprise 
121 lbid.,427. 
122 Transcript of NBC Briefing Session #13: "Has U.S. Complacency Given Leadership to the Sovietsr .. 
June 17, 1958, EL, WHO, OSANSA. NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries. Box 8, Folder - Fallout Shel-
ters, 7. 
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air nuclear attack on our continental bases of our Strategic Air Command, and if such an 
attack were successful, this would neutralize our ability to massively retaliate, which, in 
turn, would destroy our national policy of deterrence, and in the long future-and I am 
thinking possibly from 1970 on-our people face the possible danger of total annihilation 
in a nuclear war."I23 
Doolittle and Kelly served together on the Air Force Science Advisory Board 
(SAB) and maintained close ties to that military branch. Kelly told Senator Lyndon John-
son's preparedness subcommittee that "When we look at where we stand in the missile 
field in relation to our competition, it is shattering and very worrisome." 124 At the Air 
Force's annual conference, in November 1957, Doolittle told his fellow officers that the 
Air Force needed to request a defense budget in excess of$38 billion and emphasize air 
defense more. l2S He testified before the Johnson subcommittee that the goal of the Soviet 
Union "is world communization and world domination."I26 He stressed the importance of 
increasing the number of aircraft, developing and accelerating missile programs, dispersing 
SAC forces to hardened bases, and improving SAC alert statuS.127 He did not believe that 
the Soviet Union was currently stronger than the United States but argued that "Russia's 
Rate of Progress is more rapid than ours, and, unless we continue to forge ahead at full 
speed, she will soon overtake us." 128 
123 Ibid. 6. 
124 Inquiry into Satellite, 1805. 
125 6 November 1957 - Afternoon. LC, White Papers. Box 6, Folder - Conference 4 November 1957, 1; 
Gen. E. E. Partridge to Gen. Doolittle, November 8, 1957, LC, Doolittle Papers, Box 3. Folder - Qen. E. 
E. Partridge, 1; and Doolittle to Partridge, November 12. 1957, ibid., 1. 
126 Inquiry into Satellites, 112. 
127 Ibid., 113. 
128 Ibid .• 127. 
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In December 1957, Nitze and Lincoln co-wrote a report on U.S. limited war ca-
pabilities. They stressed that the United States needed to give greater attention to waging 
limited wars. They argued that "It is conceivable that a general war can be avoided for the 
indefinite future. It is almost inconceivable that limited military operations can be deterred 
indefinitely in all the various areas where United States interests are presently commit-
ted.,,129 They questioned whether the United States could fulfill its declaratory policy, i.e. 
its various commitments around the world. "At some point," they exclaimed, ''there must 
be a connection between this psychological deterrent and the actual military situation.,,13o 
Assessing the military capabilities that the United States needed to maintain, they empha-
sized that conventional military capabilities should be augmented because of the dangers 
of escalation produced by nuclear weapons. "If the enemy is presumed to have nuclear 
weapons," they wrote, "serious questions arise as to the military advantage if any which 
we would obtain through initiating their use.,,131 
One area of particular concern to the Gaither committee was the slow and ponder-
ous pace the Defense Department followed in developing new strategies and incorporating 
new scientific and technological advances into military plans. Both Corson and Fisk ar-
gued that there were serious problems in the organization of the defense establishment. 
Corson stressed that the United States faced a critical danger within two years "from an 
aggressively posed and rapidly developing enemy.,,132 He concluded that "To maintain 
129 [Lincoln and Nitzel, "Limited MilitaIy Operations", 9. 
130 Ibid, 8. 
131 Ibid., 10. 
132 J. Corson & L. Carulli, "Effective Organization for MilitaIy Defense", November 18, 1957, EL, WHO, 
OSAST, Box 6, Folder - Department of Defense (1957) (1), 1. 
186 
superiority for conducting military operations, there is a vital need for creating organiza-
tional machinery that will expediate the translation of technological concepts into weapons 
systems that can be produced prior to conflicts." 133 Fisk argued that "The Russians appear 
to have matched the United States in many significant areas of science and military tech-
nology and are surprising the United States in others.,,134 He concluded that the United 
States needed to emphasize research and development much more. 13S 
Baxter, Beckler, and Foster complained that U.S. leaders failed to recognize the 
importance of protecting the civilian population in the case of nuclear war. Baxter argued 
that the construction of fallout shelters would enhance the credibility of the massive re-
taliation doctrine by making the use of nuclear weapons less threatening to the popula-
tion.136 Beckler stressed that "unless the shelter program is developed on a government-
wide basis in the context of our over-all national policies and programs, it may not get the 
attention and support it merits as an essential protective measure for national survival 
during the uncertain days of nuclear parity in the years ahead.,,137 Foster provided a dif-
ferent rationale for building shelters. He argued that "It is known that shelters would 
provide a tremendous extra burden not on us, but on Russian strategy. Shelters would 
mean that any Soviet missile or bomber attack would have to be almost doubled to para-
lyze the United States beyond recovery. Thus, a shelter program is not a many billion 
dollar gamble against the day that the Soviet Union might attack. Rather, it is as much a 
133 Ibid. 8. 
134 [1. B. Fisk). "Efficiency and Results in U.S. Military Technology". October 1957. ibid. Series 1: Al-
phabetical Series. Subseries B: non-Top Secret File. Box 6, Folder - Department of Defense (1957) (1). 1. 
I3S Ibid. 5. 
136 Organizing!or National Security. 82. 
137 Memorandum for Arthur S. Flemming. December 13. 1956. EL, WHO, OSAST. Box 13. Folder-
OCDM and Civil Defense, Dec. '56-Oct. '60 (1), l. 
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positive deterrent as are our missile and Strategic Air Command bombers." 138 [emphasis in 
original] 
More than any other Gaither committee member, Dr. Albert Hill captured the 
committee's skeptical mood concerning Eisenhower's emphasis on maintaining a balanced 
budget. While the committee met in the faIl, Hill sent Sprague a poem he had written de-
scribing his view of the president's policies. In the poem entitled "Ode to Eternity," he 
wrote: 
I'd rather be bombed than be bankrupt, 
I'd rather be dead than be broke. 
Tis better by far to remain as we are. 
I'm a solvent if moribund bloke.139 
The Reports of the Gaither Committee's Subcommittees 
The Gaither committee's top secret discussions intensified between September and 
November. One committee member recalled that "It was like looking into the abyss and 
seeing Hell at the bottom.',I40 Foster recalled the sensitivity of the committee's work: 
"Documents taken from our office at night had to be carried by security officers. And 
when sessions were held at my home, guards were stationed at the house for protection of 
the documents.,,141 The committee had to process the information in these documents and 
then write a coherent and persuasive final report. Before this could occur, the committee 
had to analyze the reports of the four subcommittees that had been created to study spe-
138 Foster, "Search for Survival", 18. 
139 Hill to Sprague, September 28,1957, MI.T. Archives. Me 365 - Hill Papers. Box 37, Folder #4, en-
closure. 
140 Herken. Counsels to the PreSident, 114. This quote and a similar one: "I felt as though I was spend-
ing ten hours a day staring straight into hell.", have been attnbuted to Robert Lovett, Foster and Sprague. 
See Stewart Alsop, "Can we Afford Survival," New York Times; and Prados, Soviet Estimate, 70. 
141 Foster, "Search for Survival," S. 
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cific problems. The final conclusions of these groups were compiled into three volumes: 
Active Defense and SAC Vulnerability, Passive Defense, and Economic, Social, and Po-
litical.142 
The subcommittees examining U.S. active defenses and SAC vulnerability con-
eluded that U.S. air defenses were inadequate to meet the Soviet threat. They argued that 
"At the present time the ability of either military or civilian activities to utilize warning is 
essentially zero."143 They feared that the Soviet Union could possibly launch an attack 
without strategic warning. Even worse, with the deficiencies they found in both high and 
low altitude radar coverage, they believed the United States might not even have tactical 
warning of a Soviet attack. 144 
One of the major problems faced by the Gaither committee in assessing the cap a-
bilities and intentions of the Soviet Union was the lack of actual infonnation from within 
the communist bloc. 145 Rennan York described how he and Jerome Wiesner calculated 
Soviet ICBM strength for the committee. He explained: 
we knew that they had had a substantial long range missile development 
program underway for a long time and that they had recently conducted 
successful flight tests. We knew absolutely nothing about any missile de-
velopment, but we did know something about their overall manufacturing 
142 Parts of each volume are classified. Volume I on active defense and SAC vulnerability is especially 
restricted. 
143 Security Resources Panel, Volume I • "Active Defense and SAC Vulnerability," November 27, 1957, 
EL, WHO, NSC Staff Executive Secretary Subject File Series, Box IS, Folder· Security Resources Panel, 
Vol. I (2), B· 7. 
144 Ibid., B.12. 
145 Sherman Kent argues that "To the normal difficulties of piercing Soviet secrecy in even the most mun· 
dane of matters we confronted two exceptional ones. The Soviets redoubled their efforts to conceal the 
nature of their forces in being and made far greater endeavors to obscure their plans for future changes in 
the scale and nature of the strategic attack and strategic defense forces. Basically our task was not only to 
identify and enumerate the operational forces of the principal strategic weapons systems but also to project 
the probable size and deployment of such forces, three, five and sometimes ten or more years in the future. 
These flights of fancy into the outer reaches of the unknowable were forced upon us by the exigencies of 
our planners." See Kent, "Law and Custom of the National Intelligence Estimate," 113. 
capabilities. In the absence of any contrary indications, we assumed the 
worst. I recall Jerome Wiesner and I estimating that they could produce 
1000's of ICBM's in the next few years and urging that the Gaither 
Committee base its conclusions and recommendations on that fact. 146 
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Using this type of information, the subcommittees had the Soviet Union launching 1,800 
ICBMs against the United States: 125 at SAC bases, 675 at U.S. ICBMs bases, and 
1,000 at civilian targets. 147 Nitze recalled that "We calculated that ninety percent of our 
bomber force could be knocked out on the ground by a surprise Soviet bomber attack, let 
alone an attack by Soviet ICBMs." 148 
The subcommittees lamented that "there is only meager intelligence directly con-
ceming their [Soviet] ICBM and IRBM programs. The estimates of Soviet capabilities .. 
. are based almost entirely on the U.S. ICBM and IRBM capabilities, and on inferences 
from Soviet achievements in related fields." 149 With the paucity of estimates based on 
concrete intelligence, analysts tended to credit the Soviet Union with capabilities based on 
the maximum that Soviet industry could produce. They admitted that "Since there is re-
cent evidence that the Soviet technical and economic capabilities have been underesti-
mated in the past, the threat described in this report may reflect an unconscious corrective 
bias tending toward overestimation."IS0 They argued that the United States needed to 
harden SAC air bases against the pressures produced by a nuclear blast and construct ac-
146 York. "The White House Years", 42-43. York. Making Weapons, Talking Peace. 
147 Security Resources Panel, Volume 1- "Active Defense and SAC Vulnerability," November 27, 1957, 
EL, WHO, NSC Staff Executive Secretary Subject File Series, Box IS, Folder - Security Resources Panel, 
Vol. 1 (7),0-97. 
148 Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, 167. 
149 Security Resources Panel, Volume 1 - "Active Defense and SAC Vulnerability," November 27, 1957, 
EL, WHO, NSC Staff Executive Secretary Subject File Series, Box IS, Folder - Security Resources Panel, 
Vol. I (5), 0-6. 
ISO Ibid, 0-1. 
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tive defenses against both bombers and missiles. m They emphasized that "An all-out 
crash program must begin immediately in order that these defense capabilities can be 
achieved." IS2 
The Passive Defense subcommittee created three sub-groups to study the effec-
tiveness of passive defenses in protecting industry, ensuring the safety of civilians, and re-
ducing SAC vulnerability.ls3 The subcommittee examined current FCDA plans for 
evacuation and shelters that were designed to protect the civilian population and military 
equipment in the event of an attack. It argued ''that evacuation is no longer an acceptable 
alternative for shelter to protect the civil population."IS4 The committee members con-
eluded that shelters would "forcibly augment our deterrent power in two ways: first, by 
discouraging the enemy from attempting an attack on what might otherwise seem to be a 
temporarily unprepared target; second, by reinforcing his belief in our readiness to use, if 
necessary, our strategic retaliatory power."ISS 
After examining different types of shelters, the subcommittee concluded that a na-
tionwide fallout shelter program costing $25 billion over six years should be initiated, 
while the effectiveness of blast shelters should be studied further. 156 It recommended that 
shelters be constructed no more than a mile apart or in locations that the average person 
could reach in ten minutes. IS7 However, it emphasized that there is "a common aspect of 
151 Ibid., 0-4-0-5. 
152 Ibid., Folder - Security Resources Panel, Vol. 1 (6),0-72. 
153 Security Resources Panel, Volume 2 - "Passive Oefense," November 27, 1957, EL, WHO, NSC Staff 
Executive Secretary Subject File Series, Box 16, Folder - Security Resources Panel, Vol. 2 (I), 2. 
154 Ibid., Folder - Security Resources Panel, Vol. 2 (2), 7l. 
ISS Ibid., 8O-8l. 
156 Ibid., Folder - Security Resources Panel, Vol. 2 (1),46. 
157 Security Resources Panel, Volume 2 - "Passive Defense," November 27, 1957, EL, WHO, NSC Staff 
Executive Secretary Subject File Series, Box 16, Folder - Security Resources Panel, Vol. 2 (1), 45. 
191 
all [shelter] programs: none offers absolute protection, and even with a prohibitively ex-
pensive program we must anticipate heavy casualties ifwe are attacked.nlsl 
The final volume of reports contained background infonnation on the Soviet Un-
ion's economic potential, the ability of the United States to pay for the proposed pro-
grams, and how the recommendations should be implemented. The subcommittees found 
that while the Russian GNP amounted to only 40 percent of the United States GNP, the 
Kremlin devoted nearly the same amount to the military. More importantly, the commit-
tee members described that while U.S. defense spending was expected to remain constant 
at approximately $38 billion annually in the future, the Soviet Union was expected to in-
crease its expenditures. Based on these calculations, they concluded: 
If the Soviet threat is measured in terms of annual expenditures for defense 
and investment purpose, relative to our own, it is formidable indeed. So-
viet economic strength has already been sufficient to build an impressive 
military capability. It is reinforced by a political structure that permits (or 
forces) single-minded concentration of economic resources on military ob-
jectives and promises to be sufficient to build a military capability substan-
tially greater than our own before 1970, in the absence of increased effort 
on our part. In addition, increasing Soviet economic strength makes pos-
sible a continuing politico-economic offensive to extend Soviet influence 
throughout the world. 1S9 
Writing and Presentation of the Gaither Report 
Using the findings of the four subcommittees and the other evidence discussed 
earlier in this chapter, the steering committee spent most of late October devising it own 
conclusions and writing a final report. The committee assigned Sprague and Baxter the 
158 Ibid .• 74. 
159 Security Resources Panel. Volume 3 - "Economic. Social and Political." November 27.1957. EL. 
WHO. NSC Staff Executive Secretary Subject File Series. Box 16. Folder - Security Resources Panel. Vol. 
3 (1). 14-15. 
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unenviable task of drafting this report. Almost immediately, Sprague deferred much of the 
writing to Baxter, who had won a Pulitzer Prize in History for his 1946 study, Science 
Against Time. Realizing the gravity of the task of distilling hundreds of pages of research 
into a short report, Baxter asked Lincoln and Nitze to assist him. 16O Nitze and Lincoln 
quickly assumed primary responsibility for writing the final report. Nitze later recalled 
that, "Abe [Col. Lincoln] and I were mentioned as 'project members' at the back of the re-
port, which masked the fact that we shared importantly in shaping the substance of the 
final version. ,,161 
As Nitze and Lincoln composed the final report, the advisory panel presented a 
summary of its conclusions and recommendations to Eisenhower. Gaither spoke for the 
committee and identified six major conclusions. The currently planned active defense 
system was inadequate. The programmed passive defenses did not provide sufficient pro-
tection for the civilian population. SAC was vulnerable to a Soviet surprise attack. By 
1959, U.S. vulnerability would increase with the advent oflCBMs. The risks to the 
country would continue to grow until there was a workable arms control agreement. Fi-
nally, Gaither stressed that "The long-run peril to the U.S. civil population demands 
prompt and effective measures for increasing our basic and inherent strengths and for 
melding the will and resources of the free world.,,162 
160 See Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, 167; and Kaplan, Wizards, 136. 
161 Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, 167. See also Killian, Sputnik, 97-98. Kaplan stresses the impor-
tance ofNitze in writing the final report. While Nitze did help write the report, the evidence does not 
suppon Kaplan's view that Nitze played an imponant role in shaping the committees final conclusions. 
See Kaplan, Wizards, 136-41. 
162 Security Resources Panel Advisor's Notes for Conference, November 4, 1957, ibid., OSS, Subject Se-
ries. Alphabetical Subseries. Box 13, Folder - Gaither Report November 1957-December 1958 (I), 2-3. 
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After identifying these conclusions, Gaither discussed the rationale for the commit-
tee's findings: 
The employment of this Russian military power must be deterred and con-
tained by the United States and its allies until an enforceable worldwide 
arms limitation plan is achieved. In this interim of unpredictable duration 
our security must rest primarily upon the full effectiveness of deterrents 
and, if deterrents fail, upon our capability to survive as a nation and to re-
taliate with swift decisiveness. Any weakness in deterrents and any impor-
tant gap in our defenses if deterrents faiL imperil the U. S. civil population 
and national survival. A sober appraisal of the threat and of U.S. and allied 
strengths has, as we have indicated, brought us to the conclusion that today 
and in the decade ahead our deterrents are inadequate and that the U.S. 
civil population might be exposed to casualties of fifty percent or more of 
our total population-a catastrophe which defies imagination and which al-
most certainly would bring national disintegration. 163 
Gaither proposed that the United States needed to protect and augment its strate-
gic offensive striking power, reorganize the defense establishment, coordinate the free 
world's procurement and use of vital resources, educate the public to the dangers of a 
Soviet attack, and strengthen passive defenses. l64 On this last point, Gaither explained 
that "A 'fall-out shelter program' may in our final deliberations be recommended as the 
only feasible protection for millions of people who will be increasingly exposed to the haz-
ards of radiation. We frankly confess surprise that a fallout shelter program may be rec-
ommended. Our initial skepticism is yielding to the analysis of the megatonnage which 
will elude the best defensive systems now predictable.,,16s 
On November 7, the Gaither committee presented its complete report to the NSC. 
Five committee members participated in describing specific parts of the report. Sprague 
163 Ibid., 4-5. 
164 Ibid., 5-8. 
165 Ibid., 7. 
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introduced the committee's task and discussed the timetable on which the committee 
based its conclusions. Wiesner addressed the need for expanding active defenses. William 
Webster made a presentation on shelters. Robert Calkins gave a briefing on the costs and 
feasibility of the committee's recommendations. Finally, Foster summarized the proposed 
changes in defense organization and offered some concluding remarks. 166 
The committee members wasted little time defining the Soviet threat in its final re-
port. Instead, it accepted the basic American Cold War attitude that the Soviet Union 
sought world domination. It argued that "We have found no evidence in Russian foreign 
and military policy since 1945 to refute the conclusion that the USSR intentions are ex-
pansionist, and that her great efforts to build military power go beyond any concepts of 
Soviet defense.,,167 The threat as the committee members envisioned it encompassed both 
economic and military factors. 
Although it recognized the current economic superiority of the United States, the 
committee viewed this advantage as fleeting. It argued that while the United States was 
economically much superior to the Soviet Union, this difference was shrinking at a rapid 
rate. When coupled with the Soviet Union's emphasis on military spending rather than 
producing consumer goods, the decline of U.S. economic strength in comparison to the 
Soviet Union seemed even more stark. The Gaither report emphasized that while the two 
adversaries presently spent almost equal amounts on defense, current trends in spending 
indicated that the Soviet Union would surpass the United States in defense spending by 
166 Presentation by the Security Resources Panel to the National Security Council, November 7, 1957, 
ibid., l. 
167 Gaither Report, I. 
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the 1960s. It concluded that "This extraordinary concentration of the Soviet economy on 
military power and heavy industry makes ... available economic resources sufficient to 
finance both the rapid expansion of their impressive military capability and their politico-
economic offensive by which, through diplomacy, propaganda and subversion, they seek 
to extend the Soviet orbit." 168 
The committee found the Soviet military threat closely paralleling the economic 
one. After examining recent military and technological developments, the committee pre-
sented a picture of an ever-strengthening communist menace. It stressed that the Soviet 
development of atomic weapons, long-range aircraft, both ICBMs and IRBMs, a huge 
submarine force, an extensive air defense system, and an anny composed of 175 divisions 
posed a serious threat to the United States and its allies. Together with the economic 
threat, the Soviet Union's growing military strength challenged the supremacy of U.S. 
world power. 169 
The committee issued three "broad-brush" opinions. First, the active defense sys-
terns currently in place and those planned for the future offered little defense against a de-
termined Soviet attack. Second, the passive defense measures designed to protect the ci-
vilian population provided little or no protection from the effects of a nuclear blast and/or 
radioactive fallout. Finally, because of the low levels of both active and passive defenses, 
the security of the United States rested primarily on SAC. The committee warned that 
"The current vulnerability of SAC to surprise attack during a period oflessened world 
168 Ibid., 4. 
169 Ibid., 4-5. 
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tension (i.e. a time when SAC is not on a SAC 'alert' status), and the threat posed to SAC 
by the prospects of an early Russian ICBM capability, call for prompt remedial action. " 170 
The committee made several recommendations to help strengthen U.S. continental 
and civilian defenses. The highest priority was to reduce SAC wlnerability and to in-
crease the strategic retaliatory capability of U.S. nuclear forces. SAC forces, the commit-
tee argued, should be able to react with between 7 and 22 minutes warning. Additional air 
bases needed to be constructed to augment the dispersal of strategic forces. Active de-
fenses surrounding SAC bases through the use ofNIke-Hercules or Talos surface-to-air 
missiles should be strengthened. Additionally, it emphasized the need to accelerate and 
expand the introduction of both ICBMs and IRBMs into U.S. strategic retaliatory forces. 
It recommended expanding the number of planned IRBMs and ICBMs from 60 to 240 and 
from 80 to 600, respectively. Finally, it stressed that the United States needed to improve 
the ability of its military forces to wage limited operations that fall short of general war. 171 
In addition, the committee advocated programs of slightly less priority. The 
committee made its recommendations based on the belief that "Protection of the civil 
population is a national problem requiring a national remedy."l72 It estimated that if the 
Soviet Union launched a nuclear attack, the American civil population would suffer be-
tween 70 and 150 million casualties (between 35 and 75 percent of the estimated 1965 
population).173 It questioned the capability of the United States to acquire sufficient 
warning of a Soviet attack to initiate civil defense plans and to notify the population if an 
170 Ibid, s. 
171 Ibid., 6-7. 
172 Ibid, 10. 
173 Ibid., 18-20. 
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attack was indeed underway.174 It concluded that the implementation of a $25 billion pro-
gram of fallout shelters and civil defense planning "would symbolize our will to survive, 
and our understanding of our responsibilities in the nuclear age. ,,17S [emphasis in original] 
The committee also made recommendations in other areas. It stressed the need to 
improve the organization of the Defense Department so that it could effectively incorpo-
rate scientific and technological advances into its programs. It emphasized the importance 
of obtaining a greater understanding of Soviet intentions through hard intelligence. Fi-
nally, it argued that any changes in U.S. policies to reduce its wlnerability needed to be 
integrated with a broader foreign policy that would insure that allied countries would not 
see it as "a retreat to 'Fortress America. ",176 
The committee calculated that these recommendations would cost approximately 
$44 billion spread over five years (FY1959-FYI963). The active defense measures, in-
cluding the reduction of SAC wlnerability, the construction of missile defense systems, 
and the expansion of U.S. military capabilities, would cost $19 billion, while the measures 
to protect the civilian population with improved radar and fallout shelters would cost $25 
billion.177 The committee concluded that the United States could afford these programs 
although they "would necessitate ... an increase in taxes, a somewhat larger federal debt, 
substantial economies in other government expenditures, and curbs on intlation."I78 
174 Ibid., 7-8. 
175 Ibid., 22. 
176 Ibid., II. 
177 Ibid., 22. 
178 Ibid., 12. 
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The committee stressed the importance of implementing these recommendations 
immediately or risk losing the military advantage to the Soviet Union. It argued that dur-
ing the next two years, 1958 and 1959, the United States would be in a position to launch 
a decisive attack on the Soviet Union if necessary, while at the same time, it would remain 
in position to negotiate from a position of strength. Beyond this period, the committee 
expressed grave concerns about the future of the United States. "The next two years," the 
committee emphasized, "seem to critical. If we fail to act at once, the risk in our opinion 
will be unacceptable.,,179 
After the presentation to the NSC, Sprague and Foster were granted one more op-
portunity to express the committee's concerns to the president. At this invitation only 
meeting, Sprague presented information that he believed was even too sensitive for the 
NSC. ISO He wanted to warn the president about the vulnerability of SAC. lSI He believed 
that one of the best ways to minimize the vulnerability was to obtain better intelligence of 
Soviet intentions and capabilities. He argued that the acquisition of strategic warning and 
hard intelligence of a planned Soviet attack "would be extraordinarily important to the 
United States and permit it to take an aggressive reaction, rather than just a retaliatory re-
action." 182 While it is unclear what Sprague exactly meant by "aggressive reaction," at 
179 Ibid., 14. For the time table the committcc used in making its recommendations, see ibid., 15-17. 
ISO Memo for General Whisenand, November 5, 1957, LC, Twining Papers, Box 6, Folder - Diary of 
CJCS, August 15, 1957 to December 31, 1957, 1. 
181 Memorandum of Conference with the President, November 7, 1957, EL, WHO, OSS, Subject Series, 
Department of Defense Subseries, Box 6, Folder - Military Planning, 1958-1961 (3), 1-2. 
182 Sprague Oral History, 31. 
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least three members of the Gaither committee thought that the United States should 
launch a preventive war. 183 
Conclusions 
Why did the Gaither committee reach the conclusions that it did? The evidence 
points to two primary reasons. First, when Eisenhower established the committee, he was 
asking for assistance from people who had already developed opinions about Soviet inten-
tions and U.S. and Soviet military capabilities. A review of earlier chapters reveals that 
many of the committee members had previously examined topics such as active and pas-
sive defense and SAC vulnerability. In addition, most of them had been associated with 
organizations or specific policies that influenced their thinking. When Sprague's recom-
mendations for more spending on continental defense, Killian and Hill's advocacy for im-
proved early warning radar, Doolittle and Kelly's support for reducing SAC's vulnerabil-
ity, and Berlmer and Nelson's arguments concerning civil defense are taken into consid-
eration, the conclusions the committee reached should not have been a surprise. The 
committee members entered this study with backgrounds that were bound to influence the 
way they interpreted the available evidence. 
A'second reason for their conclusions is that the evidence they collected and used 
to evaluate the effectiveness of U.S. active and passive defenses seemed to confirm their 
183 Appointments, November 9, 1957, EL, DDE Papers, Ann Whitman Diary Series, Box 9, Folder - No-
vember 1957, A. C. W. Diary (2), 1. These three committee members remain unidentified. In a conver-
sation with Secretary of State Dulles. "Sprague argued that for the next two and a half years [1958-1960], 
the U.S. position vis-A-vis the Soviet Union will be at its strongest, and that during this period we can 
knock out the Soviet Union's military capability without taking a similar blow from the Soviet Union." 
Memorandum of Conversation, Janwuy 3, 1958, EL, Dulles Papers, General Correspondence Series, Box 
I, Folder - Memoranda of Conversation -General- S (I), l. 
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preconceived beliefs. Some of the most important information that the committee used 
were the intelligence estimates produced by the CIA and military services. The NIE's re-
vealed a growing apprehension of the Soviet threat and an emphasis on increasing Soviet 
capabilities. While they did not predict a Soviet attack, they did not rule out that possibil-
ity. Furthermore, as the two superpowers approached nuclear parity, the NIEs predicted 
that the Soviets would probably become more assertive on the periphery, increasing the 
risk of a war arising from miscalculation. 
One of the fundamental problems that helped skew U.S. intelligence estimates was 
the lack of careful analysis of Soviet intentions. U.S. officials and analysts assumed that 
the Soviet Union sought world domination and would use military force, if necessary, to 
achieve it. As shown earlier, Doolittle echoed this theme when he testified that the Soviet 
goal was ''world communization and world domination." The Gaither committee never 
carefully considered why the Soviet Union would want to dominate the world or assume 
the risks that country would have to take to do so. 184 In his analysis of the influence of 
184 See Eglin. Air Dejense in the Nuclear Age, 272. In making this argument. I am not discounting the 
inflammatory rhetoric originating in the Soviet Union after Sputnik. For example, the committee did read 
a threatening statement by the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Air Force Air Marshall K. A. Ver-
shinin. Descnbing the vulnerability of the United States, Vershinin explained: 
the calculation that America's remoteness will safeguard it from military blows 
in case of another world war is no longer tenable. Great distances will no longer play a 
decisive role in the age of reactor technology and atomic energy. What was inaccesstble 
before has now become quite accessible. The modem means of air attack which have 
tremendous speeds and can operate over vast distances, are capable of striking at any 
point of the globe. The means of conveyance for hydrogen bombs, the most formidable 
weapons, make it possible to bring them instantly to the remotest areas of any continent 
of the world by intercontinental ballistic missiles. . .. 
It stands to reason that should the adversary make use of these weapons, the 
Soviet Union would suffer losses. But these losses would be smaller than those of the 
countries with a greater density of population and greater concentration of industries. 
This applies, above all, to the west European countries and to the United States 
of America .... Many of the major cities of the United States and some Western coun-
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perception on policy makers, Robert Jervis provides an apt comparison to the mindset of 
the Gaither committee. He argues that "all too often statesmen assume that their opposite 
numbers see the world as they see it, fail to devote sufficient resources to determining 
whether this is actually true, and have much more confidence in their beliefs about the 
other's perceptions than the evidence warrants." 18S 
By assuming Soviet hostile intentions, policymakers and intelligence analysts raised 
the importance and difficulty of analyzing Soviet capabilities and U.S. vulnerabilities. As 
the Gaither committee members attempted to estimate Soviet strategic capabilities they 
were hampered by the lack of concrete intelligence and information. Intelligence analysts 
had to rely on the few photographs provided by the U-2 or other spy planes, electronic 
intercepts from along Soviet borders, interviews with political refugees, Soviet announce-
ments and published statements, observations of Soviet military parades, and extrapola-
tions of manufacturing capabilities to estimate Soviet capabilities. Needless to say, their 
conclusions were speculative. As Herbert York recalled in calculating estimates of the 
number of ICBMs the Soviet Union would build, he assumed it would produce the maxi-
mum number of missiles possible. Having accepted Soviet hostile intentions, the Gaither 
committee believed that the Russians would increase their military capabilities to the 
maximum. 
tries may. in the event of war. be attacked by rockets and bombers as well as by subma-
rines. 
Excerpt from Pravada. September 8. 1958. translated and quoted in Memorandum for the Steering 
Committee. October 1957. EL. WHO. OSAST. Series 1: Alphabetical Series. Subseries B non-Top Secret 
File. Box 6. Folder - Department of Defense (1957) (1). 1-2. See also McDougall •... the Heavens and 
the Earth. 237-62. 
18S Jervis. "Deterrence and Perception. n 4. 
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Once the committee determined that the Soviet Union posed a threat and con-
cluded that it was producing weapons at maximum levels. it had to decide where the 
United States was vulnerable and how the country should respond. Based on the commit-
tee's assumptions and the information it examined, several of its recommendations were 
obvious. Many of its members had already concluded that if SAC was made less vulner-
able through dispersal and by reducing reaction times, it would pose a much greater deter-
rent to the Soviet Union. Others had realized that shelters could reduce the wlnerability 
of the civilian population. These conclusions were confirmed in their analyses of other 
studies. Whether it was produced by some government agency, the RAND Corporation, 
or some other organization, the reports examined by the Gaither committee presented a 
consistent conclusion--the wlnerability of the United States could be reduced by a combi-
nation of active and passive defenses. 
A final factor that must be considered in explaining why the Gaither committee 
reached the conclusions that it did are the debates concerning various military strategies. 
The committee advocated increasing U.S. nuclear striking power, building active and pas-
sive defenses, constructing a nationwide shelter system, and expanding the military's ca-
pabilities for limited military operations. This last recommendation was of particular im-
portance to the strategic debates of 1957. Many strategists. including Nitze and Lincoln, 
had published their views on limited war. Kissinger's study of nuclear weapons and U.S. 
foreign policy was particularly influential. The Gaither committee's recommendation to 
augment u.S. limited war capabilities reveals the influence of these arguments. 
CHAPTER 5 - The Influence of the Gaither Report on 
the Eisenhower Administration in 1958 
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Nearly four decades since the meeting of the Gaither committee, mystery still sur-
rounds how Eisenhower and his advisers actually reacted to the November report. Did the 
president simply reject the report as a product of war-mongering extremists? Did he have 
access to intelligence information that undermined the basis of the committee's conclu-
sions? Was he so blinded by his devotion to a balanced budget and controlling inflation 
that he failed to see an actual Soviet threat? Was his willingness to accept only some of 
the committee's conclusions and its recommendations a product of an astute understand-
ing of U.S. economic, military, and political power or simple fortune? 
The Gaither committee's findings raised some significant issues. Its assessment of 
Soviet military capabilities posed serious questions for U.S. security. If the committee's 
conclusions were accurate, the president faced a real dilemma. He based his approach to 
government on carefully balancing the nation's many needs and responsibilities. He once 
told a friend "that the critical problem of our time is to find and stay on the path that 
marks the way of logic between conflicting arguments advanced by extremists on both 
sides of almost every economic, political and international problem that arises.,,1 Now, 
however, the Gaither committee was making recommendations that would fundamentally 
alter the balance on which Eisenhower's policies were based. To accept such conse-
quences, the president had to be convinced that the United States was really at risk. 
I Dwight D. Eisenhower to B. G. Chynoweth. July IS, 1954, quoted in Duram, Moderate Among Extrem-
ists, 54. 
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One of Eisenhower's most pressing concerns in contemplating how to handle the 
committee's findings was to determine what impact the proposals would have on the 
economy. He feared that increasing defense spending to the levels proposed by the 
committee would create budget deficits and inflation. If either of these economic prob-
lems developed, Eisenhower believed the federal government would have to regiment the 
economy through such policies as higher taxes, price controls, and rationing. Eisenhower 
wanted to avoid these infringements on individual rights at all costs. 
Eisenhower turned to the NSC and other government agencies to address the 
many issues raised by the Gaither report. Paul Nitze identified some of them when he re-
called four questions that perplexed the committee and remained to be answered by the 
president himself and his closest aides: 
1) "What is it we [the United States] should be attempting to deter by our 
nuclear offensive and defensive armament under conditions which seem 
likely to arise in the foreseeable future?,,2 
2) "In the years ahead is it to our interest that there be more or less em-
phasis upon nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy?,,3 
3) "Should we prepare primarily for a strategy of disarming the U.S.S.R. in 
a strike which precedes the receipt ofan attack by the U.S.S.R., or should 
we prepare primarily for a strategy of deterrence through having a capabil-
ity to do unacceptable damage to the Russians through a retaliatory blow-
even though we had been struck first?,,4 
4) "How much emphasis should be given to quick reaction capabilities and 
how much to delayed reaction capabilities?"s 
2 Untitled Paper by Paul Nitze, [January 1958], EL, WHO, OSAST, Box 14, Folder - SRP June 1957-
November 1960, 1. 
3lbid., 10. 
4 lbid., 4. 
5 lbid., 9. Nitze defined quick reaction capabilities as those forces which had to be launched as soon as a 
Soviet attack was detected. These forces would have included land-based ballistic missiles and aircraft. 
Delayed reaction capabilities were those forces that did not have to be launched immediately. Nitze con-
cluded that submarine-launched missiles and bombers after they were in the air offered these capabilities. 
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Eisenhower and his advisers spent most of the first half of 1958 attempting to an-
swer these questions. Stephen Ambrose argues that the president ultimately "rejected the 
Gaither Report. He refused to bend to the pressure, refused to initiate a fallout shelter 
program. It was one of his finest hours.,,6 This is a rather short-sighted view of the intlu-
ence of the Gaither report. Between January and July, the committee's recommendations 
remained at the forefront of the Eisenhower administration's deliberations concerning na-
tional security issues. The first three NSC meetings of 1958 dealt primarily with the 
Gaither committee and the comments made by the various government agencies concem-
ing specific recommendations. Beyond these meetings, the NSC periodically examined 
issues raised by the committee over the next six months. In particular, the administration 
evaluated ways to limit SAC vulnerability, accelerate ballistic missile capabilities-
including ICBMs, IRBMs, and the Polaris system-improve limited military operations ca-
pabilities, reorganize the defense establishment, improve continental defenses, and imple-
ment various shelter strategies. It can be argued that the Gaither committee did not pres-
ent any revolutionary new ideas or programs, but "It certainly helped, and pushed and 
prodded," many of them. 7 
The National Mood and Initial Reactions to the Gaither Report 
By the time the NSC received the Gaither report on November 7, Eisenhower was 
already under intense pressure to modify his national security programs. The launch of 
Sputnik and the Soviet announcement of a successful ICBM test raised considerable pub-
6 Ambrose, Eisenhower, v. 2, 435. 
7 Comments by R.C. [Robert Cutler] on W. C. Foster article, May 29,58, EL, WHO, NSC Series, Briefmg 
Notes Subserics, Box 8, Folder - Fallout Shelters (2), 1. 
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lic concern about U.S. military strength.8 Previously, Eisenhower had been able to quell 
criticisms of his defense policies by reminding the American people of his widespread ex-
perience and knowledge in these fields. After October 1957, things were different. Eisen-
hower's status as a war hero and popular president were no longer sufficient to allay the 
people's doubts about weaknesses in U.S. security. Over consecutive weeks in late Octo-
ber, A viation Week argued that Eisenhower and his advisers "have been and still are em-
barked on a fiscal policy that is shaking the military, scientific and industrial foundations of 
our national defense system so badly that only emergency action with the utmost speed 
will prevent a major deterioration of our atomic airpower strength in relation to the Sovi-
ets in the immediate future.,,9 The following week it claimed that "In the face of this 
overwhelming mass of evidence on the growth of Soviet military strength from new tech-
nological weapons, our own national leadership has been executing a policy aimed at re-
ducing our own atomic-airpower strength in being, artificially retarding the pace of our 
military technological development and thoroughly discouraging the best efforts of both 
military and scientific leaders concerned with this vital program."IO 
Similar concerns were shown by the general population. A public opinion poll in 
late November 1957 found only 26 percent of Americans satisfied with U.S. defense poli-
cies and 53 percent advocating that they be reexamined. 11 After the embarrassing failure 
8 Newsweek found that "Most Americans are in favor of a crash program to put the U.S. ahead in the 
missile race. . .. There was concern but no panic. Rather Americans seemed to have suffered a severe 
blow to their pride. They weren't used to being second best, and they wanted to catch up. Above aU. they 
understood that catching up might well be a matter of survival. 'The U.S., Ike, and Sputnik, '" Newsweek, 
50:18 (October 28, 1957),30. See also "The Moon's Meaning.'" ibid., 50:16 (October 14, 1957),39. 
9 Robert Holtz, "Why Mr. President?,'" Aviation Week 67:16 (October 21, 1957),21. 
\0 Ibid., "Intelligence Without Leadership," Aviation Week 67:17 (October 28, 1957),21. 
\I American Institute of Public Opinion, November 24, 1957, reprinted in Hazel Gaudet Erskine (ed.), 
"The Polls: Defense, Peace, and Space,'" The Public Opinion Quarterly 25:3 (Fall 1961),483. 
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of the Vanguard rocket in December, the national mood grew more somber. U.S. News & 
World Report claimed that the "U.S., today, is far behind Soviet Russia in the big race for 
superrockets.,,12 A week later, it reported a growing awareness and fear of nuclear war. 
"These new fears about war," it opined, "seemed more immediate and personal than war 
fears in the past. When past wars threatened, people worried about whether their sons 
might be called into service. . .. Now, all at once, war became a personal thing for every-
one-something that could hit you, yourself, right in your home." 13 
In December, Newsweek interviewed senators and congressmen from both parties 
about the feelings of their constituents and found "The American people have been se-
verely shaken by the sputnik era and are losing confidence in their leadership." It con-
eluded that there was: "A crisis in national confidence produced by the conviction that the 
Soviet Union was now the world leader in science and technology;" "An aching need for 
bold leadership--and a shaken faith in the soldier-statesman whom they had twice elected 
as the man best qualified to deal with national security;" and "A readiness to make the 
sacrifices necessary to 'catch up. ",14 In an analysis of public opinion in the aftermath of 
Sputnik, one scholar concludes: 
In general, American opinion in the post-Sputnik era may be characterized 
(a) as being aware of foreign and defense problems and attributing sub-
stantial importance to them; (b) as being aware of American vulnerability in 
the present military situation; (c) as having been shocked, in the short run, 
by the Soviet demonstration of scientific and technological prowess, and as 
having lost confidence in the conduct of American foreign policy in the 
immediate post-Sputnik period; and (d) as having substantially recovered 
12 "U.S. Satellite - A Myth Exploded." U.S. News & World Report 43:24 (December 13, 1957),31. 
13 "The Changing Mood in America," ibid., 43:25 (December 20, 1957),43. 
14 "What Congress Hears: We'd Better Get Busy," Newsweek 50:26 (December 23, 1957), 15. 
from this loss of confidence and accepted the Administration interpretation 
of the relative positions of the United States and the U.S.S.R. 1S 
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Eisenhower was quite dismayed by such fears. He did not understand why Ameri-
cans could not recognize the continued superiority ofD.S. military strength. Although he 
was quite concerned with Soviet technological achievements and increasing Soviet military 
strength, he disagreed with those who criticized his policies. He believed that current and 
planned U.S. defense programs would continue to deter the Soviet Union and provide 
adequate military forces to handle any limited war situations. After Gaither's presentation 
on November 4, Eisenhower explained that "he thought our strategic forces are stronger 
than the group may have indicated." He then stressed that "With regard to the ICBM, 
here is one case in which a central position is not an advantage to the Soviets. The free 
world holds the periphery and can pose a threat from a multiple of points." 16 
On the same day the Gaither committee presented its report to the NSC, Eisen-
hower began a campaign to reassure the American people of the country's continued 
military strength and technological excellence. He made a series of appearances where he 
attempted to address the public's concerns and discuss what the United States was going 
to do to improve its strategic position. Many of his comments reflected his initial assess-
ments of the Gaither committee's conclusions. He told a national television audience that 
advances in science and technology would enhance, rather than undermine, national se-
1 S George A Almond. "Public Opinion Polls and the Development of American Public Opinion. .. The 
Public Opinion Quarterly 24:4 (Winter 1960), 567. 
16 Memorandum of Conference with the President, November 4, 1957, EL, WHO, OSS, Subject Series, 
Alphabetical Subseries, Box 23, Folder - Science Advisory Committee (3) [November 1957- April 1956], 
2. 
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curity. In particular, he explained that technological advancements would improve U.S. 
defenses. 11 
On November 13, he delivered a widely publicized speech in Oklahoma City. He 
identified four tasks for U.S. military forces: possessing sufficient retaliatory strength to 
deter the Soviet Union, insuring flexibility in military capabilities in order to meet any form 
of aggression with an effective response, maintaining continental defenses in a high state 
of readiness, and retaining reserve strength to handle any emergency situations. IS To fulfill 
these tasks, he said that a high level of citizen participation would be necessary as well as a 
willingness to bear any additional financial burdens. He concluded by detailing U.S. plans: 
To continue, over the years just ahead, to maintain the Strategic Air Com-
mand in a state of maximum safety, strength, and alert, as new kinds of 
threats develop, will entail additional costs. This means accelerating the 
dispersal of Strategic Air Command to additional bases .... we have been 
providing facilities for response to emergency alarm. This, too, should be 
speeded up .... to achieve maximum possible warning of any future attack, 
we must carry on additional improvements throughout our warning line 
that are now scientifically feasible .... Another need is to develop an active 
defense missile system against missiles . 
. . . to increase retaliatory power, we shall be adding long-range missiles. 19 
While the president attempted to encourage the American people, the NSC asked 
various government agencies to make initial comments about the committee's findings. It 
requested that the Defense Department evaluate the feasibility of the committee's recom-
mendations related to the military. It asked the State Department to examine how the 
implementation of the committee's conclusions would affect U.S. allies. It ordered the 
17 Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Science in National Security," November 7, 1957, reprinted in The Depart-
ment a/State Bulletin 37:961 (November 25, 1957),821. 
18 Ibid., "Our Future Security," November 13, 1957, reprinted in The Department o/State Bulletin 37:962 
(December 2, 1957), 868. 
19 Ibid., 869. 
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Bureau of Budget, the CEA, and the Treasury Department to assess the impact of the 
committee's recommendations on the nation's economy. It asked the CIA to examine 
ways to improve intelligence and to acquire strategic warning of a Soviet attack. Finally, 
it requested that the FCDA, in collaboration with other agencies, study the committee's 
shelter recommendations. 20 
Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy assigned the lCS responsibility for developing 
the military's response to the Gaither committee's findings. The lCS completed its report 
in early December and reached several significant conclusions. It opposed the extension 
of the DEW line south of Midway because there was little likelihood that the Soviet Union 
would attack from that direction. 21 It directed that the protection of SAC bases be aug-
mented.22 It recommended dispersing SAC's forces to a greater number ofairfields.23 It 
stressed that "an anti-ICBM is an urgent requirement. ,,24 Finally, it argued "that a rea-
sonably effective air defense system against all types of aircraft and missiles, including bal-
Iistic missiles, can be achieved.,,25 
The lCS made three other recommendations. It agreed with the Gaither commit-
tee that the country's limited military operations capabilities needed to be reevaluated in 
relation to all U.S. military objectives, the Soviet threat, and the resources available during 
the period under consideration.26 In addition, the lCS accepted that a fallout shelter pro-
20 Record of Actions by the National Security Council at its 343rd Meeting, November 7, 1957, EL, WHO. 
OSS. Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, Box 19, Folder - NSC - Record of Actions, 1957 (7), 2-3. 
21 Decision of JCS 21011284, December 4, 1957, NA, RG 218, JCS, 1957 Geographic File, CCS 381 US 
(1-31-50) Sec. 73, 2539. 
22 Ibid., 2539. 
23 Ibid .• 2545. 
24 Ibid .• 2540. 
2S Ibid., 2544. 
26 Ibid .• 254 1-42. 
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gram was "the only feasible means of providing shelter protection that can be undertaken 
on a nation-wide scale at the present time.,,27 Finally, it supported the construction of 
hardened ICBM launch sites as soon as feasible.28 
Defense Secretary McElroy presented similar recommendations to the NSC in De-
cember. He addressed four issues: improving SAC reaction times, protecting SAC bases, 
accelerating the development ofIRBMs and ICBMs, and strengthening the country's ca-
pabilities to wage limited military operations. He explained that during 1958 and 1959, 
defense officials were primarily concerned with the threat from enemy bombers. In the 
years that followed, they saw the main threat emanating from missiles. He recommended 
that by January 1958 SAC should be able to launch 157 bombers with warning of between 
30 and 120 minutes. By July 1959, he expected SAC to get 515 planes off the ground 
with the same warning.29 With the expected reduction of warning time to less than 15 
minutes after the introduction of ICBMs, McElroy requested that SAC be able to launch 
240 bombers in July 1960 and 465 by July 1961 with 15 minutes notice.30 As far as reduc-
ing SAC's vulnerability, the defense secretary ordered the construction of Ntke-Hercules 
surface-to-air missile sites around SAC bases. He advised protecting 4 of 31 SAC bases 
by January 1958, 16 of44 bases by July 1959, and 29 of 52 bases by July 1960.31 While 
27 Ibid .• 2543. 
28 Ibid., 2546. 
29 "Comments and Recommendations on Report to the President by the Security Resources Panel of the 
ODM Science Advisory Committee," December 16,1957, EL, WHO, OSANSA, NSC Series, Policy Pa-
pers Subseries, Box 22, Folder - Gaither Report, Defense-I. 
30 Ibid., Defense-S. 
31 Ibid., Defense-5. 
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recommending these air defenses, he viewed the construction of shelters for SAC bombers 
as impractical. 32 
While the Gaither committee recommended augmenting the number of U.S. 
IRBMs from 60 to 240 and ICBMs from 80 to 600 by 1963, the Defense Department re-
quested increases on a smaller scale. It initially recommended the construction of 120 
IRBMs (60 Thor and 60 Jupiter missiles) and 130 ICBMs (90 Atlas and 40 Titan mis-
siles).33 The committee also advised increasing U.S. capabilities to wage limited military 
operations. McElroy agreed "that action should be taken to augment the capabilities and 
increase the readiness of U.S. and allied forces which are organized and equipped to com-
bat local aggression and to increase the mobility and flexibility of these forces. ,,34 
The NSC asked the State Department to analyze the possible impact of the imp le-
mentation of the committee's recommendations on U.S. allies. There was a concern that 
if the United States constructed fallout shelters, U.S. allies might perceive such an action 
as a move towards isolationism. The State Department argued that if the Eisenhower 
administration decided to build shelters, it needed to offer assurances to its allies that it 
would remain committed to them. The State Department stressed that "If not carefully 
integrated into our foreign policies, any substantial new programs to reduce the vulner-
ability of the United States might be widely misinterpreted as a fundamental change in 
U.S. policy which could have most serious effects on U.S. relations with our allies and the 
uncommitted nations. ,,35 
32 Ibid., Defense-II. 
33 Ibid., Defense-13-I4. 
34 Ibid., Defense-I9. 
3S Ibid., State-l. 
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The three agencies dealing with the economic implications of the Gaither commit-
tee's recommendations: the Bureau of Budget, the CEA, and the Treaswy Department 
expressed serious doubts about some of the committee's economic assumptions. The 
Budget Bureau asserted that the Gaither committee made two key mistakes in calculating 
the economic implications of its programs. It argued that the committee overestimated the 
future growth of the federal budget and underestimated non-defense expenses.36 The 
CEA emphasized that the committee exaggerated federal revenues and underrated the in-
flationary impact of its recommendations.37 The Treasury Department concluded that the 
committee failed to recognize the economic costs and consequences of its recommenda-
tions. Treasury officials were particularly concerned that the implementation of the 
Gaither committee's programs would produce an overly regulated economy and lead to 
demands from the American people for the immediate construction of shelters. 38 
The last two agencies to present their evaluations of the Gaither committee were 
the CIA and the FCDA The CIA agreed with the committee that the United States 
needed to strengthen its intelligence gathering capabilities.39 The FCDA supported the 
committee's recommendations for assigning the shelter program a highest priority.40 
As the various government agencies examined the Gaither committee's recom-
mendations, Eisenhower was completing his proposed FY 1959 budget. Prior to Sputnik, 
the administration was trying to limit defense spending so that it could meet the budget 
36 Ibid., Budget-3. 
37 Ibid., CEA-l-cEA-2. 
38 Ibid., Treaswy-3-Treasury-4. 
39 Ibid., CIA-I. 
40 Ibid., FCDA-I-FCDA-S. 
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guidelines produced by Congress earlier in the summer. 41 After October 4, priorities 
changed. Amidst the uproar and shock created by the Russian achievement, people ques-
tioned how the Soviet Union could have made such a technological achievement before 
the United States and wondered what the president would do about it.42 Administration 
officials now deemed that the current proposals for the FY 1959 budget were inadequate. 
At a meeting between Eisenhower and his military advisers on November 11, the 
president explained that the country had to raise the pay of its military personnel and ac-
celerate the alert and dispersal of SAC. Furthermore, he added, "there are several things 
we must do--we must keep SAC alert and dispersed, we must keep up our 15 carriers, and 
we must build submarines. ,,43 Considering his earlier views, he made a surprising pro-
nouncement about defense spending. He "stressed that there is nothing sacrosanct about 
the $38 billion figure [for defense spending] .... He felt we could do what needs to be 
done for approximately $39 billion or $39.5 billion.,,44 
At two other meetings during the next few weeks, Eisenhower articulated how the 
decisions for additional appropriations should be made and why they were needed. He 
explained that he wanted to approach proposals for increased expenditures for national 
security programs "not on the basis of' can we do it in response to the public outcry,' but 
41 See Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the President. July 10, 1957, FRUS 1955-
1957, 19,540-46; Memorandum ofa Conference with the President. July 10, 1957, ibid., 547-48; and 
Memorandum of Discussion at the 332nd Meeting of the National Security Council, July 25, 1957, ibid., 
556-63. 
42 See for example World Gallup PoU, October 27, 1957, reprinted in Erskine (ed.). "The Polls: Defense. 
Peace, and Space, n 486. 
43 Memorandum of Conversation with the President. November 11, 1957, EL, WHO, OSS, Subject Series, 
Department of Defense Subseries, Box 2, Folder - Budget. Military (6) (September 1957-January 1959), 3. 
44 Ibid., 3. 
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'should we do it. ",45 To obtain the right balance in his proposals, Eisenhower understood 
the importance of meeting military requirements and building the confidence of the people. 
He described in December how he was "really giving a lot of thought to what is the 
[defense budget] figure that will create confidence. He thought that a feeling of greater 
confidence in the security sphere might go over into economic confidence as well, and 
thus help the economic picture." He added that he thought two-thirds of the supplemen-
tary funds are more to stabilize public opinion than to meet a real need for acceleration.,,46 
Eisenhower did not rush to judgment or try to make immediate decisions in re-
sponse to either Sputnik or the Gaither report. He wanted his advisers to analyze carefully 
what changes and additions needed to be made in his administration's national security 
policies. By the third week in November, Eisenhower received preliminary figures for 
additions of$2.14 billion above the planned $37.66 billion defense budget for FY 1959. 
The increases would provide pay raises for military personnel, improvements in SAC alert 
and dispersal, enhanced ICBM detection, accelerated IRBM and ICBM programs, in-
creased research and development, new satellite and outer space programs, improvements 
in anti-submarine warfare, and the reorganization of the Army's divisions along Pentomic 
lines.47 
Discussions involving the president came to a temporary halt when he suffered a 
mild stroke on November 25. After convalescing in Denver, Colorado, however, Eisen-
4S Memorandum of Conference with the President, November 22, 1957, ibid., 1. 
46 Memorandum of Conference with the President, December 5, 1957, ibid., 2. 
47 Informal Notes, November 22, 1957, EL, WHO, OSANSA, Special Assistant Series, Chronological 
Subseries, Box 5, Folder - November 1957 (2), 1. See also Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 
November 17, 1957, LC, Twining Papers, Box lOS, Folder - Memos., November 1957, 1. 
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hower was able to resume most of his activities by early December. When Eisenhower 
returned to the White House, he had to decide what additional increases needed to be 
made to the FY 1958 defense budget. He realized that the additional appropriations in the 
FY 1959 budget would not go into place until Iuly 1958 and that something needed to be 
done before then. McElroy proposed and Eisenhower agreed to seek an additional $1.26 
billion for the FY 1958 defense budget to accelerate and/or augment the Polaris missile 
system, SAC dispersal, missile detection, and the development of IRBMs and ICBMs.48 
While Sputnik could account for some of these increases, the specific recommendations 
indicate the influence of the Gaither committee's conclusions. Robert Cutler, Eisen-
hower's assistant for national security affairs, explained that "Many of the measures as-
signed the highest relative value by the [Gaither] panel have been included in the Defense 
Department program for FY 1959 and the augmentations for FY 1958.,,49 
Leak of the Gaither Report 
On November 23, the White House released a statement that identified the mem-
bers of the Gaither committee's steering and advisory panels and announced that the 
committee had performed a secret study for the administration. so The statement did not 
describe the activities of the committee or the contents of the report. Not surprisingly, 
48 Memorandum ofConfereoce with the President, December 5, 1957, ibid., OSS, Subject Series, Depart-
ment of Defense Subseries, Box 2, Folder - Budget, Military (6) (September 1957-January 1959), 1. 
49 Status of the Gaither Report, [December 1957], ibid., OSANSA, NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, 
Box 16, Folder - Security Resources Panel, 1. See also 1. R Killian, Jr. to Donald Quarles, November 30, 
1957, ibid., OSAST, Series 1: Alphabetical Series, Subseries B: ooo-Top Secret File, Box 6, Folder-
Department of Defense (1957) (1), 2; Notes 00 Dr. Killian's Aide Memoire, November 30, 1957, ibid., 1-
2; Memorandum for Dr. Killian, [late 1957], ibid., 1-5. 
50 Notes, November 23, 1957, ibid., OSANSA, NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 16, Folder-
Security Resources Panel, I. 
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information about the committee began to filter out after the announcement and requests 
for access to the report bombarded the White House.51 Noted N~ York Times columnist, 
Arthur Krock, hypothesized about the contents of the report after hearing a speech that 
William Foster delivered in early December. "We," Foster proclaimed, "must get away 
from the strange dichotomy with which we have traditionally viewed force, refusing to 
consider it except as a last resort, then approaching it in a crusading manner with a 
'punish-the-bandit' view which has been prevalent in our recent conflicts." In his analysis, 
Krock wrote, "This [speech] strongly implies that the [Gaither] report to the N.S.C. gave 
the most powerful support thus far in the United States to the military policy of striking an 
enemy before an assault he obviously is about to make on this country."S2 
In addition to its specific recommendations, the Gaither committee advised the 
president and the NSC that the administration needed to raise public awareness about the 
steps the nation had to take to meet the Soviet challenge. In late November, Foster met 
with Eisenhower about this proposal and the president "seemed anxious to mobilize public 
opinion."s3 They decided that Foster should arrange "an off the record unpartisan discus-
sion of national security matters."S4 The White House saw two principal advantages deriv-
51 For an example of one of the leaks, see Robert A Hawkins to Senator Leverett Saltonstall, December 2, 
1957, ibid, OSAST, Box 4, Folder - SRP June 1957-November 1960,1. Hawkins served on the Gaither 
study group that examined anti-ICBM missile defenses. 
52 Arthur Krock, "'A Clue to the Top-Secret N.S.C. Report," New York Times, December 20, 1957, l. 
53 William Foster to Killian, October 31, 1975, MIT Archives, MC 423 - Killian Papers, Box 13, Folder-
JRK Book - Correspondence A-I{. I. 
54 Foster to Lincoln, November 26, 1957, USMA. Lincoln Papers, Box 63A, Folder - #10 - Gaither 
Committee 1957, l. 
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ing from the meeting. It hoped to gain support for both its mutual security and defense 
reorganization programs. 55 
Sparked by Eisenhower's apparent interest, Foster invited over twenty national 
leaders to his home to discuss the challenges facing the nation. Along with Foster, the 
other Gaither committee members present included Nitze, Lincoln, and Frank Stanton. In 
addition, Roswell Gilpatric, Laurence Rockefeller, Elmo Roper, John Cowles, Thomas 
Dewey, Frank Lindsay, Eric Johnson, Hugh Calkins, Bradley Gaylord, Harold Boeschen-
stein, George McGhee, and Vice President Richard Nixon, attended the dinner. 56 The 
group's actual discussions were not recorded. However, one reporter described the 
meeting as an attempt by Eisenhower to organize "a group of leading Americans who feel 
that the country requires a special, abrupt and continuous alarm bell on the danger from 
the Soviet Union. ,,57 
On December 20, any remaining secrecy concerning the Gaither committee's con-
elusions disintegrated in a front page story in the Washingtoll Post. The headlines read: 
"NATO VOTES MISSILE BASES, PEACE TRY; SECRET REPORT SEES U.S. IN 
GRA VE PERIL. II In the ensuing article, reporter Chalmer Roberts disclosed the commit-
teels most important findings. He wrote: 
The still top-secret Gaither Report portrays a United States in the 
gravest danger in its history. 
It pictures the nation moving in frightening course to the status of a 
second-class power. 
55 Memoranclum, [November 1957], EL, WHO, OSS, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, Box 13, 
Folder - Gaither Report (November 1957-January 1958) (1), 1. 
56 [Untitled list of names], ibid., I. 
57 Robert F. Whitney, "President Backs 'Alert' Advocates," New York Times, December 12, 1957, 11. For 
other newspaper reports on the dinner, see ibid., December 11, 1957, 8; and ibid., December 13, 1957, 26. 
For descriptions of the dinner based on interviews with some of the participants, see Halperin, "The 
Gaither Committee and the Policy Process," 374; and Kaplan, 152-53. 
It shows an America exposed to an almost immediate threat from 
the missile-bristling Soviet Union. 
It finds America's long-term prospect one of cataclysmic peril in 
the face of rocketing Soviet military might and of a powerful, growing So-
viet economy and technology which will bring new political propaganda 
and psychological assaults on freedom all around the globe. S8 
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Robert's article intensified requests that the report be released. George Reedy, a 
key legal assistant of Senator Johnson on the Senate preparedness subcommittee, recalled 
that "one of the big struggles was to get hold ofa copy of the Gaither Report."s9 During 
the subcommittee's hearings between November 1957 and January 1958, Johnson stated 
he had between ten and fifteen conversations with administration officials about releasing 
the report.60 Senator Stuart Symington, an outspoken critic of Eisenhower's policies, 
claimed that he also had about fifteen conversations with administration officials about the 
same issue.61 
There remains much confusion as to where the leaks of information from the 
Gaither report originated. At least eighty-five copies of the report were distributed and 
58 Chalmer Roberts, "Enormous Anns Outlay Is Held Vital to Survival, n Washington Post, December 20, 
1957, Sec. A, pp. 1, 19. Roberts was not the first to write about the Gaither repon, but his article provided 
the most in-depth description and discussion of it For early articles, see the New York Herald Tribune, 
November, 23,1957,1; andAviation Week 67:22, December 2,1957,28. 
S9lnterview XII with George E. Reedy, December 21,1983, LBJ Oral History Foundation, AC 84-54, 1. 
IiO Inquiry into Satellite, 2038. See also ibid, 923-24; Senator Lyndon B. Johnson to the President, De-
cember 4, 1957, EL, White House Central Files, Official File, Box 676, Folder - OF 133-R, 1; Killian to 
Foster, October 24, 1975, MIT Archives, MC 423 - Killian Papers, Box 13, Folder - JRK Book - Corre-
spondence A-I<, 1-2; and Minutes of Telephone Conversation between JFD and LBJ, December 23, 1957, 
EL, John Foster Dulles Papers, Telephone Call Series, Box 7, Folder - Minutes of Telephone Conversa-
tions - General, November 1, 1957 -December 27, 1957, 1. See also Divine, Sputnik Challenge, 78. 
61 Inquiry into Satellite, 1340. For examples of other requests, see Senator Joseph S. Clark to the Presi-
dent, December 17,1957, EL, White House Central Files, Official File, Box 676, Folder -OF 133-R, 1; 
Henry C. Kittredge to [Sherman] Adams, December 29, 1957, ibid, 1; General Roben E. Wood (ret.) to 
Eisenhower, December 30, 1957, ibid, 1; and Holifield to Eisenhower, January 6, 1958, ibid, 1. 
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most of those involved with the committee had access to it.62 Several committee members 
lobbied for the release of the report or at least a sanitized description of it contents.63 
Newsweek reported that Roberts's article was based on over twenty interviews.64 Killian 
recalled that Roberts received a general draft of the report which Jerome Wiesner devel-
oped in fuller detail.6s 
Public knowledge of the report made the administration's evaluations more diffi-
cult. As an internal document, Eisenhower and his advisers had great freedom in assessing 
the report's worth. However, in the public arena that was still reeling from the shock of 
Sputnik, the report became more important. It seemed to symbolize U.S. weaknesses. 
Eisenhower had no assurances that the release of a sanitized version of the report would 
alleviate fears, but by refusing to do so, he was creating the impression that he had some-
thing to hide.66 
The administration remained split over whether to release some version of the re-
port through most of January 1958. The debate within the administration focused on two 
issues: whether the release of the report would quell national fears or would multiply de-
mands for more information about other presidential advisory panels. Secretary of State 
Dulles, Vice President Nixon, and at times, Eisenhower favored the release of a sanitized 
62 See Notes of Meeting , November 7, 1957, ibid., OSS, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, Box 13, 
Folder - Gaither Report November 1957-December 1958 (1), 1; and Memorandum for 1. Patrick Coyne, 
November 19, 1957, NA. RG 273, NSC, Folder - NSC 5724, 1-2. 
63 See Jim Fisk to Killian, December 19, 1957, EL, U.S. President's Science Advisory Committee Papers, 
Correspondence - B (I), Box 6, Folder - Correspondence-F, 1; Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, 152-53; 
and Sprague to Killian, August 24, 1972, MIT Archives, MC 423 - Killian Papers, Box 13, Folder - Cor-
respondence L-Z, I. 
64 "Secret Service," Newsweek 51: 1 (January 6, 1958), 35. 
65 Handwritten Notes by Killian, [undated1, MIT Archives, MC 423 - Killian Papers, Box 25, Folder -
Greenstein, 1. 
66 See political cartoon in "Perils, Problems, The Job Ahead," Newsweek 51:2 (January 13, 1958). 
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version.67 Dulles reported that NIXon's "feelings are becoming strong that in order to kill 
it [the Gaither Report] we should put something out.,,68 This position, however, was bal-
anced by Robert Cutler's adamant disapproval. Cutler explained that "There is no way in 
which to release to the American people information vital to the national security without 
it becoming available to those dedicated to destroying the American people. ,,69 
Eisenhower's final decision to withhold the report may have stemmed from the 
opposition of key Gaither committee members. In early January, Killian asked Gaither 
whether he would "be willing to prepare and release the substance of the recommenda-
tions contained in your Panel's report, without revealing information that I might consider 
must remain secret for the protection of the nation?,,70 Gaither responded that after dis-
cussing the request with Robert Sprague and James Perkins, he was opposed to the re-
lease of either the final report or even a sanitized version. He argued that the former 
"would be a dangerous precedent for the invasion of executive privilege for receiving pri-
vate advice," while the latter "would be ineffective and dangerously misleading.,,71 Echo-
ing some of the same concerns, Eisenhower decided to deny all requests for the report. He 
told Senator Johnson: 
67 Memorandum of Conversation with the President. December 26, 1957, EL, Papers of John Foster 
Dulles and Christian A Herter, 1953-1961, Whiter House Memoranda Series, Chronological Subseries, 
Box 5, File - Meetings with the President. 1957 (1) [November-December}, 1. 
68 Telephone Conversation between JFD and Ni."(on, January 8, 1958, EL, JFD Papers, Telephone Call 
Series; Box 8, Folder - Memorandum of Telephone Conversations General January 2, 1958-March 31, 
1958 (4), I. 
69 Adams to Kittredge, Janwuy 6, 1958, ibid., Records of Bryce Harlow, Box 6, Folder - Gaither Report-
A Summary, 1. This letter was written by Cutler. 
70 Draft Letter to Mr. Gaither, Janwuy 9, 1958, EL, WHO. OSS, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, 
Box 13. Folder - Gaither Report November 1957-January 1958 (3), 1. 
7\ Gaither to Killian, January 14, 1958, ibid., OSAST, Box 14, Folder - SRP June 1957-November 1960. 
1. 
... throughout history the President has withheld information 
whenever he found that what was sought was confidential or that its disclo-
sures would jeopardize the nation's safety or the proper functioning of our 
Government. 
I mention this consideration because of my conviction, which I am 
sure you share, that in such a matter as this we must be careful to maintain 
the proper separation of powers between the Executive and Legislative 
Branches of the Government .... 
Only by preserving the confidential nature of such advice is it pos-
sible to assemble such groups or for the President to avail himself of such 
advice. 72 
Handling of the Gaither Committee Recommendations in 1958 
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At the same time as the president and his advisers wrestled with whether to release 
the Gaither report, Eisenhower presented his annual message to the Congress. He vividly 
described the threat posed by the Soviet Union: 
The threat to ou~ safety, and to the hope of the peaceful world, can 
be simply stated. It is communist imperialism. 
This threat is not something imagined by critics of the Soviets. 
Soviet spokesmen, from the beginning have publicly and frequently de-
clared their aim to expand their power, one way or another, throughout the 
world. 
The threat had become increasingly serious as this expansionist aim 
has been reinforced by an advancing industrial, military, and scientific es-
tablishment. 
But what makes the Soviet threat unique in history is its alI-
inclusiveness. Every human activity is pressed into service as a weapon of 
expansion. Trade, economic development, military power, arts, science, 
education, the whole world of ideas-all are harnessed to this same chariot 
of expansion. 
The Soviets are, in short, waging total cold war. 73 
Eisenhower then identified eight specific areas that needed immediate attention. 
The military establishment required reorganization to facilitate more effective decision-
72 Eisenhower to LBJ, January 21, 1958, EL, WHO, OSANSA. NSC Series, Administration Series. Box 4. 
Folder - NSC Agenda and Minutes - 1960, 1. 
73 Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, January 9, 1958, PPP-DDE. 1958,3. 
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making and operations. The United States had to improve its military capabilities, espe-
cially in the areas of acquiring warning of a Soviet attack as well as protecting and increas-
ing retaliatory forces. The United States needed to continue its mutual aid programs. The 
United States had to expand trade. Congress needed to pass legislation to allow the freer 
exchange of scientific and technical information between the United States and its allies. 
The country needed to increase spending for education and research. The people had to 
be willing to accept additional burdens and sacrifices. Finally, the United States had to 
seek the peaceful exchange of information throughout the world. 74 
Less than a week later he presented Congress his proposed FY 1959 budget and a 
request for supplementary funding for FY 1958. Eisenhower asked for an increase of ap-
proximately $1.3 billion in the current FY 1958 defense budget and an additional increase 
of$2.5 billion in the FY 1959 defense budget.7s He explained that the increases did not 
reflect any substantial weaknesses in current U.S. military strength but would help the 
United States meet the challenges created by new scientific and technological advances. 
He argued that "Our defenses are strong today, both as a deterrent to war and for use as a 
crushing response to any attack. Now our concern is for the future.,,76 
Congress acted quickly. On January 23, the House of Representatives voted 
unanimously to supplement the current FY 1958 budget with a $1.26 billion. Congress 
allotted $218.6 million for SAC alert and dispersal plans, $329 million for a ballistic mis-
sile detection system, $333.4 million for the acceleration of both IRBM and ICBM pro-
74 Ibid., 7-13. 
75 Annual Budget Message to the Congress. January 13. 1958. ibid .• 17-18. 
76 Ibid., 19. 
224 
grams, $350 million for augmenting and accelerating the Polaris missile system, and $29 
million for the SAGE air defense system.77 The House argued that its purpose was "to 
accelerate and expand certain high priority programs in the interest of shortening the time 
by which our military capabilities will have been advanced so as to more arrestingly deter 
war and more swiftly and devastatingly respond to any attack. In short, it is to buy 
time. ,,78 
As the president and Congress implemented initial changes in U.S. national secu-
rity programs in January, the NSC began to deliberate the Gaither committee's conclu-
sions more fully. At the first NSC meeting of the new year, Deputy Defense Secretary 
Quarles presented his department's recommendations concerning the Gaither committee's 
proposals to expand U.S. ballistic missile capabilities. He presented a startling comparison 
of estimated U.S. and Soviet missile strength. He asserted that based on the best available 
intelligence estimates, the Soviet Union would have 10 ICBMs in 1958, 100 in 1959, and 
500 by 1960. By comparison, he said the United States planned to have 10 ICBMs in 
1959,30 in 1960, and 50 in 1961. Even adding in IRBMs did not make the picture much 
brighter. By 1961, the United States planned to have 120 IRBMs located in Europe and 3 
nuclear submarines carrying 16 Polaris missiles each. 79 
77 Memorandum for the Record, January 27, 1958, EL, WHO, NSC Staff. Special File Series, Box 3, 
Folder - Gaither Report, 2-3. In comparison to these figures, the Gaither committee recommended adding 
$450 million for alert and dispersal programs, $190 million for early warning, $700 million accelerating 
IRBMs. ICBMs, and SLBMs, and $130 million for air defense to the FY 1959 budget. Gaither Report, 
34. 
78 Memorandum for the Record, January 27, 1958, EL, WHO, NSC Staff, Special File Series. Box 3, 
Folder - Gaither Report, 1. 
79 Comparison of Estimated US-USSR Missile Operational Capability, January 5, 1958, EL, WHO, 
OSANSA. NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 16, Folder - Security Resources Panel, 1. After 
reading this estimate, one member of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence Research exclaimed 
that "We must, then, reckon that in one year the United States may well, with absolutely no direct defense, 
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Quarles reported that the Defense Department currently planned to have 130 
ICBMs operational by the end ofFY 1963 as opposed to the 600 recommended by the 
Gaither committee. He explained that the United States could potentially build 600, but 
the Defense Department questioned whether the country should undertake such a pro-
gram. Quarles revealed that "The problem was not the construction of the missiles, but 
building bases for them.,,80 He argued that the selection, construction, and hardening of 
the bases would be very time-consuming and expensive. The Defense Department, 
moreover, was hesitant to make such a large commitment to first generation missiles 
which would soon be obsolete.81 
In February, the Air Force began recommending an increase in the number of 
ICBMs to levels resembling those advocated by the Gaither committee. It recommended 
the construction ofa 600 ICBM force by FY 1964.82 The Navy also made requests con-
cerning the Polaris missile submarines that were similar to the Gaither report. It recom-
mended accelerating the number of Polaris submarines to 3 in 1961, 13 in 1962,25 in 
1963, and 37 in 1964. By late February, it advised expediting the number of submarines 
from 1 in 1960 to 39 in 1964.83 
confront a Russian capability for shattering devastation of the homeland." "The ICBM Threat to the 
United States," December 23, 1957, NA, RG 59, State Department, Records of the Intelligence Bureau, 
Office of the Director, 1949-1959, Box 9, Folder - SIP, 1. Another member of the Office of Inlelligence 
Research and Analysis called the report "Doom." See Memo from R P. Joyce to Mr. A. Evans, January 6, 
1958, ibid., Box 10, Folder - ICBM. 1. 
80 Memorandum of Discussion at the 350th NSC Meeting, January 6, 1958, EL, DDE Papers, NSC Series, 
Box 9, Folder - 350th Meeting of the NSC, 17. 
81 "Comments and Recommendations," December 16, 1957, Defense-14. 
82 Memorandum for the Record, February 25, 1958, EL, WHO, OSANSA, NSC Series, Briefing Notes 
Subseries, Box 16, Folder - Security Resources Panel, 1. 
83 Ibid., 2. 
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In March 1958, the JCS asked for additional funding for other programs. It re-
quested $400 million for the Polaris missile system, $100 million for developing solid-
propellant IRBMs and ICBMs, and $100 million for the Titan ICBM.84 Later, in the same 
month, the JCS recommended increasing the number ofIRBM squadrons to 16 (240 
missiles) just as the Gaither committee had requested.8s The rcs based its decisions in 
part on a WSEG study on U.S. offensive and defensive capabilities which proposed hard-
ening Atlas bases, acquiring more Titan missiles, and augmenting the number of Polaris 
submarines.86 
In ApriL the NSC discussed the question of expanding the number of IRBMs. Sec-
retary of Defense McElroy decided to request 12 squadrons (180 missiles). Eisenhower 
questioned why the country needed to expand its IRBM force beyond 120 missiles. He 
feared that they would become obsolete quickly and have to be scrapped.87 Deputy Secre-
tary Quarles told the president that the proposal for 12 squadrons had been selected as a 
compromise between the Gaither committee's recommendation of 16 squadrons (240 
missiles) and the original Defense Department's proposal of8 squadrons (120 missiles). 
Quarles insisted that the 180 missiles were the minimum needed to meet the proposed 
81 Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Appendix A, March 19, 1958, LC, Twining Papers, Box 
105, Folder - Memos 13-31 MR 1958, 1 
85 "Report by Joint Strategic Plans Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staf(" March 24, 1958, NA, RG 218, 
JCS, 1958 Geographic File, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) Sec. 76, 2665. 
86 "Report by Joint Strategic Plans Committee to the Joint Chiefs ofStaf(" March 26, 1958, NA, RG 218, 
JCS, 1958 Geographic File, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) Sec. 76, 2670-73. See also Ponturo, Analytical Sup-
port, 166-67. 
87 Memorandum of Discussion at the 363rd Meeting of the NSC, April 24, 1958, EL, DOE Papers, NSC 
Series, Box 10, Folder - 363rd Meeting of NSC, April 24, 1958, 2. 
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NATO deployment ofIRBMs.88 Although the recommendation did not meet his desire to 
limit spending, Eisenhower reluctantly agreed to the request. 89 
At the same time as administration officials were examining ballistic missile capa-
bilities, they were also discussing how to reduce SAC wlnerability. The Gaither commit-
tee recommended five specific ways to reduce the vulnerability of U.S. retaliatory forces: 
increasing alert capabilities, dispersing SAC forces, obtaining greater warning, hardening 
SAC bases, and building anti-aircraft and anti-missile defenses. In his memoirs, Eisen-
hower explained that of all the committee's recommendations, he "was personally inter-
ested most in the measures to put more SAC bombers on an alert status and to disperse 
our SAC bases.,,90 With the exception of hardening SAC bases, the Eisenhower admini-
stration adopted these recommendations at least in part.91 
SAC worked under two scenarios in developing plans to reduce its reaction times. 
Under the first, the presumed Soviet attack would use bombers which would be detected 
at least 30 minutes prior to reaching their targets. Until 1960, SAC expected any Soviet 
attack to provide this amount of warning. After 1960, SAC planned for the second sce-
nario where the Soviet first strike would involve ballistic missiles. Under such an attack, 
SAC forces would receive less than 15 minutes warning. One scholar aptly concludes that 
"It would be difficult to overstate the impact that this time reduction [from the introduc-
88 Ibid., 4. 
89 Ibid. 6. 
90 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 222. At the an NSC meeting in January 1958, Eisenhower asserted that 
"money expended on improving the early warning system and the dispersal of SAC bases to be money 
well spent" Discussion at the 350th NSC Meeting, January 6, 1958, EL, DDE Papers, NSC Series, Box 
9, Folder - 350th Meeting of the NSC 18. See also Memorandum for General leMay, January 20, 1958, 
LC, White Papers, Box IS, Folder - ChiefofStaffSigoed Memos January 1958-December 1958, 1. 
91 Memorandum for General Cutler, April 23, 1958, EL, WHO, OSANSA, NSC Series, Briefing Notes 
Subseries, Box 16, Folder - Security Resources Panel. 1-2. 
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tion of the ICBM] had on the analysis of national security and on u.s. society.,,92 At the 
end of January, SAC proposed the achievement of the following reaction times: by mid-
1959,515 bombers should be on 30 minute alert; by mid-1960, 321 should be on 15 min-
ute alert; and by mid-1961, 465 should be on 15 minute alert.93 In March, SAC again ac-
celerated the implementation of 15 minute alert status. It proposed having 158 aircraft on 
15 minute alert by mid-1958, 355 by mid-1959, 425 by mid-1960, and 480 by mid-1961.94 
Of these aircraft, SAC expected to have 858-52 bombers on 15 minute alert in 1959, 140 
in 1960, and 165 in 1961.95 SAC made substantial progress in achieving its goals. In 
October 1958, SAC commander Power announced that "Since initiating our alert force 
operations in October 1957, SAC has steadily progressed towards so posturing the force 
that one-third of the bombers can be launched within 15 minutes.,,96 8y May 1960, he 
could disclose the fulfillment of this goal.97 
Tied closely to the reduction of reaction times was the Gaither committee's rec-
ommendation to disperse SAC forces to a larger number of airfields. The committee was 
concerned that U.S. nuclear retaliatory capabilities would be concentrated at a limited 
number of vulnerable airfields. It recommended the construction of additional SAC bases 
and possibly using non-SAC andlor commercial airfields as alternatives. In February 
92 NUIlIl, The Soviet First Strike Threat, 159. 
93 Memorandum for the Record. January 31, 1958, NA. RG 51, Records of the Office of Management and 
Budget, General Budgetary Administration, Subject Files, Series 51.14a - Subject Files for the National 
Military Establishment and Department of Defense, 1953-1961, Box 3, Folder - Defense Department Air 
Defense Programs, 2. 
94 "Supplemental Report on Items in Security Resources Panel Report, " March [7] 1958, EL, WHO, 
OSANSA. NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 22, Folder - Gaither Report, 3. 
95 Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, March 21, 1958, RG 218, JCS, 1958 - Geographic File, 
CCS 381 US (1-31-50) Sec. 76 RB, 4. 
96 Power to White, October 22, 1958, LC, White Papers, Box 19, Folder - Top Secret Files #4, 1. 
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1958, Defense Secretary McElroy announced that the supplementary appropriations for 
FY 1958 and the funding contained in the FY 1959 budget would "provide for completion 
of the dispersal of the heavy bomber wings and of a substantial number of the medium 
bomberwings.,,98 He told Senator Johnson's subcommittee that by 1960 all 33 8-52 
squadrons would be located at their own bases.99 As far as using non-SAC or commercial 
bases, both SAC and the JCS opposed the idea as unnecessary. 100 
While reducing the reaction time of SAC forces and dispersing SAC squadrons to 
more airfields won widespread support within the administration and in military circles, 
hardening SAC bases did not. The Gaither committee recommended building blast shel-
ters to protect SAC aircraft, equipment, and personnel. The JCS and Defense Department 
concluded that "Any program to harden other than the SAC numbered Air Force com-
mand control centers does not appear to be warranted at this time."lol They explained 
that while hardening might protect personnel and planes, it would not prevent the destruc-
tion of the runways or reduce the dangers posed by radiation. 102 
98 Statement of Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy Before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of 
the Senate Committee on Armed Services, February 26, 1958, EL, WHO, OSS, Subject Series, Depart-
ment of Defense Subseries. Box 1, Folder - Department of Defense Vol 2 (5) February 1958, 8. 
99 Inquiry into Satellite, 2324. 
100 "Supplemental Report on Items in Security Resources Panel Report," March [1] 1958, EL, WHO, 
OSANSA, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 22, Folder - Gaither Report, 4; Memorandum for the 
Secretary of Defense, March 21, 1958, RG 218, JCS, 1958 - Geographic File, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) Sec. 
76 RB, 3; and Memorandum for the Secretary ofDefenselSAC Alert Status, March 28, 1958, Le, Twin-
ing Papers. Box 105, Folder - Memos 13-31 MR 1958, 1. 
101 "Report by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Provision of Blast Shel-
ters at SAC Bases," February 19, 1958, NA, RG 218, JCS, 1958 Geographic File, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) 
Sec. 75, 2585. 
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In addition to the issues of alert, dispersal, and hardening. the Gaither committee 
made two other recommendations which were designed to reduce the wlnerability of SAC 
and protect the continental United States. It advocated acquiring early warning of an at-
tack and constructing active defenses against both aircraft and missiles. In October 1957, 
the JCS identified major areas of weakness in U.S. defenses. It found that the United 
States would receive little warning ofan attack carried out above 50,000 feet or below 
2,000 feet, or launched by submarines. 103 It concluded that up to 22 SAC installations 
would receive no warning of a Soviet attack launched from submarines. Furthermore, 
even if the attack occurred at between 2,000 and 50,000 feet some SAC bases would still 
receive little or no warning. 104 
In February 1958, the NSC issued NSC 5802 which described U.S. objectives and 
programs for continental defense. While it still emphasized the need for an effective nu-
clear retaliatory capability, it also stressed that "The United States should continue to im-
prove, and to maintain at a high state of readiness, an effective, integrated system of air 
surveillance, weapons, and control elements, providing defense in depth capable of detect-
ing, identifYing. engaging, and destroying enemy aircraft or missiles approaching over the 
North American Continent before they reach vital targets."IOS To achieve these objectives 
the United States had to be able to detect a Soviet attack and possess the defensive capa-
bilities to thwart the enemy's ability to reach its targets. 
103 Note by the Secretaries to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on SAC Alert Warning Times (Appendix), January 
21, 1958, NA, RG 218, JeS, 1958 Geographic File, CCS 381 US (5-23-46) Sec. 92, 251 I. 
104 Ibid., 2511-12. 
lOS NSC 580211 - U.S. Policy on Continental Defense, Febrwuy 19, 1958, NA, RG 273, NSC, Folder-
NSC 5802, 3. 
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There were two types of warning that the United States could hope to achieve. It 
could acquire strategic warning that the Soviet Union was planning an attack. This type 
of warning was difficult to obtain since it depended on determining specific Soviet inten-
tions prior to an attack. If strategic warning could not be achieved. the next best a1terna-
tive was to obtain tactical warning by detecting the attack as soon after it was initiated as 
possible. The Gaither committee recommended improving U.S. capabilities in both areas, 
but it emphasized acquiring tactical warning since obtaining strategic warning was much 
more difficult. 
The Soviet Union possessed, or would in the near future, the capability to launch 
an attack against the United States using airplanes, ICBMs, and submarine-launched mis-
siles. Deputy Defense Secretary Quarles argued in January 1958 that while obtaining tac-
tical warning was a desirable goal, it would be very expensive and could never provide 
100 percent protection. 106 Nevertheless, Secretary McElroy approved spending $427 mil-
lion to expand radar coverage of likely Soviet attack routes; the JCS recommended 
spending over $1 billion to acquire more anti-ICBM capabilities; and the Air Force began 
awarding contracts to companies that would study and implement an early warning sys-
tem. 107 
After evaluating the Gaither committee's proposals for air defense weapons sys-
tems, the JCS decided to "provide for NIKE and/or HAWK protection at 55 SAC (41 
106 Memorandum of Discussion at the 350th NSC Meeting. January 6,1958, EL, DOE Papers, NSC Se-
ries, Box 9, Folder - 350th Meeting of the NSC, 16. 
107 "Supplemental Report on Items in Security Resources Panel Report." March [1) 1958, EL, WHO, 
OSANSA, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 22, Folder - Gaither Report, I; and Memorandum by 
the Director, Joint Staff to the Joint Chief of Staff. January 21, 1958, NA, JCS, RG 218, JCS, 1958 Ge0-
graphic File, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) Sec. 74 RB, 2565a. 
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bomber, 9 refueling and 5 missile) bases, with incidental protection afforded 15 (8 bomber, 
6 refueling and 2 missile) additional SAC bases for a total of 10 projected bases, by end 
FY 1961.,,108 Furthermore, it recommended the performance of ' 'vigorous research" on 
the development of defenses against ICBMs. 109 It also emphasized that the "operational 
availability ofBMEWS [Ballistic Missile Early Warning System] for ICBM should be ac-
tively pursued." 110 
As was the Gaither committee, the lCS and Defense Department were very con-
cemed with advances in submarines capable of launching missiles. One joint committee of 
the Senate and the House of Representatives captured this fear when it argued that "The 
day is rapidly nearing when the Soviet Union can possess, first a few, and then a large fleet 
of intermediate-range ballistic missile-launching nuclear-propelled submarines .... Our 
existing and presently planned defensive system could not stop such a missile attack. 
Therein lies the peril." III Secretary McElroy echoed this view when he testified before the 
Johnson subcommittee "that the Navy did not request a [aircraft] carrier in the Fiscal '59 
budget, electing instead to put the bulk of these funds against additional modem antisub-
marine warfare readiness." 112 
lOS "Repon by the 10int Strategic Plans Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff," March 3, 1958, NA. RG 
218, JCS, 1958 Geographic File, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) Sec. 75 RB, 2605. 
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The concern over the submarine threat led to an increase in the FY 1959 budget of 
$262 million more than had been requested prior to the Gaither committee.113 An even 
more telling indication of the fear generated by submarines was a JCS plan for dealing 
with them. The JCS argued that ''the most practical solution [to the submarine threat] lies 
in establishing control over the launching submarine prior to the launching of its missiles. 
In peacetime, this control includes detection, tracking, identification, hold-down tactics, 
and in certain situations constituting an immediate and vital threat to the security of the 
United States, destruction of the submarine.,,1l4 
One of the last Gaither committee recommendations concerned augmenting U.S. 
limited military operations capabilities. The committee was very worried that the admini-
stration's reliance on nuclear weapons as the main deterrent against the Soviet Union re-
duced U. S. military options in the event of a crisis and made a nuclear war more likely. 
This concern was echoed by CIA analyst Raymond Garthoff who argued: 
the employment of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons is necessary in the 
United States concept [of war], but not in the Soviet one. The Soviets thus 
retain a greater freedom of choice. If a genuine stalemate in intercontinen-
tal capabilities is achieved in a prehostilities period, the United States might 
be endangered by the neutralization of its entire strategy, and hence of its 
ability to act, whereas the Soviet strategy would be served by this devel-
opment. lIS [emphasis in original] 
The debate over limited war capabilities coincided with General Nathan Twining's 
tenure as the JCS chairman. He later claimed that in the late 1950s, "never could the JCS 
113 "Supplemental Report on Items in Security Resources Panel Report, .. March [1] 1958, EL, WHO, 
OSANSA. NSe Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 22, Folder - Gaither Report, 7. 
114 Report by the Deputy Director for Strategic Plans, July 17, 1958, NA. RG 218 JeS, 1958 Geographic 
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agree on a definition of limited war.,,116 Civilian strategists had been debating various as-
pects of limited war strategies since at least 1954 with the discussions reaching a peak af-
ter the pUblication ofHeruy Kissinger's work in 1957. The Gaither committee did not 
recommend specific increases in limited war capabilities but did call for a study of whether 
the United States was prepared for such conflicts. The problem was that there was simply 
no consensus concerning an appropriate limited war strategy. Disputes centered on such 
issues as whether or not to use nuclear weapons, how to restrict the geographic areas of 
conflict, how to limit political objectives in a conflict, and exactly what forces were neces-
sary to wage limited war. 
Initially, the Defense Department opposed the creation of an interdepartmental 
committee to study U.S. limited military operations capabilities as the Gaither committee 
recommended. It preferred to make its own study without the involvement of other gov-
ernment agencies. Its proposal ran into sharp opposition from the State Department. In 
fact, the State Department's PPS recommended that the NSC accelerate the creation ofan 
interdepartmental panel to study limited military operations capabilities. 117 When the De-
fense Department recommended delaying the study at a January NSC meeting, Secretary 
of State Dulles raised serious doubts. 118 He stressed the importance of the study of limited 
military operations by an interdepartmental committee which could examine the varied 
implications of increasing U.S. capabilities. 119 
116 General Nathan F. Twining. Neither Liberty Nor Safety: A Hard Look at U.S. Military Policy and 
Strategy (New York: Holt. Rinehart and Winston. 1966), 105. 
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On March 5, the NSC ordered the creation of a study group to examine current 
and future limited war capabilities. For purposes of the study, the NSC argued that 
Limited Military Operations include any armed conflict short of an overt 
engagement of U.S. and USSR armed forces which has been directed by or 
concurred in by competent political authority. There exists the possibility 
of isolated incidents involving small units of the U.S. and USSR forces 
which would not lead to war. The degree of participation in limited mili-
tary operations by the United States may vary from furnishing of military 
supplies to the engagement ofa portion of the U.S. armed forces. l20 
[emphasis in original] 
The study group was charged to discover the most likely areas where the United States 
could become involved in a limited war and to determine whether U.S. military forces pos-
sessed adequate strength to deal with those situations. 121 
While the study group performed its examination, the NSC discussed limited mili-
tary operations capabilities in its review of U.S. basic national security policies in May 
1958. Cutler introduced the subject by explaining how the planning board was trying to 
make changes in u.S. policies in light of the emerging nuclear parity between the two su-
perpowers. He argued that the proposed changes were "designed to ensure that the 
United States would have a flexible capability so that it could determine the application of 
force best serving U. S. interests under the circumstances existing in each case of limited 
military aggression." 122 Cutler's recommendation received support from Army Chief of 
Staff General Maxwell Taylor, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh Burke, and 
Secretary of State Dulles. Taylor explained that "the U.S. nuclear deterrent capability was 
120 Memorandum for the Executive Secretary the National Security Council, March 5, 1958, NA. RG 273, 
NSC, Folder - NSC 5724 (background documents), 2. 
121 Ibid., 1-3. 
122 Memorandum of the Discussion at the 364th Meeting of the NSC, May 1. 1958, EL, DOE Papers, NSC 
Series, Box 10, Folder - 364th Meeting of NSC, May 1, 1958,3. 
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essentially a shield, whereas our active military capabilities must be those designed for the 
conduct of limited war." 123 Dulles and Admiral Burke made similar arguments. Dulles 
"thought new conditions are emerging which do not invalidate the massive retaliation con-
cept, but put limitations on it and require it to be supplemented by other measures." 124 
"Our need," Burke argued, "is not rigidity, but an ability to move effectively into big, in-
termediate or small operations." 125 
The Defense Department, Air Force, and Eisenhower questioned whether the 
United States did not already possess the necessary capabilities to wage limited military 
operations. Secretary McElroy expressed concern at the increased costs involved in aug-
menting u.S. conventional forces. 126 Deputy Secretary Quarles doubted any war with the 
Soviet Union could be fought without nuclear weapons and feared that if the United 
States announced that it could occur, then it would encourage Soviet aggression with 
conventional weapons. 127 Both Air Force Chief of Staff Thomas White and JCS Chairman 
Twining "insisted that the United States already possessed strong capabilities for fighting 
limited war.,,128 President Eisenhower acknowledged concerns that he had with augment-
ing U.S. forces for limited military operations. He believed that "Each small war makes 
global [nuclear] war more Iikely."I29 He also raised the question of cost. He told his ad-
visers: 
123 Ibid,S. 
124 Memorandum for Record. May 9, 1958, EL, WHO, OSS, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, Box 
21, Folder - Nuclear Exchange (September 1957-June 1958) (3), 1. 
125 Ibid .• 3. 
126 Memorandum of the Discussion at the 364th Meeting of the NSC, May 1, 1958, EL, DOE Papers, NSC 
Series, Box 10, Folder - 364th Meeting ofNSC, May 1, 1958, 4. 
127 Ibid., 4. 
128 Ibid., 7. 
129 Ibid., 10. 
We really are faced with two possible courses of action. If we 
strengthen the mobile and tactical types of forces, either we do so by de-
creasing the strength of our nuclear deterrent force or else we will have to 
accept a massive increase in the resources to be devoted to our military 
defenses. If we accept the latter alternative, we have got to decide 
promptly by what methods we are going to maintain very much larger 
military forces than we have previously done. These methods would al-
most certainly involve what is euphemistically called a controlled economy, 
but which in effect would amount to a garrison state. 130 
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While the NSC debated limited military operations capabilities, its interdepartmen-
tal study group completed a 250 page examination in June. Unfortunately, most of its re-
port and the discussions related to it remain classified. However, it evidently reached sev-
eral general conclusions. While the United States could use more limited war capabilities, 
its current forces were adequate. If a limited war did occur, the United States needed to 
notify the enemy of its intentions. The public needed to be educated about the role of nu-
clear weapons.131 The NSC planning board expressed serious concern about informing the 
enemy of the country's intentions. It explained: 
The communication of limited objectives to potential aggressors is, as the 
Study states, an important means of minimizing the likelihood of miscalcu-
lation by the aggressor and the risk of general war. However, can com-
munication of limited intentions be made in advance of every resort to lim-
ited hostilities without paying the unacceptable cost of encouraging the ag-
gressor by reassuring him of the limited extent of the risk he is taking in 
initiating aggression? Should the communication of U.S. limited objec-
tives be made (a) generally, long before a limited military operation may be 
undertaken, (b) a short time before a limited operation may be undertaken, 
(c) just after a limited operation is undertaken?132 
130 Ibid, 10. 
131 Conference, June 17, 1958, EL, WHO, OSS, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, Box 21, Folder -
Nuclear Exchange (Sept. 1957-June 1958) (3), l. See also Memorandum for the National Security 
Council, June 18, 1958, NA RG 59, State DepartmentlOCB and NSC, 1947-63, Lot 63095, Box #111, 2. 
132 Memorandum for the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, July 2, 1958, NA, RG 273, NSC, 
NSC 5724 (Background Docs.), 5. 
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The interdepartmental group's final report did not lead to any substantial changes in Eis-
enhower's programs concerning limited military operations. 
The last two Gaither committee recommendations dealt with the reorganization of 
the defense establishment and shelters. Since the beginning of his administration, Eisen-
hower had attempted without much success to make the Defense Department operate 
more effectively. In making its recommendation concerning reorganization, the committee 
concluded that the defense establishment was not incorporating scientific and technologi-
cal advances into is military programs in an efficient manner and was plagued by bureau-
cratic conflicts. Through its proposed changes, the committee sought to overcome these 
problems. 
In his 1958 state of the union address, Eisenhower argued that "The first need is to 
assure ourselves that military organization facilitates rather than hinders the functioning of 
the military establishment in maintaining the security of the nation." 133 He found the de-
fense establishment unable to meet the challenges posed by the modern world. He an-
nounced that he had established a special committee to study how the defense establish-
ment should be organized. The committee was composed of William Foster and Robert 
Lovett from the Gaither committee, Charles Coolidge, General Alfred Gruenther, General 
Nathan Twining, Admiral Arthur Radford, and General Omar Bradley. 134 After receiving 
the committee's recommendations, he submitted his proposal to Congress in April. 
133 Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Annual Message to the Congress oCtbe State oftbe Union. n JanuaIY 9, 1958, 
PPP-DDE. /958, 7. 
134 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 244. 
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Eisenhower made six recommendations for changes in the organization of the de-
fense establishment. Troops deployed overseas should be led by a designated unified 
commander rather than a commander from a particular service branch. The designated 
unified commander should answer directly to the Secretary of Defense who answered to 
the president. The JCS should serve the Secretary of Defense directly rather than particu-
lar military branches. Each chief should concentrate on managing his respective branch, 
not on developing operational plans. A new position of Director of Defense Research and 
Engineering needed to be created. Congress should appropriate funds to the Secretary of 
Defense rather than to the individual services. 135 
The president's proposals met some initial resistance in Congress. "The real 
problem," one scholar explains, "was how to apportion control of the modem military es-
tablishment, furnishing real security without compromising the traditional balance between 
executive and legislative power.,,136 Some members of Congress, led by the venerable 
representative Carl Vinson (D-GA), believed that the proposals would weaken congres-
sional influence over defense policies. 137 However, in August, Congress sent Eisenhower 
a bill that contained most of what he requested. It increased the president's control over 
the defense establishment and strengthened the Secretary of Defense's authority over the 
service chiefs. 138 
\3S Ibid., 247-48. See also Chris Donnelly, United States Defense Policies in /958 (GPO, 1959), 48-50. 
136 Brian L. Ducbin. "'The Most Spectacular Legislative Battle of the Year': President Eisenhower and 
the 1958 Reorganization of the Department of Defense," Presidential Studies Quarterly 24:2 (Spring 
1994),254. 
137 See ibid., 248-53. 
138 Duchin, "'The Most Spectacular Legislative Battle of the Year'," 256-57. 
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The Eisenhower administration's response to the five year $25 billion shelter pro-
gram was generally negative. Secretary of State Dulles found the Gaither committee's 
argument for shelters unconvincing. Sprague recalled that at the November 7 NSC meet-
ing, Dulles asserted that the committee "had over-exaggerated our weaknesses and rec-
ommended a number of things that were militarily unnecessary and economically unfeasi-
ble. My general distress was that I thought Mr. Dulles had pretty well washed down the 
drain the six months work of, I thought. quite a competent group in carrying out an as-
signment they were asked to do.,,139 Dulles explained to Eisenhower later that he was 
simply temperamentally opposed to shelters. 140 
When the NSC examined the shelter recommendation in January, the FCDA was 
the only government agency to support the program without reservations. Leo Hoegh, 
the FCDA's director, argued that shelters would bolster the deterrent power of retaliatory 
forces, strengthen the position of U.S. negotiators, and would reduce casualties in a war 
139 Sprague Oral History, 23. 
140 Memorandum of Conversation with the President, December 26, 1957, EL, JFD Papers, White House 
Memoranda Series, Chronological Subseries, Box 5, File - Meetings with the President, 1957 (1) 
[November-December] , 1. There may have been personal reasons for Dulles's rejection of the Gaither 
committee's recommendation concerning shelters. When he discovered that Paul Nitze participated in 
writing the report he was left aghast. He even questioned his brother, CIA Director Allen Dulles, how 
Nitze became an adviser to the committee. See Killian, Sputnik, Scientists. and Eisenhower, 97-98; 
Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, 185; and Telephone Conversation between Dulles and Allen Dulles, 
November 18, 1957, JFD Papers, Telephone Call Series, Box 7, Folder - Memorandum of Telephone 
Conversation, General, November I, 1957-December 27, 1957, 1. The secretary's view did not represent 
the consensus of opinions of officials in the State Department. Its PPS recommended the construction of 
the shelter program. See Memorandum for Mr. Gerard Smith, December 5, 1957, NA, RG 59, PPS Rec-
ords, Lot 67D 548, Box 194, Folder - SIP Papers 1958 (January-April), 1; Memorandum for Mr. Smith, 
December 6, 1957, ibid., I; Memorandum for Mr. Gerard Smith, December 7, 1957, ibid, 1; Memoran-
dum for Mr. Smith [from Christian Herter], December 9, 1957, ibid., 1; and Minutes of Telephone Con-
versation between Dulles and Secretary Anderson, December 27,1957, JFD Papers, Telephone Calls Se-
ries. Box 7, Folder- Memoranda of Telephone Conversation - General, November 1, 1957-Deccmber 27. 
1957 (1). 1. 
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35 to 45 percent. 141 Opponents, such as Secretary Dulles, Robert Cutler, and AEC chair-
man Admiral Lewis Strauss, questioned the costs and effectiveness of shelters, thought 
they might make war more likely, and wondered about their impact on U.S. allies.142 
Eisenhower and Vice President Nixon expressed serious reservations about the 
effectiveness of shelters in maintaining the viability of the country after a nuclear ex-
change. The question for them was not whether the shelters would reduce casualties. 
They recognized that shelters would substantially lower casualty rates. The president 
"noted that it had been said that fallout shelters might save 50 million people, a reduction 
of 3 5% in casualties. In talking about such figures, we were talking about the complete 
destruction of the United States."l43 NIXon was even more blunt. He: 
suggested that it be assumed that 40 million people would be killed in event 
of enemy attack ifwe had shelters, and 60 million would be killed ifwe did 
not have shelters. If 40 million were killed, the United States would be 
finished. He did not believe we could survive such a disaster. Our major 
objective must be to avoid the destruction of our society. Would 40 mil-
lion vs. 60 million make much difference to the USSR as to the deterrent? 
Since we have limited resources, we must concentrate on those measures 
which might deter attack rather than on shelters, which will not stop an at-
tack. 144 
After these discussions, the NSC decided not to accept the Gaither committee's shelter 
recommendation. But, it did create an interdepartmental committee to study passive de-
fenses, institute a public education program, and support research on different types of 
shelters. 145 
141 Memorandum of Discussion at the 351st NSC Meeting, January 16, 1958, EL, DOE Papers, NSC Se-
ries, Box 9, Folder - 351st Meeting of NSC, January 16, 1958, 2. 
142 Ibid., 6-11. 
143 Ibid, 8. 
144 Ibid, 11-12. 
145 Ibid., 4. 
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The Gaither committee's steering panel reconvened in February and met with 
Cutler to discuss how the administration was responding to its report. l46 Cutler wanted to 
assure the panel members that the administration was carefully considering the report. 
The steering panel members took the opportunity to question why administration officials 
seemed to be ignoring the recommendation for a nationwide shelter program. They ar-
gued that "The Gaither recommendations with respect to active and passive defenses 
should be regarded as an integrated combination. That is to say, a nation-wide fallout 
shelter program was to be taken in conjunction with recommendations for improving ac-
tive defense and as a complementary thereto in protecting American lives.,,147 
Over the next month and a half, Sprague corresponded with Killian and Cutler in 
an attempt to obtain their support for a shelter program. He explained that a one megaton 
nuclear ground burst would kill 70 percent of the population within 13 square miles of the 
explosion because of either blast pressures or thermal heat. Unsheltered people within a 
radius of 600 miles would receive a lethal dose of radiation within seven hours.l48 Spra-
gue argued that "These figures give very persuasive support to the urgent need of a fall-
out shelter to protect military and civilian personnel, whether within urban or rural ar-
eas.,,149 Although Sprague's arguments impressed Cutler, Killian was not convinced of 
146 Memorandum for General Robert Cutler, February II, 1958, EL, WHO. OSAST, Box 14, Folder - SRP 
lune 1957-November 1960, 1. 
147 Memorandum for General Cutler, February 14, 1958, EL, WHO, OSANSA, NSC Series, Briefing 
Notes Subseries, Box 8, Folder - Fallout Shelters, 1. 
148 Sprague to Killian, February 28, 1958, EL, WHO, OSAST, Box 13, Folder - OCDM and Civil De-
fense, December 1956-October 1960 (1), 1. Sprague sent a copy of the same letter to Cutler on March 19. 
149 Ibid., 2. 
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the utility of shelters. He did not even want to educate the public about shelters lest it 
generate demands for a nationwide program. ISO 
After the interdepartmental committee completed its report in March 1958. the 
NSC again addressed the question of shelters. Many of the same points made at the first 
meeting were heard again. After FCDA Director Hoegh spoke in favor of shelters. Treas-
ury Secretary Robert Anderson argued that "The problem posed by a shelter program ... 
was not only a grave financial problem. The main problem lay in the fact that we simply 
do not know enough at present to determine whether to go ahead with a large Federal 
program of shelter as a means which will really contribute to the survival of the United 
State in a terrible nuclear war."m Eisenhower later claimed ''that this was one of the 
hardest problems in the world on which to make a wise decision." 152 
The NSC finally recommended spending $35 million in FY 1959 for certain mini-
mal shelter studies. 153 It proposed: 
1) "A research and development program;" 
2) "A limited program of prototype construction of relatively small-
capacity fallout shelters;" 
3) "A nation-wide survey;" 
4) "Initiation ofa program of public education;" 
5) "The elements of a base for rapid acceleration;" and 
6) "The incorporation offallout shelter in the construction of new Federal 
civilian buildings." 154 
ISO Cutler to Sprague, March 19, 1958, EL, WHO, OSANSA, NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 
8, Folder - Fallout Shelters, I; and Memorandum of Discussion at the 360th Meeting of the NSC, March 
27, 1958, EL, DOE Papers, NSC Series, Box 10, Folder - 360th Meeting of the NSC, March 27, 1958,8. 
lSI Ibid., 3. 
IS2 Ibid., 10. 
IS3 [Untitled], March 28, 1958 - R.C., EL, WHO, OSANSA, NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 8, 
Folder - Fallout Shelters, I. 
154 Record of Actions by the NSC at its 360th Meeting, March 27, 1958, EL, DDE Papers, NSC Series, 
Box 2, Folder - Record of Actions by NSC 1958 (1) Action nos. 1839-1893,2-3. 
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Conclusions 
Although surprised by some of its contents, Eisenhower did not reject the Gaither 
report as some of scholars have claimed. lSS The Gaither committee made recommenda-
tions in five main areas: increasing U.S. offensive striking power, reducing the wlnerabil-
ity of SAC and the continent, improving U.S. limited military operations capabilities, con-
structing fallout shelters, and reorganizing the defense establishment. [n every area except 
for fallout shelters and conventional forces, the administration made major changes in its 
programs in 1958. Eisenhower was more reluctant than some of his advisers to alter his 
programs, but he did accelerate U.S. missile developments. He also emphasized the need 
for SAC alert and dispersal programs, ordered a study of U.S. limited military operations 
capabilities, and reorganized the defense establishment. 
Eisenhower expressed reluctance at increasing the number of first generation 
IRBMs and ICBMs that the United States should build. However, he did agree to deploy 
130 ICBMs, 180 IRBMs, and additional Polaris missile launching submarines. ls6 While 
these force levels are far different from the committee's recommendation of600 ICBMs 
and 240 IRBMs, the distinction is not a clear as it appears. Eisenhower did not oppose 
increasing U.S. offensive striking power; he only had doubts whether first generation 
missiles should be the basis of these forces. Because he had much more faith in the deliv-
ery capability of heavy bombers, he believed the United States should deploy a minimum 
number offirst generation missiles while concentrating on improving their accuracy. He 
told the NSC in April 1958 "that he still had more faith in the delivery capabilities of the 
ISS See Ambrose, Eisenhower, v. 2, 435; and Gaddis, Strategies o/Containment, 185-88. 
IS6 See Divine, Sputnik Challenge, 127. 
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aircraft than he had in all these missiles at the present time."IS7 Accordingly, while he 
supported enhanced alert and dispersal programs for SAC, he approved only a relatively 
limited number of first generation missiles. 
As far as augmenting U.S. limited war capabilities, Eisenhower questioned the 
Gaither committee's contentions that small wars would remain limited. He did agree, 
however, to a new study of whether U.S. limited military operations capabilities were suf-
ficient to address possible trouble spots in the world. The president ultimately based his 
decision to not expand conventional forces on his belief that future wars would be short 
and waged with nuclear weapons. IS8 He explained his views in 1956: 
I have spent my life in the study of military strength as a deterrent 
to war, and in the character of military annaments necessary to win a war. 
The study of the first of these questions is still profitable, but we are rapidly 
getting to the point that no war can be won. War implies a contest; when 
you get to the point that the contest is no longer involved and the outlook 
comes close to destruction of the enemy and suicide for ourselves-an out-
look that neither side can ignore-then arguments as to the exact amount of 
available strength as compared to somebody else's are no longer the vital 
issues. ls9 
Of all the Gaither committee recommendations, the most palatable to Eisenhower 
was its proposal to reorganize the defense establishment. The Gaither committee was only 
one of many groups recommending change. Eisenhower was already well aware of the 
157 Memorandum of Discussion at the 363rd Meeting of the NSC, April 24, 1958, EL, DDE Papers, NSC 
Series, Box 10, Folder -·363rd Meeting of NSC, April 24, 1958,6. 
158 Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, March 12, 1958 LC, Twining Papers, Box 105, Folder-
Memos MR 1958 1-12, 1. 
159 Eisenhower to Richard L. Simon, April 4, 1956, MIT Archives, MC 423 - Killian Papers, Box 25. 
Folder - Greenstein, 1. See also Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, March 12, 1958, LC, Twin-
ing Papers, Box 105, Folder - Memos MR 1958 1-12.2. 
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problems and made reorganization one of his legislative priorities in 1958. He successfully 
persuaded Congress to make substantial changes in the defense establishment. 160 
While many of the Gaither committee's recommendations received widespread 
support within the administration, its call for a nationwide system of shelters met stiff re-
sistance. There was some support from the FCDA, the ODM, and the PPS. However, 
most of Eisenhower's advisers opposed the recommendation because of the costs of she 1-
ters, the knowledge that in a nuclear exchange millions would still die regardless of pre-
ventive measures, or the implications of a shelter program to U.S. allies. Cutler later re-
called the administration's reasons for rejecting the recommendation. He explained that 
"All of this about the need for shelter from fall-out overlooks the many factors which have 
puzzled the NSC and are still being researched. It is too one-sided. It overlooks foreign 
repercussion, effect on economy, human practicality, whether it shouldn't be done at local 
level, effect on national morale, etc. It argues all on one side.,,161 
The Gaither committee asked for an incredibly comprehensive security system. It 
requested military capabilities that would have allowed the United States to launch a pre-
ventive war or an overwhelming retaliatory strike, and to wage limited wars with or with-
out nuclear weapons. Although Eisenhower wondered whether he could "carry out all of 
these plans and still maintain a free economy in the United States," he still carefully con-
sidered the committee's conclusions. 162 While he did not accept all of them, he did find 
160 OucbiD. '''The Most Spectacular Legislative Battle of that Year:','" 256-57. 
161 Comments by R C. on W. C. Foster article, May 29, 1958, EL. WHO, OSANSA. NSC Series, Briefing 
Notes Subseries, Box 8, Folder - Fallout Shelters (2). 2. 
162 Memorandum of Discussion at the 3S6th Meeting of the NSC. February 28, 1958, EL. DOE Papers, 
NSC Series, Box 9, Folder - 356th Meeting of the NSC, February 27, 1958, II. 
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many of the recommendations necessary and incorporated them into his national security 
programs with a careful eye on limiting their impact on the economy. 
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Chapter 6 - The Legacy of the Gaither Committee 
By July 1958, the Eisenhower administration had thoroughly evaluated the Gaither 
committee's conclusions and recommendations. In contrast to some interpretations, the 
committee's findings significantly influenced Eisenhower's national security policies. I 
While the Gaither report itselffaded from NSC discussions after 1958, the issues and 
questions it raised continued to dominate policy making. For the remainder of his presi-
dency, Eisenhower struggled to guarantee U.S. capabilities to strike the Soviet Union and 
preserve the security of the United States, while at the same time, not undermining the 
American way of life that he treasured. 
The influence of specific members of the Gaither committee members on the Eis-
enhower administration continued to the end of his presidency. James Killian acted as 
Eisenhower's national science adviser until 1959. Herbert York served as the director of 
the Defense Department's Office of Research and Development. William Foster headed 
an American delegation to Geneva in late 1958 to discuss with Soviet representatives 
ways to reduce the possibility of a surprise attack. Many other committee members also 
continued to serve in a variety of other capacities, including as advisers to PSAC and the 
Defense Department. 
Although Eisenhower did not believe that the communist leaders intended to 
launch an attack, the presence of these advisers, additional technological advances, and 
intelligence estimates which indicated that the Soviet Union had a quantitative lead in nu-
clear missiles forced the president to re-examine his policies. While he never seriously 
I See footnote 4 in the introduction. 
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questioned his strategy of deterrence, he did conclude that he needed to strengthen the 
u.s. military. By the time he left office, he had expanded his initial proposals for ap-
proximately 350 nuclear missiles to almost 1400. Furthennore, he continued to disperse 
SAC, improve alert status, construct anti-missile defenses, and build early warning radar. 
Despite significantly expanding U.S. military programs in the three years after 
Sputnik and the Gaither committee, Eisenhower faced almost constant criticism that his 
defense policies failed to provide adequate guarantees for the nation's security. More 
specifically, his policies were challenged in two areas: missile strength and limited war 
capabilities. Senators Stuart Symington, Lyndon Johnson, and John F. Kennedy led a cho-
rus of opposition to Eisenhower's military programs. Symington claimed in early 1958 
that "It is a tragic fact that, even after the warnings contained in the Sputnik launchings, 
and despite the previously known deficiencies in SAC, nothing has been done to rectify 
those deficiencies.,,2 The leak of the Gaither report played an instrumental role in further-
ing the perception that u.S. missile capabilities were inferior to those of the Soviet Union. 
One recent scholar aptly concludes that while the Gaither report did not create the missile 
gap or fears of a national emergency, it "was essential to their circulation beyond the intel-
ligence community and, ultimately, outside the administration.,,3 
The debates over Eisenhower's national security policies became pivotal in the 
1960 presidential campaign.4 Democratic candidate Kennedy and his running mate, Lyn-
2 Statement of the Senate Democratic Caucus on The Current Status of the Strategic Air Force by Senator 
Stuart Symington. January 7, 1958, LC, White Papers, Box 17, Folder - Congressional (M-Z), 6. 
3 Roman, Eisenhower and the Missile Gap, 33. 
4 Obviously, the debate over national security issues was only one of the many areas of differences between 
Kennedy and Nixon. 
250 
don Johnson, argued that the Eisenhower administration failed to recognize the deficien-
cies in U.S. military capabilities because it was too concerned with balancing the budget 
and controlling inflation. While Kennedy and Johnson saw these policies as admirable 
goals, they believed that the danger posed by the Soviet Union was much greater than Eis-
enhower, and more importantly at this time, Republican candidate Richard N'IXon realized. 
Capitalizing on perceptions of the missile gap and deficiencies in the massive retaliation 
strategy, the democratic nominee challenged whether the United States could survive the 
continuation of Eisenhower's military policies with Nixon as president. Kennedy won the 
election in part because of his promises to strengthen U.S. warfighting capabilities. 
During the 1960 election campaign and then in his presidency, Kennedy sought the 
advice of numerous Gaither committee members. He studied the committee's report early 
in his administration. Paul Nitze, in particular, served as Kennedy's primary adviser on 
defense and foreign policy issues and became the new president's Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for International Security Affairs. Foster helped negotiate the 1963 ban on at-
mospheric nuclear tests. Killian continued to advise Kennedy on science and intelligence 
issues. Jerome Wiesner became Kennedy's national science adviser. At least another 
eight Gaither committee members served the Kennedy administration in a variety of ca-
pacities. 
After his inauguration, Kennedy immediately began to alter the national security 
policies he inherited from Eisenhower. The new president expanded U.S. strategic missile 
capabilities, augmented limited war forces, and improved SAC's alert status. He also fo-
cused renewed attention on the question of civil defense. While it is impossible to tie the 
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Gaither report directly to the policies introduced by Kennedy, the similarities between the 
committee's recommendations and the new administration's flexible response strategy are 
readily apparent. 
Eisenhower's National Security Policies, 1958-1961 
For the last two and half years of his presidency, Eisenhower attempted to formu-
late national security policies that would continue his emphasis on balancing the country's 
economic and military needs. While he was also worried about Soviet military and techno-
logical advances, he questioned the willingness of the Kremlin to risk their own destruc-
tion by attacking the United States. He argued that "until an enemy has enough opera-
tional capability to destroy most of our bases simultaneously and thus prevent retaliation 
by us, our deterrent remains effective. We would make a mistake to credit him with abso-
lute capabilities."s Rather than seeking to out-produce the Soviet Union or embarking on 
expensive and unproven programs to protect U.S. civilians, he pursued policies that he 
believed would guarantee U.S. capabilities to retaliate even under the worst possible 
conditions and would not hurt the economy.6 
During the first six months of 1958, Eisenhower instituted alert and dispersal pro-
grams, expanded early warning radar coverage, programmed anti-aircraft and anti-missile 
defenses, and accelerated the development and deployment of several different missile 
systems. While the specific recommendations did not reflect complete agreement with 
5 Memorandum of Conference with the President, February 6, 1958, quoted in Nunn, The Soviet First 
Strike Threat, 188. 
6 See Robert Cutler to Admiral Arthur W. Radford, July 9,1958, EL, WHO, OSANSA, NSC Series, 
Briefing Notes Subserics, Box 8, Folder - Fallout Shelters, 2. 
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those of the Gaither committee, they do show its considerable influence. After the sum-
mer of 1958, the Gaither report was rarely discussed within the Eisenhower administration 
or mentioned in public debates. However, the report's obscurity during this time does not 
signify its lack of importance in helping shape debates concerning U.S. national security 
programs. The changes in these programs during the first half of 1958 were only the first 
of many to occur before Eisenhower left office. 
While he often approved increases reluctantly, Eisenhower eventually accepted 
recommendations from his advisers to create a missile force substantially larger than the 
one proposed by the Gaither committee. Several factors influenced Eisenhower's decision 
making. Until the introduction of satellite intelligence at the end of 1960, estimates of So-
viet missile capabilities remained speculative and continued to emphh;)l!.e the communist's 
quantitative superiority.7 Eisenhower also received recommendations from his military 
advisers for expanded missile programs that reflected their inability to overcome interserv-
ice rivalries. While Eisenhower did not have to accept their recommendations, he faced 
great opposition if he did not. The rapid development of more reliable second generation 
missiles, moreover, made their deployment more acceptable and important. 
In addition to expanding missile forces, Eisenhower also continued to disperse 
U. S. nuclear delivery systems, increase SAC alert capabilities, expand radar coverage, and 
construct active defenses. The president viewed these policies as essential to guarantee 
the capability of the United States to retaliate regardless of the circumstances. He agreed 
with Secretary of State Dulles who asserted that ''the United States should not attempt to 
, The influence of satellite intelligence on intelligence estimates will be discussed more fully later in the 
chapter. 
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be the greatest military in the world. . . . In the field of military capabilities enough was 
enough. Ifwe didn't realize this fact, the time would come when all our national produc-
tion would be centered on our military establishment."s By expanding U.S. missile capa-
bilities and reducing their wlnerability, Eisenhower felt confident that the Soviet Union 
would avoid taking any risks that might result in its own destruction. 
The Gaither committee proposed the expansion of five separate offensive missile 
systems: Thor and Jupiter IRBMs, Atlas and Titan ICBMs, and the Polaris SLBM. By 
the end ofFY 1963, It recommended the deployment of240 IRBMs, 600 ICBMs, and 6 
Polaris submarines carrying 16 SLBMs each by the end of 1963. In total, these forces 
would have consisted of almost 940 nuclear missiles.9 Over his last three years in office, 
Eisenhower met and then surpassed these force levels. In August 1958, the Defense De-
partment studied expanding the programmed ICBM force to 200 missiles (110 Titan and 
90 Atlas). 10 In November 1959, the Defense Department proposed and Eisenhower ap-
proved a force of270 ICBMs (140 Titans and 130 Atlas).11 By Kennedy's inauguration in 
January 1961, Eisenhower had programmed the deployment of810 ICBMs (130 Atlas, 
140 Titan, and 540 Minuteman).12 
Eisenhower also supervised a similar expansion of the development of Polaris 
missile submarines. He saw the Polaris as a major hedge against the Soviet Union 
8 Memorandum of Discussion at the 363rd Meeting of the NSC, Apri124, 1958, EL, DDE Papers, NSC 
Series, Box to, Folder - 363rd Meeting ofNSC, April 24, 1958,5. 
9 Gaither Report, 34. 
10 See Neufeld. Ballistic Missiles, 190; and Roman, Eisenhower and the Missile Gap, 179. 
11 See Neufeld. Ballistic Missiles, 184; and Roman, Eisenhower and the Missile Gap, 197. 
12 Roman, Eisenhower and the Missile Gap, 150-1 and 187. By the time Eisenhower left office, he had 
deployed 12 Atlas ICBMs and launched two Polaris submarines carrying a total of 32 SLBMs. Sec Des-
mond Ball, 1'he Development of the SlOP, 1960-1983," in Ball and RichelsoD, Strategic Nuclear Target-
ing,57. 
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launching a surprise attack. By providing a virtually inwlnerable second strike capability, 
the Polaris would force Soviet leaders to consider even more seriously the consequences 
of attacking the United States. In 1958, Eisenhower approved plans to construct 9 Polaris 
submarines. A year later, he agreed to expand the force even further to 15. 13 By July 
1960, the president approved the construction of 24 Polaris submarines.14 These 24 sub-
marines added 384 SBLMs to the already planned 810 ICBM force. 
In addition to the ICBM and Polaris forces, the Eisenhower administration imp le-
mented its plans to deploy both Thor and Jupiter IRBMs overseas. In April 1958, Eisen-
hower had agreed to a Defense Department recommendation to deploy 12 IRBM squad-
rons (9 Thor and 3 Jupiter) containing 15 missiles each. Ultimately, four Thor and 3 Jupi-
ter squadrons became operational in Great Britain, Turkey, and Italy between 1959 and 
1962. IS The Eisenhower administration limited the deployment of IRBMs to seven squad-
rons when it realized that reliable ICBMs would be available which would make the 
IRBMs unnecessary and obsolete. However, while the IRBMs were plagued with short-
comings, they "demonstrated America's resolve to defend its allies and represented the 
only display of strategic missiles in Europe.,,16 
The ICBM and IRBM forces and the Polaris submarines represented only two legs 
of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. The third part of the nuclear triad remained SAC bombers. 
The Gaither committee did not recommend substantial increases in bomber force levels, 
but it did emphasize the importance of reducing SAC wlnerability. It proposed the im-
13 Roman. Eisenhower and the Missile Gap, 184. 
14 Ibid., 190. 
IS Neufeld. Ballistic Missiles, 224-26. 
16 Ibid .• 232. 
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plementation of alert forces, the further dispersal of bomber squadrons, the improvement 
of early warning, and the construction of active defenses. Eisenhower and the NSC fo-
cused on each of these issues between 1958 and 1961. Additionally, Eisenhower adopted 
proposals to modernize the composition of the bomber and tanker forces. While he 
phased out the B-36 in 1958 and began to reduce the importance of the B-47 in 1959, he 
increased the deployment of B-52 bombers from 243 in 1957 to 567 in 1961. Further-
more, he modernized the tanker force by introducing the KC_135. 17 
Besides determining strategic force levels, the most pressing military question ad-
dressed by the Eisenhower administration between 1958 and 1961 was to determine the 
optimal force requirements for fighting either general or limited wars. As shown in earlier 
chapters, the distinction between limited and general wars had been a controversial topic 
for military strategists. Civilians like Bernard Brodie, Henry Kissinger, Robert Osgood, 
Paul Nitze, and William Kaufinan insisted that the United States should develop greater 
military capabilities to wage limited wars. However, there was no consensus as to how 
these types of wars should be fought. Should nuclear weapons be used or should conven-
tional forces be relied upon? How should political objectives be determined and conveyed 
to an enemy? How could the geographical areas of conflict be limited? Without providing 
specifics, the Gaither committee recommended that the United States perfonn a study to 
determine the best composition and role for its limited war forces. 
17 Alert Operations and the Strategic Air Command, 1957-1991 (Offutt Air Force Base, NE: Office of the 
Historian, Headquarters Strategic Air Command, 1991),77. See also, Peter J. Roman, "Strategic Bomb-
ers over the Missile Horizon," Journal o/Strategic Studies 18 (March 1995), 200-10. 
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As a result of the Gaither committee recommendations, the NSC created a task 
force in the spring of 1958 composed of representatives of the State Department, Defense 
Department, JCS, and CIA to study U.S. capabilities to wage limited wars through July 
1961. The task force concluded that "United States capabilities for limited military opera-
tions are adequate to undertake and carry out limited operations.,,18 However, this opin-
ion was not unanimous within the administration. Another study completed in September 
1958 by the Defense Department's Defense Science Board found "The limited-war capa-
bility of the United States is inadequate from the viewpoint both of military operations and 
of research and development." 19 Furthermore, it argued that the "present capability [of 
the United States] is limited in strength and cannot be exercised quickly or effecrlvely.,,20 
This type of criticism reappeared on several occasions during the remainder of the Eisen-
hower administration. 
In 1960, two separate committees, a PSAC panel and an inter-agency study group, 
examined U.S. limited war capabilities. The panel found what it believed to be several se-
rious deficiencies. It concluded, in particular, that the military branches focused so much 
attention on maintaining forces for general war that they neglected ''the specialized weap-
ons and systems for limited war."21 To remedy these deficiencies, the panel recommended 
18 Memorandum for the National Security Council, June 18, 1958, NA. RG 59, State Department, Records 
of the OCB and NSC, 1947-63, Lot 66095, Box 111,2. 
19 "Final Report of the Task Group on Limited War, Defense Science Board,'" September I, 1958, NA, RG 
359, Office of Science and Technology, Subject Files, 1957-62, Box 58, Folder - Limited War - Army, 3. 
20 Ibid., 6. 
21 Memorandum of Meeting with the President, August 25, 1960, EL, WHO, OSS, Subject Series, Alpha-
betical Subserics. Box 23, Folder - Science Advisory Committee (6) July 1959-August 1960, 2. 
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augmenting U.S. airlift capabilities, developing ground support aircraft for limited war, 
and placing more emphasis on the development of non-nuclear weapons.22 
The inter-agency study group composed of representatives from the CIA, State 
Department, and the Department of Defense performed a similar study to the one insti-
gated by the Gaither committee recommendations in 1958. The impetus for this examina-
tion was the belief among some members of the Eisenhower administration that the 1958 
study failed to resolve the role of nuclear weapons in limited war.23 The group's final re-
port remains classified, but discussions concerning its conclusions provide a revealing look 
at the disagreements over limited military operations.24 The study group examined five 
possible locations of limited war confrontations: Berlin, Iran, Laos, Korea, and the Chi-
nese Offshore Islands ofQuemoy and Matsu.2S It concluded that the United States had 
"an adequate capability for anyone of the situations studied but cannot handle two at 
once.,,26 More specifically, it stressed: 
U.S. capabilities in conjunction with those of our Allies are gener-
ally adequate to conduct anyone of the limited military operations studies 
but these capabilities are dependent on prompt action, as required in each 
case, to 
a. Initiate partial mobilization. 
b. Augment existing military [air]lift capabilities. 
c. Expand the war production base. 
22 Ibid., 4-5. 
23 See Memorandum for the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. September 
28, 1960, NA, RG 273, NSC, Folder - NSC 5724 (Background Documents), 1; and Memorandum for the 
Acting Secretary, October 5. 1960, NA, RG 59, Records of the OCB and NSC, 1947-63, Lot 66095, Box 
Ill, 1 
24 See Memorandum for the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, September 
28, 1960. NA, RG 273, NSC, Folder - NSC 5724 (Background Documents), 1-3. 
2S Memorandum for the Acting Secretary, October 5, 1960, NA, RG 59, Records of the OCB and NSC, 
1947-63, Lot 66D 95, Box Ill, 2. 
26 Memorandum of Conversation, September 27, 1960, ibid., 3. 
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d. Waive financiallimitations. rT 
The State Department found that U.S. capabilities in these fields were insufficient. 
State Department representative Gerard Smith told Secretary of State Christian Herter 
that" Although the language of the present study's conclusions is carefully hedged, its im-
port seems to me inescapable. The US does not have now an adequate limited war capa-
bility.,,28 Under Secretary of State Livingston Merchant emphasized that "There is una-
nimity in the State Department about the need for a greater limited war capability.,,29 He 
then explained that "The State Department . . . believes it is difficult to have an effective 
and successful foreign policy if the US lacks the capability of dealing with at least two 
limited war situations concurrently without an unacceptable degradation of our general 
war capability. ,,30 
U.S. military leaders also analyzed the inter-agency group's report. Their overrid-
ing conclusion was "that our limited war capability is basically dependent on our general 
war capability and our determination to risk general war.,,31 One of the key questions they 
could not answer was whether nuclear weapons would be used in limited war situations. 
JCS Chairman Twining explained that "we must assume that when we get in a shooting 
war we will have to have a supplemental budget and step up our airlift. . .. On the use of 
27 "U.S. and Allied Capabilities for Limited Military Operations to July 1, 1962," excerpt quoted in 
Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense - Appendix, December 9, 1960, EL, WHO. OSANSA, NSC 
Series, Subject Subseries, Box 5, Folder - Limited Military Operations, Appendix - 1. 
28 Memorandum for the Acting Secretary, October 5, 1960, NA, RG 59, State Department, OCB and NSC 
Records, Lot 66D 95, Box Ill, 1. 
29 Ibid., 5. 
30 Ibid., 6. 
31 Memorandum of Conversation, September 27, 1960, NA, RG 59, State Department, OCB and NSC 
Records, Lot 660 95, Box Ill, 2. 
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atomic weapons we cannot prejudge.,,32 Army Chief of Staff Lyman Lemnitzer concurred. 
He argued that it is not "possible to decide in advance whether to use nuclear weapons . 
. . . Therefore, it is necessary to have a proper balance between nuclear and conventional 
forces so we won't get musclebound.,,33 Overall, the lCS stressed that "the United States 
does not have forces in being adequate to cope with all envisaged limited war situa-
tions.,,34 
Navy Chief of Staff Admiral Arleigh Burke and Air Force Chief of Staff General 
Thomas White raised the issues of U.S. prestige and will. Burke argued: 
The US will is important. The Soviets will push us at every opportunity 
and we need to have the will to resist. For example, in the Berlin situation 
it is easy to consider letting Berlin go rather than fight a general war. 
However, we need to stand up to the enemy if we want to keep the free 
world on our side. We must keep Berlin or lose our prestige and respect. 
If general war is necessary, we might as well have it now and take the risk 
oflosing our nation.3S 
White expressed his complete agreement. "We need," he stressed, "national determination 
in a situation where general war must be risked. We should use whatever weapons are 
necessary. ,,36 
Questions concerning U. S. capabilities to wage limited wars were also raised by 
Nitze and General Maxwell Taylor, who retired as the Army's chief of staff in 1959. 
Taylor believed that Eisenhower's reliance on massive retaliation significantly limited U.S. 
capabilities to respond to military crises short of general war. He argued that "Massive 
32 Ibid., 2. 
33 Ibid., 4. 
34 Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense - Appendix. December 9, 1960, EL, WHO, OSANSA. NSC 
Series, Subject Subseries, Box 5, Folder - Limited Military Operations, 1. 
3S Ibid., 3-4. 
36 Ibid., 4. 
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Retaliation as a guiding strategic concept has reached a dead end and that there is an ur-
gent need for a reappraisal of our strategic needs. In its heyday, massive retaliation could 
offer our leaders only two choices, the initiation of general nuclear war or compromise 
and retreat. ,,37 Taylor claimed that the United States needed to expand the capabilities of 
its conventional forces to wage limited wars to insure that it would not have to respond to 
every military crisis with nuclear weapons.38 
Nitze was the most vocal proponent on the Gaither committee for expanding lim-
ited war capabilities. In June 1959, he argued that as programmed by the Eisenhower 
administration, U.S. military forces were inadequate to meet the range of threats posed by 
the U.S.S.R. He explained that "If one grades the various threats which Soviet-
Communist initiative can present to the free world in order of the violence of the means 
involved, one finds a wide band starting with reasonably mild but disturbing words at one 
end of the spectrum and an all-out surprise nuclear attack on the United States at the other 
end of the spectrum.,,39 He believed that the United States needed to be prepared for all 
contingencies. The United States should possess a secure retaliatory capability, expanded 
limited war capabilities, and strong security alliances. 40 
37 Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1959, 1960), 
5. 
38 Ibid., 6-7 and 136-64. See also A. J. Bacevich, The Pentomic Era: The U.S. Army Between Korea and 
Vietnam (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1986),44. 
39 Paul Nitze, "An Alternative Nuclear Policy as a Base for Negotiations," in East-West Negotiations, 2nd 
edition (Washington, D.C.: The Washington Center for Foreign Policy Research, 1959), reprinted in 
Kenneth W. Thompson and Steven L. Rearden (eds.), Paul H. Nitze on National Security and Arms Con-
trol (Lanham. MD: University Press of America, Inc., 1990), 140. 
40 Ibid., 105-6. 
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Eisenhower saw several basic flaws in the arguments of the critics of his limited 
war policies.41 He believed that they underestimated the deterrent factor of U.S. strategic 
capabilities and the convertibility of these forces for limited war operations. He ques-
tioned whether any limited war between U.S. and Soviet forces would remain that way for 
very long since he believed that any engagements would quickly escalate into a general 
war. He further argued that any other limited conflicts could be controlled with existing 
forces in being at least until the United States had time to mobilize additional manpower 
and armaments.42 Accordingly, during his last few years in office, he did not waver from 
his reliance on nuclear weapons and strategic delivery systems as the principal deterrent to 
the Soviet Union. 43 
The last major issue that the Gaither committee addressed and the Eisenhower 
administration had to discuss was the question of civil defense, and in particular, fallout 
shelters. The Gaither committee recommended that the United States should spend $25 
billion over five years to construct fallout shelters for the civilian population. No one seri-
ously questioned that a system of fallout shelters would reduce substantially the number of 
casualties from a Soviet nuclear attack. As the NSC studied the Gaither committee's rec-
ommendation for shelters, it ordered an examination of the consequences of a massive 
nuclear exchange (approximately 15 million kilotons). The study concluded that in an at-
tack of this magnitude, only 94 million out of the estimated U.S. population of 192 million 
41 Eisenhower was well aware of these specific studies criticizing his limited war forces. See Memoran-
dum of Mecting with the President, August 25. 1960. EL. WHO. OSS. Subject Series. Alphabetical Sub-
series. Box 23, Folder - Science Advisory Committee (6) July 1959-August 1960. 
42 See ibid .• 5-6. 
43 Roman. Eisenhower and the Missile Gap. 82; Charles H. Donnelly. United States Defense Policies in 
1958 (GPO, 1959). 12-17; Charles H. Donnelly. United States Defense Policies in 1959 (GPO, 1960), 18-
20; and Charles H. Donnelly, United States Defense Policies in 1960 (GPO, 1961), 23-24. 
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would survive even with a nationwide fallout shelter system.44 While the study found that 
67 million people would have lived because of the shelters, the question was whether the 
loss of almost 100 million people would allow the continued existence of the United States 
as a nation. 
Eisenhower and his advisers continually struggled with this question. The cost of 
the shelters created a dilemma. When FCDA director Leo Hoegh recommended modify-
ing existing federal buildings for use as shelters at a cost of$5 million in FY 1960, Eisen-
hower did not oppose the idea. He simply did not feel "he knew exactly what to do about 
it.,,45 In December 1958, the NSC decided to authorize up to $35 million to continue re-
search, construct a small number of shelters, survey potential existing structures for shelter 
spaces, initiate a public education program, and incorporate shelters in new federal build-
ings.46 
By the end of his administration, Eisenhower's civil defense programs revealed lit-
tie influence from the Gaither committee. Based on the 1958 program, the FCDA studied 
possible existing shelter facilities and built almost 150 prototype shelters. However, it did 
not incorporate shelters into new federal buildings as was earlier planned because of in-
adequate funding. A lack of consensus concerning shelters hamstrung the FCDA and the 
Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (OCDM).47 While certain groups, like the 
44 Memorandum to the Secretary [of State), July 10, 1958, NA. RG 59, State Department. PPS Records. 
Lot 670 548, Box 194, Folder - SIP Papers 1958 (Jan. -April), 2. 
4S Memorandum of Discussion at the 390th Meeting of the NSC, December 11, 1958, EL, DDE Papers, 
NSC Series. Box 10, Folder - 390th Meeting of the NSC, December 11, 1958,3. 
46 NSC 5807/2 - Measures to Carty Out the Concept of Shelter, December 24, 1958, EL, WHO, OSANSA, 
NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 24, Folder - Shelter Program, 1-6. 
47 See for example, Memorandum to the Secretmy, October 6, 1960, NA, RG 59, State Department. PPS 
Records, Lot 670 548, Box 194, Folder - SIP Papers 1958 (January-April), 1-2. 
Gaither committee and the Rockefeller Pane~ and individuals, like Congressman Chet 
Holifield, recommended the construction of shelters, neither the public nor Congress 
showed a strong willingness to support expanded expenditures for shelters. Although 
people supported the idea of a community shelter, only 39 percent supported spending 
$500 to build a private, family shelter in 1960.48 Even more glaringly, Congress cut the 
OCDM budget 40 percent between 1959 and 1961.49 Without a consensus on shelters, 
Eisenhower felt no concerted pressure to expand his civil defense policies. 
The Missile Gap and the 1960 Presidential Election 
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As Eisenhower and his advisors attempted to devise plans for strengthening u.s. 
strategic forces, they faced some of the same problems experienced by the Gaither com-
mittee. They wanted to maintain sufficient military capabilities to deter the Soviet Union 
from launching a nuclear war. To do this, they needed to know approximately how large 
the Soviet bomber and missile forces were and what the Kremlin's intentions were. Intel-
ligence analysts from the CIA, military branches, and other government agencies had to 
rely on limited information to derive their estimates of Soviet capabilities. so A leading 
scholar of the missile gap controversy persuasively argues that after Sputnik ''the question 
of Soviet intent assumed an even greater importance in any effort to determine the future 
48 See Gallup, Gallup Poll, v. 3, 1671; and Kerr, Civil Defense in the United States, 115. 
49 See Kerr, Civil Defense in the United States, 114; and Winkler, Life Under a Cloud, 120. 
50 See Donald P. Steury (ed.), Intentions and Capabilities: Estimates on Soviet Strategic Forces. /950-
/983 (Washington. D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1996), xii; 
and Noon. The Soviet First Strike Threat, 173. 
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course of Russian missile programs and the Soviet's willingness to use this power to pur-
sue their foreign policy goals. ,,51 
Claims ofa missile gap periodically resurfaced between 1958 and the 1960 presi-
dential election. 52 Senator Symington wrote Eisenhower in the summer of 1958 that "we 
[Symington and his advisers] believe our national intelligence system is underestimating 
the enemy's current and future ballistic missile capability .... As a result we also believe 
that our national defense plans and programs are not being effectively related to sound es-
timates of Soviet capability. ,,53 Others criticized the administration for failing to recognize 
and overcome the emergence of the alleged Soviet quantitative lead in missile capabilities. 
If the Soviet Union did have such a lead, Eisenhower's critics argued that the communist 
leaders might be more willing to take policy risks in pursuit of its goal of world domina-
tion. Senator Lyndon Johnson's chieflegal counsel captured the essence of the critics' 
concerns when he argued that "we [U.S. leaders] have been unwilling to face the disagree-
able facts that we are actually in a state of war, that the enemy has prepared for war and 
that unless we work 365 days a year with an urgency, as though we were in a war, we are 
liable to be licked and become a second-class country."S4 
Although the critics were wrong, there were legitimate reasons for concluding 
that there was a missile gap. The national intelligence estimates during these years consis-
tently predicted a prospective Soviet missile force much larger than the one possessed by 
51 Bottome, The Missile Gap, 66. 
52 See Robert 1. Watson. "The Eisenhower Administration and the Missile Gap. 1958-1960," paper pre-
sented at the 1996 Annual Meeting of the Society for Military History, Washington, D.C., 1996; Roman. 
Eisenhower and the Missile Gap, 138-39; and Bottome, The Missile Gap, 115-46. 
53 Stuart Symington to the President, August 29, 1958, EL, DOE Papers, Harlow Records, Box 2. Folder-
[Missiles] Sen. Stuart Symington, 1958,6. 
54 InqUiry into Satellite, 2469. 
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the United States. While the projected gap was always in the future, the estimates pointed 
to a period in the early 1960s when the Soviet Union would have a substantial quantitative 
lead in ICBMs. A NIE in June 1958 estimated that the Soviet Union could have 100 
ICBMs in 1959,500 in 1960, and 1000 in 1961.55 A NIE later in the same year predicted 
that the Soviet Union would have 10 ICBMs in 1959, 100 in 1960 and 500 by 1962.56 
NIE 11-8-59, which was not released until February 1960, estimated that the Soviets 
would have 35 ICBMs by mid-1960 and between 140 and 200 by mid-1961.57 Finally, 
NIE 11-8-60 estimated that the Soviet Union would have between 10 and 35 ICBMs in 
1960 and between 50 and 200 in 1961.58 
The problem for intelligence analysts was determining the intentions of an adver-
sary who resided in a restricted society and whose assumed goal was world domination. 
Herbert York and Alan Greb explain that "In such circumstances [where the enemy resides 
in a closed society], it often becomes necessary to plan to cope with what the other side 
might be doing rather than what it actually is doing. And what it might be doing is limited 
only by human imagination rather than by physical reality. ,,59 [Emphasis in original] When 
the Gaither committee made its estimates, it assumed that the Soviet Union would pro-
duce military hardware at maximum levels. Based on this assumption, it reached some 
55 Prados, The Soviet Estimate, 79. 
56 NIE 11-5-58, "Soviet Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles," [December 195811, re-
printed in Stewy (ed.), Intentions and Capabilities, 67-68. See also NIE 11-4-58 which contained similar 
estimates. See Roman, Eisenhower and the Missile Gap, 40. 
57 NIE 11-8-59, "Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack Through Mid-1964," February 9, 1960, reprinted 
in Stewy (ed.), Intentions and Capabilities, 75. See also descriptions ofNIE 11-4-59 in Prados, The S0-
viet Estimate, 89; and Roman, Eisenhower and the Missile Gap, 43. 
58 NIE 11-8-60, "Soviet Capabilities for Long Range Attack Through Mid-I 965," August 1, 1960, re-
printed in Stewy (ed.), Intentions and Capabilities, 3. See also Prados, The Soviet Estimate, 89. 
59 York and Greb, "Strategic Reconnaissance," 36. 
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frightening conclusions. The intelligence community had to deal with some of the same 
problems. 
In 1959, Defense Secretary Neil McElroy attempted to explain to a congressional 
committee one of the difficulties in making accurate intelligence estimates. He testified 
that "We concede the capacity of the Soviets to do a good many things, if they make the 
determination to do so .... We do concede them capacity, but no one that I know can be 
inside of the Russian mind and decide what proportion of that capacity they are going to 
use.,,60 Because of the difficulty in determining Soviet intentions, the intelligence analysts 
adopted ''the position that they were not very much interested in intentions, they were only 
interested in capabilities.,,61 JCS Chairman General Nathan Twining elaborated on the 
difficulties of estimating Soviet capabilities. He told the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee that "I would like to establish a point which should be borne in mind at all times 
when considering the United States versus the Soviet weapons comparison: Our informa-
tion on what we now have is exact, while that given for the Soviets is often estimated 
from assumptions and requirements. . .. In other words, because we can do things, we 
assume they can and they have requirements, therefore, they are developing these mis-
siles.,,62 
With little concrete evidence, intelligence analysts had difficulty developing con-
clusive estimates. The result was an overestimation of Soviet capabilities and, accord-
60 U.S. Congress, Senate, Joint Hearings before the Preparedness Investigation Subcommittee of the 
Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Activities, MisSile and 
Space Activities, 86th Congress, 1st session, 1958, 15-16. 
61 Oral History of James H. Douglas, Oral History Research Office, Columbia University, 1973, IS. 
62 U.S. Congress, Senate, Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Vol. X (GPO, 
1980),63. 
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ingly, a potentially much greater threat to the United States.63 George Reedy, a legislative 
assistant to Senator Johnson, explained how these exaggerated estimates led to the belief 
of a missile gap: 
We [the members of the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee] didn't realize 
a very simple thing, that what they [the intelligence analysts] were doing 
was extrapolating on the basis of Russian capabilities, but using actual fig-
ures for what the United States was doing. Now their assumption was that 
the Soviet Union was producing missiles to capacity, and so when they ex-
trapolated on that from the standpoint of what they knew the Soviet Union 
produced at one point, they were able to get such a tremendous imbalance 
between the Soviet Union and the United States.64 
The press also made substantial claims about the supposed missile gap. Joseph Al-
sop reported in July and August 1958 that the United States was falling dangerously be-
hind the Soviets in missile capabilities. He argued that while the U.S.S.R. would have 100 
ICBMs in 1959, 500 in 1960, and 1000 in 1961, the United States would have 0 in 1959, 
30 in 1960, and 70 in 1961.65 Taken together, all of these calculations painted a frighten-
ing picture. Although they were only estimates, if they proved accurate, the United States 
faced a potentially deadly threat. Robert Amory, a CIA analyst, remembered that "Taking 
our earliest estimate of when they [the Soviets] could have five hundred [ICBMs] and then 
comparing that with the known projection of American strengths, . . . you came up with a 
potential missile gap.,,66 [emphasis in original] 
63 The exaggeration of Soviet missile capabilities by intelligence analysts was not realized until the advent 
of the Corona satellite program beginning in 1960. See Kenneth E. Greer, "Corona." Studies in Intelli-
gence. Supplement, 17 (Spring 1973), reprinted in Ruffner (ed.) Corona, 24 and 38. For the impact of 
satellite photography on intelligence estimates, see NIE 11-8/1-6, "Strength and Deployment of Soviet 
Long Range Ballistic Missile Forces," September 21, 1961, printed in Ruffner (ed.) Corona, 127-55. 
64 Interview XI with George E. Reedy, December 20, 1983., LBJ Oral Hist0IY Project, 41-42. 
6S See Divine, Sputnik Challenge, 177; and Roy E. Linklider, "The Missile Gap Controversy," Political 
Science Quarterly 85:4 (December 1970),615. 
66 Robert Amory, Jr. Oral History, February 9, 1966, John F. Kennedy Library [hereafter 1FKL). 87. 
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The 1960 presidential election brought into focus many of the criticisms of Eisen-
hower's national security policies. Democratic candidate Kennedy and his running mate, 
Senator Johnson, were among the most vociferous critics of the Eisenhower administra-
tion. As the Senate majority leader and the chairman of the preparedness subcommittee, 
Johnson maintained constant pressure on the administration to improve u.S. military 
strength vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. He told Defense Secretary McElroy in July 1958 that 
he was disappointed in the progress made since the preparedness subcommittee reached its 
initial conclusions at the beginning of that year.67 
Kennedy was an even more persistent critic. In August 1958, he delivered a 
scathing attack on Eisenhower's national security policies. He claimed the president and 
his advisers "tailored our strategy and military requirements to fit our budget-instead of 
fitting our budget to our military requirements and strategy.,,68 He then accused the ad-
ministration oflosing the military advantage to the Soviet Union. "The fact of the mat-
ter," Kennedy argued, "is that during that period when emphasis was laid upon our eco-
nomic strength instead of our military strength, we were losing the decisive years when we 
could have maintained a lead against the Soviet Union in our missile capability. ,,69 
After lambasting Eisenhower's national security policies, Kennedy described what 
the United States needed to do to overcome its military deficiencies. He advocated adding 
more tanker aircraft to SAC's forces, accelerating the development and deployment of 
ICBMs, IRBMs, and SLBMs, improving continental defenses, expanding airlift capabili-
67 Inquiry into Satellite, 2447. 
68 "Speech to the Senate on the Missile Gap by John F. Kennedy," August 14, 1958, reprinted in Senator 
John F. Kennedy, The Strategy a/Peace (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960),40. 
69 Ibid., 41. 
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ties, and increasing manpower for limited military operations.70 He complained that if 
these measures were not implemented, the Soviet "missile power will be the shield from 
behind which they will slowly, but surely, advance-through Sputnik diplomacy, limited 
brush-fire wars, indirect non-overt aggression, intimidation, and subversion, internal 
revolution, increased prestige or influence, and the vicious blackmail of our allies. The 
periphery of the Free World will slowly be nibbled away. The balance of power will 
gradually shift against us." 71 
In a subsequent interview, Kennedy made similar claims: 
In military preparedness I think that the reasoning of the Eisenhower ad-
ministration is comparable to the prediction ofBritains [sic] Stanley Bald-
win during the Thirties-the enemy's capabilities are grossly and constantly 
underestimated. There isn't any doubt that the Russians are able to build 
accurate intercontinental ballistic missiles. I believe that the dangers of an 
unbalanced budget are far less than the danger to which the administration 
is determined to subject us by keeping us behind the Soviet Union in the 
ultimate weapon. When some people still say we are equall [sic] with the 
Russians in military strength, I would ask how much of our strength will be 
left after we have sustained a surprise blow; How equal are we after the 
first attack had been made by them on us? 72 
As Kennedy sought the Democratic nomination, he turned to Paul Nitze and sev-
era! other Gaither committee members for advice on national security issues.73 Kennedy 
asked Nitze to chair a committee that included former Gaither committee member James 
Perkins, Roswell Gilpatric, and David Bruce to make recommendations concerning U.S. 
national security policies. During the group's deliberations, it talked to many experts on 
70 Ibid., 42. 
71 Ibid., 37-38. Kennedy made similar arguments in a book review of General James Gavin's War and 
Peace in the Spa-:<! Age (1958). Senator John F. Kennedy, "General Gavin Sounds the Alarm. " The Re-
porter 19:7 (October 30, 1958),35. 
72 Interview with [John F.J Kennedy by Philip Deane, undated [March 1959?], JFK Librcuy, Pre-
Presidential Papers, Senate Files, General Files, 1953-1960, Folder - President's Office Files - Defense, 1. 
73 Callahan, Dangerous Capabilities, 185-92. 
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defense issues including Foster, Lincoln, and Robert Lovett from the Gaither committee. 
The group concluded that U.S. nuclear forces had to be expanded and improved to meet 
any possible Soviet challenge.74 
These conclusions proved appealing to the new president. In his run for the presi-
dency, he advocated increased defense spending and the acceleration of U.S. missile ca-
pabilities. Specifically, he proposed reducing SAC vulnerability by maintaining 25 percent 
of its planes in the air at all times, accelerating the production of Atlas missiles, increasing 
spending for the development of both the Polaris and Minuteman missiles, and augmenting 
conventional forces. 75 Kennedy recognized that these programs would require higher 
spending and possibly unbalanced budgets. He explained to his Senate colleagues the di-
lemma faced by U.S. decision makers and made a clear distinction between his position 
and that of the Eisenhower administration. He argued that "We cannot be certain that the 
Soviets will have, during the term of the next administration, the tremendous lead in mis-
sile striking power which they give every evidence of building-and we cannot be certain 
that they will use that lead to threaten or launch an attack upon the United States. Conse-
quentIy those of us who call for a higher defense budget are taking a chance on spending 
money unnecessarily. But those who oppose these expenditures are taking a chance on 
our very survival as a nation. ,,76 
In a campaign speech in October 1960, Kennedy cited the Gaither report in his ar-
guments that Eisenhower was not doing enough to meet the Soviet threat. He claimed 
74 Ibid .. 187-89. 
7S Senate Speech by John Kennedy on American Defense Policy, February 29, 1960, reprinted in Branyan 
and Larsen (eds.), The Eisenhower Administration, 1233-35. 
76 Ibid., 1228. 
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that during the Eisenhower administration, "The Soviet Union decided to go all out in 
missile development. But here in the United States, we cut back in funds for missile de-
velopment. We slashed our defense budget. We slowed up the modernization of our con-
ventional forces-until, today, the Soviet Union is rapidly building up a missile striking 
force that endangers our power to retaliate-and thus our survival itself" n 
Eisenhower reacted in dismay to such criticisms. He adamantly believed in the 
adequacy of U.S. military programs. He simply considered it foolish to expand U.S. mili-
tary power further when there was little likelihood that it would ever be needed. Despite 
intense pressure, he successfully resisted demands for significant increases in military 
spending. He failed, however, to allay the nation's great concerns.78 McGeorge Bundy 
succinctly explains this failure: 
Eisenhower did not adequately explain himself His failure to give a full 
explanation of his disbelief in a prospective missile gap was reinforced in its 
unfortunate effects not only by his failure to spell out publicly his view of 
the deterrent strength of the forces on both sides, but also by his failure to 
press on his countrymen the understanding he had expressed so clearly 
back in 1954, that in matters of this magnitude Soviet leaders would pre-
dictably be most cautious. So while he did sensible things and resisted 
foolish ones, he allowed the ensuing public arguments to be led by men 
who did not understand matters as well as he did. 79 
The 1960 election proved a great disappointment to Eisenhower. Although he was 
not completely enamored with Nixon, he was adamantly opposed to Kennedy. When 
Nixon's chances looked dim in the month leading to the election, Eisenhower began to 
77 "Speech to the American Legion by John F. Kennedy," October 1960, quoted in "Kennedy on National 
Defense," Aviation Week and Space Technology 73:17 (October 24, 1960),21. 
78 Robert A. Divine, Foreign Policy and U.S. Presidential Elections: 195211960 (New York: New View-
points, 1974),242. 
79 Bundy, Danger and Survival, 349. 
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campaign vigorously for his vice president. His efforts proved to no avail. While still per-
sonally popular, Eisenhower could not rally the Republican party to victory. In one of the 
closest presidential races ever, Kennedy won by less than 120,000 votes ~fthe 68 million 
that were cast.80 Eisenhower viewed the results as a repudiation of his eight years in of-
Kennedy's Defense Policies - An Overview 
After winning the election, Kennedy resolved to alleviate any deficiencies in U.S. 
military strength and raise u.S. prestige abroad. Jean Smith concludes that "On military 
policy Kennedy's views remained fixed: the United States should maintain forces in being 
to deter and defeat aggression at any point on the spectrum ofviolence.,,82 To carry out 
such a policy, Kennedy rejected the massive retaliation doctrine of the Eisenhower ad-
ministration and adopted a strategic approach that emphasized the maintenance of a 
greater variety of military options to meet any possible challenge. In developing his poli-
cies, the influence of the Gaither committee is clear. Over a dozen of the committee's 
members served as advisers to Kennedy, including Wiesner, Nitze, York. Foster, Killian, 
Robert Sprague, Spurgeon Keeny, Vmcent McRae, Brockway McMillan, Richard Bissell, 
and John McCloy.83 Furthermore, during his first weeks in office, Kennedy studied the 
Gaither report.84 
80 James N. Giglio, The Presidency 0/ John F. Kennedy (Lawrence, KA: University Press of Kansas. 
1991), 18. 
81 Ambrose, Eisenhower, v. 2, 604. 
82 Jean Edward Smith. "Kennedy and Defense," Air University Review 18:3 (March-April 1967), 48. See 
also Bundy, Danger and Survival, 352; and Gaddis, Strategies o/Containment, 203, 215, and 227-28. 
83 See Ball, Politics and Force Levels, 23; and Herken, Cardinal ChOices, 127-45. 
84 See The President's News Conference of February 1, 1961, in Public Papers o/the Presidents o/the 
United Siales, John Fitzgerald Kennedy, [hereafter ppp, JFK] 1961 (GPO, 1964),40. 
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Kennedy's strategy to expand U.S. military capabilities encompassed three re-
quirements: augmenting U.S. nuclear forces, enlarging U.S. conventional forces for lim-
ited military operations, and strengthening civil defense.8s Kennedy succeeded in expand-
ing U.S. missile capabilities even beyond the levels prescribed by the Eisenhower admini-
stration. He placed a greater emphasis on limited war capabilities, and especially, the de-
velopment of counter-insurgency forces. Finally, he announced a civil defense plan that, 
although not varying greatly from Eisenhower's approach, had a much greater impact be-
cause of the president's public pronouncements. 
Despite his initial reluctance in 1957 and 1958, Eisenhower greatly expanded U.S. 
nuclear capabilities before he left office. Kennedy inherited the nuclear triad-SAC bomb-
ers, ICBMs, and SLBMs--that formed the foundation of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Reflect-
ing the advice ofNitze's advisory committee, Kennedy believed that the United States 
needed more. In his first message to the Congress in January 1961, the new president 
proposed the expansion of the entire missile program. By the time he was assassinated in 
November 1963, the United States had deployed 631 ICBMs and 160 SLBMs and had 
programmed the deployment of an additional 800 missiles. 86 
When Kennedy entered the White House, he had access to a new source of intelli-
gence that had only become available in the last few months of the Eisenhower admini-
stration. In August 1960, Eisenhower received the first satellite photographs which "in 
one mission provided more photographic coverage of the Soviet Union than all previous 
8S See Michael Brower, "Nuclear Strategy of the Kennedy Administration, ,., Bulletin o/the Atomic SCien-
tists 18:8 (October 1962): 34-41. 
86 Ball, Politics and Force Levels, 50-1. 
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U-2 missions.,,87 Although it is unclear whether Kennedy was informed of the new intelli-
gence during the campaign. he gained access to the intelligence information after the No-
vember election.88 The satellite photographs dispelled any possibility of a missile gap in 
favor of the Soviet Union.89 Despite this knowledge, Kennedy remained detennined to 
expand U.S. missile capabilities. He immediately initiated plans to increase Eisenhower's 
proposed FY 1962 defense budget ofS40.8 billion. During his first nine months in office, 
Kennedy added an additional $1.95 billion to the defense budget in March, $225 million in 
May, and $3.45 billion in July. By August 1961, Kennedy had expanded the defense 
budget by nearly $6 billion. 90 
The March 1961 appropriations were geared primarily to accelerate the expansion 
of U.S. strategic forces. In particular, Kennedy wanted to augment the Polaris submarine 
forces. While Eisenhower had planned to build 19 submarines carrying a total of 304 
missiles by June 1965, Kennedy's program accelerated the deployment to 29 submarines 
carrying 464 missiles. In addition to expanding the Polaris forces, Kennedy also added 60 
Minuteman ICBMs to Eisenhower's program of 540.91 In the FY 1963 budget, Kennedy 
completed the deployment of the Atlas ICBMs (129 missiles) and Titan ICBMs (108 
missiles) and funded sixteen squadrons of Minuteman ICBMs totaling 800 missiles. Ken-
87 Ruffner (ed.), Corona, xiii. See also Kenneth E. Greer, "Corona." Studies in Intelligence, Supplement, 
17 (Spring 1973): 1-37, reprinted in ibid., 22-26. 
88 Herken, Counsels o/War, 140. 
89 For the impact of satellite photography on intelligence estimates, see NIE 11-8/1-61, "Strength and 
Deployment of Soviet Long Range Ballistic Missile Forces," September 21, 1961, printed in Ruffner (ed.), 
Corona, 127-55. 
90 See Kolodziej, Uncommon Defonse and Congress, 390-92; and Giglio, Presidency of John F. Kennedy, 
46. 
91 Ball, Politics and Force Levels, 114-16. 
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nedy also again augmented the deployment of Polaris submarines to 41 carrying 656 
missiles. Finally, he increased the 8-52 bomber force to 600 aircraft.92 
As part of the policy oftlexible response, Kennedy advocated the growth of U.S. 
conventional military capabilities. As early as 1957, he had argued that the United States 
needed to adopt a military strategy that maintained large nuclear forces and sufficient con-
ventional forces to meet any possible challenge.93 The new president had been influenced 
by the thinking of General Maxwell Taylor, General James Gavin, and Nitze who argued 
that the United States needed to expand its military options to meet the variety of military 
threats posed by the Soviet Union. In particular, Taylor and Nitze saw the need for ex-
panded conventional forces to wage limited wars. Herbert York, who served in both the 
Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, remembered the change in emphasis in defense 
policies: "There was a definite change in attitude between the Eisenhower administration 
and the Kennedy administration. . .. I never got anywhere trying to sell much in the way 
of limited war ideas to Tom Gates [Eisenhower's last Secretary of Defense], or persuading 
him that it needed more, whereas [Kennedy's Secretary of Defense Robert] McNamara 
started off with the assumption, that more needs to be done in that area.,,94 
Kennedy and his advisers believed that" A posture of flexible response was deemd 
[sic] to be more credible in support of American security interests and foreign policy ob-
jectives, because a clearer and closer correspondence could be struck between the military 
force that was to be applied by the President and the political stakes and the scope of the 
92 Ibid., 50-51. 
93 John F. Kennedy, "A Democrat Looks at Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs 36:1 (October 1957),48. 
94 Oral History cfHerbert York. JFK Library, June 16, 1964, 1 L 
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military conflict at issue between the United States and an enemy power. ,,95 In the March 
additions to the FY 1962 defense budget, $850 million was directed to improve U.S. lim-
ited war capabilities. Reflecting a general agreement with the limited war studies com-
pleted in 1960, most of the funding went to the expansion ofair and sea lift forces and the 
procurement of conventional weapons. In May Kennedy added $237 million to the de-
fense budget to enhance U.S. limited war capabilities. The final $3.2 billion increase in 
July for FY 1962 facilitated increases in both conventional and nuclear capabilities. By the 
end of July 1961, Kennedy had proposed and Congress accepted the expansion of U.S. 
military personnel from the 2,493,000 requested by Eisenhower to 2,743,000. Over half 
the increase went to the army.96 
Kennedy did not announce a position on civil defense during the presidential cam-
paign. However, during his first year in office he gave more public attention to it than any 
other previous president. Kennedy stated in May 1961 that shelters should be viewed "as 
insurance for the civilian population in the event of such a miscalculation [a Soviet attack]. 
It is insurance we trust will never be needed-but insurance which we could never forgive 
ourselves for foregoing in the event of catastrophe." He then added that ''there is no point 
in delaying the initiation of a nationwide long-range program of identifYing present fallout 
shelter capacity and providing shelter in new and existing structures. Such a program 
would protect millions of people against the hazards of radioactive fallout in the event of a 
large-scale nuclear attack.,,97 
9S Kol0d7iej, Uncommon Defense and Congress, 328. 
96 Ibid., 385-89. 
97 John F. Kennedy, "Urgent National Needs: Address of the President of the United States,'" May 25, 
1961, quoted in Kerr, Civil Defense in the U.S., 118. 
In the midst of the renewed Berlin crisis two months later, Kennedy told a TV 
audience: 
In the event of an attac~ the lives of those families which are not hit in a 
nuclear blast and fire can still be saved if they can be warned to take shelter 
and if that shelter is available. We owe that kind of insurance to our fami-
lies, and to our country. 
In contrast to our friends in Europe, the need for this type of protection 
is new to our shores. But the time to start is now. In the coming months, I 
hope to let every citizen know what steps he can take without delay to 
protect his family in case of attack. I know you would not want to do 
less.98 
Secretary of Defense McNamara presented Kennedy's civil defense plans to the 
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Senate Appropriations Committee the next day. As the first phase of a plan to find shelter 
spaces for over 100 million people, McNamara requested $207.6 million to identify exist-
ing shelter spaces and to stock them with necessary emergency supplies. With the Berlin 
Crisis acting as an impetus, Congress approved the entire amount. 99 When compared to 
the Eisenhower programs, there was not much difference. However, Kennedy's public 
announcements raised a national hysteria. 100 
Kennedy's proposals to build community shelters met much less success with 
Congress. Billed as the Shelter Incentive Program, Kennedy proposed giving $25 per 
shelter space to non-profit facilities such as hospitals, libraries, and schools that built them. 
For FY 1963, the newly formed Office of Civil Defense (OCD) requested $695 million for 
this shelter program, but Congress only granted $113 million. For FY 1964, the OCD re-
98 John F. Kennedy, "Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Berlin Crisis,'" July 25, 
1961, quoted in Kerr, Civil Defonse in the U.S., 119. 
99 Kerr, Civil Defonse in the U.S., 120. 
100 See Winkler, Lifo Under a Cloud, 12-30; Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon. 309-14; Arthur M. 
Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston: Houghton Mifilin 
Company, (965), 747-49; and Stanley L. Newman. "Civil Defense and the Congress: Quiet Reversal,'" 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 18:9 (November (962),35. 
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quested $346.9 million and received $11.6 million.101 Congress' response to Kennedy's 
proposals reflected its general unwillingness to support major expenses for the construc-
tion of new shelters. 102 
Conclusions 
Eisenhower reacted cautiously to the Gaither report and attempted to limit its in-
fluence on his national security policies. He approved those recommendations that he be-
lieved would strengthen the United States but resisted those proposals that he thought 
would undermine U.S. economic security. As a result of his caution. he constantly re-
sisted calls for significant increases in defense spending. Therefore, while he did expand 
U.S. nuclear capabilities and improve U.S. defenses, he refused to adopt a nation-wide 
shelter program because he did not believe it would insure the continued viability of the 
United States after a nuclear war. In his mind, the cost of shelters simply would not reap 
many benefits. He also rejected demands to increase U.S. limited war capabilities because 
he already believed that the United States possessed the military forces to meet any likely 
conflicts of this type. 
Eisenhower justified his military policies on two primary grounds. He continually 
argued that the Soviet Union would not risk a nuclear war in pursuit of its policy goals. 
Additionally, he stressed that there was little possibility of a limited war with the Soviet 
Union because such a conflict would quickly escalate into a nuclear war. He emphasized 
101 Kerr, Civil Defonse in the U.S. 126-31; Giglio, Presidency of John F. Kennedy, 82; and Kaplan, Wiz-
ards of Armageddon, 314. 
102 See Bundy, Danger and Survival, 355-56; Winkler, Life Under a Cloud, 128-32; and Newman, "Civil 
Defense and the Congress," 33-37. 
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to the NSC in 1960 that "the only hostilities the U.S. was really concerned about was an 
all-out atomic attack."I03 Eisenhower did not mean to imply that limited wars might not 
occur, but he believed such conflicts would be waged between U.S. and non-Soviet 
forces. In these types of engagements Eisenhower was confident that U.S. forces in being 
were more than adequate. 104 
Although Eisenhower felt strongly that his policies would guarantee U.S. security, 
many people shared the Gaither committee's view that the United States needed to spend 
more on defense. Stimulated by Sputnik and the leak of the Gaither report, critics of the 
Republican administration claimed that Eisenhower was allowing the Soviet Union to ob-
tain a lead over the United States in ballistic missile capabilities. These assertions of a 
missile gap dogged Eisenhower until he left office. In retrospect, it is clear that Eisen-
hower held a more nuanced view of the Cold War in the late 1950s than his critics. How-
ever, he failed to clearly articulate this view to the public. This failure allowed the Demo-
crats to capitalize on the missile gap issue and regain the White House in 1960. 
During his campaign and presidency, Kennedy asked many former members of the 
Gaither committee to serve in important advisory roles. The new president shared many 
of the committee's views and attempted to include them in his policies. In particular, he 
turned to Paul Nitze for advice on defense and foreign policy issues. After his election, 
Nitze continued to advise the president along with Wiesner, Killian, Foster, and others 
103 Memorandum of Discussion at the 453rd Meeting of the NSC, July 25, 1960, quoted in Roman, Eisen-
hower and the Missile Gap, 189. 
104 Memorandum of Meeting with the President. August 25, 1960, EL, OSS, Subject Series, Alphabetical 
Subseries, Box 23, Folder, Science Advisory Committee (6) July 1959-August 1960, 5-6. See also Roman, 
Eisenhower and the Missile Gap. 189-90. 
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from the Gaither committee. Not surprisingly then, by the end of 1963, most of the 
committee's recommendations, with the significant exception of fallout shelters, had be-
come part of U.S. policy. 
Unlike Eisenhower, Kennedy "believed that the economy could benefit from gov-
ernment spending, and he was therefore less concerned about allowing the military budget 
to rise during his presidency."lOs He expanded U.S. nuclear forces even more, increased 
U.S. capabilities to wage limited wars, and recommended an enlarged civil defense pro-
gram. In implementing these changes, he increased expenditures for the military services 
from $41.3 billion in 1960 to $47.9 billion in 1963 and added approximately 225,000 
military personnel to Eisenhower's recommendations. 106 At a news conference in 1963, 
Kennedy bragged that "The fact of the matter is, when we came into office we had 11 
combat ready divisions; we now have 16. We increased the scheduling of Polaris, nearly 
double per year. We've increased the number of planes on 15 minute alert from 33 per-
cent of our strategic air force to 50 percent. In a whole variety of ways ... we've 
strengthened ourselves in defense and space." 107 
lOS Bernard J. Firestone, "Defense Policy as a Fonn of Arms Control: Nuclear Force Posture and Strategy 
under John F. Kennedy," in Paul Harper and Joann P. Krieg (cds.), John F. Kennedy: The Promise Re-
visited (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988),58. See also Alan Wolfe, America 's [mpasse: TheRiseand 
Fall o/the Politics o/Growth (New York: Pantheon Books, 1981), 124-25. 
106 Statistical History o/the United States, 1123 and 1141. 
107 The President's News Conference of April 3, 1963, in ppp, JFK, 1963,308. 
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Conclusion 
Beginning in 1957, Eisenhower faced tremendous pressures to reexamine U.S: na-
tional security policies. Through his first term, he attempted to moderate the defense 
policies of the Truman administration and achieve a balanced budget. He was successful. 
However, with significant scientific and technological advances in nuclear weapons and 
delivery systems, the president's New Look policies came under increasing attack. One of 
the most important criticisms raised in 1956 and 1957 was whether the United States was 
doing enough to protect its civilian population. To answer this question, Eisenhower 
asked a panel of experts to examine U.S. active and passive defenses. The Gaither com-
mittee, as the panel became known, concluded that there were significant deficiencies in 
u.S. national security policies which could only be rectified by increased defense spending 
and expanded civil defense programs. 
This study illuminates Eisenhower's decision making process concerning national 
security issues. Until recently, records related to the Gaither committee remained hidden 
from the scholar's view. Although the Gaither report itselfwas declassified in the 1970s, 
most of the documents related to its development and dissemination continued to be re-
stricted until the 1990s. The recent release of many of these records has allowed a clearer 
understanding of the significance of the committee's conclusions, and at the same time, 
provided another avenue to evaluate Eisenhower as a decision maker. 
This study has drawn heavily from the depositories at the Eisenhower Library, the 
National Archives, the Library of Congress, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
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and the United States Military Academy. By piecing together widely scattered documents. 
it reveals that the Gaither committee was of vital importance in creating the impression of 
a missile gap and pressuring Eisenhower to change his national security policies. Further-
more. it underlines the difficulties Eisenhower experienced in trying to assess and imple-
ment the committee's recommendations. The president attempted to maintain a balance 
between the needs of national security and what the nation could afford. 1 Eisenhower 
feared that if he disrupted the economy through excessive spending on defense programs 
then the government would have to become more directly involved in everyday life. In his 
mind, such involvement would undermined the individual rights that he viewed as fonning 
the basis of the American system of government and life. 
When Eisenhower created the Gaither committee, he used an advisory system that 
had worked well previously. He entered the presidency believing that one of the central 
ingredients to decision making was to obtain advice that had been thoroughly discussed 
and analyzed by his key advisers. He viewed the National Security Council as the organi-
zation that could evaluate issues related to national security most effectively. During his 
first months in office. Eisenhower quickly approved the reorganization of the NSC to 50-
lidify its position in his decision making system. For the remainder of his administration, 
the NSC served in the unprecedented role as one of the president's most important advi-
sory organizations.2 
I See for example Griffith. "Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Corporate Commonwealth. " 87-122; Sloan, 
"The Management and Decision-Making of President Eisenhower" 295-331; and Greenstein, Hidden-
Hand PreSidency, 100-51. 
2 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 712. 
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In addition to revamping the NSC, Eisenhower turned to consultants outside the 
government for policy advice. The new president had realized during World War IT that 
science and technology were evolving so quickly that no man or group could understand 
all of the changes. The advances in nuclear weaponry and delivery systems in the late 
1940s and 1950s made it even more difficult to comprehend the implications of the tech-
nological changes. While the members of the NSC were highly trained in certain fields, 
they lacked the expertise to understand fully the impact that scientific and technological 
advances would have. Eisenhower, therefore, sought the advice of specialists who had 
expertise in specific fields or a broad understanding of the technological changes that 
might impact u.s. national security.3 
On three occasions during his two terms in office, Eisenhower asked the NSC to 
create advisory panels to evaluate national security issues. In 1953, the newly elected 
president initiated Project Solarium to study different strategies. Composed of three pan-
els of consultants, Project Solarium provided advice that Eisenhower and the NSC used to 
develop the administration's New Look national security strategy. In 1954, Eisenhower 
again turned to a group of consultants, known as the Killian committee, to evaluate the 
threat of a surprise attack. After the committee submitted its report to the NSC in early 
1955, Eisenhower accelerated U.S. missile programs and initiated the top secret U-2 intel-
ligence program. Finally, in 1957, he created the Gaither committee to examine the effec-
tiveness of U.S. active and passive defenses against an attack. 
3 For Eisenhower's use of experts, see Griffith. "Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Corporate Common-
wealth." 87-122; Kaplan. Wizards 0/ Armageddon, 11-247; Herken, Cardinal Choices, 69-123; and 
Hcrken, Counsels o/War, 102-34. 
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Since the completion of its examination in November 1957, the Gaither committee 
has been misunderstood by historians and other scholars. The committee has been de-
scribed as of little importance.4 This examination does not support this conclusion. The 
Gaither committee finished its report at a time in the Cold War of extremely high tension. 
The Soviet launch of Sputnik I in October and Sputnik II in November raised serious 
Questions of the wlnerability of the United States. While it was much easier to launch a 
rocket into space than to hit a target with a nuclear weapon thousands of miles a way, the 
Soviet satellites seemed to indicate that country's nuclear superiority over the United 
States. This conclusion was shortsighted, especially when U.S. Strategic Air Command 
bombers were included in a comparison of U.S. and Soviet strengths. However, it was 
hard for most Americans to feel secure when Sputnik could orbit the United States with 
impunity. 
The Gaither committee was not immune to the fears created by Sputnik. Its con-
clusions were pessimistic and its recommendations reflected deeply held fears of the So-
viet Union. But, with a few exceptions, the committee members did not want war, and in 
fact, saw the strengthening of U.S. military forces as the only way to avoid it. The views 
held by the Gaither committee were not at the extremes of American society. There was a 
widespread fear of the Soviet Union and a belief that the United States needed to expand 
its military power. Consequently, the Gaither committee recommendations served as a 
starting point for the re-evaluation of Eisenhower's national security policies in late 1957 
and early 1958. 
" For assessments of the Gaither committee's lack of influence, see Ambrose, Eisenhower, v. 2, 434-35; 
and Gaddis, Strategies o/Containment, 185-86. 
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Eisenhower ordered the creation of the Gaither committee after serious questions 
were raised about U.S. civil defenses and its ability to defend against a Soviet attack. The 
growing fears about radioactive fallout led the Federal Civil Defense Administration to 
recommend in early 1957 the construction of a nationwide system of fallout shelters. The 
advent of ballistic missiles brought into doubt u.s. capabilities to detect the launch ofa 
Soviet attack, to defend the country if such an attack did occur, and to retaliate, if neces-
sary. These questions did not have easy answers; therefore, Eisenhower turned to con-
sultants who either had expertise in specific technological fields or a broad understanding 
of the problems of active and passive defenses. 
The committee met sporadically in the summer of 1957 and then much more in-
tensely in the fall. It received briefings from the nation's ranking military leaders, exam-
ined numerous reports which had evaluated U.S. military policies, and studied intelligence 
estimates of Soviet military strength. By the time the committee presented its final report 
to the NSC in November 1957, it had examined U.S. military policies as thoroughly as 
time would allow. Its conclusions were frightening and its recommendations were unset-
ding, but based on the evidence it examined, they were perfectly understandable. 
The committee concluded that within two years the United States would lose its 
nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union. It, therefore, might find itselfwlnerable to a 
Soviet surpri~ attack. With these conclusions in mind, it recommended increasing nuclear 
forces to maintain U.S. superiority, or at a minimum, the ability to retaliate; expanding 
U.S. early warning radar capabilities; dispersing SAC forces; constructing anti-missile de-
fenses; building fallout shelters; reorganizing the Defense Department; and augmenting 
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limited war capabilities. These programs would not be cheap. The committee estimated 
that they would cost $44.2 billion more than currently programmed in the fiscal years 
1959 through 1963 defense budgets. 
The committee's recommendations created a dilemma for the Eisenhower admini-
stration. Spending, on average, an additional $9 billion a year would have meant increas-
ing annual defense budgets by nearly 25 percent. If Eisenhower accepted these increases, 
he would have had to accept higher taxes and deficits-both of which he abhorred. The 
president feared that higher taxes and deficit spending would force the government to 
regiment the economy and intrude on the rights of the individual. Nevertheless, Eisen-
hower was willing to accept higher spending, if national security depended on it. In 
evaluating the Gaither report, Eisenhower sought to balance the consequences of higher 
defense spending with the preservation of national security. 
Between November 1957 and July 1958, the Gaither report remained the center-
piece ofNSC discussions. Various government agencies, including the Defense Depart-
ment, the JCS, the State Department, the CIA, the Treasury Department, the Budget Bu-
reau, and the FCDA, evaluated the Gaither report and presented their recommendations to 
the NSC. After numerous discussions, Eisenhower adopted changes to his national secu-
rity policies which reflected the influence of the Gaither committee's recommendations. 
By July 1958, he increased force levels for IRBMs, ICBMs, and SLBMs; ordered the dis-
persal of SAC forces to more airfields and improved in SAC's alert status; expanded early 
warning radar coverage; constructed additional anti-missile defenses; reorganized the De-
fense Department; and initiated studies ofD.S. limited war capabilities and fallout shelters. 
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While he did not accept all of the Gaither committee's recommendations, their impact is 
clear. 
The influence of the Gaither committee did not end in the summer of 1958. For 
the remainder of his presidency, Eisenhower continually reevaluated the policies that the 
Gaither committee brought into focus. During these years, the specific Gaither committee 
recommendations lost their relevance as new reports and intelligence estimates forced the 
administration to reevaluate U.S. strategic needs. However, the import of the committee's 
conclusions, specifically its calls for greater strategic capabilities, limited war forces, and 
fallout shelters, provided a continued impetus for discussions of U.S. national security 
needs. 
Part of the lasting influence of the Gaither report rested in the political atmosphere 
it helped create. More than anything, Sputnik raised the awareness that U.S. technological 
superiority was not guaranteed.s After it was leaked to the press in December 1957, the 
Gaither report furthered this fear by posing the possibility of a missile gap in favor of the 
Soviet Union. Without trivializing their real concerns about U.S. security, many Demo-
crats saw the "missile gap" as an issue which they could use to criticize the Republican 
administration.6 Eisenhower's refusal to release the report to Congressional leaders fueled 
fears that the president was trying to hide the country's weaknesses. Until it was finally 
dispelled by new satellite intelligence in 1961, the missile gap remained pivotal in debates 
about U.S. national security. 
5 See McDougall, Heavens and the Earth, 7-8; Divine, The Sputnik Challenge, vii and xiii-xviii. 
6 See Bottome, The Missile Gap, 37-61 and 11'5-46. 
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Senator John Kennedy was one of the most vocal proponents of the missile gap 
theory and harshest critics of the Eisenhower administration. He attacked U.S. military 
deficiencies on the Senate floor in 1958 and 1959, and campaigned against the Republican 
administration's policies in 1960. During his presidential run and administration, Kennedy 
on several occasions turned to former Gaither committee members for advice and even 
read the Gaither report. It would be too much to argue that the Gaither report specifically 
influenced Kennedy's policies, but the ideas it espoused were surely important in the de-
velopment of the new administration's flexible response strategy. 
When Kennedy entered office in 1961, he saw two areas of U.S. military power 
that needed strengthening-nuclear missiles and conventional forces. Kennedy expanded 
the nuclear triad he inherited from the Eisenhower administration to insure U.S. superior-
ity over the Soviet Union and augmented U.S. conventional force to control conflicts 
short of general war. He further revisited the Gaither committee's call for a nationwide 
system of fallout shelters. During his three years in office, Kennedy successfully expanded 
U.S. nuclear forces, augmented limited war capabilities, and located new shelter sites. 
Along with showing the influence of the Gaither committee on the Eisenhower and 
Kennedy administrations, this study evaluates why the committee reached the conclusions 
it did. As it met in the summer and fall of 1957, the committee's members struggled to 
develop recommendations which reflected their understanding of the Soviet threat. While 
they were selected to advise Eisenhower, their opinions did not always coincide with the 
president's own views. They perceived a much greater Soviet threat than did Eisenhower. 
At later Senate hearings, both Robert Sprague and James Perkins questioned whether Eis-
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enhower and his advisors really understood the threat posed by the Soviet Union. "I be-
lieve," Sprague testified, " ... that the danger is more serious than the President has ex-
pressed himself to the American public.'" Even more scathingly, Perkins argued that "the 
nature of the threat was not fully realized," and later concluded that "the Government did 
not have its eyes open in the summer and fall of 1957. ,,8 
Most of the committee members entered the study with deeply held opinions. 
With few exceptions, they had participated in other studies that addressed some of the is-
sues found in the Gaither report. It is striking how closely the committee's conclusions 
resembled the findings of the MIT summer studies, Project East River, Project Solarium, 
and the Killian committee. Many members of these groups served on the Gaither commit-
tee. Furthermore, most of the members were influenced by their past or current affilia-
tions. While it does not appear that the committee directly sought to benefit one group or 
another, its conclusions supported many of its members' affiliated groups. For instance, 
James Doolittle and Mervin Kelly were closely tied to the Air Force; James Fisk had been 
a consistent proponent for increased funding for research and development; and James 
Killian, Albert Hill, and James McCormack maintained very close ties to MIT and were 
advocates for obtaining financing for improved early warning radar. The members' insti-
tutional ties and the knowledge they gained from earlier studies helped formulate the 
opinions they held when they entered the Gaither study. 
Once the committee began its examination, the members' preconceived opinions 
were re-enforced by the evidence they analyzed. The military leaders consistently stressed 
7 Organizing for National Security, SS. 
g Ibid .• 293 and 294. 
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deficiencies in their respective military branches and requested additional funding. Various 
reports created by government and civilian organizations concluded that the United States 
was deficient in strategic missile strength and vulnerable to a Soviet missile attack. Fi-
nally, the intelligence estimates predicted Soviet missile force levels which, if accurate, 
could have posed a significant threat to the United States. Taken together, this evidence 
provided committee members no reason to alter their earlier opinions. 
In his memoirs, Eisenhower criticized the Gaither committee for failing "to see the 
totality of the national and international situation.,,9 However, with their backgrounds and 
the available evidence, it is difficult to criticize the committee too much. It reached con-
elusions and made recommendations that were widely accepted. 10 Nevertheless, two 
significant criticisms can be directed at the committee. It made recommendations for 
significant increases in U.S. military force levels, yet, it never articulated how or when 
they should be used. The implication of the committee's recommendations was that the 
United States should prepare for all possible contingencies without regard for their prob-
ability, their economic consequences, or their impact on foreign policy. II 
Even more telling, the committee developed its conclusions based on an assump-
tion about Soviet intentions rather than on a careful evaluation of why the Soviet Union 
might take particular actions. 12 At the beginning of its report, the committee stated that 
9 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 221. 
10 Both the Rockefeller Panel Report and Johns Hopkins Report reached similar conclusions to the Gaither 
committee. See chapter 4. 
II See Roman, •• American Strategic Nuclear Force Planning," 38. 
12 For the role of perceptions in decision ~g, see Jervis "Deterrence and Perception;" and David L. 
Snead, "Eisenhower, the Gaither Committee, and Intelligence Assessment: The Problem of Equating Ca-
pabilities with Intentions," Paper presented at the 1996 Annual Meeting of the Society for Military His-
tory, April 1996. For discussion of the exaggerations of Soviet capabilities and intentions by intelligence 
analysts, see Roman, Eisenhower and the Missile Gap, 30-47~ Prados, SoViet Estimate, S7-126~ Freedman, 
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the Soviet Union's goal was world domination. At no point in the subsequent pages did 
the committee attempt to evaluate whether this really was the Soviet Union's goal or what 
risks its leaders would be willing to take to achieve it. The committee had available stud-
ies of the casualties that the United States could expect in a nuclear war, including several 
that predicted 100 million Americans would be killed. For the Soviet Union to risk a nu-
clear exchange with the United States, it would have had to consider the possible conse-
quences for its own population. In making its recommendations, the committee failed to 
evaluate the likelihood of the risks the Soviet Union might take to achieve its goals; 
therefore, it proposed major increases in defense spending that did not reflect the improb-
ability of a Soviet attack. 
These criticisms are significant because without articulating a new strategy for how 
to utilize the expanded military forces and failing to analyze Soviet intentions, the commit-
tee placed a much greater emphasis on Soviet capabilities than it might have otherwise 
done. In doing so, it recommended the expansion of military forces to preserve the supe-
riority of the United States without truly evaluating whether those forces and the costs 
associated with them were necessary. 
As already explained, Eisenhower and his advisers carefully evaluated the Gaither 
report, and after much study, modified some of the administration's national security poli-
cies. Questions still remain as to the effectiveness of Eisenhower's decision making sys-
tern in dealing with the Gaither report. Was the establishment of the Gaither committee 
the best way to obtain the advice he wanted? Did his "hands off' approach to manage-
US Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat, 67-80; and Stewy, Intentions and Capabilities, 5-7 and 
55-57. 
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ment permit the committee to overstep the intended scope of its study? Did he articulate 
his administration's response to Sputnik and the Gaither report in a clear and re-assuring 
manner? Did his national security policies after 1957 reflect a nuanced assessment of the 
Soviet threat and U.S. strategic needs? The answers to these questions provide a unique 
opportunity to reevaluate the effectiveness of Eisenhower as president. 
During his administration, Eisenhower followed a strategy of deterrence in devel-
oping his national security programs. In pursuit of this strategy, he attempted to maintain 
a strong military while limiting defense spending. He believed his presidential responsi-
bilities included protecting the nation's physical integrity as well as preserving a way of 
life. He recognized that a strong military could provide national security but spending too 
much could undermine the economy and challenge freedoms guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion. He told a friend during the 1958 congressional election campaigns that "The brick-
bats that will be thrown at me I shall ignore, and I shall concentrate, as I have tried to do 
in the past, upon our national security, upon inching toward a just and durable peace for 
all the world, and upon sustaining the health of the American economy.,,13 He, therefore, 
always carefully evaluated the economic impact of potential policies. 
Eisenhower established the Gaither committee to obtain advice that would allow 
him to find the proper balance in his policies. Eisenhower recalled that, "With no vested 
interest in a particular department, and no federal jobs to protect, the panel was a means 
of obtaining independent judgments." 14 If he really believed that he could obtain such 
"independent" advice, he was mistaken. More importantly, it represents his failure to 
13 Dwight D. Eisenhower to Swede Hazlett, February 26, 1958 in Griffith. Ike's Letters to a Friend, 199. 
14 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 220. 
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comprehend the views already held by the Gaither committee members. He had access to 
the reports of Project East River, Project Solarium, and the Killian committee, and had 
received briefings from Sprague, Doolittle, Killian, and Fisk concerning their perceptions 
of weaknesses in U.S. military or intelligence operations. Eisenhower knew their views 
and should have foreseen their conclusions. To have expected otherwise was remarkably 
short-sighted. There was simply no way the Gaither committee or any other group of ex-
perts could reach conclusions unaffected by preconceived beliefs or past affiliations. 
This assessment leads to a necessary re-evaluation of Eisenhower's decision mak-
ing system. Fred Greenstein persuasively argues that Eisenhower followed a "hands off' 
approach to decision making. IS This approach is readily apparent in the president's su-
pervision of the Gaither committee. After ordering its creatio~ Eisenhower allowed his 
subordinates to oversee the selection of the committee members and their activities. Other 
than once in July, Eisenhower did not have direct contact with the group between May 
and the end of October. While it must be recognized that he had to allow the committee 
to do its work, his lack of oversight permitted the committee to expand its mandate well-
beyond an examination of active and passive defenses. The result was a report that 
evaluated the entire U.S. national security program and made extensive calIs for revisions-
-an outcome the president did not want. 
After receiving the committee's report, Eisenhower and his advisers carefully 
evaluated its recommendations and conclusions. This stage of Eisenhower's decision 
making system worked well. The NSC assigned the respective government departments 
IS Greenstein. Hidden-Hand PreSidency, 58-65 and 80-92. 
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relevant sections of the report to analyze. After receiving feedback, the NSC held discus-
sions and made recommendations to the president. Through the entire process, Eisen-
hower participated actively in the NSC discussions and then made his decisions. By July 
1958, the entire Gaither report had been thoroughly evaluated. 
The changes Eisenhower made in his policies in 1958 and beyond represented his 
attempt to maintain a balance in his programs. He wanted to preserve national security, 
maintain an economy based on low inflation and balanced budgets, and protect individual 
rights. Although he was not convinced of the existence ofa missile gap, he recognized 
that if the intelligence estimates were close to accurate, he could not allow the Soviet Un-
ion to acquire a lead in missile capabilities. He, therefore, reluctantly increased the coun-
try's offensive and defensive military capabilities. 
Who was right? Did the Gaither committee illuminate a more potent threat than 
Eisenhower recognized or was Eisenhower's caution a reflection of a more prudent analy-
sis of the available evidence? In retrospect, it seems clear that Eisenhowers more cautious 
approach was the most appropriate one. From the standpoint of the late 1950s, however, 
this view was hard to defend. The briefings, intelligence estimates, and the studies exam-
ined by the Gaither committee clearly indicate that many leading experts, both civilian and 
military, believed that the Soviet Union posed a significant threat to the United States. 
Although this assessment was inaccurate, it does not negate the fact that many people 
agreed with it. 16 
16 It was not until the early 19605 that U.S. intelligence estimates fully recog--jzed the deficiencies in S0-
viet missile technology. See NIE 11-8/1-61, "Strength and Deployment of Soviet Long Range Ballistic 
Missile Forces," September 21, 1961, printed in Ruffner (ed.), Corona, 127-55: and Steury (ed.), Inten-
tions and Capabilities, 121-38. 
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David Rosenberg has criticized Eisenhower for failing to regulate the expansion of 
the United States nuclear arsenal during the 1950s. He argues that Eisenhower recog-
nized that the United States possessed sufficient nuclear weapons to destroy the Soviet 
Union but allowed the arsenal to continue to groW. 17 This conclusion has much validity, 
but it does overlook the control that Eisenhower maintained over delivery systems. The 
president faced tremendous pressure over his last few years in office to expand defense 
budgets and military programs even more. It is to his credit that he kept spending as low 
as he did. 
Eisenhower's handling of the Gaither report provides clear evidence of his struggle 
to limit defense spending. While defense spending increased after Sputnik and the Gaither 
report, these funds were used to address specific strategic needs. Even though Eisen-
hower did not think the Soviet Union would attack and believed that the intelligence esti-
mates exaggerated Soviet capabilities, he recognized that he had to plan on the possibility 
that he might be wrong. He showed remarkable prudence in the implementation of his 
missile programs. He recognized the limitations of first generation missiles and deliber-
ately restricted their deployment. He only expanded ICBM force levels when the second 
generation missiles, and especially the Minuteman, became available. Additionally, he 
foresaw the deterrent value of Polaris. Was it "overkill," as Rosenberg suggests? Yes, 
but it was predicated on the belief that the forces might be necessary to deter an enemy 
whose intentions remained unclear. 
17 Rosenberg. "Origins ofOvcrkill," 8, 44, and 65-66. 
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Heretofore, the history of the Gaither committee and its influence on the Eisen-
hower and Kennedy administrations was obscure. Changes in U.S. national security poli-
cies in the last few years of the Eisenhower presidency generally have been explained as 
the administration's reaction to Sputnik. This study reveals that Sputnik offered only the 
most obvious incentive for change. The Gaither committee provided a blueprint for 
meeting any challenges posed by the Soviet Union. [t recommended a U.S. military pro-
gram that would have allowed the president to pursue any policy he chose. Eisenhower 
did not accept all of the committee's findings, but he was sufficiently persuaded by the 
panel of experts that he did modifY some of his national security policies. Now, almost 
forty years later, it is clear that the Gaither committee played a pivotal role in the escala-
tion of the Cold War in the late 1950s. 
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